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Visionary Power 
Attends upon the motion of the winds 
Embodied in the mystery of words; 
There darkness makes abode, and all the host 
Of shadowy things do work their changes there, 
As in a mansion like their proper home; 
Even forms and substances are circumfused 
By that transparent veil with light divine; 
And through the turnings intricate of Verse, 
Present themselves as objects recognised, 
In flashes, and with a glory scarce their own. 
William Wordsworth 
The Prelude, Book Five, 619-629 
for the other 'D' in my life 
Deirdre 
and to Craig 
for not minding being 
lower in the alphabet 
Introduction 
The Seeds of Deconstruction 
An authoritative reference work on science fiction (SF) begins its entry on Samuel R. 
Delany by describing him as a "US author and critic, one of the most influential and 
most discussed within the genre",1 who achieved 'fame' as one of SF's "youthful 
prodigies" (Clute 1993:15). What is interesting about this statement is its conflation of 
the categories of author and critic, suggesting that the one is inseparable from the 
other, while giving no indication of how the two terms evolved, or how they are 
separate or disparate from each other. Delany's output as a youth is also seen as 
synonymous with his attendant fame, placing his later work as an older man in the 
shadow of this early ascendancy. Once again, there is no indication of the evolution of 
the writer both as an artist and as an individual. Instead, Delany is pinned down to the 
dissecting board of critical scrutiny at one particular moment of his career and life, 
namely that of youthful prodigy, which is seen as the definitive moment of everything 
that he was up to then, and would later aspire to. 
What is equally fascinating is that the entry begins by emphasising Delany's 
academic achievements before detailing his oeuvre, with the result that his work as a 
scholar and critic is foregrounded, and his fictions and other writings placed in the 
background as a sort of attendant underpinning or propping up. In a genre often 
portrayed as being populist - in addition to the bulk of its consumers being seen as 
youthful - the initial impression of Delany conveyed by the entry is that of a serious 
thinker pursued more for his critical and literary elucidation and insight than for 
entertainment purposes.2 The first piece of biographical information provided is the 
1 John Clute makes a similar assessment, stating that Delany's "most important work in recent decades may 
well be pedagogical" (1995: 169). Clute goes so far as to say that Delany has become "something of a guru", 
with "his pronouncements on issues of gender, race, genre, and politics" receiving much scrutiny 
( 1995: 169). Writing in an earlier, and no less influential, reference work, Brian Aldiss gives some insight 
into the impact Delany made when he burst onto the SF scene in the early 1960s: "Much has subsequently 
been written about the meaning of Delany's work ... but what impressed at first reading was style, sheer 
style! The ideas were familiar fifties models ... but the manner of expression transformed the tired images 
and scenes" (1986:367). 
2 It is probable that many young readers encountering Delany for the first time today will be aware of his 
academic reputation at the outset. This is in contrast to my own personal experience, for example. My first 
encounter with Delany was via The Jewels of Aptor, read when I was a teenager, and with no prior 
knowledge of the author. I liked it immensely- it was stylish, exciting, and exotic - and carried on reading. 
It was only when I bought and read The Motion of Light in Water that I became aware ofDelany's equally 
stylish, exciting, and exotic background. Up to then I had not even known for sure that he was black. Later 
when I studied English at university, and went through the grinding mill of being taught literary theory, I 
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fact that Delany has taught at several universities, thereby emphasising his role as 
educator and teacher as opposed to being a spinner of popular SF yarns. The entry 
then gives a brief account of what it terms Delany' s "somewhat mixed cultural 
background": 
Black, born and raised in Harlem, New York, and therefore familiar with the 
Black ghetto; but his father, a wealthy funeral-parlour proprietor, had the 
family brought up in privileged, upper-middle-class circumstances - SRD was 
educated at the prestigious Bronx High School of Science (although he left 
college after only one term). This double background is evident in all his 
writing. (Clute 1993:315) 
Such a textbook background of political correctness seems automatically to 
imply a certain socio-political context to Delany' s work, but it is important to note 
that he chose to sublimate his very real 'otherness' by writing in a genre where 
'otherness' has been transmuted into the 'alien'. With the publication of his first 
novel, the background delineated above was unknown, and the book could only be 
judged on its own merits - which, indeed, it was, and very successfully.3 The entry 
then continues by stating it was "in the mid-1970s that it became generally known that 
SRD was bisexual" (1993 :316). 
Actually, Delany is homosexual, but this statement refers to the brief period 
when he was married to fellow child prodigy Marilyn Hacker, who is Jewish, and they 
produced a child. The use of the word 'bisexual' seems a delicate way of introducing 
this controversial aspect of Delany's character, especially in a genre whose very 
populism defines its inherent conservatism. SF readers may well obtain a frisson of 
titillation by reading about the copulatory mechanics of alien beings, but it is an 
altogether different story when they discover that these were extrapolated froi:n the 
writer's own marginal sexual practices, as this challenges social conventions and 
morality. 
returned to earlier works like Babel-I 7, and was able to enjoy them all over again, and to a far richer extent. 
In this way I have been fortunate to follow Delany's entire career as he continued to weave a rich pattern of 
experimentation and consolidation. Today, no doubt, there are many readers who only read Delany's now-
infrequent SF, those who only read his literary theory and criticism, or those who only read his now-frequent 
gay fiction and polemic. This progression has been inevitable, for Delany's interests are too many and varied 
to appeal to a homogenous audience. It is also ironic, for the purveyor of structuralism in SF has become his 
own transcendental signified, dissolved in the peripheries of a marginal genre. 
3 One ofDelany's favourite themes is the enigma of return; how objects, events, and even circumstances 
change through the act of observation or revisitation. Similarly, scholars have been returning to Delany's 
early works with very insightful results. For example, Gregory Rutledge teases out Babel-I 7' s contribution 
to the Black consciousness movement, though he nearly scuppers his own premise with the horrendous pun 
that "Delany is surely a Chip off the Black Power/ Arts movements block" (2000: 138). 
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It is in this unique intersection of imagination and reality, driven by Delany's 
own unique position as a marginalised individual working in a marginal genre, that he 
assumes particular relevance to redefining SF as a genre, and ultimately the role of the 
author as well.4 An academic; black; and gay - the diversity of Delany's background 
is reflected in the diversity of his output. He published his first novel, The Jewels of 
Aptor, in 1962 at the age of 20, which began an eclectic career that has seen him 
produce everything from graphic novels to sword-and-sorcery, pornography, and 
autobiography, as well as literary and SF criticism. Many brave attempts have been 
made to affirm the 'essential' Delany by categorising him through his work, and 
engaging in various levels of theoretical speculation. Notable in this regard are 
Peplow and Bravard's 1980 biography, and George Slusser's 1977 structural analysis 
of a few early novels. 
I believe that an ideal assessment of Delany's influence and impact on SF and 
its relation to literature and critical theory in general would combine biography and 
theory as part of a single dialectic, with the two strands binding each other together, 
and simultaneously strengthening each other. There are so many facets to Delany that 
it is tempting to focus on only one in trying to comprehend the complex and 
enigmatic nature of his authorial, personal, and theoretical selves.5 But in order to do 
the subject justice, all the facets and their intersections have to be considered, and 
therefore I have chosen the term 'dislocation' to describe what I perceive as the 
particular literary effect that Delany has managed to perfect. 
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines 'dislocation' as the process of 
"disturbing the normal connection of' (Sykes 1982:276), or disruption. One can see 
from the outset how this would apply to Delany: his 'normal connection' with SF -
that is, as a practitioner of the genre, using its tropes, conventions, and all the other 
literary paraphernalia that constitutes it as a genre - is recomplicated by bringing his 
4 Perhaps 'redefining' suggests that Delany was the first to lay claim to the literary qualities of SF. Of 
course, this ignores the rich history of SF criticism, including such luminaries as Darko Suvin and 
Robert Scholes. What Delany has done can, perhaps, best be described as re-appropriating, or 
reinventing, the genre on his own terms, and for his own ends. 
5 A fascinating, and frustrating, aspect of this is that Delany contributes actively to his own fragmentation 
and dissolution, through the invention of various fictional personae, pseudonyms, and sometimes conflicting 
biographical information. One assumes, logically, that there must be an 'essential' Delany, as tangible as his 
own flesh, but then, bearing in mind the deconstruction of logocentrism, one has to acknowledge that Delany 
has no 'centre'. The play between signifier and signified is, indeed, endless. And, in the spirit of the word 
'play', Delany has engaged in this postmodern game with much verve and audacity: his alternate authorial 
'voices', SL Kermit and K Leslie Steiner, have become 'characters' in their own right. And on the margin 
lurks the Author, endlessly deferred, eternally present. 
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particular background into play in the arena of his fictional endeavours. For example, 
one can read Babel-17 as a simple and colourful space opera, the genre's own unique 
term for what literature generally terms a potboiler, but on a deeper level it raises 
questions about gender and genre that extend the traditional boundaries of SF. 
This is a question of identity: SF' s own identity as a particular literary genre; 
Delany's own identity as a certain writer of SF; and how these identities interact with, 
and reflect, each other. In this context, another definition of 'dislocation' is provided 
by Ernest Laclau, who states that "every identity is dislocated insofar as it depends on 
an outside which both denies that identity and provides its condition of possibility at 
the same time" (1990:39). In other words, SF has a particular identity as a marginal 
literary genre in relation to the greater corpus of literature, while Delany's own 
relationship to SF, and literature in general, is refracted and mediated by his own 
particular 'outside' - that is, his status of multiple marginality in being black and 
6 gay. 
In this sense, dislocation is the interface or boundary between an individual 
identity and its social context. Laclau notes that the term has negative and positive 
connotations: it is a boundary containing that which it seeks to define, and a frontier 
holding out the possibility of extending that boundary in arbitrary directions 
(1990:39). Thus "the constitution of any identity is based on the exclusion of that 
which denies it" (1990:33). Laclau applies the term 'dislocation' as a means "to study 
the conditions of existence of a given social identity", meaning an examination of the 
power mechanisms that give rise to such a particular identity (1990:32). The duality 
implied by the term is a reflection of Jacques Derrida's notion of binary opposites: 
... an identity's constitution is always based on excluding something and 
establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles - form/matter, 
essence/accident, black/white, man/woman, etc. (Laclau 1990:32) 
6 It is difficult to decide as to whether Delany's status as an academic entrenches his marginality even 
further, or eases his mainstream acceptance. SF is a popular genre, read by young people, for whom its main 
appeals are colour and escapism. Delany is certainly colourful, but his academic endeavours are unlikely to 
generate broad appeal in the mass of SF readership. On the other hand, he is also a peculiarly unacademic 
character: a college drop-out, with no formal tertiary qualifications, and a predilection for the perverse and 
the sublime, wherever he may find them. But his academic work has definitely entrenched his reputation in 
literature in general. The lesson, I suppose, is that what is marginal in one sense can become totally the 
opposite in a different context; yet another flirtatious postmodern inversion. This sense of embracing one 
position and its exact opposite, both at the same instant, while simultaneously denying both, is typical of 
Delany. 
5 
Just as social identity is defined by that which it excludes, so can a social 
institution be seen as trailing traces or supplements of its dislocated 'identity' or 
contextual meaning. If identity is a social construct, it then stands to reason that social 
institutions are simply aggregates or concretisations of social forces that have become 
'sedimented' or entrenched over time. That is, they are unquestioned and taken as 
givens of the social landscape. In relation to Delany, he teases open the conventional 
notion that SF is a given of the literary landscape, and attempts to show how, as a 
construct, it is constituted from various interactive elements; and how, in turn, those 
elements themselves are comprised. This is the practice of dislocation or 
deconstruction: 7 
Insofar as an act of institution has been successful, a 'forgetting of the origins' 
tends to occur, the system of possible alternatives tends to vanish and the 
traces of the original contingency to fade. In this way, the institution tends to 
assume the form of a mere objective presence. This is the moment of 
sedimentation. (Laclau 1990:34) 
Beyond individual identity and social institution, it needs to be asked: "To 
what extent is a certain society a society?" (1990:36), for this is the larger arena in 
which 'otherness' is constituted. Laclau explains that this means determining how a 
society conceals the system of exclusion that has given rise to it, which means being 
aware of the powerful force of dislocation, and how it both disrupts and constitutes 
individual and social identity. 
Laclau notes, rather pessimistically, that "a reconciled and transparent society" 
is a myth due to the unevenness and opacity of power relations (1990:35), but adds 
that this idea contains the seeds of a radical transformation (1990:36). Dislocation 
arises precisely from the fact that power relations are uneven, but an important 
outcome of this process, and one which can be seen to redefine dislocation as a 
positive concept instead of the negative connotations it is perceived to have, is that 
structure is dislocated and "constitutively decentred" (1990:40). 
The dislocation we are referring to is not one of a machine that has broken 
down because of the misadjustment of one of its components. We are dealing 
with a very specific dislocation: one that stems from the presence of 
antagonistic forces. Social dislocation is therefore coterminous with the 
7 Of course, Delany does not have a monopoly on this. Other SF writers who have mined the same rich 
field include Ursula K Le Guin and Philip K Dick. 
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construction of power centres. But given that the possibility of resistance to 
that power means that the latter is not a total power, the vision of the social 
emerging from this description is that of a plurality of power centres, each 
with different capacity to irradiate and structure. (Laclau 1990:40) 
What Laclau means is that dislocation fragments possibility and meanmg, 
favouring spatialisation as opposed to hegemonic order. "The dislocated structure thus 
opens possibilities of multiple and indeterminate rearticulations for those freed from 
its coercive force and who are consequently outside it" (1990:43). Once again, Laclau 
refers to the 'outside', but as a position of strength from which to direct social 
determination, as opposed to interpreting the 'outside' in the sense of hermeneutic 
exclusion from social reality.8 
Commenting on his view of the role of SF, Delany says it is a "literature of 
ideas" (l 994a:71) that "dramatises notions of critical theory in much the same way 
that it dramatises notions from any hard or soft science" (l 994a:71 ). Therefore, as a 
marginal literary activity, it "shatters the whole notion of a firm and fixed social 
centre, as well as of a coherent and socially centred subject" (1994a:71). This is akin 
to Laclau' s theory of dislocation, and thus Delany can be seen as using SF to dislocate 
conventional ideas about society and structure. Structure is a key concept, especially 
if we take into account the "structuralist vision" (Laclau 1990:43) that "I am a product 
of structures; there is nothing in me with a separate substantiality from the discourses 
making me up; a total determinism governs my actions" (1990:43). This leads me to a 
more detailed discussion of structuralism itself as a literary theory, as this is an 
important part of Delany' s fictional project. 
My critical focus in this thesis is the shift in literary theory from structuralism 
towards the increasingly slippery slope of poststructuralism and postmodemism, 
concentrating on Derrida's critique of the main components of structuralism, such as 
the sign and structure, and its methodology, as represented specifically by semiology 
(Jefferson 1986:112). Delany himself, in a discussion of his Neveryon series, explains 
how such a critical shift can be structured: the classical notion of the sign - that is, its 
8 Delany's carefully-nurtured position as an 'outsider' in the closely-knit community of SF readers and 
writers gives him leeway to dissect the genre and its commonality. In other words, he uses SF's own 
exclusion from the greater body of mainstream literature to refract his own exclusion or difference in socio-
political terms. Importantly, what Delany has achieved is to foreground these socio-political concerns in the 
very fabric of SF itself, thereby successfully opposing the contention that the genre is mainly narcissistic and 
playful. In other words, it may be divorced from reality in terms of its subject matter, but this is an 
articulation of dislocation that ultimately seeks to deconstruct society itself. 
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division into signifier and signified - stabilises a "conservative notion of social 
relations" (1989c:354 ). 
For example, SF signifies a particular literary genre with strict formal 
interpretations of its scope and function, so that it is easy to declare what is SF and 
what is not. A more detailed view of the sign "shatter[ s] it into sign consumption I 
transformation I production (or semiosis - more usually defined as 'sign 
interpretation'), sign function, and sign vehicle ... " (Delany 1989c:354). Delany 
explains that semiosis "allows signs to evolve, generate new signs, critique 
themselves, and generally to change" (1989c:354). For example, SF is not nearly as 
simple a term as it appears at first, for what it actually excludes through its formal 
definition forces an active reinterpretation of the genre itself. This means seeing SF as 
a process rather as a product, with a view to outlining its literary evolution. By 
examining the extremely varied work of a practitioner of SF such as Delany, elements 
of this critical trajectory can be traced. 
One of the main proponents of this deconstructive practice is, of course, 
Derrida himself, whose main focus is to point out the pitfalls of constructing any 
theoretical system, as the notion of a system automatically implies a hierarchy in 
which certain concepts are privileged over others, and others are simply taken as 
givens when, in truth, all are relational and interdependent. Instead of a concrete 
theoretical system, all there can possibly be is an associative tracery of influences, 
inferences, and references (Culler 1979: 155-56). Structuralism supposes that language 
is the answer, with the very structure of language reflecting the basic structure of 
society - thus, understanding the one automatically implies knowledge of the other. 
But the solution contains the seeds of the exact same problems it is meant to resolve, 
namely "the relationship between event and structure, the empirical and the ideal, 
system and origin, and speech and writing" (Culler 1979:157). Delany comments as 
follows: 
Language in its classical model begins as the grunt spilling out 
alongside gesture, the excess of indication, the supplement to ostension, the 
verbal signifier denoting reference. But eventually the grunt, the excess, the 
supplement recomplicates into meaning, a system so rich it reverses the 
hierarchy at precisely the point the grunt becomes a spillage, an excess, a 
supplement to emotion, need, desire . . . In its recomplication it becomes a 
system able to create and to control meaning on its own, developing in the 
process its own spillage, excess, supplement - writing - which begins to 
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recomplicate all over again, again upsetting the power hierarchy . . . . (Delany 
1989c:3 55-56) 
The obvious corollary to this, states Delany, is that social power relations are "very 
much a language" (1989c:357). 
They involve understood meanings, always more or less accepted, always 
more or less challenged, always in excess of bodily coercion ... that contour 
appropriate or inappropriate behaviour. (1989c:357) 
As Derrida notes, '"everyday language' is not innocent or neutral" (1981: 19). 
He uses the concept of logocentrism to describe "all forms of thought which base 
themselves on some external point ofreference, such as the notion of truth" (Jefferson 
1986:113). From Plato onwards, Western philosophy has always regarded language as 
being subservient to some external idea, referent, or intention. This flies in the face of 
the Saussurean notion that it is language itself that is primary, with meaning not 
preceding language in any way, but simply being an effect of language, or a 
byproduct. However, "the conceptual oppositions which structure Western 
philosophical thought" all imply the idea that content and medium exist independently 
of each other. The word 'medium' conveys the impression that language is an 
instrument or secondary vehicle for something primary and irreducible that "governs 
it from without" (Jefferson 1986:113). 
Another term for Western logocentrism is metaphysics of presence, which 
underpins all our thinking, but also gives "rise to paradoxes that challenge its 
coherence and consistence, and therefore challenge the possibility of determining or 
defining being as presence" (Culler 1979:161). An example is two people speaking-
we assume automatically that the meaning conveyed in the exchange was already 
implicit in the speakers' minds, which is a hierarchical and logocentric assumption. 
Even our notion of reality is logocentric, because the building blocks of reality are "a 
series of present states" (Culler 1979: 162). The concept of a tree, for example, exists 
because at some other time a person referred to it, and so on and so on. But this is the 
crux of the logocentric dilemma: if what we assume to be the very building blocks of 
reality are so interdependent on others, then how can we possibly lay claim to them as 
being constituent components? Culler comments: 
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An account of what is happening at a given instant requires references to other 
instants, which are not present. There is thus a crucial sense in which the non-
present inhabits and is part of the present .... Anything that is supposedly 
present and given as such is dependent for its identity on differences and 
relations which can never be present. (1979: 163) 
This is the "paradox (or aporia) of structure and event" (Culler 1979: 163). The 
assumption that a word's meaning depends on that word having being communicated 
before infers that the very structure of language in terms of the rules that govern it 
result from communicative acts. But every event is predetermined and anchored by 
existing structures, which points to the impossibility of arriving at the originating 
event of the first structure. Thus signification is dependent on differences or contrasts, 
which, in turn, are themselves the products of events, creating a constantly shifting 
perspective or dialectic between the two. Derrida describes this shifting perspective as 
differance, about which he remarks: "'I do not know if it signifies at all"' (1981:8). 
Differance "'is written and read, but cannot be heard"' due to the introduction of the 
'a'. It is a noun predicated on the verb differer, and is the lynchpin of various 
concepts: 
First, differance refers to the (active and passive) movement that consists in 
deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, 
postponement ... Second, the movement of differance, as that which produces 
different things, that which . differentiates, is the common root of all the 
oppositional concepts that mark our language . . . Third, differance is also the 
production . . . of these differences, of the diacriticity that the linguistics 
generated by Saussure, and all the structural sciences modeled upon it, have 
recalled is the condition for any signification and any structure. (Derrida 
1981 :8-9) 
Armed with differance, Derrida tackles the logocentrism of Saussure's theory 
of language, a project he terms "'an uprooting of the sign from its own soil'" 
(1981: 17). Saussure both denies and affirms logocentrism and the metaphysics of 
presence. On the one hand, his notion of language as a system of arbitrary signs, 
which are only distinguishable by their difference as relational units, flies in the face 
of logocentrism. On the other hand, Derrida highlights a distinct logocentric bent in 
Saussure in his view of writing as "a secondary, derivative status compared with 
speaking" (Culler 1979: 166). Saussure proclaims: 
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... linguistics will constantly have to deal with the written language ... but it 
will always distinguish between the written text and what lies underneath; 
treating the former as being only the envelope or external mode of 
presentation of its true object, which is solely the spoken language. (1910) 
Derrida focused on this aspect of Saussure because it is symptomatic of the 
Western attitude towards language, which perceives speech as being natural or direct 
communication, with writing as "an oblique representation of a representation" 
(Culler 1979: 166). The physical marks that make up writing are inferior in two 
important aspects: they are removed from the thoughts or ideas that gave rise to them, 
and function in the absence of the speaker or hearer. The fact that writing can even be 
anonymous - that is, totally divorced from any author or speaker - further underlines 
Saussure's impression of writing as a deformation or distortion of speech. 
What is at stake here is an ideal model of communication, whereby the listener 
understands precisely, and instantly, the message or information conveyed by the 
speaker. Saussure warns, however, that this ideal mode of interaction can be 
'"usurped'" by the '"tyranny of writing"' - for example, pronunciation errors can 
"infect" or "corrupt" the "natural spoken forms" (Culler 1979: 167). This admission 
adds a complex new dimension to the relationship between speech and writing. The 
traditional view is that meaning is made manifest by the spoken word in a clear one-
to-one relationship between speaker and utterance. Derrida ultimately argues that 
language is "a play of differences, a proliferation of traces and repetitions that, under 
conditions that can be described but never exhaustively specified, give rise to effects 
of meaning" (Culler 1979: 172). 
The critique of logocentrism "is sustained by the very logocentrism which it 
seeks to breach" (Culler 1979: 172), meaning that Derrida is arguing from within the 
boundaries of the system he is seeking to subvert, and thus cannot totally avoid being 
influenced by the prevailing system. This is also due to the simple fact that one cannot 
step outside language in order to criticise it. What is needed, then, is a new approach 
that introduces new concepts as well as using the old system to deconstruct itself, a 
process that Culler defines as a "double reading" (1979: 172): 
Deconstruction thus undertakes a double reading, describing the ways 
in which lines of argument in the texts it is analysing call their premises into 
question, and using the system of concepts within which a text works to 
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produce constructs, such as differance and supplement, which challenge the 
consistency of that system. (Culler 1979: 172) 
Culler comments further that Derrida's "deconstruction reversals are strategic 
interventions" (1979: 178), meaning that he draws attention to the limits and inherent 
assumptions underpinning any system or concept. He focuses on terms that, in their 
"double functioning[,] reveal a problematic logic that exceeds and undermines the 
explicit of a text" (Culler 1979: 178). The sign is defined traditionally as being a 
substitute for something. Saussure developed the concept further by breaking it down 
into signifier and signified, and stressing the arbitrary nature of signs. Though 
Saussure was careful to point out that these two components are like different sides of 
the same coin, and therefore inseparable, Derrida argues that a hierarchy is 
nevertheless implicit, for the very distinction between the two components raises the 
possibility "of an independent signified existing prior to its signifier, and therefore 
capable of being represented by more than one signifier" (Jefferson 1986: 115). 
The implication of this is that a signifier can be seen as a substitute for a 
signified. Derrida comments that the notion of the sign "carries within itself the 
necessity of privileging the phonic substance and of setting up linguistics as the 
'pattern' for semiology" (1981 :22-23). Therefore Derrida's notion of differance -
which he is careful to stress is not a concept, but should rather be seen as a condition 
- is more flexible and adaptive than Saussure's principle of the differential. Derrida 
also highlights the problem of the '"transcendental signified'", which is "'a concept 
simply present for thought, independent of a relationship to language"' (1981: 19). It 
exceeds the chains of signs, meaning that it is not bound to any signifier. 
This is the moment when structuralism gives way to poststructuralism - as the 
former "divided the sign from the referent", so does the latter "distance the signifier 
from the signified", introducing the concept of play into structure (Marshall 1992:66). 
This is important because the Prague School definition of structure - that is, the 
prevailing or traditional meaning - presupposed hierarchical elements comprising a 
closed totality, with the parts being subordinate to the whole, and the form of the 
structure treated as an object in its own right, which dispenses with differential value 
(Jefferson 1986: 115): 
Similarly, being closed and self-contained, the structure implies a 
concentric form of organisation with the centre as the organising agent which 
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would then be exempt from the play of difference which, instead, it appears to 
control. (Jefferson 1986: 115) 
Derrida's notion of differance presupposes an open-ended chain of 
signification in which the individual elements cannot simply be reduced to objects, as 
this chain is both temporal and spatial (Jefferson 1986:115). For Derrida, language is 
a "field of substitutions'', but without any centre to constrain such play, resulting in 
language becoming "a dynamic of supplementarity" (Marshall 1992:68). The 
traditional view of a direct relation between object and word presupposed some 
organising centre, namely truth or reality, maintaining such a closed system of 
meaning. But with Derrida, the sign is the centre - implying that, according to the 
logic of the supplement, "language functions in the space of absence".9 This loss of 
the centre, combined with the concept of play, marks the ascendancy of the 
postmodern moment: 
If we think of this 'play', this loss of the centre, in a spirit of mourning for the 
lost dream of truth and absolutes, then we are not thinking within the 
postmodern moment. Within the postmodern moment 'play' remarks a 
'joyous affirmation": it suggests a world not based on a closing down of 
meaning through a false acquiescence of power, but rather on an opening up 
toward the privileging of active interpretation. (Marshall 1992:69-70) 
This complex and far-reaching debate about the nature of language suffuses 
Delany's own writings in, and about, SF, into which he injects the poststructuralist 
concept of 'play' to open up the genre to the possibilities of "the privileging of active 
interpretation". Delany comments that the suggestion that "meanings could come 
apart from words" (1994a:22) originates as far back as the Greek Stoics, who were 
"generally presumed to be the earliest Western thinkers to have described the sign as 
consisting of a perceptible signans and an intelligible signatum - i.e., a signifier and a 
signified" (1994a:57). What Delany is suggesting is that the debate about words and 
their meanings is as old as Western thinking itself, underpinning its own continuing 
evolution and development. The 'modern' view about the meanings of words is that 
"meanings just aren't hard-edged and delimitable" (1994a:22), with Derrida "one of 
the new thinkers to make it disturbingly clear that the most fixed and irrefutable-
9 As Culler points out: "The marginal in its very marginality turns out to characterise the central object of 
discussion" (1979: 171 ). 
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seemmg meaning is finally a more or less undetermined play of undecidables" 
(1994a:22-23). 
Delany comments that what interests him about words is how they are 
combined to form sentences, and the rules that govern these combinations and 
permutations. Sentences are constructed on the basis of rigid 'codes', resulting in 
"various combinations and embeddings and tortuosities" (1994a:23). This leads to the 
even more interesting structuralist question: what, in tum, constitutes these 'codes' 
themselves? 
Knowing the simplest meaning of a word is a matter of knowing a code. 
Knowing printed letters - written characters - stand for language and are there 
to convey it is, itself, only a certain codic convention. "Word" (or, indeed, 
"sentence" or "paragraph") is only the codic term for the complex of codic 
conventions by which we recognise, respond to, understand, and act on 
whatever causes us to recognise, respond, understand, and act in such a way 
that, among those recognitions and responses and understandings, is the 
possible response: "word" (or, indeed, "sentence" or "paragraph"). 
(1994a:23) 10 
The obvious corollary to this structuralist view is that the world is comprised of 
"nothing but codes, codic systems and complexes, and the codic terms used to 
designate one part of one system, complex, or another" (1994a:23 ). This is yet another 
articulation of Laclau's 'structuralist vision' of social reality being comprised of 
nothing more - or less - than a dialectic of intersecting social dialogues. But how far 
can one push the analogy before it begins to fall apart and become nonsensical - or 
even dangerous to the system itself it is purportedly dissecting? Delany warns that 
"the sentential, codic - or semiotic - view is dangerous because questions that, at least 
initially, seem inimical to the system do get asked" (1994a:23-24). 
Sense-bound distinctions such as inside and outside become hugely 
questionable. Value-bound metaphors such as higher and lower stand revealed 
as arbitrary. And the physically inspired quality of identity becomes a highly 
rigid mentalistic ascription in a system that can clearly accommodate more 
flexibility. (Delany 1994a:24) 
How does one deal with this situation without becoming irrational or even 
mad? Delany responds that one must always bear in mind that the way that social 
10 One can clearly discern the influence of Derrida on Delany in this convoluted, playful, yet apparently 
serious paragraph, which reads like 'Derrida Lite' ... 
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reality is coded is "terribly complex, recursive, self-critical, and self-revising" 
(1994a:24), for therefore, by definition, it is overdetermined, and "the 
overdetermination of the codic system is the most forceful suggestion that the 
universe, from which the system is made and to which (we assume) it is a response, is 
itself overdetermined - which is to say: It operates by laws" (l 994a:24). It seems 
perverse to conclude that the free play governing social structure is, in fact, an 
expression of immutable laws, as this returns one to the starting point of debating the 
separation between meanings and words. But such circularity is, indeed, a supreme 
expression of poststructuralist 'play', where every end is its own beginning, and every 
signified is also a signifier. 
Bearing in mind the intricate metaphysical and philosophical debate behind 
the notion of codic systems or laws - which underpins the very meaning of language, 
and the language of meaning itself - Delany's critical project has been to determine 
the codic systems or laws of SF itself and, in so doing, manipulate them to reveal their 
arbitrariness and constructed nature - which, in turn, will reveal these codic systems 
or laws all the more starkly due to their overdetermined or redundant nature. David N. 
Samuelson notes that, "whatever their differences, commercial writers, fan critics, and 
academics have hailed Delany as a major theorist of the contours and exposition of 
[SF]" (1994:21). 
Delany has been able to achieve this status by making up the rules, and 
defending or recasting them, as he goes along, "while academic scholars often 
struggle under a load of knowledge and techniques more appropriate to defending 
values of the literary canon" (Samuelson 1994:21). This is not to suggest that 
Delany's preconceptions are unacademic - rather, he brings to bear on SF the same 
critical values applied to the so-called 'literary canon', in order to cast a light of 
scrutiny to reflect on, and illuminate, each other's differences in terms of the codic 
systems that underpin both. Samuelson comments that Delany's critical writings are 
"a collage of theory, invention, and memoir" ( 1994 :23 ), thereby conflating the very 
nature of 'critical writing' itself. He adds that these are "atypical for [SF] in the nature 
and range of material he has absorbed, including personal experience" (1994:23): 
... an observant child of the "black bourgeoisie" growing up in Harlem in the 
Forties and Fifties. Attending schools for the gifted across town, he saw at first 
hand disparities of class and caste distinguished by economics, skin colour, 
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and subculture. Homosexual in a sexually repressed era and married at age 19 
to a precocious poet, he could hardly escape noticing arbitrary gender 
distinctions, from the opprobrium heaped on "perverts" to the heterosexual 
economy of scarcity, from male dominance in job rewards and assignments to 
the different cuts of men's and women's jeans. (Samuelson 1994:23) 
For Delany, the challenge was how to articulate these defining life experiences 
in the fictional, and fantastical, realm of SF. But first one has to question why Delany 
gravitated towards SF at all, a geme whose relationship to reality can best be 
described as arbitrary. 11 Samuelson proposes that Delany "was attracted to SF largely 
by its potential for alternatives" (1994:23). In other words, it opposes reality by being 
totally different or removed from it in some fundamental context, implying that reality 
as we know it is not the only template upon which to construct social relations. 
Therefore SF's 'oppositional' character can be seen as rich dialectical ground to 
nurture alternative theories of social construction and interaction. Samuelson notes 
that Delany "began writing it highly conscious of theoretical concerns and their 
practical applications to the written word, and very aware that he was writing and 
living on the margin of reputability" (1994:23). This was due, in part, to an eclectic 
upbringing that saw him exposed to African-American writers at school, to classical 
and modern texts at home, and to SF when in summer camp (Samuelson 1994:23). 
In addition, dyslexia meant that Delany "came early to a grasp of conventions 
and complexity" (1994:23) through the sheer effort of having to pay close attention to 
every single letter. Samuelson also speculates that Delany is an "acute analyst" of 
social roles and behaviours due to having to deal with the conflict generated by his 
sexuality in opposition to social norms and conventions (1994:23). Given this 
particular background, it was perhaps inevitable that Delany became exposed to such 
theorists as Derrida and Michel Foucault, with the former's emphasis on 'free play' 
and 'decentring', and the latter's analyses of sex and power relations. However, while 
Delany's prodigious intellect obviously played a constitutive role in this, it must be 
noted that not every homosexual is destined to become a poststructuralist academic. 
The first important aspect to note about Delany's critical project is how he 
cannot hope to escape geme definitions or expectations. Samuelson explains how 
11 Even this assertion is problematic, for as Delany says: "I've never proclaimed my work SF, proudly or 
humbly. I assume most of my published fiction is SF - and I assume most of my readers feel it is, too. But 
that's like a poet assuming she writes poems, or a playwright assuming he writes plays" (1994a:27). 
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these expectations are generated automatically almost as a byproduct of Delany's 
critical intentions: 
As a theorist, Delany' s first concern is to raise audience consciousness 
of the act of reading, which initiates a dialogue between readers and writers 
(themselves first and foremost readers). Central to reading is the interplay 
between the written text and reader expectations, about life as well as 
literature. Reinforced expectations "sediment out", that is, enough material 
and practice become distinct from those in other areas of discourse to establish 
a separate identity, typically called a "genre", but uniting reading and 
rhetorical practices as well as texts .... (Samuelson 1994:23-24) 
This has led Delany to define his own particular 'brand' of SF, as it were, as 
'paraliterature' (1994a:21), emphasising its marginal status within the context of a 
marginal genre. 12 By conflating his life with his fictional enterprise, Delany is 
attempting to extend the boundaries of SF. In this vein, Samuelson comments that 
"his ultimate goal as a writer may be to bring about a recognition of the power of 
language to decentre the role of conventions in life as well as in fiction" (1994:24). 13 
Therefore it is significant that Delany's critical project has always stressed interplay 
between reader and text, suggesting that the boundary between the two is permeable. 
By 1972, Delany began to talk about 'reader protocols', referred to later as 
'codes' or 'conventions', which are "elements of reader expectation immediately 
perceived by those attuned to a specific 'discourse"' (Samuelson 1994:24). In other 
words, reader protocols are those elements that lead a reader to define a particular text 
as being SF, and how those expectations shape his or her textual perceptions. Genre 
conventions - that is, elements of style, subject matter, tropes, and other literary 
devices or techniques - that define a particular genre such as SF have to be 'learnt' in 
the sense that frequent exposure will familiarise a reader with them. 
12 Samuelson comments: "Delany seems to seek an ideal (para-)literature in which considerations of race and 
sexual preference are inclusive rather than exclusive, and in which science and technology take unexpected 
turns" (1994:34). A startling example of the latter is Bron Helstrom's sex change in Triton (1976). Delany 
comments: "Literature is a marginal, strategic, and subversive activity at play in the social margins of 
politics, industry, advertising, and the media, and the minor literatures are, of course, on the margin of the 
margin [which] recalls Derrida's "the signifier of the signifier" as the model for all signification" 
(1994a:212). 
13 This conflation of fiction and reality is clearly evident in such a later non-SF work as The Mad Man, 
where, despite clear autobiographical elements, Delany states in a Disclaimer: "No character, major or 
minor, is intended to represent any actual person, living or dead. (Correspondences are not only coincidental 
but preposterous.)" (I 994b:xiii). Perhaps what Delany is trying to do here is force the reader to re-evaluate 
his or her own perceptions about fiction versus reality. Whatever the case, a neat causal link cannot be 
inferred. Disruption or dislocation is always the path that Delany suggests his readers must follow in order to 
be illuminated, and, in turn, illuminate the text themselves through their own experiences and perceptions. 
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This not only refers to neologisms or unknown words or phrases; perfectly 
ordinary words or phrases can assume completely different meanings or intentions in 
an SF context. This implies that the repertoire of literary effects and meanings 
available to SF is far wider than conventional literature, and also that SF as a genre is 
more flexible and adaptable. Samuelson says that SF's "wider verbal latitude, 
including and supplementing meanings of here and now, offers more scope than 
mundane realism on the level of style" (1994:25). Another implication is that, despite 
the fact that SF is mainly billed as the genre of the future, it maintains an "outward 
discourse" with the world it creates, so that reader and author become complicit in the 
act of creation, giving the SF context a tangible basis in the here and now. This 
subverts the notion that literature is "a privileged mode of writing apart from life" 
(Samuelson 1994:34). 
Delany has adopted this as a sort of mantra or credo underlining every aspect 
of his existence, identifying with the oppressed, marginal, and deviant in both his life 
and his writing, to the extent that he has often resided in rundown urban 
neighbourhoods (Samuelson 1994:35). 14 The reason for this is "that such settings 
expose one to changes facing the larger society" (1994:35), but Samuelson argues that 
underlying this too-rational explanation is the fact that Delany "seems to crave a 
degree of danger in his life" (1994:35). This is the danger of living on the edge of the 
marginal, of inhabiting the dark corners and interstices of the social fabric. 
His memoirs and some of his more overtly autobiographical fiction suggest 
that he has risked both life and limb in promiscuous sexual behaviour. He has 
also befriended many marginal individuals, among them petty criminals and 
unappreciated artists. Having voluntarily undergone therapy in a mental 
hospital in 1964 to deal with stress resulting from the sexual, racial, and 
professional anomalies in his life, he is sensitive to both the mentally ill and 
the socially deviant. Seeing these categories as socially (not medically) 
determined, virtually as a gentrification of human beings, he accepts criminals 
as well as artists, sadists as well as homosexuals. (Samuelson 1994:35) 
14 Carey Goldberg writes tactfully ofDelany's quarters in New York: "It is a rather rundown apartment 
where he ruminates, one in urgent need of a paint job" ( 1999). In total contrast to the usual academic fare 
churned out about Delany, Goldberg's feature story- about a day in the life of the Famous Writer- is 
amusing and revealing. It begins: "Samuel R. Delany thumps down the rickety-rackety stairs of his fifth-
floor walk-up and drops off his garbage on the curb like anybody else. He buys tickets at the Port Authority. 
He stops for an afternoon pick-me-up at a bar nearby, a New York guy doing everyday things. But there is a 
gleam in his eye from another galaxy" (1999). 
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This means that Delany has always criticised "establishment rules and 
attitudes" (1994:35) by active example as opposed to empty rhetoric. It is something 
of a paradox that Delany's dabbling in deviancy has added to his glamour as a 
colourful figure on the periphery of a marginal genre. Another paradox is that, 
"embodying the positive message of expanding alternatives and opportunities, his 
work speaks the language of the establishment at the same time as he helps to destroy 
the limiting values that uphold it" (Samuelson 1994:35). This is because of the nature 
of Delany's fundamental message, namely that "we must understand codes and 
conventions in order to transcend them" (Samuelson 1994:35). Samuelson explains 
how these 'protocols' function: 
The protocols of language mirror those of society and genre. Their arbitrary 
nature is the source of their strength, their hold on our imaginations, since we 
memorise and internalise them, rather than deriving them from logic and 
experiment. We must see the world through arbitrary categories before 
viewing categories critically; without such frameworks, we see nothing 
critically. (Samuelson 1994:35) 
Delany comments that "orthodox and radical psychiatry or the Moral Majority 
or feminist critics against pornography" are "signs of potential terrorism" as they 
interiorise the 'law' through the medium of sex (1989c:356). (Law can be seen as 
referring to conventional morality). Like Foucault, Delany sees social relations as 
power relations, but with a particular gender bias that entrenches patriarchal society. 
The material power of the present father is the material power of any coercive 
aggressive individual, male or female, armed or unarmed. But it is only the 
power to coerce in excess of immediate bodily force - the power of the 'absent 
father' - that constitutes authority in our patriarchal culture as a day-to-day 
social reality ... as long as power, whether it goes with or against the law, is 
named male, the law will itself be male .... (Delany 1989c:357) 
Delany argues that this is the case because "language is first and foremost a stabiliser 
of behaviour" (1989c:360), meaning that it conditions responses and attitudes for both 
groups and individuals. Its role as a tool of communication and intellectual analysis is 
secondary to its function as a moderator or regulator of social behaviour. Although 
such a stabilising system is oppressive in that it fixes meaning, Delany notes that it 
also performs a vital and necessary function in generating meaning itself: 
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Given the tasks we humans find, fixate on, and imagine, again and again our 
responses must achieve a variety, complexity, and accuracy surpassing those 
of other species by enormous factors. If there were not an extensive stabilising 
system, that variety, complexity, and accuracy could never be achieved. 
(Delany l 989c:361) 
Delany argues that, "among the most fundamental conceptual alignments of 
patriarchal thought, and one of the most common in the range of human cultures'', is 
"to make the complex, multiple, and unequal alignment penis I outside I something 
(presence I desire) on the one hand and vagina I inside I nothing (absence) on the 
other" (1989c:362). Delany explains that the phallus is the "Symbolic unit that 
conjoins the notions of masculinity, greater relative size, hardness, and power", while 
ignoring the equally symbolic "vulnerability of the male genitalia during erection'', or 
indeed in a flaccid state (1989c:363). The point of this is that patriarchal society has a 
masculine bias in the language through which it is defined and determined, a bias that 
"stabilises responses and patterns of response" (1989c:363). 
Language is a stabiliser among our responses to the world and to our 
problems in it. When the stabilising system is so powerful and important as to 
make our responses as we recognise them, for all practical purposes (whether 
they are good responses or bad ones), possible, it is tempting to view that the 
stabilising system itself as causative of the responses if the responses are 
judged good, and causative of the problems themselves if the responses are 
judged bad ... (Delany l 989c:364) 
What Delany is saying here is that the stabilising system is as much the answer 
to the problem as it is the original cause thereof. If behaviour is stabilised by 
language, then "to make real changes in patriarchal society and culture will require 
complex, intricate, and accurate behaviour" (1989c:364). Delany argues that the Bible 
itself, the text underpinning the socio-political reality of Christianity as a stabilised 
form of normative behaviour, teaches that Adam "alone had the right to name - that 
is, he had the triple right, first, to divide up the world into the semantic units most 
useful to him, second, to organise those units into the fictions that would stabilise 
what was most useful to him to have stable, and, third, to exclude from language 
whatever was most convenient for him to leave unspoken" (1989c:366-67). Delany 
argues that the path towards a world where "freedom of social determination" is a 
given for both sexes can only be stabilised itself if women "seize this triple right to 
name, seize it violently and hold to it tenaciously" (1989c:367). They must do so in 
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order to tell new tales, in order to "stabilise reactions in both men and women at a fine 
enough precision to bring about the desired revolution in patriarchal society and 
culture" (1989c:367). 
. . . at this point the historical battle to name the law and to effect its 
constitution within an always-to-be-created society and culture - already a 
whit less patriarchal for sustaining the conflict even the length of time it takes 
to name it - has always-already begun. (Delany 1989c:367) 
It is this 'always-to-be-created' future society of true social determination that is the 
Holy Grail of Delany's fictions. It is this yet-to-begin and already-vanquished 
mythical war to stabilise new forms of behaviour that will shatter the shackles of 
oppression and difference that he is wearily slogging away at, is awaiting eagerly to 
begin, and has long-since vanquished. 
Chapter One 
Words of Wonder 
In this chapter, I will begin to examine the potential link between SF and literary 
theory, with especial reference to structuralism, by means of a close reading of Babel-
17 (Delany 1966) and They Fly at <;iron (Delany 1993), and thereby attempt to 
illuminate what I perceive of as Delany' s articulation of the mutual compatibility 
between the two. By applying structuralist theory as a mode of reading to these two 
novels, I will attempt to explicate how Delany is aware of, and uses, literary theory as 
part of his science fictional strategy. Several points need to be spelled out from the 
outset: it must be noted that I am not attempting to argue that these are two 
'structuralist' novels; that the terms 'structuralism' and 'SF' themselves are 
multivalent and ambiguous; and that Delany's own critical trajectory cannot be 
isolated to a convenient point of commencement, and traced linearly to some 
definitive conclusion in the later novels. 
What I am attempting to do in this chapter is examine the functioning of 
literary theory in relation to SF. Of the two novels I have selected, the former uses the 
conventions of space opera to weave a dense theoretical web about "speculative 
linguistics" (Samuelson 1994:21 ), while the latter, written 30 years later, is a mythical 
fantasy that engages dialectically with the basic structuralist tenets expressed in 
Babel-17. I believe that They Fly at <;iron also gives an interesting glimpse into what 
Delany thinks constitutes SF itself, which becomes particularly relevant when the 
latter novel is examined against the backdrop of Babel-17. First of all, I need to 
address the question of terminology and definitions. This chapter is merely a tentative 
embarkation by placing Delany's second published SF work under the theoretical 
spotlight, and examining its contrast and complementarity with one of his later works. 
I am not attempting any formal closure as to Delany's definition of SF (a detailed 
discussion of the complexity of this issue will be presented in Chapter Four, where the 
focus will fall on poststructuralism and postmodemism, which are only touched upon 
in passing in this initial foray). 
Of course, my own definition of SF which I apply in this chapter cannot, by 
. definition, be neutral. 1 Whereas Clute notes that early definitions focused on "the 
1 Edward James offers valuable insight into the problem of defining SF: "Attempts at definition usually 
seem to imply a belief in a Platonic idea of 'science fiction', rather than a bundle of perceptions about 
what constitutes sf [sic} - a bundle whose contents are constantly changing, from decade to decade, 
from critic to critic, and from country to country. Attempts at definition, in other words, frequently 
appear to be laying down rules about what sf ought to be like, rather than offering some kind of all-
embracing description of the great range and wide variety of texts which have been, and are, recognised 
as making up the body of sf. Definitions are thus frequently closely linked to the desire of critics to 
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presence of 'science', or at least scientific method, as a necessary part of the fiction" 
(1993 :312), Delany approaches the problem from a more theoretical viewpoint in 
Triton (1976), and puts forward the idea that SF is a 'way ofreading': 
Science fiction is science fiction because various bits of technological 
discourse ... - that is to say, the science - are used to redeem various other 
sentences from the merely metaphorical, or even the meaningless, for 
denotative description/presentation of incident. . . . embedded in the textus of 
anyone who can read the sentence properly, are those emblems by which they 
could recognise such discourse were it manifested to them . . . . (Delany 
1976:336) 
Delany notes that textus is derived from the Latin term for 'web', a convenient 
metaphor to apply to the polymorphous nature of the term 'SF', with its serpentine 
interpenetration and interrelation. 
All the uses of the word 'web', 'weave', 'net', 'matrix' and more ... become 
entrance points into a textus, which is ordered from all language and language-
functions, and upon which the text itself is embedded. (Delany 1976:333) 
This focus on language brings me to the definition of structuralism, in turn, which is 
as contested a term as SF itself. Chris Baldick argues that structuralism 
analyses cultural phenomena according to principles derived from linguistics, 
emphasising the systematic interrelationship among the elements of any 
human activity, and thus the abstract codes and conventions governing the 
social production of meanings. (1990:213) 
Delany's interest in structuralism is closely related to his interest in SF, for the 
latter is also governed by 'abstract codes and conventions' to produce meaning. These 
include such tropes as spaceships, galactic empires, aliens, and interstellar conflict -
all elements of a generic sub-division known as space opera, to which Babel-17 
belongs.2 And yet, as I will show, Delany manipulates SF signifieds beyond their 
traditional meaning to engage in a dialectic about the nature of language and reality. 
Just as SF is constructed of tropes and conventions, so is reality constructed by mutual 
defend their interests in the face of hostile attacks by emphasising one element of sf at the expense of 
others" (1994: 1 ). Brian Aldiss makes a similar point when he declares that "there is no such entity as 
science fiction. We have only the work of many men and women which, for convenience, we can group 
together under the label 'science fiction"' (1986:23). 
2 John Clute explains the origins of the term: "When radio was the principal medium of home 
entertainment in the USA, daytime serials intended for housewives were often sponsored by soap-
powder companies; the series were thus dubbed 'soap operas'. The name was soon generalised to refer 
to any corny domestic drama ... the pattern was extended into sf [sic] terminology by Wilson Tucker 
in 1941, who proposed 'space opera' as the appropriate term for the 'hacky, grinding, stinking, 
outworn, spaceship yarn"'. (1993: 113 8) 
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consensus on the part of its members, according to one sociological viewpoint. This 
gives Babel-17 a peculiar doubling effect: by examining a fictional reality imagined 
by the author, Delany is simultaneously commenting on the processes by which 
'normal' reality is maintained and mediated. 
Babel-17, Delany' s second published novel, won the Nebula Award for best 
SF novel of 1966, having introduced "something new in the genre" in the form of "a 
far greater emphasis on language" (Aldiss 1986:368). Aldiss adds that Delany's true 
value lies in "his intelligent approach to the actual business of writing'', and for his 
recognition and exploitation of "the sheer potentiality" of the genre (1986:368). 
Aldiss' s statement can be read as implying that literary theory can be legitimately 
applied to SF. This seems simplistic, but the implications are profound, for it 
intimates a level of complexity and sophistication not ordinarily afforded to the genre 
due to its firmly-perceived locus in popular culture. 
Are Delany' s overt concerns with language and contemporary literary theory 
unfamiliar or strange thematic material for SF and fantasy? Has Delany genuinely 
broken new ground, or merely expressed ideas implicit in SF all along? My initial 
focus on Babel-17 will be to show that dealing with such thematic material SF is far 
from odd, but rather enriching in the sense that it expands the significatory scope of 
the genre. The novelty or innovation of Delany's approach within the boundaries of 
the genre itself will be assessed in later chapters. 
George Slusser's comment that, "both in theory and practice, Delany's 
'speculative fiction' is structuralist" (1977:3), is a perceptive, albeit dated, example of 
the attempt to analyse Delany' s early conceptual or theoretical position - as well as to 
unify or clarify that position, a task complicated by such books as the critical-essay 
collection The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of Science Fiction (1977), 
where Delany acknowledges his own contradictions and revisions. This is an 
important element of his theoretical forays, which I think have the side-effect of 
inculcating debate about SF and its theoretical underpinnings; it also defends against 
the dogmatic defense of a single mode of inquiry, which can limit the richness of 
Delany's project. 
Damien Broderick comments about Delany that "one can trace through his 
essays a critical trajectory launched from a distrust of the content/form antithesis and 
peaking in an idiosyncratic blend of semiotics, Marxism, psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction" (1995 :65). This multifaceted appraisal is in marked contrast to 
Slusser's cautious assessment of 1977, with Broderick's more confident approach 
acknowledging that one cannot impose a unidirectional focus on Delany' s critical 
trajectory. By examining Babel-17 and They Fly at <;iron, I will attempt to focus on 
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Delany' s engagement with structuralism as a strand of the theoretical trajectory he has 
embarked upon in his career. 
An example of Delany's intellectual engagement with SF is naming the 
spaceship of character Rydra Wong in Babel-17 the Rimbaud. Wong says "the name 
was Muels' idea (1966:46) - a reference to another character, Muels Aranlyde (an 
anagram of the real author's name), who is the fictitious author of the in-text book 
Empire Star (which Delany later used as a real title). This began a long tradition of 
Delany featuring as a character in his own fiction, which has continued up to The Mad 
Man (1994).3 Delany writes of the 'luminosity' of a particular writer's vision, and 
"the construction of these violent nets of wonder called sp[ e ]culative fiction" 
(1977:46), as being akin to poetry.4 
The vision (sense of wonder, if you will) that [SF] tries for seems to me very 
close to the vision of poetry, particularly poetry as it concerned the nineteenth 
century Symbolists. No matter how disciplined its creation, to move into the 
'unreal' world demands a brush with mysticism. (Delany 1977:46) 
Delany compares the notion of a 'sense of wonder' associated with SF to 
Rimbaud's theory "of the systematic derangement of the senses to achieve the 
unknown" (1977:47). This is a single idea in The Jewel-Hinged Jaw, and illustrates 
the extent of the academic vistas that Delany believes SF is privy to through its 
complexity and richness as a legitimate literary genre. But Delany' s interest in 
Rimbaud is not a mere spark - later, in The Motion of Light in Water (1990), this 
early idea is reflected in his interest in Roland Barth es and the notion of an 'erotics' of 
reading characterised by jouissance, or the 'pleasure' of the text (Delany 1994a:2). 
These two examples demonstrate Delany's eclectic interest in literary theory, which 
problematises any attempt at articulating a unified theoretical position, as Slusser 
bravely attempted. 
Rimbaud has an added significance, as in Jebel Tarik's ironic comment to 
Rydra that "'Here on the Rim we are seldom visited by a Bard'" (1966:97). This is a 
somewhat laboured pun, but the message is clear: SF is a 'fun' genre in the sense that 
it can lend itself to intellectual 'games'. It is Delany' s interest in applying literary 
theory to what is conventionally considered a marginal genre, or in Delany's 
3 Commenting on Delany's early work, Brian Aldiss states that "Delany himself was there behind his 
mask ... a blend of Jean Genet and Cordwainer Smith, part cynical literateur, part wide-eyed fan" 
( 1986:367). 
4 Delany's use of 'speculative fiction' instead of the more traditional SF in this seminal critical work 
indicates the scope of his ambitious theoretical undertakings in the genre. Brian Aldiss states that the 
term refers to the borderland or middleground "between science fiction and fantasy" (1986:267). It also 
owes a debt to Robert Scholes's explication of 'structural fabulation' in his 1975 book of the same title 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press). 
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terminology a form of 'paraliterature', that has contributed to his marginalisation. (An 
interesting question is whether this is ironic or not, or simply a reflection of the extent 
to which Delany courts marginalisation.) He is working from a boundary or interstitial 
zone where the accepted conventions of SF are malleable, and can be deconstructed to 
reveal their innermost workings. As I shall show in this chapter, Delany crosses and 
recrosses the boundary between SF and literary theory with an insidious slippage that 
blurs sight of the boundary itself, to create an absence or gap in which meaning can 
proliferate. 
Mario Pei comments in the epigraph to Babel-17 that '"Nowhere is civilisation 
so perfectly mirrored as in speech. If our knowledge of speech, or the speech itself, is 
not yet perfect, neither is civilisation"' (Delany 1966:2). At the beginning of They Fly 
at <;iron, the narrator comments that history itself fails "when the memory of a village 
is no older than the four or five generations it takes a grave-scroll record to rot" 
(1993:13). The point is that both novels are about different and opposing civilisations, 
and the attempts made by both sides - both inadvertently and actively - to 
comprehend and come to terms with each other. In Babel-17 the focus is on language, 
while They Fly at <;iron raises the issue of writing and its relation to speech - both 
language and writing are defining characteristics of society, and perpetuate and enrich 
its common history. 
Theorists from Plato to Ferdinand de Saussure have grappled with the vexing 
question of what is the true measure of civilisation: speech or writing (Culler 
1979:167). In Phaedrus, Plato describes writing as "a bastardised form of 
communication" (Culler 1979:167), while Saussure relegates writing to "a secondary, 
derivative status as compared with speaking" (Culler 1979: 166). Derrida argues that 
"treating writing as a parasitic and imperfect representation of speech" is a means of 
"repressing or setting aside certain features of language, or certain aspects of its 
functioning" (Culler 1979: 167), a phenomenon he terms 'phonocentrism'. The 
physical marks that constitute writing are removed from the thought that led to their 
production, which introduces the possibility of misrepresentation or distortion 
between speech and writing - the former being the pure, untrammelled state defiled 
by the intrusion of the latter. Jefferson writes that: 
Any view which gives speech precedence over writing must be basing its 
preference on this sort of hierarchical model, which implicitly places ideas in a 
commanding position at the top, and writing as a degraded form of 
representation at the bottom. A truly Saussurean approach would give speech 
and writing equal status, since it regards language as a system of differences, 
and not as a collection of terms for conveying information existing 
independently ofit. (1986:113) 
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Derrida illustrates the idea that writing does not copy speech by coining the 
term differance as a subtle variation of the usual French difference, a distinction only 
apparent in written form, and which does not correspond in any way to the spoken 
form, but although "this a is written or read, but cannot be heard ... this alteration, 
this graphic and grammatical aggression, implies an irreducible reference to the mute 
intervention of a written sign" (1981 :8). The link between writing and identity is 
expressed in Tales of Neveryon (1979) when Old Venn remarks that writing was 
invented to control slaves: '"If you can write down a woman's or man's name ... you 
can manoeuvre your own dealings with them in ways that will soon control them"' 
(Delany 1979: 104). Thus writing is also inextricably linked with social identity - and 
if thought or can be controlled or mediated through writing, then so can identity be 
regulated or determined. Thus a model of communication becomes a medium of 
social interaction: 
If distance, absence, misunderstanding, insincerity are features of writing, then 
by distinguishing writing from speech one can construct a model of 
communication which takes as the norm an ideal associated with speech -
where the listener is thought to be able in principle to grasp precisely what the 
speaker has in mind. (Culler 1979: 167) 
In Babel-17, Delany speculates on what may constitute such an ideal norm by 
'inventing' a perfect language that conflates the speech/writing debate by being both 
pictographic and information-dense to a point of optimal compactness. Delany 
addresses the identity question in a startlingly controversial way by positing that the 
very nature of such a language would render a native speaker incapable of grasping or 
even articulating the concept of 'I' or the self. Terry Eagleton remarks that 
structuralism 
is a symptom of the fact that language, with its problems, mysteries and 
implications, has become both paradigm and obsession for twentieth-century 
intellectual life. ( 1983 :97) 
According to Culler this is because: 
Language is no longer the simple, transparent medium of thought it was once 
accepted as being. We prefer now to equate language with thought, and 
instead of looking through it, at reality, in an attempt to understand how we 
first of all acquire it and then use it. (Culler 1979: 12) 
This refers back to Mario Pei's ambiguous contention that speech mirrors 
civilisation, for a mirror image is a reversal - and what then is reflection, and what is 
reality? Attempting to define the term 'reality' is to slip into a quagmire of signifiers. 
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Berger and Luckmann state that, from a sociological viewpoint, reality is "a kind of 
collective fiction, constructed and sustained by the processes of socialisation, 
institutionalisation, and everyday social interaction, especially through the medium of 
language" (McHale 1987:37). 
The social reality of Babel-17 is underpinned further by the religious 
connotations of Delany' s choice of title, in that Christianity is predicated upon the 
assumption that in the beginning was the Word. It is significant that Delany chooses a 
Biblical signifier in naming his perfect language, for the story of Babel begins with 
the whole earth united in a single language - which implies a perfect, harmonious 
civilisation. The people then decide to build a tower "whose top may reach unto 
heaven", as well as choosing a name for themselves, "lest [they] be scattered abroad 
upon the face of the whole earth" (Scofield 1917: 19). Thus language can be seen as 
the template upon which civilisation is built, and a controllable tool by which greater 
heights can be aspired to. But the story of Babel ends in tragedy: 5 
And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of 
men builded. 
And the lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one 
language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from 
them, which they have imagined to do. 
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they 
may not understand one another's speech. 
So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the 
earth: and they left off to build the city. 
Therefore is the name of it called Babel ... (1917: 19) 
Mario Pei comments that civilisation cannot be perfected unless its language is 
also perfected, and, in a sense, SF can be seen as an attempt to provide a perfect 
image of civilisation through the power of imagination (but mediated through the 
inadequacies of language). Of course, this is merely one view of the sociological 
import of SF, as it is not to say that everyone perceives the relevance or even 
significance of the genre in this fashion. Delany cautions that "[SF] is not about the 
future; it uses the future as a narrative convention to present significant distortions 
upon the present" (1984:47).6 He adds that: "A 60 000 word novel is one picture 
corrected 59 999 times" (1977:37). Thus the signifier 'Babel-17' is both title and 
5 The question is why? Union in language implies perfect understanding, which then bestows unlimited 
collective power. Of course, the Old Testament God was too jealous to countenance this. 
6 Ursula K Le Guin, a fellow SF writer much admired by and commented upon by Delany, expresses a 
similar sentiment when she states that "science fiction is not predictive; it is descriptive''. Le Guin adds 
that "prediction is the business of prophets, clairvoyants and futurologists. It is not the business of 
novelists. A novelist's business is lying" (1989: 151 ). 
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subject matter - endlessly modified and corrected, and even contradicted, when at the 
end Babel-18 is given concrete form. Delany explains further: 
. . . practically any text, if read carefully enough, generates both denotations 
and connotations that contradict each other, that subvert each other, that 
interfere with each other in such a way that the very concept of 'knowing what 
the text means' begins to fall apart ... (1984:48-49) 
Delany's choice of space opera as subject matter for his SF novel is as 
significant as the title. Perhaps the defining characteristic of space opera is war. It 
allows a writer to place characters in heroic situations, and to introduce a panoply of 
mysterious alien civilisations, artifacts and technobabble. Delany subverts the generic 
protocols of space opera by immediately opening Babel-17 with an 
uncompromisingly gritty depiction of an anonymous port city caught in the 
stranglehold of a series of protracted interstellar embargoes played out against the 
larger backdrop of what is simply termed the 'Invasion'. 
. . . these people have lived for two decades under the Invasion. They've 
starved during the embargoes, broken windows, looted, run screaming before 
firehoses, torn flesh from a corpse's arm with decalcified teeth. (Delany 
1966:6) 
By introducing a military-type character in a pensive and philosophical mood, 
Delany both dislocates the traditional action hero associated with space opera, and 
gives himself a vehicle to voice some of the deeper concerns to be addressed by the 
novel. General Forester's ironic speculation on "Who is this animal man?" (1966:6) 
reflects the contradictory notion that the Invasion has produced "Panics, riots, 
burnings, twice cannibalism -" (1966:6), as well as inculcating patriotism and an 
obsession with social trivia as a means of societal defense and denial. 
Forester is concerned that it is impossible to begin to know the masses on any 
level approaching individual intimacy, which perhaps also intimates the writer's 
concern at conveying fully-rounded characters on the written page. From a 
structuralist perspective, the introduction of the Butcher raises the concern that 
studying language as a system to which individuals are subordinate actually negates 
the concept of individuality, as illustrated by the fact that the Butcher's language has 
no word for 'I'; thus it has no concept of individuality. 
Walter Meyers points out that a significant criticism of Delany's treatment of 
language in Babel-17 is that he disregards the point that "any Whorfian linguistic 
influence would work on the mass of people, not on individuals" (1980: 181 ). Thus it 
is unclear how Babel-17 would function at a societal level, as the only example of its 
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functioning is provided by an individual - but, paradoxically, the language itself 
negates the concept of individuality. 7 
Space opera is also characterised by exotic aliens, and perhaps as a play upon 
this convention, Delany introduces a female Asian as central protagonist, who is "the 
most famous poet in five explored galaxies" and the voice of her age (1966:7, 18).8 It 
is ironic that a bureaucratic and literal-minded institution such as the military 
commandeers the services of a free-thinking and unpredictable poet to help decipher a 
cryptographic puzzle, but this is a subtle indication of Delany's high regard for poetry 
and writing in general as a technical discipline. Wong explains that poetry involves 
absorbing the jumbled thoughts and clumsy feelings of people, burnishing this raw 
material, and welding the gleaming end product to a rhythmic frame ( 1966: 18). 
Delany uses the initial meeting between the protagonists to comment on the 
intricacies of communication between two people. Forester is clearly smitten with 
Wong, but berates himself for failing to communicate his true feelings to her. Indeed, 
it is revealed that Wong had deduced Forester's thoughts of his failure to 
communicate through a complex, almost intuitive form of body language/muscle 
reading that is her own peculiar gift - a supplement to communication that goes 
beyond language itself in subtlety and nuance. But even with this added facility, 
communication between the two breaks down. Delany seems to suggest that, as a 
corollary to Mario Pei, the perfection or clarity of language depends on viewing it as a 
communication process. Berger and Luckmann's contention that reality is mediated 
through language can be taken to mean that language itself is a reflective medium like 
a mirror, with language and civilisation poised on either side of the reflective 
interface, as Pei suggests. 
Just after Forester ponders rhetorically "Who is this animal man?", Delany has 
him observe his reflected image in a plate-glass window in a moment of peculiar 
disassociation (1966:7). It is interesting to note that, in an extract from The Splendour 
and Misery of Bodies, of Cities, Delany talks about the "multiplicity and iteration of 
image" as an extension of identity (1996:103), thus reiterating his interest in the 
dialectic between image and identity. 
7 Meyers delivers some descriptive criticism of Babel- I 7, stating that the novel "is like a building of 
magnificent design, marred throughout by substandard materials. Most passers-by will be impressed by 
the architecture and never realise that the lights don't work and the plumbing leaks". More specifically, 
he notes that "the uninformed reader of Babel-I 7 [surely implying the average SF fan, who can 
scarcely claim to be an expert in linguistics] receives misinformation about American Indian languages, 
English vowels, the effect of first-language speech patterns on second languages, the distinction 
between specific and general, and computer languages" (1980: 180). However, Meyers notes that the 
novel's many errors are largely peripheral to the story itself, and could be corrected easily in a simple 
revision. He concludes that, "considering all his work, Delany is the most adventurous and thoughtful 
writer concerning himself with human communication" (1980:182). 
8 The muse here is no doubt Marilyn Hacker. 
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Forester and Wong are only able to communicate with each other on a 
superficial, business-like level about the conundrum of Babel-17 which, she informs 
the General, is indeed a language and not a code (1966:8). Forester is dismissive of 
the distinction, but it is important as it means that Babel-17 is probably as 
recomplicated and diffuse as any form of language, and cannot be broken down into 
one-on-one or constituent signifiers/signifieds. This also implies that understanding 
Babel-17 requires a basic comprehension of the people who speak it, and vice versa. 
In other words, a basic understanding of the language implies, by definition, a basic 
understanding of the social structure, which is where language functions to maintain 
and replicate the social system. An interesting question is whether the link between 
social reality and language is akin to the correlation between written symbols and 
their meaning? This is how Delany explains the functioning ofBabel-17: 
... there are two types of codes. In the first, letters, or symbols that stand for 
letters, are shuffled and juggled according to a pattern. In the second, letters, 
words, or groups of words are replaced by other letters, symbols or words ... 
once you find the key, you just plug it in and out come logical sentences. A 
language, however, has its own internal logic, its own grammar, its own way 
of putting thoughts together with words that span various spectra of meaning. 
There is no key you can plug in to unlock the exact meaning. At best you can 
get a close approximation. (1966:9) 
Once again doubt is cast on the notion that language is a medium reflecting 
some kind of objective, quantifiable sense of meaning. Delany gives some insight into 
Wong's past and her incredible facility with languages, described as an innate ability 
of "distinguishing grammatical order from random rearrangement" (1966:11-12). 
That she is also a "fair mathematician" (1966: 11) and has progressed from being a 
governmental translator to a brief stint in military cryptography, and finally to fame 
and fortune as a poet, is Delany' s inversion of the cliche of the artist as an anti-social 
bohemian. 
What is not clearly defined is Wong's status as an outsider or even pariah due 
to her somewhat freakish ability. The fact that she is not from Earth adds to her exotic 
and mysterious status. Her interaction with Forester, and his instinctive attraction 
towards her, clearly mitigates against perceiving her as a misunderstood intellectual 
forced to apply her unique abilities from society's boundary. But chapter two of the 
novel, beginning with the sentence '"Mocky, help me!'" (1966:15) reveals the 
vulnerable and dependent side of her character. 
Wong turns to Dr Markus T'mwarba, affectionately referred to as Mocky, for 
help and comfort. It is significant that T'mwarba is called upon for mentorship at two 
central crisis points in the novel: at the beginning, when she first encounters the 
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insidious nature of Babel-17, and at the end, when the alien language has almost 
erased her identity. T'mwarba is a therapist who has treated her since she was 15 and 
is a surrogate parent as both her parents died during the second embargo. As a poet 
and polymath, Wong is acutely aware of the pitfalls of communication. She confesses 
to her mentor about the miscommunication in her encounter with Forester: 
"He thought I didn't understand. He thought nothing had been communicated. 
And I was angry. I was hurt. All the misunderstandings that tie the world up 
and keep people apart were quivering before me at once, waiting for me to 
untangle them, explain them, and I couldn't. I didn't know the words, the 
grammar, the syntax." (Delany 1966:21) 
Wong confides to T'mwarba that Babel-17 scares her even more than Forester, 
a revelation of the extent to which she has hidden her own true feelings from the 
General. She says Babel-17 displays the strange structural attribute of 'compactness' 
in that it is small, tight and close together ( 1966 :21 ). But then she offers the 
contradictory notion that when she begins to 'see' into Babel-17, she sees 'too much' 
(1966:22). From a structuralist point of view, language is dense or compact in that its 
constituent signs are, in turn, made up of inseparable signifiers (letters or words) and 
signifieds (concepts). 
Of course, associating a particular signifier with a corresponding signified is 
totally arbitrary (Robey 1986:4 7). Wong recounts an acute anxiety attack at age 13 
brought on by a talking mynah bird conversationally telling her: "'Hello, Rydra, it's a 
fine day out and I'm happy!'" (Delany 1966:23). It is only towards the end of the 
novel that the real reason for her horror becomes clear: the mental image that 
accompanied the words the bird had been trained to speak was that of its next meal, 
an earthworm, and Wong was able to discern the arbitrary relationship between 
signifier and signified, which left her with a sense of dissociation (1966: 125). 
Derrida warns that the sign must not be seen as a substitute for something as 
this negates the concept of differance, which is non-substantive and non-hierarchical 
(Jefferson 1986: 115). Signification is ultimately dependent on difference or contrast 
(Culler 1979: 164), and thus differance "is the force behind, or rather in language; it 
produces the effects of difference which make up language" (Jefferson 1986:114). 
Babel-17 is so different from anything else Wong has yet experienced that it scares 
her with its possibilities of enhancing perception and perhaps even remaking reality. 
But the only way she is capable of even making an attempt at understanding it is to 
determine how it differs from her own linguistic frame of reference. As Weedman 
puts it, "to find out how the language works, she must be cognizant of how her own 
language works" (1982:44). 
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"[ ... ] most textbooks say language is a mechanism for expressing thought [ ... ] 
But language is thought. Thought is information given form. The form is 
language. The form of this language is ... amazing." (Delany 1966:22) 
Wong remarks further that "when you learn another tongue, you learn the way another 
people see the world, the universe" (1966:22). On a different level, we 'learn' the 
world of the novel Babel-17 by 'reading' the codes and conventions of SF, which is a 
form of language in itself. 
After revealing that she knows where the next act of sabotage involving 
Babel-17 is likely to take place, and affirming her determination to "find out who 
speaks this language" in order to "find out who, or what, in the Universe thinks that 
way" (1966:22-23), the action shifts to Transport Town in the third chapter of the 
novel as Wong enlists the assistance of customs officer Danil D. Appleby to 'approve' 
her spaceship crew on the spot - that is, match 'psyche-ratings' to achieve optimum 
compatibility. Even though she herself is a spaceship captain, this is one of the 
bureaucratic formalities she has to fulfil in order to get a crew together (and again this 
emphasizes communication and relationships). 
In keeping with the theme of the unnamed 'port city' at the beginning of the 
novel, Delany likens spaceflight to captaining a real oceangoing ship, as the "pilot's 
nervous system is connected directly with the controls" (1966:35-36). Unlike the 
conventional hi-tech space-opera stereotype, technology is rendered subordinate, with 
the emphasis on skill, instinct, and human interaction. Wong chooses a pilot by going 
to a wrestling venue and gauging the physical responses of various contestants -
which is as finely-calibrated a skill as the task of piloting itself. Wong comments on 
the relationship between art and science: 
"As of yet, the Customs work involved in getting ships from star to star is a 
science. The transport work manoeuvring through hyperstasis levels is still an 
art. In a hundred they may both be sciences [ ... ] But today a person who 
learns the rules of art well is a little rarer than the person who learns the rules 
of science." (Delany 1966:42) 
The navigational component of a spaceship crew is known as a 'triple', 
described as "a close, precarious, emotional and sexual relation with two other 
people" (1966:38), representing a radical social compact playing on the permutations 
of the traditional binary male-female relationship.9 Ironically, it is the task of 
9 As revealed in The Motion of Light in Water (1990), Delany was involved in a real 'triple': " ... what 
happened between Bob, Marilyn, and me was not some fetishised 'perversion' sought as a replicable 
object, but rather three people relating (personally, sexually, socially) within the margins of their own 
sexual possibilities ... " ( 1990:430). Thus even the most fantastic and revolutionary aspects of Babel-
17, such as the notion of a 'triple' as a radical reinvention of normal relationships, is based in lived 
experience, adding to Delany's contention that SF is not about the future, but the present. 
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conservative, law-abiding Appleby to determine the psychological compatibility of 
such a triple. His innate conservativeness is indicated by the fact that he is hesitant to 
wander around Transport Town at night. Delany's description is lush and vivid, and 
skilfully blends realistic observation with fantastic detail: 
... the streets were smaller, and a continuous whine of transport ships fell 
across the sky. Warehouses and repair and supply shops, sandwiched rickety 
apartments and rooming houses. A larger street cut past, rumbling with traffic, 
busy loaders, stellarmen. They passed neon entertainments, restaurants of 
many worlds, bars and brothels. (1966: 25-26) 
Appleby, whose very surname seems to suggest all-American wholesomeness, 
is a peripheral but important character who appears again at the end of the novel. His 
response to the idea of a 'triple' is to label the participants as 'perverts' (1966:38). 
Calli criticises him for clinging to the comfort zone of his orderly existence, without 
ever having the inclination to break free (1966:37-38). Similarly, Babel-17 is not 
only indicative of a totally different world view, but probably a whole new lived 
reality as well - and the aim in comprehending it is to break through the barrier posed 
by the alien language in order to comprehend this different reality. The mystery of 
Babel-17 is liberating in its potential. But to seize this potential requires significant 
courage, and a willingness to cross boundaries, as it poses a direct challenge to an 
undeviating and fixed world view. Appleby represents this idyllic central locus of 
social harmony, but rather than representing a position of strength, his position is 
ultimately a stultifying source of weakness. His inability to see beyond the limitations 
of his own world view, or his lack of desire to push the social envelope, is a form of 
cultural blindness concealed by such euphemisms as duty and social responsibility. 
Wong plays on Appleby's compelling notion of duty and, in a sense, entices 
him to take a walk on the dark side through the underbelly of Transport Town. Thus 
he symbolically crosses the boundary from his own comfortable and familiar world to 
an adjacent co-existing one where his status and knowledge signify nothing. Delany 
argues that society has no centre, and merely consists of intersecting boundaries (the 
fact that the Discorporate Zone is an even more forbidding no-go area within 
Transport Town itself underlines this idea). In other words, the comfortable regulated 
world that Appleby inhabits is not the centre of the social universe. Delany comments 
further: 
But really I don't think our society has a centre - or, I suspect, did it ever. 
Centrality was, at best, a stabilising illusion. At worst it was an oppressive and 
exploitative lie. All I think is or was is a system of intersecting margins [ ... ] 
The phrase recalls Derrida's 'the signifier of the signifier' as the model for all 
signification. (1994a:71) 
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The wrestling visited by Wong is another boundary containing that which 
society cannot tolerate, but just because society has sanctioned, and even assimilated 
such activity, by enclosing it in a social boundary, does not mean it is any less diluted 
or atavistic. The sailor motif is elaborated upon further when Wong likens the 
'cosmetisurgery' of the contestants to tattoos. It is significant that the pilot she 
eventually selects, simply known as Brass, wins against someone called the Silver 
Dragon - for Delany, dragons have always been a symbol of free expression and 
jouissance (from the winged creatures in They Fly at 9iron to the Evelmi in Stars in 
my Pocket like Grains of Sand). The theme of the pitfalls of communication is again 
reiterated when Appleby is "hustled by a succubus" (1966:40), and finds the 
experience trivialised by words when he attempts to convey its essence: 
... still trying to regain her face, her words, her shape. But it stayed away, 
frustrating as the imperative comment that leaves your mind as speech begins, 
and the mouth is left empty, a lost reference to love. (Delany 1966:42) 
Also important is the fact that one of the crew members selected by Wong, 
known as Mollya Twa, cannot speak English. Her reason for selecting her is that it 
will give the crew time to get acquainted with her before they "can say anything really 
foolish" (1966:45). It is also an example of the linguistic learning process they will 
have to undergo in attempting to fathom the intricacies of Babel-17. The Rimbaud is 
apparently sabotaged and becomes stranded in space without instruments. Wong 
solves the problem of determining their location without any navigational aids by 
referring "to another language in order to think about the problem clearly" (1966:57), 
and this is Babel-17. The highly mathematical solution to their predicament involves 
intersecting circular planes and a bag of marbles. Wong explains that the term for 
'Great Circle' in Babel-17 contains more precise information than its English 
counterpart and, more specifically, that "it carries the information right in the word" 
(1966:56). Babel-17 is more information-dense, and in written form uses less space 
than any four or five languages she knows combined. 
William Schuyler explains that philosophers refer to this linguistic mode of 
cognition as the "picture theory of meaning", and contends that Babel-17 must 
therefore be a 'picture' language (1982:89, 90). Schuyler attempts to examine whether 
or not a language with the characteristics of Babel-17 is at all tenable, ultimately 
concluding that it is not. But this misses the point, as Delany is more interested in 
examining functioning structural aspects of language than developing artificial new 
linguistic structures, though it is interesting to note the linguistic terminology he 
attributes to Wong in order to lend veracity to her investigation into Babel-17. The 
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three areas she has identified are possible phonemic structure, probable phonetic 
structure, and finally siotic, semantic and syntactic ambiguities (1966:50). 10 
Wong and her crew are invited for dinner at the residence of Baron Ver Dorco, 
who is "in charge of co-ordinating the various research projects against the Invaders" 
(1966:62). She ponders the upsetting fact that "her poems were popular on both 
sides", for, "born a galaxy away, she might as easily have been an Invader" (1966:60). 
Reflecting the arbitrary nature of the signifiers 'Alliance' and 'Invader', this idea will 
ultimately become the weapon with which she ends the Invasion itself. Wong does not 
realise that, through her work, she has achieved what both warring sides have 
dismally failed at thus far: communication. 
Ver Dorco says of the Alliance: "'We live in a world of isolated communities, 
each hardly touching its neighbour, each speaking, as it were, a different language'" 
(1966:60) - in other words, a post-Tower of Babel society. Furthermore, he believes 
that '"without the Invasion, something for the Alliance to focus its energies upon, our 
society would disintegrate"' (1966:60). Jebel Tarik expands on Ver Dorco's concerns: 
... with all nine species of galaxy-hopping life forms, each as widespread as 
our own, each as technically intelligent, with as complicated an economy, 
seven of them engaged in the same war we are, still we hardly ever run into 
them, and they run into us or each other about as frequently [ ... ] because 
compatibility factors for communication are incredibly low. (Delany 
1966: 122) 
How probable then is the extract from the Marilyn Hacker poem that forms the 
epigraph to part three, where she writes: "I would make a language we could all 
speak?" (1966:88), for as she observes in the epigraph to part one:" ... Here is the hub 
of ambiguity" (1966:5)? What are the chances of perfecting civilisation through the 
linguistic matrix that constitutes it if language itself is so impermanent and diffuse? 
Delany leaves this central paradox unresolved in Babel-17, but returns to some of its 
implications in They Fly at <;iron. 
Ver Dorco gives Wong a guided tour of some "gross, uncivilised weapons" 
perfected by the Alliance, but comments that the true weapon "is the knowledge of 
what to do with what you have" (1966:65)11 - which, as demonstrated in They Fly at 
<;iron, also includes using language as a weapon. It is interesting to note how Ver 
Dorco's frank and shocking views on the art and economics of warfare - which, given 
the date of the novel's publication, can also be seen as a reference to the Vietnam War 
- are light years apart from the conventional gung-ho bluster of space opera. The 
10 Delany could just be showing off here, of course, trying to dazzle the reader with jargon. 
11 This reminds one of Foucault's dictum that 'knowledge is power', as expressed in such books as The 
Order of Things ( 1970) and The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
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pnme exhibit is TW-55, a human spy genetically engineered to the limits of 
perfection, the physical counterpart of the linguistic perfection of Babel-17. It reflects 
Ver Dorco's Aryan-like view of human evolution: 
Medical science has progressed so that all sorts of hopeless human refuse lives 
and reproduces at a frightening rate - inferior creatures that would have been 
too weak to survive a handful of centuries ago. (Delany 1966:69) 
This is a more radical interpretation of Forester's original question, "Who is 
this animal man?" 12 (1966:6), and the difficulty of quantifying individuality. But, for 
Delany, such so-called 'human refuse' represents the diversity, creativity and sheer 
hunger for life that ultimately distinguishes those masses that so intimidate Forester. 
In Delany's physical description of an eventual member of Wong's crew, physical 
attributes are exaggerated to suggest the potency, virility and physical menace of a 
marginalised character who has asserted his individuality by inhabiting a social 
boundary: 
. . . Ron was small, thin, with uncannily sharp muscular definition: pectorals 
like scored metal plates beneath drawn wax skin; stomach like ridged hosing, 
arms like braided cables . . . He was unkempt and towheaded and sapphire-
eyed, but the only cosmetisurgery evident was the bright rose growing on his 
shoulder ... (Delany 1966:30) 
This highly romanticised view of perfection through marginalisation is concretised in 
the fantastic creatures known as the Winged Ones in They Fly at <;iron. 
Delany uses the Ver Dorco dinner to give a stylised, satirical portrait of the 
Alliance's ruling class intersected by the marginal and altogether different vision of 
society represented by Wong's spaceship crew. The two meet and mingle 
uncomfortably, and butt against the social boundary separating them. Delany uses 
imagery of appetite and hunger as a grim counterpoint to the scenes of cannibalism 
evoked at the beginning of the novel. Ver Dorco's wife says to Wong: '"You bring 
something so cool and pleasing, so fresh, so crisp"', which makes the crew resemble a 
salad (1966:75), a deliberate metaphor on the part of the Baroness, who shrewdly 
notes that her society would devour Wong and her band of misfits if given half the 
chance. By 'devour' she implies assimilating or homogenising the differences that 
challenge or even threaten her own orderly, staid society. This highly ritualised 
society, where individuality itself has been turned into a mechanised social function to 
rid it of any unpredictability or spontaneity, is symbolised by the banquet that the 
12 The juxtaposition of 'animal' with 'man' is particularly ironic. Of course, Forester's existential 
conundrum is one of SF' s 'great themes'. 
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Baroness controls from her seat by pushing a sequence of buttons. She explains to 
Wong the impact her crew has had: "' ... you come to us and immediately we start to 
learn things, things about you, and ultimately about ourselves"' (1966:75). 13 
The irony here is that, though Wong's crew and the Ver Dorcos speak the 
same language, the communication gulf that separates them is akin to Babel-17. The 
Ver Dorcos use language in a more ornate and elaborate way to render meaning 
opaque and ambiguous - thus what the Baroness says is essentially meaningless 
beyond its phatic value. Wong, on the other hand, sees language as a transparent or 
reflective medium that enhances or facilitates interaction and social cohesion, which 
is why Babel-17 is a such a frustration and a challenge. Where she sees a challenge, 
the Ver Dorcos see a threat, as they use language to codify social interaction. Their 
world and its ways are as if cast in stone, and thus they are unable to comprehend the 
true significance of Babel-17. 
In keeping with the theme of language as communication medium, the 
Baroness is described as "a muffled, vast vacuous silence" (1966:72), and Wong notes 
that "the small muscle shifts, those counter communications that she was used to in 
direct communication, were blunted in the Baroness under the fat" (1966:72). Ver 
Dorco himself is described as forming words "as languidly as the slow mandibles of 
the cannibal mantis" (1966:61), while Ron observes that the guests 'eat' Wong with 
their hungry eyes ( 1966: 77). 
A similar banquet scene occurs in They Fly at <;iron, where the Winged Ones 
arrange a feast in honour of the groundling Rahm who had saved the Bandsman 
Vortcir from a giant spider-like creature in a cave. Unlike the Ver Dorco dinner, 
which is a carefully choreographed social ballet, the feast put on by the Winged Ones 
is spontaneous, given openly to sensory pleasure and a celebration of their communal 
lifestyle. Rahm notes that "around him the Winged Ones caroused through the 
deepening evening" (1993 :99-100). Here food, m its mutual sharing and 
consumption, also has sexual connotations, with the meal itself an elaborate 
affirmation of life. 
A crucial function of the banquet scene in Babel-17 is to bring Wong and her 
crew closer together, with Ron accusing the poet of being incapable of understanding 
the intimacy of a triple's functioning: '"You write what you see. Not what you do"' 
(1966:76). But Wong reveals she is indeed a legitimate member of this social margin 
as she herself had been tripled with Muels Aranlyde (1966:76). 
Wong encounters an enigmatic stranger who describes the Baron as Cassius 
with a '"lean and hungry look"' (1966:81 ). This is prophetic for the stranger, later 
13 Delany uses the banquet to ritualise social interaction, which nevertheless is always unpredictable. 
Thus the Baroness can control the food, but not the interaction. 
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revealed to be TW-55 gone rogue, kills Ver Dorco during the banquet, and causes the 
Baroness's carefully-orchestrated culinary spectacle to descend into chaos. The first 
sign of the murder is a trickle of blood 'worming' from beneath the Baron's face 
(1966:84), a metaphor echoing Wong's earlier thought on realising there must be a 
saboteur aboard her spaceship: "Somewhere in Eden, now, a worm, a worm" 
(1966:63). The use of the word 'Eden' also suggests that she sees her ship as a 
microcosmic idealised society, and also recalls the utopian potential of Babel-17. 
The last chapter of part two simply ends with the single word "And-" 
(1966:87) as Delany breaks into a stream-of-consciousness technique to convey 
Wong's thought processes in Babel-17. It also symbolises a breakdown of traditional 
boundaries of communication as she is undergoing an epistemological crisis centred 
on the language that defines her self-identity. Wong realises that this identity is a 
social construct mediated by the symbolic properties of language, and not an 
expression of innate qualities attributable to a discrete character. This means she is 
what she has been named in terms of her work, social standing, and even social 
interaction: 
Names? What's in a name? What name am I? ... Words are names for things. 
In Plato's time things were names for ideas - what better description of the 
Platonic Ideal? But were words names for things, or was that just a bit of 
semantic confusion? Words were symbols for whole categories of things ... 
'My name is Rydra!' An individual, a thing apart from its environment, and 
apart from all things in that environment, an individual was a type of thing for 
which symbols were inadequate, and so names were invented. I am invented. 
(Delany 1966:88) 
On another level Delany is playing on the difference between the sign and the 
symbol. Saussure's theory of the sign as a basic element of communication ignores 
the referent or external object referred to by a sign, which led to American 
philosopher CS Pierce differentiating between the symbol, icon and index as different 
types of signs (Baldick 1990:205). Thus, as Slusser notes, the 'webbing' that restrains 
Wong becomes an ambiguous symbol for the social matrix in which individuals are 
either bound and entangled, or united, by language (1977:39). Thinking in Babel-17, 
Wong attempts to name the webbing that restrains her, for as she notes at the 
beginning of the chapter, something cannot be thought about if there is no word for it 
(Delany 1966:88). Schuyler explains that Delany' s inadequate attempt to convey the 
linguistic mechanisms of an alien language in English is a retrospective comment on 
the failures or limitations of language in general (1982:91). The level of structural 
depth Delany accords to his elaborate working description of Babel-17, which 
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Schuyler notes is the fullest such description in the entire novel (1982:92), is a 
remarkably sustained exercise in omission, implication, and suggestion: 
She 'something at the something'. The first something was a tiny vocable that 
implied an immediate, but passive, perception that could be aural or olfactory 
as well as visual. The second something was three equally tiny phonemes that 
blended at different musical pitches: one, an indicator that fixed the size of the 
chamber at roughly twenty-five feet long and cubical, the second identifying 
the colour and probable substance of the walls - some blue metal - while the 
third was at once a place holder for particles that should denote the room's 
function when she discovered it, and a sort of grammatical tag by which she 
could refer to the whole experience with only the one symbol for as long as 
she needed. All four sounds took less time on her tongue and in her mind than 
the one clumsy diphthong in 'room' . (Delany 1966:90) 
Weedman's comment that Wong is only able to perceive the pattern that is the 
webbing and so discover its weak point by thinking mathematically is a too-literal 
interpretation of the revelation later that Babel-17 is akin to a computer language 
(1982:44). What is important about Babel-17 is the unique mode of perception it 
engenders, and the impact this has on Wong's gestalt and traditional world view, and 
not the mathematical possibilities of its linguistic structure, though it is interesting to 
note that the first problem Wong solves using Babel-17 - when the Rimbaud is dead 
in space - is a mathematical conundrum. 
Following the webbing incident, Wong meets three of her captors, whom she 
is unable to place as Alliance or Invader as they are not readily identifiable, while the 
cosmetisurgery they sport conceals as much as it asserts individuality (Delany 
1966:96). To name or identify is to assert control or power over something, and thus 
Wong's lack of knowledge places her at an immediate disadvantage. She eventually 
learns that Jebel Tarik and his cohorts are looters, predatory mercenaries on the border 
of the Alliance-Invader war and tolerated for the scavenging role they fulfil, an 
amplification of Delany' s view that society has no centre but simply comprises 
intersecting margins. 
Realising that the pattern of spacecraft superimposed on a grid of space co-
ordinates is simply another version of the restraining webbing that she had broken by 
defining its weakest point, Wong enters Babel-17 mode again when Tarik goes to the 
assistance of an Alliance supply ship tracked by an Invader destroyer, and helps the 
looters break the enemy's defense net (1966: 103, 106). It is significant that the first 
Invader we encounter in the novel is a seven-month pregnant female, but instead of 
evoking reader sympathy, Delany accentuates the alienness of the Invaders by having 
Tarik comment that the Invaders place pregnant women on fighting ships as they have 
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faster reflexes (1966: 107). This defamiliarises patriarchal stereotypes of pregnant 
women as being helpless, but also makes sense in terms of protecting the species. 
Ironically, the character known simply as the Butcher, a name redolent of a 
violent existence in a violent war, makes a futile attempt to save the Invader foetus 
through surgery. Wong's first encounter with the Butcher leads her to the crucial 
realisation that he is incapable of articulating the concept of 'I' (1966: 111 ). She also 
further refines her understanding of the way Babel-17 functions: 
It was not only a language, she understood now, but a flexible matrix of 
analytical possibilities where the name 'word' defined the stresses in a 
webbing of medical bandage, or a defensive grid of spaceships. What would it 
do with the tensions and yearnings in a human face? Perhaps the flicker of 
eyelids and fingers would become mathematics, without meaning. (Delany 
1966:112) 
Schuyler remarks that "the possibility of a language with the characteristics of 
Babel-17 rests on certain assumptions about the human mind, the nature of 
knowledge, and the ways in which we can know" (1982:88). One of these 
assumptions is that the distinction between self and other is crucial for an individual 
to be able to function in society, but the Butcher clearly lacks this understanding, 
which leads to the question of whether or not he is, or can ever be, truly self-aware. 
Schuyler argues that the structure of Babel-17 imposes a specific mode of cognition 
upon the speaker, and since the language inherently contains all the information 
required, the Butcher is still able to perceive a gestalt or pattern, which becomes the 
self. 
Insofar as he can conceive of being an individual, he will think of himself as 
the whole pattern - his physical self will not be bounded by the surface of his 
body. Thus he can conceive of action, but only in terms of the pattern acting to 
alter itself. (Schuyler 1982:90) 
The Butcher's peculiar and apparently contradictory mode of cognition is also 
a reflection of the underpinning theoretical assumptions of structuralism, which, as 
Eagleton notes, is concerned with the general laws of structures, and only considers 
the individual units of systems in relation to each other and not as discrete entities 
(1983 :94). Therefore an effect of structuralism is "the 'decentring' of the individual, 
who is no longer to be regarded as the source or end of meaning" (Eagleton 1983 :40). 
The fact that 'meaning' is a construct not only implies that humans share systems of 
signification, but that meaning cannot be said to originate with any single individual: 
... language predated the individual, and was much less his or her product than 
he or she was the product of it ... the way you interpreted your world was a 
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function of the languages you had at your disposal, and there was evidently 
nothing immutable about these . . . Reality was not reflected by language but 
produced by it. (Eagleton 1983: 108-109) 
Derrida's campaign to reverse the privileging of speech over writing is also important 
in this context as writing "is that mode of language use in which the human individual 
is not present to authenticate it" (Sturrock 1979: 14). Language is "the most 
fundamental element of all in our socialisation" (Sturrock 1979:12), and it is 
'impersonal' because "it exceeds us as individuals", which implies that to use 
language is to surrender some aspect of our individuality (Sturrock 1979: 12). 
Saussure's observation that language is a form and not a substance indicates 
the proper concern of structuralism to be the "relations between mutually conditioned 
elements of a system and not between self-contained essences" (Sturrock 1979: 10), as 
meaning cannot exist without difference, which implies a systemic or relational 
approach. In terms of a text written by an individual author, this then implies that the 
text has been 'set free' from its conditions of production, and that 'the meanings it 
will henceforth yield . . . will depend on who reads it and in what circumstances" 
(Sturrock 1979: 14). This represents the singular strength of structuralism - though 
language "has powers we cannot control" (Sturrock 1979: 15), it "invites us to delight 
in the plurality of meaning this opens up, to reject the authoritarian or unequivocal 
interpretation of signs" (Sturrock 1979: 15). 
Language plays a crucial role in forming and articulating individuality. By 
positing a character with a radically different concept of self-awareness, Delany 
reveals how identity is mediated through language. The character of the Butcher can 
also be seen as a profound criticism of structuralism. Structuralism is opposed to 
humanism, and "has carried its strong bias against essentialism so far as to somehow 
deny the existence of human beings altogether" (Sturrock 1979:13). Thus the Butcher 
can be perceived as "an unstable, replaceable form within a soulless system" 
(Sturrock 1979: 13). 
This is achieved through his action of actually killing someone - but since the 
Butcher has no understanding of 'I', by definition he can entertain no concept of 
'murder'. However, the reader judges his actions from an individualistic basis - that 
is, from the viewpoint of his or her linguistic (and also conceptual and moral) 
framework. From the Butcher's viewpoint, he has simply reacted to external events, 
but the act of murder also reveals that he is lacking some vital component. Delany 
uses the shocking incident of the killing to impress upon the reader the inhumanity of 
the Butcher, which is also signified graphically by his name. This leads to the 
proposition that, if the Butcher cannot comprehend 'I', then it must mean that he has 
no self-identity, and thus he cannot be said to form a part of society. However, he can 
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never be said to be totally beyond the boundaries of society as he inevitably interacts 
with other people. The Butcher 'embodies' the very qualities that make Babel-17 such 
a mystery and a threat, but he is more a social cipher than a self-aware individual. 
Wong's quest to comprehend the nature of the Butcher's identity is to attempt 
to restore his sense of self-identity. To be able to do this she has to learn the language 
he speaks in order to understand his terms of reference, and then in a sense she has to 
reprogramme his linguistic ability - a significant metaphor as Babel- I 7 is akin to a 
computer language. Computers also have the connotation of being cold and lifeless, 
which emphasises the anti-humanism of Babel-17, which, in tum, is a reflection of the 
anti-individualism of structuralism itself. An interesting appendix to this debate is 
Naa's contemplation of "a single great consciousness" in They Fly at <;iron when 
asked by Rimgia what happens after death: 14 
Well, according to those elders, you and I are not really alive - we're not 
really living our lives, here and now .... What we think and feel and 
experience as our own consciousness, living through moment after moment, is 
really the one great consciousness reading our lives, from our birth to our 
death, as if one of us were just an entry in Ienbar's scrolls. (Delany 1993:30) 
Here Delany relates the concepts of individuality and identity to reading and 
writing: individuals are like marks on a page and, in the process of understanding 
those marks, comes the realisation that the marks cannot exist in isolation as they 
form part of a process. 15 In terms of structuralism, reducing individuals to patterns in 
a system is not a deliberate ploy to negate individuality, but is intended to 
comprehend the parameters of the articulation of identity, especially through language 
- whose characteristic use marks us as individuals, but which is shared by all, and 
perhaps exceeds us all. This shows how complicated the structuralist debate is -
stressing the lack of humanism in structuralism, without taking into account anything 
else, is a simple binary reduction. But nevertheless one has to be aware of the claim of 
possible anti-humanist trends within structuralism. Therefore the anti-humanist 
elements of Babel-17, such as the character of the Butcher, is part of the structuralist 
debate. 
Wong uses a combination of Babel-17 and her skills at reading body language, 
which she finally realises is actually a form of telepathy (in other words, an intuitive, 
non-verbal form of communication that, in a sense, is a picture language just like 
Babel-17) as "the nexus of old talent and a new way of thinking" that "opened worlds 
14 This is a fairly common idea in Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. 
15 The 'great consciousness' is, of course, also the author 'reading' the lives of his characters as he 
writes them. But to what extent can the characters be said to 'write' their own lives, or is this just 
anthropomorphising the creative process? 
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of perception, of action" (Delany 1966: 117), to form a 'wordview' of Geoffrey Cord 
and his plan to assassinate Tarik. But extended immersion in this type of cognition 
physically sickens Wong, which seems to indicate that humans are not physiologically 
adapted for such a heightened form of perception and communication. 
The Butcher promptly, and casually, kills Cord, which horrifies Wong with the 
contradiction of such "egoless brutality" displayed in a human being (1966: 117). But 
she notes revealingly that, "though bloody handed, he was safer than the precision of 
the world linguistically corrected" (1966: 117). Here Delany implies that, if our 
concept of language approaches the analytical perfection realised in Babel-17, then 
language would paradoxically surrender its meaning, for which it is dependent on 
difference, plurality, and multivalency - precisely the linguistic phenomena excised 
by Babel-17. 
At the end of the novel, Wong concludes that the fundamental flaw of the 
language is its exclusion of the symbolic process, "which is the way we distinguish 
between. reality and our expression of reality" (1966: 170). In other words, the 
language is the buffer or filter between ourselves and the real world. Wong does not 
realise immediately that the Butcher is a native speaker of Babel-17, which is a 
surprising lapse of her formidable analytical abilities. But this omission could be 
linked to that part of her character blinding her to the fact that she herself had 
sabotaged the Rimbaud. She had done this out of a subconscious fear of discovering 
who spoke and thought in such a language, as solving the conundrum posed by the 
alien language posed a radical threat to her own self-identity. 
When she did indeed arrive at a solution, what then? How would she have 
changed, and would she be aware of exactly how much she had changed? Would she 
still perceive the world in the same way as before, or would her very perception be 
altered or contaminated? She attempts to teach the Butcher the concept of 'I', but 
realises this is simply developing a private language for the two of them instead of a 
mutual exchange of linguistic frames of reference. A 'perfect' language defeats its 
purpose if no one can understand it, and such understanding can only be shared 
through common terms of reference. 
Despite Delany noting earlier that compatibility factors for communication 
between different species are low, Tarik's forces are assisted by a Ciribian ship when 
attacked by the Invaders. Wong ponders the futility of the Invasion in general, and 
notes that, though nobody likes it, it simply carries on by the sheer force of its own 
momentum (1966: 130), as its terms of reference are never called into question. 
Entitled 'The Butcher', part four begins with a telepathic mind-meld between 
Wong and the ex-convict, described as entering him "in some bewildering, reversed 
sexuality" ( 1966: 144): 
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... her mind shook inside his, curving to his pain or pleasure, strange emotions 
because they were ego-less and inarticulate, magic, seductive, mythical. 
(Delany 1966: 144) 
The Butcher is able to discern the pattern in Wong's mind that defines her poetic 
consciousness, which affirms Schuyler's comment that this form of cognition would 
primarily recognise such patterns in lieu of self-identity or self-awareness. The 
Butcher notes that the word 'poet' in Greek means maker or builder, indicating the 
process of how she uses language as a construction tool to make an end product in the 
form of the tangible structure of a poem. Furthermore, the Butcher notes that he 
perceives "the pattern named The Criminal and artistic consciousness meeting in the 
same head with one language between them ... " (1966: 145). The conflation of artist 
and criminal, an embryonic idea in Babel-17, and explored more fully in Dhalgren 
(1974), suggests that both are marginalised social roles, and that both perform 
essentially the same function of dislocation - that is, probing the paradigms of society 
from its borders, where those very paradigms begin to unravel. It also suggests that 
creativity may issue from social transgression, a very Romantic idea. 
Significantly, Delany describes Wong as being mirrored in the Butcher's 
mind, which recalls the beginning of the novel and General Forester pondering his 
own image reflected in a plateglass window. The term 'reversed sexuality' used to 
describe the intimacy of the mind-meld refers to the reversal of identity engendered 
by this mirroring process, as well as the notion of marginality sexuality in Babel-17 as 
a whole, especially the concept of the triple as a functioning social and sexual unit. 
Part five reintroduces customs officer Danil D. Appleby who, enamoured with 
Wong and her exotic friends upon their initial acquaintance, decides to revisit the 
"delightfully ethnic" meeting place (1966: 150) where he had witnessed Brass wrestle 
with the Silver Dragon. Noting that, though such activity is still considered illegal, it 
is nonetheless fascinating, Appleby exclaims to T'mwarba: 
I saw a bunch of the weirdest, oddest people I had ever met in my life, who 
thought different, and acted different, and even made love different. And they 
made me laugh, and get angry, and be happy, and be sad, and excited, and 
even fall in love a little ... And they didn't seem so weird or strange anymore. 
(Delany 1966:153-154) 
In other words, despite their status as social misfits, they evoked 'normal' reactions in 
Appleby, which leads him to the realisation that his perception of eccentricity is just 
that - his own construct, based on the norms and values that society at large upholds. 
The point is that, if we relativise marginality, we must also interrogate normality. 
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Appleby decides to pay a visit to the cosmetisurgery establishment Plastiplasm 
Plus ('Addendums, Superscripts and Footnotes to the Beautiful Body'), and have a 
miniature dragon in a cage grafted to his shoulder as a symbol of his new 
broadmindedness in tolerating, accepting, and embracing social deviance (1966: 151-
152). Bearing in mind that Delany regards the dragon as a symbol of jouissance, the 
miniature version that Appleby has attached to his nervous system, and which he can 
make "whistle, hiss, roar, flap his wings and spit sparks" (1966:152) satirises the fact 
that his new knowledge is only skin deep. 
Appleby' s intersection with the social margin represented by Wong has left no 
lasting impression upon him and, as with General Forester, communication has failed. 
Society may have no centre and only comprise intersecting margins, but Delany 
pessimistically suggests that the social dislocation needed to appreciate this view is 
beyond ordinary humans, who cling blindly to what they know best. 
The discorporate crew tell T'mwarba that "'sometimes worlds exist under 
your eyes and you never see"', and that Wong '"cut through worlds, and joined them 
... so that both became bigger"' (1966:162-16J). After Wong breaks the mind-meld 
with the Butcher that had merged their identities into a single personality, she tells 
T'mwarba that '"the word for Alliance in Babel-17 translates literally into English as: 
one-who-has-invaded"' (1966: 170), a linguistic echo of the role reversal originally 
used to describe the mind-meld. 
She writes the best prose sentence of her career, namely: "'This war will end 
within six months"', which is circulated to top Alliance officials so it can be 
"semantically imprinted" on their minds (1966: 173). Ironically, there is nothing earth-
shatteringly original about this utterly prosaic line; certainly it did not need the calibre 
of a poet of Wong's stature to write it. But the point is that it took someone of her 
intellectual ability to be able to understand Babel-17 and its functioning, which is 
what ultimately makes the sentence such an artistic achievement: it expresses 
precisely how the alien language functions, and uses that understanding to achieve the 
end of the ruinous invasion. Wong also notes that the Alliance has the best possible 
tool with which to realise this statement as truth -namely Babel-18. This is also a 
political expression of the connection between language and power. 
Whereas Babel-17 is recognisably SF in that it is clear the author has welded 
his linguistic concerns to a conventional space-opera framework, They Fly at <;iron 
(1993) is more problematic to identify and locate in a particular genre as Delany uses 
those very linguistic concerns to generate generic dislocation. The peculiar problem of 
generic pigeonholing posed by SF and fantasy can be highlighted by Baldick's 
definition of the term - which, it must be noted, is merely a sample of the surfeit of 
definitions currently available. 
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Baldick describes fantasy as "a general term for any kind of fictional work that 
is not primarily devoted to realistic representation of the known world" (1990:81 ), 
and SF as "a popular modem branch of prose fiction that explores the probable 
consequences of some improbable or impossible transformation of the basic 
conditions of human (or intelligent non-human existence") (1990:200). 16 They Fly at 
<;iron is an example of a novel that partakes of the qualities given in both definitions 
without fitting comfortably into either camp, which suggests that the difference 
between these two genres may only be a matter of degree. 
The novel is fantasy in that the Winged Ones are clearly an extrapolation of a 
stock fantasy trope, namely dragons; 17 but the way Delany logically extrapolates the 
parameters of an alternate, possibly utopian society using the Winged Ones as a 
reference point also clearly makes it SF. From the viewpoint that the novel examines 
the intersection of an impossible rural idyll with the colonising forces of a larger 
civilisation, it may even be defined as a form of historical fantasy - which is an 
example of the recomplication of the traditional definition of SF. 
In Babel-17, Delany conveys the 'alienness' of the language by revealing that 
it cannot be defined by another language, which demonstrates how language functions 
in maintaining social reality. He uses a similar, but slightly different, approach in 
They Fly at C::iron by adopting the world view of a people whose language is 
fundamentally similar to, yet crucially different, from the rest of the people that 
inhabit their world. The focus is what happens when it collides, or forcibly intersects 
with, antagonistic world views. This 'collision' produces the end result of Babel-17 -
namely, the 'corrected' version of the alien tongue that is simply numbered 18 - and 
Delany posits this as the fundamental strength and flexibility of language, namely its 
ability to adapt. 
But if, as structuralism contends, our very identities and the social reality in 
which we are embedded are an inextricable outcome of language, what happens to our 
world view when that language changes or is challenged? Will there be a mighty fall 
as with the Tower of Babel or, as Mario Pei contends, will civilisation itself be 
rendered perfect when we come to the fundamental realisation that language - the 
very mirror-image of civilisation - is itself imperfect? 
The prose poem at the beginning of They Fly at <;iron expands on the idea in 
Babel-17 that compatibility factors for communication are low when dealing with 
opposing cultures and even different species. Delany suggests that harmonious 
16 Edward James notes that "the borderline between fantasy and [SF] is one that has been endlessly 
debated ... the distinction between the two is blurred still more if the fantasy is being written, as it 
often has been, by writers of sf, who will often, playfully, treat magic with rigorous logic, effectively 
making it an alternative science" (1994: 178-179). 
17 Or angels? 
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interaction is possible, but such cultures that do intersect are inevitably altered by the 
encounter and, against the larger background of evolutionary progression, often fade 
into the mists of history. 
Among the tribes and villages and hamlets and townships that ornament the 
world with their variety, many have 
existed 
in mutual support, exchange and friendship. Many others have stayed to 
themselves, regarding their neighbours with hostility and suspicion. Some have 
gone from one state to the other. Some have even gone back. But when the 
memory of a village is no older than the four or five generations it takes a 
grave-scroll record to rot, there is no history - only myth and song. (Delany 
1993:13) 
That the novel ends with just a myth - in the form of a separate short story that 
recounts the world of <;:iron as the stuff of legend - suggests that neither the <;ironians 
nor the Winged Ones ultimately survive as intact societies, which poses the further 
question of whether or not the cultural experience embodied by these societies has 
also been lost. This is the timeless tragedy of the Tower of Babel: that humanity 
struggles to reach a point of perfection, or even limited understanding, only to 
undergo a cyclical relapse that renders all earlier achievements meaningless. 
In They Fly at <;iron, Delany posits a society that is Edenic in its perfection, 
but this very perfection is its downfall as it has no knowledge of alternative world 
views due to the fact that its language is the entire world that it inhabits. This means 
that the society lacks the crucial survival mechanism of being able to assimilate 
opposing views without being totally subsumed, which would strengthen its social 
matrix against dissolution in a larger cultural context. The key to that downfall is 
language, as the <;:ironians, who live in harmony with the natural world and each 
other, have no words for weapons of war, and thus are unable even to comprehend 
what is happening to them when their village is invaded by the colonising Myetrans. 
Like the Alliance in Babel-17, Myetra is a militaristic hierarchy bent on conquest as a 
means of expanding its boundaries to prevent its own extinction. 
The novel begins with Prince Nactor callously shooting captives of war as 
they are "dogs'', and Lieutenant Kire trying to extract the reasoning for this inhumane 
act from his superiors without appearing insubordinate. It is interesting to note that 
Kire, a member of the 'enemy' camp, is used as a viewpoint character, as this subverts 
the traditional binary opposition of portraying the Myetrans negatively and the 
<;:ironians positively in terms of moral and ethical considerations. This tenuous 
boundary dividing the two camps is blurred further as it is unclear which 'side' the 
Winged Ones will support until the end of the novel. Delany introduces two crucial 
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signifiers in 'powergun' and 'Winged One' which, like 'Babel-17', are deconstructed 
and recomplicated throughout the course of the novel. 
Darko Suvin writes that "SF is distinguished by the narrative dominance or 
hegemony of a fictional 'novum' (novelty, innovation) validated by cognitive logic" 
(1979:63). Suvin defines a novum as "a totalising phenomena or relationship 
deviating from the author's and implied reader's norm of reality" (1979:64), and 
argues that this is the "necessary condition" for SF, provided it is validated by 
"scientifically methodical cognition" (1979:65-66). 
The novum focuses on 'newness' or 'difference', but seems to be merely an 
amplification of the traditional sign, rather than a totally new critical tool functioning 
in the context of SF. Delany argues that Suvin's strategy to unearth the "necessary 
and sufficient" conditions for SF is intrinsically doomed, as no other literary genre is 
thus defined. He comments further that "the dream of scientificity that haunted early 
structuralist criticism also haunts [SF]" (1994a: 192). Delany favours deconstruction 
as a powerful literary instrument to pry apart the mechanisms of SF, with a particular 
emphasis on the traditional sign, as opposed to such alternative terminology as the 
novum. He explains that signs function to produce a web of meaning, an image he 
uses in both Babel -17 and They Fly at <;iron: 
... the general concept that meaning is not contained in the sign but is extrinsic 
to it, i.e., that the ontological location of meaning ... lies in the signifier's 
relation to other signifiers, and that the signified is therefore always a web of 
signifiers. (l 994a:248). 
This concept is critical to understanding They Fly at <;iron, which concerns 
language and the web of meaning it casts. At the same time as it analyses language 
from a structural perspective, it also uses language as a vehicle for literary expression, 
with these two aspects existing in relation to each other like opposite faces of a coin. 
In other words, writing about language can illuminate its functioning, but cannot step 
beyond its functioning, because it is also a construct. There is obviously no alternative 
to using language to write about language, but one has to be aware that, far from 
solving the problem, it merely takes it to another level of debate. 
For example, Delany's linguistic ideas are at the forefront of Babel-17 in the 
form of the technical discussion about the structure of the alien language, which is a 
metaphor for how our own language moulds our view of reality. Such ideas are 
implied more than they are stated explicitly in the narrative of They Fly at <;iron, 
where linguistic debate and the main story are integrated seamlessly. Delany's textual 
strategy differs in the two novels, but his aim is the same: to engender debate about 
language, through language. 
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They Fly at <;iron introduces us to the warlike Myetrans, who are dedicated to 
plunder and conquest in order to maintain the vitality and scope of their empire. The 
Alliance and Myetra can be said to represent the pinnacles of their respective 
civilisations, but the initial inference is that both these societal models are 
fundamentally flawed. The initial encounter between Forester and Wong takes the 
form of a class confrontation: Forester represents the military hierarchy that has a 
vested interest in the Invasion continuing, while Wong represents the faceless masses 
that disturb the General with their anonymity and unpredictability. Whereas the 
intended purpose of the meeting is professional, Forester finds himself responding to 
Wong on a social level, but is not sure where he stands with her as she is a famous 
Oriental poet, and thus not an ordinary citizen - nor an ordinary woman. Similarly, 
the initial encounter between Kire and Rahm at the beginning of They Fly at <;iron is 
also a class confrontation: it represents the first meeting between Myetra and one of 
its future conquests, but with a particularly ironic twist in that Kire's attempt to save 
Rahm from the 'attack' of the Winged One by using his powergun is an empty 
gesture, for the Myetrans will later destroy Rahm' s village, while ultimately we learn 
that the Winged One had only flown down to try and help Rahm in his struggle with a 
puma. 
As in the failed communication attempt between Forester and Wong, Delany 
again illustrates the misunderstanding and lack of empathy apparently endemic to 
human interaction. This is the first time that Rahm has ever seen a weapon - clearly 
the device is akin to a 'ray gun' of traditional space opera, but by using the signifier 
'powergun', Delany introduces the concept via a different world view. It is ironic that, 
having just killed a puma, Rahm calls the weapon "a frightening thing" (1993:22). For 
Kire, the encounter with the "man and a beast" (1993 :20) represents his first contact 
with a <;ironian. When he asks Rahm if all members of his village go about peaceful, 
naked and weaponless, or if he himself is just 'simple-minded' (1993:23), it is clear 
that Delany is treading a delicate balance between lampooning the rural idyll of <;iron 
and upholding it as a model of societal perfection. Delany's point could also be that 
'perfection' itself lapses into caricature. 
Rahm does not understand the concept of a weapon, but explains he was able 
to kill the puma bare-handed as he is "'stronger than any animal in this land"' 
(1993 :23 ), which implies that <;iron lives in harmony with nature instead of 
attempting to impose its own will on the world as Myetra does. Significantly, the 
mysterious Winged Ones living in the mountains at Hi-Vator represent the only thing 
the <;ironians are afraid of, which hints at the innate prejudice and insularity of this 
idyllic society. 
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Interestingly, Rahm's fight with the puma can also be contrasted with the 
staged contest between Brass and Dragon at the beginning of Babel-17, the former 
being a Darwinian struggle of the fittest, and the latter a ritualised assimilation of 
antisocial tendencies. In his physical description of Rahm and Kire, Delany seems to 
equate the former with passion and spontaneity, and the latter with reason and 
intellect: 
. . . the wide, brown face, the hair sweated in black blades to a cheek and a 
forehead still wrinkled with gasps from the fight. The eyes were molten amber 
- wet and hot. 
(The lieutenant's eyes were a cool, startling green). (1993:21) 
Delany begins chapter one with the brutality of Prince Nactor as symbolic of 
the predatory, destructive nature of Myetran society, while our first glimpse of yiron 
in chapter two sees Naa and Rimgia discussing complex philosophical ideas - a stark 
contrast that raises the question of whether it is actually Myetra or yiron that 
represents an ideal form of 'civilisation'. Described as having visited "'dozens of 
lands'" and having '"learned the songs of people all over the world"' (1993:33), the 
character of Naa is similar to Wong in that she is an artist articulating what is 
important and pertinent to her own society from its boundary or edge. 
Rimgia says of the wandering singer: "' ... thou makest us, for the moments of 
thy song, soar like men and women with wings"' (1993:33), which not only implies 
that Naa is a repository of experience and wisdom collected on her travels, but that 
she is also a communal fount of hope and imagination to be tapped by isolated 
villages such as yiron in their understanding of, and potential interaction with, the 
larger world around them. In a sense she articulates the boundary separating yiron 
from the rest of the world - a boundary that marks difference and opposition. The 
reference to winged people is significant as it seems to suggest that, while yiron's 
fear of the creatures of Hi-Vator stems from a lack of knowledge about them, they 
literally look up to the Winged Ones as higher beings. 
Rimgia asks Naa what happens after death, and she recounts the idea about the 
'great consciousness' referred to earlier 'reading' the lives of the characters. The 
connection between writing and identity shows that yiron is a literate society but, as 
the prose poem suggests, such written records and the history it represents are only as 
permanent as the scrolls they are inscribed upon. The 'single consciousness' also 
plays on the concept of logocentrism, which Baldick defines as "the desire for a 
centre or original guarantee of all meanings" (1990: 125), which subverts the concept 
of differance. 18 
18 It may also refer to the Hindu-based concept that all consciousness is ultimately one. 
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The very identity of the ephemeral creatures known only as the Winged Ones 
arises from their contrast or relation to the <;ironians, with neither culture able to 
define itself in isolation. It is clear Hi-Vator is a much more sophisticated society than 
<;iron: a matriarchy ruled by the Old Queen, and, with its own creation myth, it 
reverted back to a barter economy after having decided a monetary system did not 
meet its egalitarian needs. 
Rahm's journey of discovery in Hi-Vator begins when he flees the destruction 
of his village by heading into the mountains, and rescues a Winged One trapped in a 
giant spider web in a cave. The web can be seen as the social matrix binding both Hi-
Vator and <;iron through the medium of a common language with which they define 
their mutual reality. The scene recalls Wong 'thinking' in Babel-17 in order to free 
herself from the restraining webbing by comprehending the totality of its pattern. 
Delany recomplicates this idea in They Fly at <;iron: the webbing also represents the 
constrained view of each other the two societies are caught up in. The meeting 
between Rahm and the Winged One becomes the symbolic interface between the two 
cultures, as well as representing the distinguishing differences comprising the 
boundary separating them. 
Delany suggests that such a boundary is not necessarily divisive or restrictive, 
but can be seen as a fertile area of cross-pollination between the two cultures - a 
veritable seed bed of interaction and commingling. However, the encounter between 
<;iron and Myetra reveals the potential violence and disruption of such contact. But. 
on the other hand, these are themselves creative forces to be nurtured rather than 
repressed. At first Rahm is astonished when the captive creature addresses him in his 
own language, revealing his own innate social prejudice. Whereas Babel-17 dealt with 
the intricacies and parameters of a fictitious language, They Fly at <;iron deals with 
the essential paradox of two different societies and species nevertheless sharing a 
common language. 
This has profound implications for Mario Pei's contention that civilisation will 
only be perfected when language itself is rendered 'perfect'. With <;iron and Hi-Vator 
as control and experimental societies, Delany shows that 'civilisation' and 'language' 
are not objects that can be rendered perfect, but instead are dynamic and mutable 
processes generating boundaries to control and even subvert their interaction. 
Language is perhaps the defining sign of a sentient species, and socialised through 
their culture to comprehend the Winged Ones as animals, the <;ironians had never 
thought them possessed of such a faculty. 
The difference between Rahm and Vortcir is indicated by the fact that, even 
though they share a common language, the former is unable to understand certain 
words of the latter, including 'station' and 'ironic'. This may be taken to represent a 
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class difference between the two, but Delany deliberately confounds this initial 
boundary with Vortcir' s musing that the Cironians are perhaps a "finer people" 
(1993:83) than the Winged Ones. 
"Vortcir," Rahm said, as they walked, "my people go naked on the 
ground. Thy ... people go naked in the air. Both are easy with the land about 
them. We fight with our hands and our feet - and then only what attacks. We 
love our kind and are at peace with what lies about us. But ... this is not true 
of all creatures ... ". (1993:81) 
This is ironic as Rahm himself has human blood on his hands as earlier he had 
killed Mowkry in what Uk described as a fit of "absolute, enraged and blood-stopping 
evil" (1993 :67), the intensity of which had chilled Uk. An added irony is that Rahm 
later uses Uk' s exact phrasing when faced with a charging Myetran. The same words 
are used, but in a different context, which suggests that perception is relative and 
subservient to circumstance. The subsequent horror at his actions causes Rahm to flee 
into the mountains; but he realises that what he is trying to flee is within himself, 
namely the capacity for violence. 
He tells Vortcir that he is no longer the same person he was before the 
incident, and doubts whether he will be able to return to Ciron because of what has 
been awakened within himself. This is akin to Babel-17 when Wong's personality is 
subsumed by the alien language - she becomes a stranger to herself. What is 
important is that both these traumatic events precipitate journeys of discovery and 
quests for meaning and self-definition. 
Rahm has crossed a boundary and, while he realises there is no return to his 
previous state, he still fails to understand that the only way for himself, Ciron and 
indeed Hi-Vator to survive such encounters is through assimilation - which is the 
secret of Myetra's successful colonisation campaign. Interestingly, the fact that Rahm 
had killed a man does not necessarily signify that Ciron is inherently primitive. 
Vortcir states that his people also commit murder, even though they know this to be 
wrong, but the perpetrator is always caught and punished. 
The novel can be seen as an extended meditation on Ciron as exemplar of an 
ideal society in terms of social grouping and relation to the external world as 
mediated by the boundary of language, which is an osmotic interface allowing 
different ideas and concepts to filter through in order to both enrich and strengthen 
the society, as Naa's stories do. But Rahm's symbolic ascent to Hi-Vator introduces 
him to the notion that Ciron is far from perfect. Indeed, this ascent can even be seen 
to represent the Biblical story of the Tower of Babel since the knowledge Rahm gains 
is what changes his view of Ciron. 
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In his portrayal of the Winged Ones, Delany seems to offer another meditation 
on social harmony. Vortcir says his people's unique view of the world enabled them 
to see what atrocities were committed below in the name of civilisation. The Winged 
Ones practised "a policy of self-containment, helped on by a bit of mild, if mutual, 
hostility" (1993 :79) in order to maintain the boundary between itself and the rest of 
the world. The association with traditional Christian angels is perhaps deliberate -
they are higher beings watching over the world below, but choosing not to get 
involved in the grubby affairs of humanity. Delany adds a further complication by 
hinting that, perhaps, the Myetrans themselves are the perfect civilisation due to their 
ability to expand across elastic social boundaries by absorbing other cultures and 
societies. The disruption generated by this is a force of growth driving the engine of 
social change - change that will impact on both Myetra and <;iron. 19 
Delany's aim in bringing Rahm and Vortcir together as representatives of their 
respective societies is to illustrate the point that, however varied they may be, these 
societies are merely the sum of their differences. Rahm initially concludes that the 
Winged Ones are a people very like his own, but, "with their mysterious and mystic 
notions - money and God - these folk had again to seem wholly foreign" ( 1993: 100). 
He finally comes to the realisation "that it was precisely those differences that made 
them a people" (1993 :95). 
Rahm raised his hand to finger the chain at his neck, that made him, at least 
honourably, some sort of personage among these incomprehensible creatures. 
What, he wondered, would he tell the Winged Ones who wanted to know what 
ideas were most central to his own, groundbound nest site? (1993: 100) 
The chain also symbolises the ties binding Rahm to his particular <;ironian 
world view, while the question he articulates is at the crux of the novel's forward-
looking reflection on Mario Pei. What is the interface between language and 
civilisation, between individual identity and social grouping? At what point can the 
boundary be drawn, and recrossed? 
Delany cautions against the notion that society must naturally have a centre 
from which it can be defined and contained. Instead it is an intersecting web of 
flexible boundaries or interfaces that have to be mediated. To counter the 
logocentrism implicit in Rahm's 'journey of discovery', he introduces the character of 
Qualt, <;iron's garbage collector. His function renders him an outsider in terms of 
social standing, but at the same time gives him a unique insight from the perspective 
of the social boundary circumscribing his world-view. When Rahm befriends a 
19 
'Perfection' depends on the criteria used: is it communalistic contentment, or the ability to grow and 
survive? 
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Winged One who itself is an outsider, Delany intersects the 'main' text with a 
marginal viewpoint. This provides a different, but equally valid, perspective on both 
societies - and through these alternative viewpoints an image of the total society is 
arrived at. In other words, a holistic overview - or a bird's-eye view - is gained of 
both societies. Brenda Marshall comments that 
A critique of logocentrism, then, must include a rigorous examination of 
language because within the logocentrism of our Western tradition language 
provides the mediating system through which thought (or meaning) is 
physically manifested. (1992:21) 
Although Rahm and Vortcir speak the same language, there are subtle and 
fundamental differences. The latter notes that, while both share the same word for 
'star', the Winged Ones "had no single word for 'ear', but more than ten for its 
various parts and functions" (1993 :88). That the <;ironians have no word for 
'powergun', and thus do not understand the concept of a weapon, precludes their fate 
at the hands of the colonising Myetrans, showing how important language is in 
comprehending external reality. This is not to suggest, though, that language creates 
reality, as per the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which has been generally discredited in 
linguistic circles.20 It merely indicates that a correlative link can be made between 
language and social reality in how the former is used to explicate and construct the 
latter. 
By contrasting Rahm and Qualt, and <;iron and Hi-Vator, Delany also 
explicates the structuralist concept of binary opposition as conveyed in the terms 
signifier and signified. Binary logic "is based on the primary distinction between 
identity and difference", and "we come to think of our social and cultural world as a 
series of sign systems, comparable with languages" (Marshall 1992:43). In language, 
"the perception of identity is the same as the perception of difference; thus every 
linguistic perception holds in its mind at the same time an awareness of its own 
opposite" (1992:44). 
This is a key concept in the type of structuralism that Delany exemplifies in 
both Babel -17 and They Fly at <;iron. He draws on two distinct strands: on the one 
hand, he is particularly interested in Saussure's semiology based on his classic 
delineation of the sign into a signifier in written or spoken form, and the signified or 
meaning. On the other hand, he also draws on the 'structural anthropology of Levi-
20 Walter Meyers explains that "the central question oflinguistic relativity is this: does our perception 
of reality constrain our language, or does our language constrain our perception of reality?" This 
principle of linguistic relativity is the Sapir-Whorfhypothesis (1980:159-160). 
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Strauss, which states that "individual elements have meaning only in so far they are 
part of an overall system" (Jefferson 1986:93). 
The crux of structuralism is the belief that culture is akin to language, as it also 
contains signs organised in a similar fashion. It is important to realize that 
structuralism is not a school or a doctrine, but "a generalised revolution in ways of 
thinking" (Jefferson 1986:94). What Delany does in both Babel-17 and They Fly at 
<;iron is to apply this revolutionary 'way of thinking' to SF, which has its own unique 
and flexible signification system. Barthes defines structuralism as the reconstruction 
of an object "in such a way as to manifest the rules of functioning" of this object 
(1986:303). An example of this is analysing cultural artefacts by means of 
contemporary linguistics. Delany does this in a retrospective fashion by focusing, in 
tum, on the 'artefacts' or signifieds of SF itself, and thereby adding a further cultural 
or societal dimension to their traditional valence within the genre. 
SF is a particular application of language, and Delany' s primary focus is on 
the functioning and properties of language itself. In Babel-17 he articulates this 
concern by having a heroine embark on a quest to comprehend the alien language of 
an invading species, but ultimately she has to confront the nature of her own self-
identity. Instead of Babel-17 being the 'perfect' language, which Mario Pei contends 
would axiomatically result in a 'perfect' civilisation, Wong's interaction with the 
enigmatic Butcher leads to the birth of Babel-18 - in essence, she re-enacts the story 
of the fall of the Tower of Babel. 
In They Fly at <;iron, Delany examines the same problematic interface 
between language and civilisation by depicting three distinct societies, each claiming 
to be exemplars of perfection, and how their different applications of language impact 
on their relationships with each other. \:iron is an Edenic rural idyll but, with no 
concept of weapons or war in its language, it is easy prey for the colonising Myetrans. 
Without any sense of such sophisticated concepts as religion or money, \:iron is 
described as not being civilised enough to be taken seriously - but it is a society that 
lives in harmony with nature and itself, even if this introspective isolation is the cause 
of its downfall. 
Disturbingly, Myetra claims to be the superior civilisation due to its ability to 
expand and absorb other cultures (and, of course, due to its superior technology). The 
social boundary separating Myetra from other cultures is not a passive delineation, but 
is seen as a zone of violent, if generative, conflict and chaos fuelling the social engine 
driving change and adaptation, and thus the cyclical nature of history. Kire asks Naa: 
"Do you know anything about Myetra, singer? It's a pleasant place - but there 
are too many people in it. There is not enough food- and above all not enough 
land for all our people. You see us now taking lives, breaking apart cultures 
56 
and traditions .... But soon what you will see, in a band from water to water, 
is the growth of a rich, intelligent, and wonderfully hardworking and 
resourceful people, taking land, making food, imparting their ways and 
wonders on these myriad backwards folk who have no notion of their own 
histories ... ". (Delany 1993: 135-136) 
Whereas Delany uses the fictitious decentred language of Babel-17 to expound 
on the anti-humanism implicit in structuralism, he tackles the concept of binary 
opposition in They Fly at <;,iron, together with the basic structuralist tenet that 
meaning only exists in difference or opposition. This plurality of meaning in the 
language/civilisation debate also indicates Delany's move towards post-structuralism 
for its added flexibility and ambiguity in dealing with such complex issues. Jefferson 
notes that "the primacy of the system over what it represents is a conclusion that 
poetics derives from the extension of the Saussurean model" (1986: 106). 
Structuralism is ultimately concerned with the way in which meaning is produced, 
and sees language as a self-sufficient system not predetermined by the intentions of its 
speakers. But herein lies a central dilemma, as articulated by Marshall: 
Such an emphasis begins to free meaning from absolute represyntation and to 
move it toward the postmodern notion of meaning as constructed. Individual 
experience is understood in social terms. But the structuralist paradigm closes 
this movement down just as it opens it up, by referring to social actions as a 
system of norms. Thus, the absoluteness of one-to-one representation is 
replaced by the absoluteness of rules and mechanisms (for Saussure, the rules 
of a language). It remains for poststructuralist theory to historicise these rules, 
and thus, to break open the closed structural system. This move by 
poststructuralism, however, would have been unthinkable without 
structuralism's rupture of meaning, from pure essence to social construction. 
(1992:30) 
There are several noticeable instances in both novels where Delany engages in 
such a 'rupture of meaning'. One is the notion in Babel-17 of language as a mirror 
reflecting reality, as opposed to being a transparent medium through which some 
ultimate form of reality can be glimpsed. Another is the notion of society as a tangled 
web of interrelationships lacking a definable centre point, a web whose entanglements 
can be negotiated and untied by language, in the same way Wong 'sees' the 
weaknesses of the binding holding her captive by thinking in Babel-17. 
Another more amorphous notion in both novels is that any form of societal 
disruption or intrusion, such as invasion or colonisation, becomes an interface for 
contact that is as potentially stimulating as it is initially destructive. In Babel-17, 
Wong 'ends' the ruinous invasion by redefining its terms of reference in the alien 
language, and thus nullifying the very definitions that had upheld the mutual 
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aggression for so long. In They Fly at <;iron, we learn that the goal of Myetra is to 
forge a vast communal society sharing its strength and wisdom by assimilating lesser 
'backward' societies like <;iron. Such colonising practices do have ethical 
implications, but Myetra is of the opinion that its actions are justified and in the best 
interests of all concerned as it serves its own greater good, which is seen to be the 
greater good for everybody (this is typical of colonizing nations' self-justification). 
Perhaps the most slippery signifier of all is the Winged Ones, those graceful 
creatures who watch the folly of humanity from their mountain-top society, and who 
seem to suggest for Delany a state of physical and societal perfection only hinted at 
through language. In Babel-17, the gender and sexual/political issues to dominate 
such later novels as Triton (1976) are still dormant, though the notion of a 'triple' 
foreshadows Dhalgren (1977). The cosmetisurgery that Forester undergoes to 
differentiate himself as a person inhabiting the social margin of Wong's spaceship 
crew is given full expression in the Winged Ones, who are not only radically different 
in physical form but, more importantly, seem androgynous. By negating sexual 
differences through androgyny, Delany presents the Winged Ones as a truly 
egalitarian species . 
.. . these were a people among whom the women's furry breasts were scarcely 
larger than the men's, and that the men's genitals were almost as internal as 
the women's. The distinction between the sexes was only minimally evident 
.... (Delany 1993:86) 
The use of the words 'margin', 'rim' and 'edge' in close proximity underlines 
the status of the Winged Ones as a peripheral society. It is interesting to note that, 
while these creatures appear androgynous, they are fully sexual. Kire recounts in an 
appendix forming a marginal addition to the novel itself of how a group of Winged 
Ones submitted him to a "game of desire" after they had "just vanquished the whole 
of a Myetran brigade" (1993:219). That he feared the Winged Ones in this bizarre 
erotic encounter is ironic because these creatures were next on the Myetrans' list of 
conquests. The only hint of intimacy in Babel-17 occurs when Delany ddcribes 
Wong as entering the Butcher's mind "in some bewildering, reversed sexuality" 
(1966:144). Delany suggests that sex, like language, is a boundary or interface of 
communication between people. This idea will be explored more fully in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter Two 
The Anatomy of Difference 
At the end of They Fly at C::iron, Delany subverts the traditional notion of a novel's 
ending or conclusion by adding on several shorter pieces that reflect on, or expand, 
the themes in the novella. 1 One of these, 'Return to <;iron', concerns Kire's account to 
a Calvicon historian about "something unmentioned" (Delany 1993 :217), a sexual 
game of desire that a group of Winged Ones asks him to join. This is just after the pall 
of battle has passed, with Kire's life having been saved by Rahm. He is wandering 
dazed around the camp, which is littered with the corpses of the fallen, and tainted 
with the smoke of pillage. 
The Winged Ones' exhortation to the 'groundling' to "play a game" 
(1993 :219) seems jarringly out of place. That the game itself is sexual seems equally 
bizarre in the circumstances.2 Kire is afraid of the Winged Ones as "they'd just 
vanquished the whole of a Myetran brigade" (1993:219), and so is understandably 
hesitant to go against their wishes. He recounts how he is borne aloft on the back of a 
Winged One, accompanied by two others, and is transferred between them in the air. 
"We play the game of desire, along the chain of desire ... We tangle the chain 
in our play!" One piece and another, my clothes came away ... 
The three of them at me, shook me and pleasured me, bit at me - .. . 
Do you understand? Moments before, I had been by a dying man .. . 
But now, with these three lovers upon me, my bodily perceptions were 
cajoled, caressed, excited to a pitch, an altitude, where language could not 
follow . . . As I floated and flowed and soared above words, listening to their 
me wings and scrittings, I let a sound that was wholly animal ... ( 1993 :221) 
Both Babel-17 and They Fly at C::iron are about the primacy of language, and 
yet Delany ends the latter with an account that is peripheral to the main narrative, but 
which overshadows it with its disturbing intimations of experience beyond language, 
of language's failure to articulate feeling or reason. The game of desire that Kire takes 
part in portrays sex as an interface for communication, but the 'chain of desire' that 
binds them together is also a complex set of power relations that uses the body itself 
1 Derrida refers to a parergon or "supplement outside the work" (1982:55) as something that extends 
the boundaries of the traditional novel. It defers the anticipated ending, and subverts the notion of 
closure. 
2 This 'game of desire' also subverts the notion of the Winged Ones conveyed in the novella - and the 
fact that this happens beyond the boundary of the traditional closure point, namely the 'ending', is even 
more subversive. The Winged Ones' androgyny has the corollary of making them appear to be asexual, 
or uninterested in matters of the flesh. Portrayed as 'higher' creatures, as symbolised by their 
mountain-top home, the fact that they even feel desire makes them appear more human - and more 
alien at the same time. 
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as a site of discourse, and a locus of identity. McNay explains the 'cultural 
significance' of the body: 
... it is impossible to know the materiality of the body outside of its cultural 
signification. The psychic impulses and drives of the body may form the 
threshold of sexual identity, but these drives are not pre-social, rather they are 
always already produced within the signifying network of gender. Since the 
body cannot be known in its unadorned essence, sexual liberation cannot be ... 
sexuality without power relations. . . . Once we accept that desire and power 
are indissolubly linked, that sexuality gains its shape from historically specific 
power relations, then we can begin to imagine new forms of desire which are 
not hampered by the myth of a state of powerlessness. (1992:30) 
This chapter will focus on Delany' s interest in power relations and sexual 
identity, using the materiality of the body as a point of focus and contestation. I will 
look at two novels: the first, Triton (1976), is an SF novel about an idyllic utopia 
where not only every nuance of sexual orientation can be fulfilled, but is categorised 
and thus normalised. The main protagonist is Bron Helstrom, and the central theme is 
his quest for self-identity - or to fix an identity with which he is happy - which leads 
to a change of gender at the end of the novel. By constructing an artificial society, 
Delany is able to reveal how social institutions and practices are codified, and their 
impact upon power relations, with the body as a site of struggle and intersecting 
discourses as exemplified by Helstrom' s quest. 
I will also look briefly at The Mad Man in order to highlight complementary 
themes and issues, and the different ways in which Delany approaches them (The Mad 
Man is discussed again in Chapter Five). In his 'Disclaimer' Delany describes his 
novel as "a pornotopic fantasy" (l 994b:xiii). It is a thriller about graduate student 
John Marr' s research into the life and work of philosopher Timothy Hasler, a quest 
that plunges him into the shadowy realm of marginal gay sexual practices in post-
AIDS New York. Marr's ostensible aim is to attempt to understand who Hasler was, 
but the more he finds out, the more it throws his own self-identity into question, until 
the boundary between his research and his own life is crossed. 
I link between these two seemingly disparate novels via the work of Michel 
Foucault, who states that sexuality is "an especially dense transfer point for relations 
of power". Foucault's example "in resisting the naturalising assumptions that 
undergird normative sexual behaviours" (Bristow 1997: 170) has led to modern 
theoretical discourses such as 'queer theory' :3 
3 David Gauntlett defines queer theory as "a set of ideas based around the idea that identities are not 
fixed and do not determine who we are. It suggests that it is meaningless to talk in general about 
'women' or any other group, as identities consist of so many elements that to assume that people can be 
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There is no doubt that Foucault's significance for queer theory lies in the 
particular emphasis he puts on the discursive construction of eroticism, 
especially how and why desire has been damagingly constrained by the ways 
in which we have come to talk and think about a late nineteenth-century word, 
sexuality, particularly in its limited dualistic 'homo-' and 'hetero-' forms. 
(Bristow 1997: 170) 
By 'queer theory' I do not wish to oversimplify my position by seeming to 
indicate that these novels are reconstructionist visions of socio-sexual activism. 
Homo- and hetero- forms of sexuality should not be taken to mean a simple binary 
opposition, as I wish to show that Delany' s main concern is "the cultural management 
of differences between men and women, between generations, and between classes" 
by examining "how and why eroticism is bound into structures of inequality" 
(1997:172). 
James Miller cites Foucault as arguing that the term 'gay' has become obsolete 
due to the transformation of our understanding of the concept of sexuality: "We see 
the extent to which our pursuit of pleasure has been limited in large part by a 
vocabulary foisted upon us" (1993:254). Foucault goes on to point out that there is 
"an infinite range of what we call sexual behaviour" (quoted in Miller 1993:254). 
Delany is concerned with sexuality as the expression of an overarching 
institutionalised normative structure, and the various strategies and expressions that 
people adopt in resistance and subversion of this structure - which, at the same time, 
maintains and extends that structure. 
The novels have different structures. Triton depicts a fictitious liberal society 
where there is much sexual freedom but endless classification, while The Mad Man is 
about how an individual challenges society through the peripheral practices of a 
sexual subgroup. I think Delany's aim is identical in both novels: to explicate power 
relations in terms of how they function, and are engendered. The concept of sex goes 
far beyond such classifications as 'homo-' or 'hetero-'; it is a complex interface 
between the individual and his or her society, and is one of the primary means by 
which such an individual mediates him- or herself in terms of that society. 
This leads back to the concept of power relations, and how these are mediated 
between individuals in a social and institutional context, and how this struggle is 
inscribed upon the battlefield of the body itself. Barry Smart states that Foucault's 
work is aimed at interpreting the human condition in a way "that effectively revealed, 
seen collectively on the basis of one shared characteristic is wrong. Indeed, it proposes that we 
deliberately challenge all notions of fixed identity, in varied and non-predictable ways" (1999). 
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beneath surface appearances, conflicts of interest and power at the level of the social 
formation, the individual psyche, and humanity in general" (1985:14). 
A main theme of this pouvoir-savoir - which, as Merquior notes, is the 
original French term for power-knowledge relations (1991: 108), has been "the 
historical inscription of relations of power-knowledge upon the body". This is 
combined "with the forms, modalities, practices and 'techniques of self through 
which 'the individual is constituted and becomes conscious of himself as a subject"'. 
Smart notes that locating the body as a central locus in the operation of power 
relations reveals the body to be located "in a political field invested with power 
relations which render it docile and productive, and thus politically and economically 
useful": 
This political technology of the body - the calculations, organisations, and 
techniques linking power relations, knowledge and the body - has no specific 
institutional locus although institutions use it or employ certain of its methods. 
In consequence the analysis of relations of power, knowledge and the body is 
not situated at the level of social institutions, rather the focus is upon the 
diffusion of particular technologies of power and their inter-relationship with 
the emergence of particular forms of knowledge, notably those sciences which 
have human beings, the individual, as their object. (Smart 1985 :77) 
McHoul and Grace agree, and state that "political practice therefore cannot be 
separated from the fundamental philosophical question of 'being' or 'subjectivity"' 
(1993 :57), noting that, for Foucault, "the question of subjectivity, and the political 
struggles associated with 'identities' constitutes the most important issues of our 
time". Foucault states that, 
in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, 
and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated 
nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and 
functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without 
a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the 
basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through 
power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. 
(quoted in McHoul and Grace 1993:59)4 
4 Discourse is an important concept for Delany: "Discourses are plural and are learned, with language, 
where they function as a particular economic level in the linguistic array. They are not a set of criteria 
that are to be met or missed by a text. Rather, they lodge inchoately in the processes by which we make 
a text make sense .... They are revisable, often within themselves. The maintenance of a discourse, 
like the revision of a discourse, always involves some violent rhetorical shift - though the final effects 
of that violence may well be in some wholly unexpected area of understanding that the discourse 
effects" (1999:8). In other words, discourse permeates a text. The 'violent rhetorical shift' that Delany 
refers to is the process of dislocation in action, which is an operating parameter of discourse. 
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Foucault poses two main questions about power: how, and by what means, is it 
exercised?; and what is the impact or outcome of the exercise of power? He states that 
"power is not conceived as a property or possession of a dominant class, state or 
sovereign but as a strategy" (quoted in Smart 1985 :77). 
. . . the effects of domination associated with power arises not from an 
appropriation and deployment by a subject but from 'manoeuvres, tactics, 
techniques, functionings': and a relation of power does not constitute an 
obligation or prohibition imposed upon the 'powerless', rather it invests them, 
is transmitted by and through them. (quoted in Smart 1985 :77) 
Foucault argues that power is 'omnipresent' (Merquior 1991:111), as well as 
being anonymous and comprehensive: "It makes cogs in its machinery of us all, high 
and low; ruling and ruled" (quoted in Merquior 1991: 114 ). Commenting on the first 
volume of his History of Sexuality, Foucault explains that his aim was to "highlight 
the discourse of sex in relation to 'polymorphous techniques of power"': 
Sex was [no longer] something one simply judged; it was a thing one 
administered'. Since the dawn of the industrial age, Western civilisation 
colonised our biology: it devised an 'anatomopolitics' - the planning of the 
population. Human sciences such as psychology, medicine and demography 
seized on the 'confessed' body as an object of social concern and 
governmental manipulation. Once more, a crucial alliance between power and 
knowledge was struck. (quoted in Merquior 1991 : 121) 
Foucault defines "sexuality" as an "historically constructed apparatus", with the 
"disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population" forming the two axes 
about which "the organisation of power over life" revolved. The discourse of sex 
came about mostly as a 
technology of the self wielded by the bourgeois sculpting his own image. The 
bourgeoisie built a code of sex for its own self-assertion. It erected the 
heterosexual monogamous couple into the standard of morality and pillar of 
society. Every other form of sex came to be regarded as contrary to nature and 
dangerous to society. (quoted in McHoul and Grace 1993:123) 
The main site of this mediation and interface, the locus of resistance and 
expression of sexuality, is the human body. Turner explains that, "in modem societies, 
power has a specific focus, namely the body, which is the product of political/power 
relationships" (1984:34). As an object of power, the body is produced so as to be 
"controlled, identified and reproduced" (1984:34). Foucault referred to 
'anatomopolitics' as the disciplines of the body, while 'biopolitics' concerns 
populations (quoted in Turner 1984:34). I will argue that the SF format gives Delany 
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a unique opportunity to explore this theme by extrapolating a future society with all 
its attendant institutions and social apparatus, placing his main protagonist in the 
midst of this society, and revealing the interaction between the individual body and 
the collective societal body. In Babel-17 and They Fly at (:iron, the focus was on the 
interface between language and society, while in these two novels the interface is 
between the corporeal individual and a discorporeal society. 
The Mad Man complements Triton in that it concerns a specific social set-up -
in this instance, the gay S&M subculture - and how an individual from outside this 
society is assimilated into it. The difference here is that the social set-up is a given, as 
it is based on reality, with Delany aiming to reveal the body as a point of convergence 
for power relations. We not only inhabit society, but society is an integral component 
of our own make-up. Delany focuses on sex in both novels - Helstrom is a former 
prostitute, and Hasler becomes initiated into 'deviant' sex - as sex and power 
relations are closely related. Foucault argues that "rather being the natural origin of 
desires, sex is in fact a cultural construct that is produced with the aim of social 
regulation and the control of sexuality" (McNay 1992:28). 
The construct of 'natural sex' performs a certain number of regulatory 
functions: firstly, it makes it possible to group together in an 'artificial unity' a 
number of disparate and unrelated biological functions and bodily pleasures; 
secondly, by unifying these disparate pleasures, it bolsters a regulatory notion of 
a 'natural' heterosexuality; finally, the notion of sex inverts the representation 
of the relationship of power to sexuality, so that, rather than seeing sexuality as 
a phenomenon produced and constructed through the exercise of power 
relations, it is seen as an unruly force which power can only attempt to repress 
and control. (1992:29) 
Foucault comments that "we have witnessed a visible explosion of unorthodox 
sexualities" (1978:49). Lois McNay notes that the notion of sex as a regulatory 
construct "disrupts binary distinctions between the natural and the cultural contained 
in the sex/gender distinction" (1992:29-30). By this she means that gender is not only 
the name attributed to a pre-given sex, but is also the means by which sexes are 
produced and established (1992:30). 
As Kathryn Woodward notes, "the body offers potential boundaries to the self 
and presents both the uniqueness of each individual and a site for the marking of 
difference" (1997 :65). This leads her to the concept of embodiment, described as "a 
common concern with how the bodily bases of people's actions and interactions are 
socially structured in different ways" (1997:65). Woodward argues that, in order to 
comprehend embodiment, a person needs to understand how our corporeality is 
shaped by social and natural processes. 
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This means we need to understand the body not only in terms of biology and 
how it functions to keep us alive, but how "it shapes our identities and structures our 
interventions in, and classifications of, the world" (1997:65). The concept of 'identity' 
is critical to such an understanding, for "the physical body is one site which might 
both set out the boundaries of who we are and provide the basis of identity - for 
example, sexual identity" (1997: 13). If sexuality is one aspect of identity, then 
identity is obviously a crucial starting-point for social differentiation and 
classification. As Woodward notes: 
... the concept of identity raises fundamental questions about how individuals 
fit into the community and the social world and how identity can be seen as 
the interface between subjective positions and cultural situations. Identity 
gives us an idea of who we are and of how we relate to others and to the world 
in which we live. Identity marks the ways in which we are the same as others 
who share that position, and the ways in which we are different from those 
who do not. Often, identity is most clearly defined by difference, that is by 
what it is not. Identities may be marked by polarisation, for example ... by the 
marking of inclusion or exclusion - insiders and outsiders, 'us' and 'them'. 
Identities are frequently constructed in terms of oppositions such as 
man/woman, black/white, straight/gay, healthy/unhealthy, normal/deviant. 
(1997:1-2) 
Woodward goes on to explain that identities are "produced, consumed and regulated 
within culture", and the 'identity positions' that are assigned to us, or projected by us, 
are rendered meaningful through symbolic systems of representation, including 
language and visual images: 
Representation includes the signifying practices and symbolic systems 
through which meanings are produced and which position us as subjects. 
Representations produce meanings through which we can make sense of our 
experience and of who we are. We could go further and suggest that these 
symbolic systems create the possibilities of what we are and what we can 
become. Representation as a cultural process establishes individual and 
collective identities and symbolic systems provide possible answers to the 
questions: who am I?; what could I be?; who I do want to be? (1997: 15) 
This raises interesting questions about the process of identification - of who does the 
identifying, and how identities become fixed. Is identity immutable, or fluid? And is 
there such a thing as a 'true' or 'essential' identity? Woodward questions if the 
assertion of identity refers to "some essential quality", either by establishing that this 
is inherent in a person, or by pinpointing its "authentic source in history?" (1997:39). 
This refers to another aspect of identity, namely gender, and whether this is 
biologically predetermined or socially inculcated. The implication of this, states 
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Woodward, is that the very articulation of identity has become contested, because the 
site on which all this is focused - the body - is a battleground for the "marking of 
difference" (1997:29). Difference is perpetuated through the very symbolic systems 
referred to earlier. Woodward argues that: 
... ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions 
have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy 
experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference between, within and 
without, above and below, male and female, for and against that a semblance 
of order is created. (1997:33) 
Paradoxically, the social order is maintained through binary oppositions, as 
things exist in relation to each other, and only find meaning and definition through 
such relation. But the relation is not nearly so simple or even obvious, as in terms of 
gender and identity issues, where one set of terms is weighted against the other and 
underpins social divisions as well. This returns us to language as a classificatory 
system that mediates power relations in society: 
. . . binary oppositions - the most extreme form of marking difference - are 
essential to the production of meaning . . . Difference can be constructed 
negatively as the exclusion and marginalisation of those who are defined as 
'other' by outsiders . . . On the other hand, it can be celebrated as a source of 
diversity, heterogeneity and hybridity, where the recognition of change and 
difference is seen as enriching .... (Woodward 1997:35)5 
It is in this complex context of power relations, identity, gender and the quest for 
political and social utopia that I will examine Triton and The Mad Man as contrasting, 
and yet complementary, discourses on alternative forms of sexuality - the former 
legitimised through the conventions and tropes of SF as an imagined utopia; and the 
latter legitimised by being a realistic novel about marginal gay sexual practices in a 
contemporary urban setting. Both discourses articulate different structures of power 
and knowledge relations, which are not nearly as straightforward as indicated by the 
above statement. 
Triton deals with the marginal underbelly or social intersections of the utopia 
it constructs, while Delany refutes his apparent 'mode' of realism in The Mad Man by 
introducing the novel with a 'disclaimer' stressing its non-realism, and interjecting 
descriptions of a fantastical winged and horned beast stalking the Hudson River in 
Central Park, New York, which have the effect of making the novel seem more of a 
5 In line with Woodward's argument, I cannot over-emphasise the importance of the idea that 
dislocation is not a negative concept, but, through disruption and eruption, is a powerful agent of 
meaningful change. 
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fantasy than Triton ostensibly is. Through such recomplication, Delany attempts to 
illustrate the fluidity and complexity of the social systems underpinning his 
discourses, and how multivalent power and knowledge relations become when they 
are institutionalised to the point of constructing the very fabric of society, which 
becomes an illusory and shifting background against which issues of gender and 
genre are examined. 
Marc Zaldivar notes that, with Triton, "Delany consciously enters the history 
of discourse surrounding the utopian/dystopian polemic" (1999), with Russell 
Blackford commenting that the novel "is an experiment in radical utopian narrative" 
(1996: 142).6 But what exactly is meant by utopia? Zaldivar lists the following 
questions that are raised by the term: What does it imply to have an ideal society? 
Does this imply ideal citizens? What assumptions and limitations do an author, and 
the reader, contend with in modelling an ideal? Darko Suvin explicates Thomas 
More's original use of the term 'utopia' (1979:37): 
Utopias operate by example and demonstration, dialectically. At the 
basis of all utopian debates, in its open or hidden dialogues, is a gesture of 
pointing, a wide-eyed glance from here to there, a "travelling shot" moving 
from the author's everyday lookout to the wondrous panorama of a far-off 
land. (Suvin 1979:37) 
The book's first subtitle, 'An Ambiguous Heterotopia', was coined between 
the first and third drafts, and was intended to "exaggerate a textual dialogue" with The 
Dispossessed by Ursula K Le Guin, itself subtitled 'An Ambiguous Utopia' (Zaldivar 
1999). Delany himself states that his "added subtitle was an attempt to put the two 
novels clearly into a dialogue I already felt was implied" (Philmus 1990:301). In the 
same interview, Delany refers to the medical definition of heterotopia as "the removal 
of one part or org~ from the body and affixing it at another place in or on the body" 
(1990:301), such as a skin graft or sex change - with a sex-change operation itself 
being a critical turning point at the end of the book. But the most important definition 
of 'heterotopia' is that of Foucault in the preface to The Order of Things - a definition 
which Delany quotes as a frontispiece to the second appendix of Triton, virtually at 
the end of the novel:7 
6 In 1996, Wesleyan University Press in the US reissued the 1976 Bantam Spectra edition under its 
original title, Trouble on Triton, which, unlike the bland and non-committal original signifier, 
immediately introduces a dystopic element. 
7 Walter Meyers comments that "whether Foucault's influence was good for Delany's art is doubtful: 
George Steiner says The Order of Things produces, on first reading, "an almost intolerable sense of 
verbosity, arrogance, and obscure platitude", and his was one of the kinder reviews. Similarly, Triton's 
reviewers in the science-fiction magazines found little to praise in the novel" (1980: 183). 
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Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is 
nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; 
they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries 
where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias 
are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because 
they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the 
syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax 
which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold 
together'. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: they run with the 
very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the 
fabula: heterotopias ... desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the 
very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilise 
the lyricism of our sentences. (Foucault 1970:xviii) 
Part one of the novel, 'Trouble on Triton, or Der Satz', is prefaced by Willard 
Van Orman Quine's statement in Word and Object that "no two of us learn our 
language alike, nor, in a sense, does any finish learning it while he lives" (1976:1). 8 
Delany refers to language as "a stabilising mechanism" in The Mad Man, with the 
world itself made from language - "i.e., that it is constituted by the structure of its 
stabilising forces" (1994b:67-68). With language as the main stabilising force in 
society, a heterotopia can be seen as revealing the world as a constructed object, and 
to challenge that construct at its most fundamental level - that of language. How these 
stabilising forces are structured in terms of power and knowledge relations in the 
heterotopia that is Triton is a main concern of the novel. The quotation from Natural 
Symbols by Mary Douglas that prefaces the whole novel is a reflection of the 
Foucauldian discourse on power and knowledge relations in terms of the locus of the 
human/social body: 
The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived. The 
physical experience of the body, always modified by the social categories 
through which it is known, sustains a particular view of society. There is a 
continual exchange of meaning between the two kinds of bodily experience so 
that each reinforces the categories of the other. (Delany 1976: preface)9 
Delany contends that SF is not about the future, but is in dialogue with the 
present: "It works by setting up a dialogue with the here-and-now, a dialogue as 
intricate and rich as the writer can make it" (Philmus 1990:320). He also remarks that 
8 Walter Meyers comments that Triton is "a storehouse oflinguistic themes", with the main focus being 
semantics. Each of the seven chapters is headed by a quotation by a notable linguistic philosopher 
(1980:183). 
9 One could quite easily conclude that Triton focuses on the 'social' body at the expense of the 
'physical' body. There is little, if any, of the graphic content that characterises The Mad Man, for 
example. 
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SF is "fundamentally different from utopian thinking", and that "to force SF into 
utopian templates is a largely unproductive strategy", as "utopia presupposes a pretty 
static, unchanging, and rather tyrannical world" (1990:320). Referring to this notion 
of a dialogue with the present - that is, extrapolating from current trends and 
institutions - Kathy Acker remarks in the foreword to the Wesleyan University Press 
edition of Triton that, "in 1976 Delany, magician, was prophesying or creating the 
San Francisco of 1996" (1996:xi). 
In other words, the heterotopia that is Triton is, in effect, a discursive space in 
which contemporary notions about power and knowledge relations with regard to the 
body and its identity, and the accompanying social structures, are extended into a 
fictive realm in order to map out their consequences. It is also about the contestation 
and assertion of identity, and articulates questions about what constitutes identity, and 
how identity is mediated in a social context. This makes for a complex, interrelated 
debate about the link between representation and identity, as Woodward notes: 
Questions can be raised about the power of representation and how and why 
some meanings are preferred. All signifying practices that produce meaning 
involve relations of power, including the power to define who is included and 
who is excluded. Culture shapes identity through giving meaning to 
experience, making it possible to opt for one mode of subjectivity ... 
However, we are constrained, not only by the range of possibilities which 
culture offers - that is, by the variety of symbolic representations - but also by 
social relations. ( 1997: 15) 
Jonathan Rutherford contends that identity is the intersection of social, cultural 
and economic relations, and that it represents the conjuncture "of our everyday lives 
with the economic and political relations of subordination and domination" 
(Woodward 1997: 15). This debate is complicated further when one considers that 
Delany is also writing from a poststructuralist stance. As Zaldivar notes, "Delany 
proves himself to be firmly in the post-structuralist debate as he questions 
simultaneously the limits and margins of a social system and the idea of a centred 
structure around which the social system operates" (1999). Derrida makes the 
following point about centred structure: 
No doubt that by orienting and organising the coherence of the system, the 
centre of a structure permits the free play of its elements inside the total form. 
And even today the notion of a structure lacking any centre represents the 
unthinkable. Nevertheless, the centre also closes off the free play it opens up 
and makes possible. (Zaldivar 1999) 
This creates "a seemingly contradictory, definitely paradoxical, relationship 
between a centre and the free play of the elements within the larger structure" (1999). 
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It also implies a fruitful arena for identity contestation and articulation, for "social 
systems offer new ways of making sense of the experience of social divisions and 
inequalities and the means whereby some groups are excluded and stigmatised" 
(Woodward 1997:15). Delany articulates a similar idea in The Mad Man: 
... large-scale, messy, informal systems are necessary in order to develop, on 
top of them, precise, hard-edged, tractable systems - or, more accurately, 
structures that are so informal that it is questionable whether they can be 
called systematic at all are prerequisites for those structures that can, indeed, 
be recognised as systems in the first place. (1994b:243) 
This raises questions about how identity is institutionalised, and how certain 
identities come to enjoy primacy over others, which are marginalised. This complex 
debate about society and its social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion takes place 
on a heterotopic level in Triton "from within and without of the textual boundaries", 
meaning that Triton is "a hard novel to name" as it repeatedly questions "the problem 
of naming, and therefore centring" (Zaldivar 1999). By applying the 'name' of 
heterotopia within SF boundaries - and yet integrating disparate genres such as the 
romance novel and sociological exposition - Delany's text opens up possibilities 
beyond its simplistic SF labelling. 
Robert Philmus remarks that the "utopian possibilities of Triton's social 
dimension, or the whole dimension of the book that goes along with utopia, seem to 
be decentred, to be in the background" (1990:305). This is because everything we see 
and learn about the world of Triton is mediated through the character of Bron 
Helstrom, whose thought on the very first page of whether or not he is "a reasonably 
happy man" forms the basis of his quest for identity and meaning that underpins the 
novel - both in terms of self-identity, and for how identity itself functions and is 
constituted. 10 The only external viewpoint is offered by the two appendices, with 
Delany himself commenting that he "wanted to leave the suggestion that there is a 
political side to these problems that the rest of the narrative - at least as it's been told 
from Bron's point of view - has up till now repressed or been blind to" (Philmus 
1990:302). 
Delany refers to the four modernist world views expressed by WH Auden: 
New Jerusalem is "the technological super-city where everything is bright and shiny 
and clean"; Brave New World is where "everything is regimented and standardized"; 
Arcadia is "that wonderful place where everyone eats natural foods and no machine 
larger than one person can fix in an hour is allowed in"; and the Land of Flies is 
10 It is interesting to compare this to General Forester's thought at the opening of Babel-17: "What is 
this animal man?" (1966:6). 
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where "fire and flood and earthquake - as well as famine and disease - are always 
shattering the quality oflife" (1990:303). 
SF can be perceived as "a concert of these four images: all four, either through 
their presence or absence, always spoke from every SF text" - and it is this interplay 
that complicates the utopian/dystopian dialectic and prevents it from being a 
simplistic binary split or schism. Delany extends Auden's argument by stating that 
postmodemism has added a further two images: the "techno-chaos" of Junk City, with 
the "country landscape polluted with technological detritus" as the "corresponding 
rural image" (1990:304). 
Delany implies that dystopia is intrinsically inherent in utopia - with both 
social conditions being different sides of the same coin. All four of these images are 
inherent in Triton, which marks the applicability of the 'heterotopia' label. Zaldivar 
argues that "it is the compilation of these paradoxically different societies being 
blended into one model that makes Triton such an intricate work . . . [Delany] refuses 
to let the reader, or even his main character, settle on any sort of fixed meaning" 
(1999). 
This is precisely because meaning is not, and cannot be, fixed - particularly in 
a social system, which is a compact between individuals. What is crucial, argues 
Delany, is the seemingly invisible process whereby meaning appears to become fixed 
- that is, how a social system is eventually over-determined. Zaldivar states that 
"perspective is always in play" (1999) and, as Derrida argues: 
In the absence of a centre or origin - everything became a system where the 
central signified is never absolutely present outside a system of difference. 
The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the 
interplay of signification ad infinitum. (Zaldivar 1999) 
Zaldivar argues that Bron refuses to accept the system of difference that underpins 
Triton's social structure, which functions by means of a "fundamental internal 
contradiction": 
There is no centre, except those that are created momentarily by the free play 
of the elements of the system. Most accept this and create momentary centres, 
as they should do. Bron, however, wants to escape the system and become an 
'individual'. He cannot accept his position of being implicated in the game of 
difference. This is the source of his anxiety. He wants his meaning to be the 
transcendental meaning - the timeless, true meaning - and the quest for it 
drives him to madness. (1999) 
Madness as a part of creative and destructive impulses is an important theme 
in The Mad Man. If a defining term in Triton is 'heterotopia', its counterpart in The 
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Mad Man is 'ekpyrosis', which is found written in excrement on the wall of John 
Marr' s trashed apartment after the philosopher's death by stabbing at the Pit off Times 
Square. Graduate student Marr, who is studying Hasler for a thesis, finds out that this 
is a term coined by the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, meaning conflagration or 
apocalypse, and "generally assumed to refer to the end of the universe, when 
everything ... would collapse into fire" (1994b:307). 
Marr follows in Hasler's footsteps by simulating his proclivity for sexual 
experimentation, which leads to his own 'ekpyrosis' in an orgy eerily reminiscent of 
the one that preceded Hasler' s death, and even featuring some of the same people. 
Marr understands 'ekpyrosis' as "that all-consuming, all-cleansing Heraclitean fire ... 
which is itself the Heraclitean notion of change and flux raised to such a level beyond 
flux or rage that nothing can escape it, that no man's or woman's flow can quench it" 
(1994b:480). 11 
Both heterotopia and ekpyrosis function to challenge our concept of social 
order, and to break it down and reconstitute it in such a way that the constructed 
nature of reality, and our own complicity, is laid bare. The implication, of course, is 
that we can build society anew once we understand how it functions, which is one of 
the driving forces behind the utopian impulse. If utopia is taken to mean a dialectic by 
which the flaws in present social arrangements are highlighted through contrast with 
alternative arrangements, then The Mad Man can also be said to display utopian 
elements (which are countered by dystopian elements; one could argue that it is only 
by a considerable feat of divergent thinking that The Mad Man can be considered an 
example of utopian literature). 
Like the latter novel, the former also engages with Foucault, but the quote that 
Delany highlights at the beginning of The Mad Man suggests a completely new focus 
on, or re-engagement with, Foucault: "The bios philosophicus is the animality of 
being human, renewed as a challenge, practiced as an exercise - and thrown in the 
face of others as a scandal" (1994b:5). Prefacing this is a prose poem or proem 
describing a winged centaur-like creature in graphic detail, beginning with its sexual 
organs, which also symbolises the site of sexuality, identity and gender that is 
circumscribed in the course of the novel: 12 
11 Foucault provides a structuralist description of madness or heterotopia: "Things themselves become 
so burdened with attributes, signs, allusions that they finally lose their own form. Meaning is no longer 
read in an immediate perception, the figure no longer speaks for itself; between the knowledge which 
animates it and the form into which it is transposed, a gap widens. It is free for the dream ... Thus the 
image is burdened with supplementary meanings, and forced to express them. And dreams, madness, 
the unreasonable can slip into this excess of meaning" (1965:18-19). Ekpyrosis represents such a 
proliferation, where meaning is so overburdened or shadowed by interpretation that it descends into 
chaotic flux. 
12 The beast symbolises madness and chaos. Foucault notes that "madness fascinates because it is 
knowledge. It is knowledge, first, because all these absurd figures are in reality elements of a difficult, 
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Black, raddled, roped with veins, it rose like a charred tallboy from snarled 
loins. Below, the texture and colour of overripe avocados, testicles hung like 
rocks. It sagged in the envelope of flesh that held it to the belly, almost as high 
as the navel's gnarled pit. A black cock on a hulking white man? A dog's dick 
on a humongous buck? Only beyond seven feet, it wasn't a man ... (l 994b: 1) 
Delany goes on to describe how this creature defecates and urinates: 
Now the tail jerked aside, to let honking gases, then drop its crumbling turd, 
black, grass- and bone-rich, steaming on the frost - while before its belly, 
urine arched, heavy, sudden, gold, to spill and splat, angrily on the macadam. 
Unconcerned with where it slopped, first it reached back to maul its still-
delivering sphincter, then to raise the thick man hand, swung inadvertently 
through its stream, to its mouth, to enjoy its salts, the stench on its fingers ... 
(1994b:2) 
The importance of this description is highlighted further on when Marr is 
engaged in fellatio, and the recipient accidentally urinates into his mouth. Delany 
describes this voiding as "an arbitrary consecration, with the substance and essence -
the bread and wine - of his body ... a gift of grace, that I could not have sought, but 
that only he could have given" (1994b:78). The biological functioning of the mythical 
creature of the proem is described as being totally naturalistic, and as being an 
integral part of the creature's existence. By terming the byproducts of the human 
body - which can be taken to include perspiration and seminal secretions - as bread 
and wine, though, Delany is consecrating them as being vitally symbolic of our 
corporeal essence. This, in tum, highlights Foucault's concept of the animality of 
being human, with Delany suggesting that the baser functions of being human should 
not be taken to mean that they debase existence. Instead it represents a level of 
intimacy with the physical body that is essential to the representation of a total human 
creature. This is akin to the utopian sentiment embodied in the Winged Ones of They 
Fly at <;iron, which represent an ideal mental and physical totality. In The Mad Man, 
there is a much greater level of graphic detail, which renders the utopian impulse 
heterotopic. This is part of the challenge and practice that Foucault argues must "be 
thrown in the face of others as a scandal". 
Hans Jam es notes that the current thinking is that everything is constructed, a 
logical outcome of the critique of the self initiated by Nietzsche more than a century 
hermetic, esoteric learning" ( 1965 :21 ). The beast is a symbol of animality - a symbol that the novel 
seeks to embrace. Interestingly, the beast can also be linked to the Amnewor in 'The Tale of Plagues 
and Carnivals': "Both are collage monsters, formed of fragments and disparate traits, held together only 
by the desire of a reader to make them into a whole, to form them into a coherent entity" (Delany 
1999:129). 
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ago (1995:1). Thus the subject is taken to be a fiction, "a function in social discourse 
through which certain modes of power are modulated" (1995: 10). James states further 
that the concept of "a thoroughly constructed human being obviates the need for us to 
contemplate the bodily parameters that precede and work in concert with the 
constructions that develop at any particular site" (1995: 12). This means that the 
body's function as an interface in societal discourse supersedes its physical reality, 
which leads to disembodiment. Karlene Faith argues that "it is within the realm of the 
body that the personal becomes political and the individual becomes the collectivity", 
and that it is "the most private intimacy", sex, where "power is made public and 
resistance is most socially engaged" (1994:39). 
Bristow argues that Foucault's main contradiction is that, while the body 
features strongly as a "locus of power and transformation", it "has no deep substance 
in his work" (1997:196). However, Delany's proem is an invocation to the materiality 
of the human body, and can be seen as a critique of modes of discourse that diffuse 
this materiality into ephemeral power relations. James argues that Foucault's failure to 
incorporate the materiality of the human body is a general failure of discourse: 13 
Where are we to find a place for Nietzsche's bowels or the lust for 
Helen in our current discourse? ... Humans are simply not animals ... We are 
constructors, people who live outside of our bodies in the midst of power 
relations that may be brought to bear on bodies. (1995 :29) 
In Triton, Delany presents his version of an ideal society where the corporeality of the 
body is acknowledged and indeed institutionalised. 14 The main protagonist is Bron 
Helstrom, who was involved in prostitution at the Flesh Pit in Bellona on Mars, a 
position which he thinks affords him some exclusivity: "These wholesome Outer 
Satellites were desperately accepting of any World-bound decadence: it supplied 
some sort of frisson, he suspected, ordinarily missing from their small-world lives" 
(1976:78-9). 
Commenting on the impact of his experience as a prostitute, Bron remarks 
that, "sexually, at any rate ... you just got a pretty good idea of who you really were", 
adding that, however, he was unsure '"if it does anything for the relationship of a 
sexualisationship. Maybe it's having so much sex right there ... "' (197 6: 84 ). 
Sexualisationship is an interesting neologism referring to sexual and emotional 
compatibility, with the ideal blend being a perfect melding of the two aspects. It also 
focuses on a relationship as a process or a 'becoming', leading Bron to comment on 
13 Or Foucault himself could simply be at fault for denigrating the corporeal or material aspects of life. 
14 The Mad Man is an extension of this idea: its graphic detail is meant to 'throw' the corporeality of 
the body into the 'face ofothers as a scandal'. 
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his progress in this regard: '"Perhaps I never had much of a bent for relationships, 
even as a kid; which is why I went into prostitution in the first place. But it's certainly 
made me more tolerant of a lot more different types of people than most ordinary 
Martians ... "' (1976:84-85). Thus Delany sets the stage for the novel: the main 
character is an outsider with a particular past who is introduced to a new societal 
structure that he thinks he is superior to. This is, of course, the utopia of Triton. Along 
with the main protagonists, the reader will, as the plot progresses, experience this 
society in action: that is, how it assimilates someone like Bron, who is an outsider. 
Delany raises the important issue of identity politics when Bron terms his 
friend Lawrence a 'political homosexual'. He describes him as "'this perfectly crazed, 
74-year-old, unregenerated character who, whenever he gets drunk, is always making 
futile attempts on my tired, pale bod; then he sorts of revels in it when I reject him. I 
think it gives him some sort of masochistic solace"' (1976:89). Despite his stated 
tolerance of difference due to his 'otherworldly' status, Bron is surprisingly 
judgemental of Lawrence when he suggests that his sexual orientation is politically 
motivated rather than a genetic given. It seems that Bron tolerates Lawrence's 
attempts at seduction because he is the one who derives 'masochistic solace' from the 
encounters, especially considering that it is his decision to stay where he is living: 
"He had been living at the men's co-op (Serpent's House) six months now. This one 
had been working out well" (1976:1). 
The use of the word 'serpent' is an interesting reference to the Judaeo-
Christian 'fall of humanity' story, for as the novel progresses it becomes clear that the 
garden of Eden that is Triton contains dystopic elements. "I am a reasonably happy 
man," thinks Bron, and then he wonders suddenly: "Is it just that I am, happily, 
reasonable?" (1976: 1) This suggests a psychological ambivalence related to the larger 
concern of his integration with the society of Triton as a whole. It is this double 
interface - between Bron and his inner self, and Bron and the society he inhabits -
that becomes such a rich site for the contestation of identity and gender politics in the 
course of the novel. 
A crucial character in this regard is the Spike: "working name of Gene 
Trimbell, producer, director, playwright, actress, general manager of a shifting 
personnel theatrical commune", as Bron later gleans from General Information 
(1976:49). She is operating on a Govijrnment Arts Endowment "to produce micro-
theatre for unique audiences" (1976:20). Her name has phallic connotations, as well 
as indicating her probing nature: she digs into Bron's defenses in order to get to his 
character, but identity is as protean a construct as society itself. The Spike describes 
the artistic function of her work as follows: 
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" basically we're concerned with leading people gently into a single 
moment of verbal and spatial disorientation - I say disorientation: what I 
mean, of course, is a freeing, to experience a greater order than the quotidian 
can provide. A moment of verbal, spatial, spiritual energy in resolution. That's 
so necessary in a world that's as closed in as life in any satellite city must, of 
necessity, be." (Delany 1976:88)15 
It is significant that Bron is exposed to such a theatrical experience, which 
challenges his notion of reality, in the unlicensed sector or 'u-1', a part of the city of 
Tethys where there is no official law. This demonstrates the sophistication of the 
utopia of Triton: it recognises that social order, by definition, has its binary opposite 
in the form of opposition to the norm, or outright anarchy. The u-1 is an attempt to 
pre-empt or disarm such anti-social impulses by acknowledging them, making space 
for their legitimate articulation in the ordinary social configuration, and thereby 
institutionalising and nullifying them as sources of disruption. 
At founding, each Outer Satellite city had set aside a city sector where no law 
officially held - since, as the sociologist who had first advocated it had 
pointed out, most cities develop, of necessity, such a neighbourhood anyway. 
These sectors fulfilled a complex range of functions in the cities' 
psychological, political, and economic ecology. (1976:9) 
The u-1 can be seen as a decentring device, as it fragments the city of Tethys into a 
series of convergent zones or areas, without a single locus or centre. This refers to 
Delany's contention (outlined in the previous chapter) that society does not have a 
centre, but simply comprises intersecting margins and boundaries in an ever-shifting 
social matrix. Foucault adds another dimension to this dynamic: how does the social 
body stabilise and anchor the physical body, and vice versa? How do power and 
knowledge relations in the u-1 differ from the rest of the city, and why? Added to this 
are certain poststructuralist concerns: 
... Derrida refers to a centralised, stable meaning that the reader tries to draw 
out of a text. This idea of a centred structure is paradoxical. It seems to come 
from the text, yet is always finally defined as the reader attempts to pursue it. 
However, as Derrida states, the quest after the illusory signified (in the text, as 
well as in 'philosophy' or 'science') expresses the force of a desire, and 
according to many post-structuralist theorists, desire fulfilment is the crucial 
motivational force. This quest after meaning, and its connections to desire, are 
predominant in Triton. (Zaldivar 1999) 
15 In Foucauldian terms, this micro-theatre is 'heterotopic'. It also refers to Laclau's notion of 
'dislocation'. 
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A key focus of desire fulfilment in the novel is the u-1, which Bron notes has a 
"definite and different feel" (1976: 10) to its streets. Delany notes that "most large 
cities do develop areas kind of like the u-1'', and he mentions Soho in London, North 
Beach in San Francisco, East and West Village in New York, The French Quarter in 
Paris, and Freemont in Seattle (Philmus 1990:320). In imagining the u-1 in Tethys, he 
"was wondering what would happen if urban planners formalised this, carrying it a 
few steps further" (1990:320). By formalisation, Delany means what would happen if 
such an area were demarcated within the urban landscape, and allowed to develop 
according to its own logic and evolutionary needs. There is a similar societally-
differentiated area in The Mad Man, referred to as the Minnesota Strip - '"but that 
name only lasted a season ... it doesn't really have a name. Or, at least, it doesn't 
seem to be able to keep one when it gets one'" (1994b:l49): 
... all that surrounds this strip of conflicting absences, this construct of desire 
at its darkest and lightest, all that finally secretes the discrete and shabby 
elements that, together, make up this space, so that somehow it is a part of, as 
much as it is apart from, the world .... (1994b:l51) 
Delany assigns specific geographical boundaries to this area in order to signify 
its reality, and then he uses this physical space to circumscribe the psychological 
terrain it encompasses. It is a "few blocks on and off Eighth Avenue", containing a 
plethora of doorways, bars, porn-magazine and peep-show shops and movie theatres. 
"In one sense all the encounters that occur here take place on some vast and dreary 
Audenesque plain where a thousand people mill, where no one knows anyone else" 
(1994b: 148). It is this sense of anonymity and ubiquity that gives the Minnesota Strip, 
and indeed the u-1, their sense of transgressive danger, for this means that 
individuality is negotiable, and desire can be acted upon, instead of being constrained 
by the social compact. 
It is in the u-1 that we first encounter war posters, and such slogans as 'Triton 
with the Satellite Alliance', which gives the reader a glimpse of a larger, as yet 
unspecified, situation impinging on Tethys as a whole. Gradually we learn that the 
nine inhabited moons of the solar system - including, eventually, Triton, a moon of 
Uranus - are involved in a war with Earth and Mars, the only two inhabited planets. 
This has lead to a complex interrelationship between planets and satellites, with 
cultural and economic friction building up between the so-called Outer Satellites and 
Triton. Between these two factions sits Mars, which has sided with Earth. A few years 
before there was free play between all three societies, with Bron being a male 
prostitute on Mars in his teens. Delany states that 
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Helstrom is a misfit in the Outer Satellite community. His 'misfittedness' does 
not consist of the comic mistakes of the newly arrived immigrant trying to 
learn the new manners and mores . . . . His is the deep, cultural unhappiness 
that so frequently comes to people years after they have made all the surface 
adjustments (1989:96). 16 
The war remains in the background for most of the novel, and takes the form 
of "a political battle fought in negotiation rooms by diplomats" (Zaldivar 1999). It 
first impinges on Bron's life, and is thus foregrounded in the novel, in a rather 
spectacular fashion when Tethys experiences a 'gravity cut' or an interruption of the 
sensory shield that contains the atmosphere of the moon, and gives the illusion of a 
sky. This forms a double boundary, or a margin within a margin: Triton's status as a 
member of the Outer Satellites forms a boundary separating it from Earth and Mars, 
while the sensory shield itself is a boundary within which the utopian society has been 
constructed (1999). Delany notes that the sensory shield actually predetermines the 
type of social structure that has developed: 
. . . the stringencies of life under glass - or under plasma - have made it 
necessary to restructure the whole concept of human society. Such a city 
simply cannot tolerate either a runaway population growth or a vast, unskilled 
labour supply that can do very little efficiently except breed. (1989:94) 
Triton's complex utopian structure is gradually revealed to us through Bron's 
eyes. As the reader becomes more familiar with this society, questions of power and 
knowledge relations begin to surface: how does this social structure impact upon 
Bron? How does he interact with it? How typical a citizen is he? What, if anything, 
can such an open society not tolerate? The debate is recomplicated even further at the 
end when gender issues come into play. The novel ultimately does make an attempt to 
answer these questions, but it eventually reaches a stage beyond comprehension or 
simple articulation - that is, heterotopia or ekpyrosis, which holds out the final 
possibility of radical social transformation. 
The Spike challenges Bron's summation of Lawrence as a 'political 
homosexual'. Her narrative function is thus to represent wisdom and insight, and to 
cut through Bron's defenses. She points out logically that Triton's is an age of 
regeneration and refixation treatments: "'He can have his sexuality refixated on 
someone, or thing, that can get it up for him"' (1976:90). She sums up Lawrence's 
predicament by declaring that he is unhappy, and is forcing his affections on people 
who will not reciprocate. This pertains equally to Bron himself, and thus the question 
16 Interestingly, this quotation comes from an essay that Delany wrote under his pseudonym K Leslie 
Steiner, which he uses to comment on his own work. Delany's disavowal of his own authorship 
contributes to his own identity or role dislocation. 
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is raised as to why he does not consider refixation if he is unsure about his own 
identity. 
But to take this step would require Bron to acknowledge that his identity, the 
very basis of his being, is in doubt. Thus, paradoxically, he chooses to contend with 
his frustration and uncertainty rather than attempt to get to the root of his problem. 
The Spike declares that '"anybody who is concerned with sexualisationship"' - which 
presumably means the entire population of Triton - '"who doesn't take advantage of 
them, from pure prejudice - and it's nothing more (Your Lawrence friend sounds like 
he's from Earth.)-is a fool"' (1976:90). 
She qualifies this somewhat by stating that "'refixation is a matter of desire, 
not performance. And I assure you, as one who is also a fair performer, desire is 
something else again"' (1976:91). 17 This leads Bron to wonder: "-And what am I 
hung up in ... ?", only to declare later to Philip that "'I'm pretty straightforward too. 
At least about my emotions"' (1976:104), which subtly underpins the confusion 
permeating Bron's sense of his own self-identity. Zaldivar argues that Bron's 
confusion is manifested in a sense of entrapment: 
. . . Bron is caught in a trap, and he cannot work his way out. The trap is the 
Derridean quest for 'centred structure', taking the form of Bron's self-identity. 
Bron desires a whole, stable, and unique personality and constantly pushes 
people away in search of his missing parts. (Zaldivar 1999) 
Though noting that this is a "standard psychological-romance scenario", 18 Zaldivar 
points out that "Delany consciously leaves traces of his genre in his text", which is 
most manifest in the appendices, themselves a heterotopic device to decentre 
conventional or generic assumptions about the text (1999). Triton parts company with 
other psychological romances because, "on Triton, you can be whatever you want to 
be. Bron's lack of self-determination is out of place, a seeming rarity in this society" 
(1999). It is not 'to be or not to be' that is his defining question about himself, but 
what to be in a social context where anything is possible, and everything permissible. 
The one thing that this perfect society seems not to have considered is the possibility 
that, given such a surfeit of possible identities and sexual fixations, a person may be 
psychologically incapable of choosing at all. A revealing profile of Bron is provided 
by Audri: 
17 This echoes Judith Butler's notion of 'gender performance', as explicated by David Gauntlett. The 
traditional view is that sex (male and female) causes gender (masculine and feminine), which in tum 
produces desire towards the other gender in a sort of continuum. What Butler does, with the help of 
Foucault, is to deconstruct the perceived links in this continuum. The result is that gender and desire 
become flexible, with the implication that gender is a performance: "It's what you do at particular 
times, rather than a universal who you are" (Gauntlett 1999). 
18 Though how 'standard' a romance is Triton? Boy gets girl, boy loses girl, boy becomes girl ... 
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"I'd say you were a very ordinary - or special, depending on how you look at 
it - combination of well-intentioned and emotionally lazy, perhaps a little too 
self-centred for some people's liking. But you also have an awful lot of talent 
at your job. Maybe the rest are just the necessary personality bugs that go 
along." (1976:108) 
Bron experiences an acute moment of psychological clarity about the 
consequences of his own actions when he acknowledges that "his own, involved, 
counter-espionage had lost [Miramne] a job. His own responses that he should have 
used as flexible parameters he had taken as rigid, fixed perimeters . . . Suffering the 
wound of having wounded, he thought: Help me . . . Somebody help me ... " 
(1976:109-110). This is Bron first's realisation that he has a serious problem, and his 
first attempt to reach beyond his own limited resources to find a solution - that he is 
only spurred on to do so at the crux of a crisis reveals the extent of his own self-
delusion. The fact that Bron remembers to collect Alfred's ointment shows that he is 
capable of caring: it also displays social responsibility, if not accountability. 
Predictably, Bron reverts back to type when he visits the Spike and wishes he 
could declare to her: "I come to tell you that no matter what that crazed lesbian says, I 
am not responsible for her losing her job - no matter what kind of louse she thinks I 
am!" Instead he says: "'I came to find out about you, who you were and what you 
were"' - which is really just his way of saying that he wishes to find out about 
himself, and because he projects his own inner voice onto the Other, as Lacan argues. 
Noting that Bron is "all masked and veiled and swathed about in shadowy 
cerements"' (1976:115), the Spike dons a white cloak and full-hood mask, and says: 
'"Now we can roam the labyrinths of honesty and deceit, searching out the illusive 
centres of our being by a detailed examination of the shift and glitter of our own, 
protean surfaces"' (1976:115). This sounds forced and pretentious in the context of a 
stand-alone quotation, but serves as an important precis of Delany's intentions thus 
far. As he explains: 
By and large, today, in SF, you start with the texture of life around 
some character. Nor is that texture necessarily conceived of as 'the good life'. 
Rather, you say, what would be an interesting life-texture. If you have to have 
bad things, what bad things might you be able to stand? You look at the 
specific texture of the character's everyday world - not the greater political 
structure his or her bit of life is enmeshed in. Then, in the course of the fictive 
interrogation-of-the-material that makes up the rest of the book or story, you 
move - fundamentally - up and out . . . towards the political. (quoted in 
Philmus 1990:307) 
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Such a shift towards a larger, encompassing socio-political dimension is 
indicated when Bron blurts out to the Spike (this when he had originally enquired 
about her): '"I'm ... not happy in the world I live in'" (1976:116). Her immediate 
response is a linguistic correction that decentres and denies the problem - she notes 
that Triton is a moon, and not a world, which refers to the Inner World/Outer Satellite 
schism. At first glance it seems that Bron has not articulated anything new, as the 
reader is aware of his unhappiness from the very first page. But what is different is 
that, for the first time, he has contextualised his dilemma in terms of the knowledge 
and power relations that enmesh him in a particular socio-political set-up - which, of 
course, is the 'heterotopia' ofTriton. 19 
In the ensuing dialogue between Bron and the Spike, Delany fleshes out some 
of the structural detail which, up to this point, has only been implicit in the text. We 
learn that there are "' 40 or 50 basic sexes, falling loosely into nine categories, four 
homophilic"', meaning that "'no matter who or what you like to screw, you prefer to 
live and have friends primarily from your own sex'", while the other five are 
'heterophilic' - which sounds bizarrely like the institutionalisation of racial or ethnic 
segregation using sexual orientation as the basis of differentiation. What is notable 
about the picture of Triton that emerges from this dialogue is the sense of irony and 
outright humour that Delany injects into the discourse. Bron uses the example of the 
fetish "'to manacle 18-year-old boys to the wall and pierce their nipples with red-hot 
needles"': 
" after work, you can always drop in to the place where the 18-year-old 
boys who happen to be into that sort of thing - red-hot needles on the second 
floor, ice-cold ones on the third - have all gotten together in a mutually-
beneficial alliance where you and they, and your Labrador retriever, if she's 
what it takes to get you off, can all meet one another on a footing of co-
operation, mutual benefit, and respect." 
"And the kennel's on the first floor?" 
"And there's one here in your unit, and one in mine, and probably a 
dozen more throughout the city. And if you're just not satisfied with the 
amount or quality of 18-year-old boys that week, you can make an 
appointment to have your preference switched. And while you are at it, if you 
find your own body distasteful, you can have it regenerated, dyed green or 
heliotrope, padded out here, slimmed down there ... And if you're just too 
jaded for any of it, you can turn to the solace of religion and let your body 
mortify any way it wants while you concentrate on whatever your idea of 
Higher Things happens to be, in the sure knowledge that when you're tired or 
19 Walter Meyers explains that Triton disturbs the syntax of things, as "characters can change their size 
or sex without much difficulty", meaning that, in this future, the language of sex and gender has 
become "'shattered or tangled"' (1980: 184). 
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that, there's a diagnostic computer waiting with soup and a snifter in the wings 
to put you back together." (1976: 117-118)20 
Earlier on Bron wonders about "the things people will do to their bodies" 
(1976: 112), revealing a prudishness - which is surprising given his history as a male 
prostitute - about physical transformation or alteration, which is symptomatic of his 
internal identity confusion as reflected in his discomfort at the fluidity afforded to 
external appearance by the social structure of Triton.21 The above passage also reveals 
a deeper discontent or even prejudice against Triton, where the expansion of the very 
concept of individuality has ironically prevented Bron establishing his own sense of 
individuality. "'They make it so easy for you - all you have to do is know what you 
want"' (1976:116) focuses Bron's central dilemma into a succinct equation: he does 
not know what he wants, nor why he does not know, and therefore what should have 
been relatively simple is recomplicated beyond his ability to cope. 
This is transferred into resentment against the society he inhabits and the 
people he interacts with. Is this a tragic failure of the society of Triton to 
accommodate all difference, or is it merely the sad tale of a single deluded person's 
abject failure to avail himself of the wondrous opportunities of this 'best of all 
possible worlds', where there is "no twenty-first-century-style philosophical 
oppression, no twentieth-century-style sexual oppression, no nineteenth-century-style 
economic oppression"'? (1976:116). From the reader's point of view, the latter 
contention seems to be the most plausible. 
It is revealing that, in this dialogue between Bron and the Spike, we learn for 
the first time that Tethys has a social hierarchy - though this does not imply that the 
society has a central nucleus as it is constructed in concentric layers, much like an 
onion: the Ring is "a sort of scalloped endocycloid along the outer edge of the city 
compris[ing] the most lavish communal complexes in Tethys" (1976: 118), which is 
where Philip lives. Bron comments on Philip's family: 
It was beautiful, whole, harmonious, radiant - it was a family I'd have 
given my left testicle - hell, both of them - to be a daughter or a son to. What 
a place to have grown up in, secure that you are loved whatever you do, 
whatever you are, and with all the knowledge and self-assurance it would give 
20 Though satirical, this passage provides important insight into the mechanics of sexual desire, and 
how society suppresses dialogue on what it terms to be deviant. The following comment by Ray Davis 
on The Mad Man is equally applicable to Triton: "Sex, though defined as unspeakable or even 
'unimaginable' madness, actually enables and expresses sanity ... No system is self-consistent; simply 
to live is to be in flux between what has been defined as sane and what has been abjured as 
unspeakable. And therefore, to follow desire outside culturally dictated boundaries - though never, of 
course, outside culturally determined boundaries - is to enable survival within the culture" (2000). 
21 An interesting aside is that Bron could be expressing Delany's distaste for the focus on body 
alteration in cyberpunk. 
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you while you decided what that was. But the great lie those people hold out, 
whether they're in a commune or a co-op - and this, I suppose, when all is 
said and done, is why I hate them - even the ones I like ... is: Anyone can 
have it, be a part of it, bask in its radiance, and be one with the radiating 
element itself .... (1976:122) 
Bron admits to the degrading aspect of prostitution as personal devaluation in 
terms of human relations, and refers to the sexual freedom of the Outer Satellites as 
"'the golden myth of two worlds"' (1976:124). It is a myth precisely because of his 
above-stated contention - that he cannot be a part of the 'radiating element itself 
because he is unsure of what part he actually constitutes, or indeed if he can fit in at 
all: "What happens to the ones of us in whom even the part that wants has lost, 
through atrophy, all connection with articulate reason?" (1976:124). 
Bron acknowledges that he is from another world - a world that Triton is at 
war with, and a world where things are done differently (1976:125). He cannot escape 
this fact because it has defined who he is up to this point - not only does he realise 
that this has made him an alien in an alien world, but that the very social structure of 
Triton demands that he sacrifice or subsume this alien heritage in the interests of the 
greater good, which is something that Bron is unwilling, or incapable, of doing, which 
leads him to declare to the Spike: "'Then people like me should be exterminated'" 
(1976: 125).22 
It seems to Bron as if Triton as a whole is totally impervious to his dilemma: 
"'It was all perfect, beautiful, without a crack or a seam. Any blow you struck was 
absorbed and became one with the structure"' (1976:122). When on earth later, Bron 
declares: "'I think I could enjoy this world, if we just got rid of the earthies?"' 
(1976:216). Bron says to Sam that '"maybe I'm just that odd and inexplicable point 
oh oh oh oh oh one percent they call an individual"', to which Sam replies "'No. 
You're a type like the rest of us"' (1976:143). The fact that Bron cannot escape being 
part of Triton, or being a particular 'type' in relation to this is underlined dramatically 
when he is incarcerated on earth while accompanying Sam on a State mission, and is 
derogatorily referred to as a 'Moonie' held on suspicion of possible subversive 
intentions. 
Bron's self-centredness is revealed dramatically when he 'bumps' into the 
Spike and her troupe on an archaeological dig in Outer Mongolia, and takes her for 
dinner at the Swan's Craw. Her unfamiliarity with the etiquette of the place - "the 
client's job was to impress, not be impressed" (1976: 199) - leads Bron to conclude, 
rather ungraciously, but in his estimation, 'fondly', that the Spike would "make a 
lousy whore" (1976: 193). Her unalloyed delight at the theatricality of the event, 
22 Bron could be said to be suffering from a form of cultural dislocation. 
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coupled with the fact that he is, once again, in the company of the woman he thinks he 
loves after ostensibly having gone "hundreds of millions of kilometres to forget her" 
(1976:156), simply goes over his head. 
All that preoccupies Bron and predetermines his attitude to the Spike is his 
over-inflated concern with the social role-playing involved, with him mortified by the 
impression they were giving as a couple as being "a cheap Bellona john and ... a 
really dumb whore" (1976: 197). In a moment of breathtaking cognitive dissonance, 
Bron declares to the Spike: '"I love you. Throw up the theatre. Join your life to mine. 
Become one with me. Be mine. Let me possess you wholly"' (1976:209). This is a 
stark manifestation of his own overweening self-interest, and the fact that he does not 
really understand the Spike at all as an individual - he just wants her to affirm, and 
repair, his own damaged sense of individuality. Also, what Bron is essentially asking 
is the Spike's permission for him to dominate and possess her in terms of 
conventional male-female power relations. 
On the return flight to Triton, Bron receives a facsimile copy of a letter from 
the Spike in which she states that she does not want to have an affair with him, or 
even particularly want to be his friend: "I don't like the type of person you are" 
(1976:227-28). His initial reaction is righteous anger, as Bron says: '" ... all she was 
concerned with was that she'd bowed to the proper fashion"' (1976:255). He 
concludes, grandly, that "'there was just no understanding at all ... They don't 
understand. They can't understand. Men just have to go through it alone"' (1976:256). 
This reveals Bron's view of gender relations as the binary opposition of male 
dominance and female submissiveness, with anything upsetting this equation deemed 
to be inferior. Bron's attitude towards women is far from neutral, as earlier he had 
declared that "women don't understand. Faggots don't understand either"' (1976:254) 
to Lawrence, implying that he considers 'women' and 'faggots' as equally derogatory 
terms, and as people with less status or power in terms of social relations. It is ironic 
that the homosexual Lawrence gives the following explanation to Bron about the true 
state of male-female power relations: 
Let me tell you a secret. There is a difference between men and women, a 
little, tiny one at that, I'm afraid, has probably made most of your adult life 
miserable and will probably continue to make it so till you die. The difference 
is simply that women have only really been treated, by that bizarre, 
Durkheimian abstract, 'society', as human beings for the last - oh, say 65 
years, and then, really, only on the moons: whereas men have had the luxury 
for the last 4 000. The result of this historical anomaly is simply that, on a 
statistical basis, women are just a little less willing to put up with certain kinds 
of shit than men - simply because the concept of a certain kind of shit-free 
Universe is, in that equally bizarre Jungian abstraction, the female 'collective 
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unconscious', too new and too precious ... Your problem, you see, is that 
essentially you are a logical pervert, looking for a woman with a mutually 
compatible logical perversion. The fact is, the mutual perversion you are 
looking for is very, very rare - if not nonexistent. (Delany 1976:253) 
In fact, it is so rare that "'maybe one man out of 50 has it"', with '"the 
corresponding perversion you're searching for in women, thanks to that little 
historical anomaly, is more like one out of 5 000'" (1976:254). It is during this 
discussion of bloodless statistics that Lawrence informs Bron that the war is over, 
with five million people dead on Iapetus, and 75% of the Earth's population 
decimated. It is also at this point of the novel that Bron decides to become a woman, 
which at first seems a surprising and totally perplexing response to the Spike's 
rejection. 
Bron reasons that "'women, or people with large female components to their 
personalities, are too social to have that necessary aloneness to act outside society"' 
(1976:257). He is referring to "'that particular male aloneness"' (1976:257) which he 
has wrongly thought of as a sign of his lack of social integration. Instead it is a 
necessary precondition for the survival of the species, as it allows for the development 
of a peculiar ingenuity that is also, peculiarly, male - as demonstrated when Bron 
rescues a bunch of women and children during another sustained failure of Tethys' 
atmospheric shield (here Bron neglects the fact that women can rescue people, too). 
Bron argues that he is not saying '"women can't be courageous"' - instead, 
the fundamental difference is that women focus on society because '"in one sense, 
women are society"' as they '"reproduce it"' (1976:257). Therefore, Bron reasons 
that, by becoming female - coupled simultaneously with the advantages of having 
shared his peculiar male viewpoint - will enable him to become a unique member of 
society. Bron's political/gender conversion is intimately connected to the war that 
Triton was reluctantly forced to participate in to preserve the integrity of its social 
compact, and to allow people such as Bron the freedom to express their own 
sociopolitical reality. This singular act of personal revolution, of societal redefinition, 
is the crux and turning point of the novel. It is, indeed, a heterotopic act. It is the very 
society of Triton in action. 
What Bron chooses to do now - and through the very act of that choice, and 
even by its simple affirmation - means he is carrying out the fundamental, defining 
act of individuation that this world can offer him: total transformation, reinvention, 
and casting anew. This dissolves the final boundary separating him from the world he 
wishes to belong to, and feel an integral part of: his sex. What Bron fails to realise is 
that his sex is a construct or cultural configuration in which gender has a hegemonic 
stranglehold (Gauntlett 1999). What he chooses to do is termed 'gender trouble' by 
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Judith Butler: "the mobilisation, subversive confusion, and proliferation of genders -
and therefore identity" (quoted by Gauntlett 1999). But Bron is caught up in the 
hegemonic stranglehold imposed upon his identity by his sex, and cannot free himself 
- even though he proposes to change genders. 
Delany describes the process that Bron has to undergo as if it is a shopping 
expedition for a particularly complicated item, as if the commodification of gender 
change has resulted in its own peculiar sales pitch to convince potential customers 
that their needs are legitimate, and that the ultimate capitalist genuflection, the ritual 
act of commerce, can even solve psychological problems such as an identity crisis. 
Bron informs the technician that "'genetically, hormonally, physically"' (1976:267) 
he wishes to be a woman, and is rather taken aback when asked what sex he is at 
present. This implies that sexual/gender differentiation goes much deeper than mere 
physical differences. Bron is then given a brief lecture on the implications of this 
choice on his life, and some of the concrete impacts such a decision will translate into: 
Ms. Helstrom, it would be completely fatuous of me to pretend I was unaware 
that, even in this day and age, such a decision as you have made may cause 
some consternation among one's co-operative, if not communal, colleagues. 
It's not hard not to find such consternation upsetting - not to mention those 
nameless social attitudes internalised during a less enlightened youth on a 
world with a different culture, that are, very often, the same attitudes to 
dissatisfaction with which prompted one to the decision confronting us now. 
And while we have our own emotional commitment to bolster us, these 
external prejudices assail us nevertheless, invariably presenting themselves in 
the guise of logic. (Delany 1976:268) 
Although Bron tells Lawrence she "'did it to preserve the species"' 
(1976:277), when she bumps into the Spike again, she is willing to have an instant 
refixation in order to declare her continuing, unceasing love. It is unclear whether 
Bron is offering to change back to male, or to have her sexual profile reorientated to 
lesbianism. Later in a conversation with Brian, Bron confesses to not 'feeling' like a 
woman, and his counsellor tells him that '"being a woman is a complicated genetic 
interface"' (1976:298) between the physical growth of a body and its societal growth 
in the world it inhabits: 
In that sense, you will never be a 'complete' woman. We can do a lot here; we 
can make you a woman from a given time on. We cannot make you have been 
a woman for all the time you were a man. (Delany 1976:298) 
Brian's advice to Bron is to get involved with a man, and she visits a bar 
where she bumps into Sam, asks to join his commune as she finds herself attracted to 
him, and is turned down. Meanwhile, at work, Audri expresses her desire for Bron 
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who, in turn, rejects her. Both these encounters - male and female - suggest that Bron 
is unable to come to terms with herself sexually, and she is unable to determine 
whether or not this is a trace of her previous genetic disposition. The fact that Bron 
has not changed on a fundamental psychological level is illustrated by his account of 
meeting the Spike in his new gender. She describes the Spike as "'an incredibly ugly 
person"' who '"feels she can distort anything that occurs for whatever purpose she 
wants'" (1976:322). This is a rather acute description of Bron herself, whose gender 
change is a prime example of such distortibn and delusion. 
The act of lying to Audri does induce a crisis of conscience in Bron, who has a 
dream in which she is confronted by her old male self, who tells her that he will 
destroy her, as he, in tum, has been destroyed by her. This suggests that the new Bron 
has failed to integrate successfully with her new self. The novel ends with Bron's 
realisation that her journey from Mars has not taken her away from her old self in the 
same convenient way as she had switched worlds: "Here I am, on Triton, and again I 
am lost in some hopeless tangle of confusion, trouble, and distress-" (1976:329). All 
that she has achieved is to fragment her precarious sense of self-identity even further, 
and to increase the distance between her 'true' self and the 'social' self she holds up 
to the world around her in order to 'fit in'. At the end, she is still very much "an alien 
in an alien world" (1976: 177). 
The narrative falls curiously silent between this change and Bron's first 
reappearance as her new self. There is a physical break in the text that also seems to 
represent a boundary that Delany does not cross. There is no physical description of 
Bron as a woman; no tactile landmarks as to how she feels to have breasts, or even 
how big her breasts are; how it feels to walk; the absence of a penis. Bron does not 
engage in any sexual acts after the gender change, so there really is not much to point 
out how different a person she now is (which, of course, could precisely be the 
point).23 But in terms of the injunctions of 'heterotopia', as invoked by Delany 
himself, has he taken its powers of dislocation and disruption to a sufficiently 
advanced conclusion to make such discontinuity obvious in the face of 
institutionalised normality, to which it is meant to be a provocative contrast? What is 
the point of including such details? Sade's injunction in The 120 Days of Sodom, as 
highlighted by Foucault, is that "your narrations must be decorated with the most 
numerous and searching details; the precise way and extent to which we may judge 
how the passion you describe relates to human manners and man's character is 
determined by your willingness to disguise no circumstance ... " (1978:21). In other 
words: 
23 We have to assume that Delany's lacunae are deliberate. Maybe the lack of detail is meant to indicate 
Bron's failure to understand the concepts of sex and gender. 
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The object, in short, is to define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that 
sustains the discourse on human sexuality .... The central issue, then ... is not 
to determine whether one says yes or no to sex, whether one formulates 
prohibitions or permissions, whether one asserts its importance or denies its 
effects, or whether one refines the words one uses to designate it; but to 
account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, 
the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which 
prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that 
are said. What is at issue, briefly, is the overall 'discursive fact', the way into 
which sex is 'put into discourse'. (Foucault 1978: 11) 
Bron's change of gender is a political statement of sex as discourse. In 
changing his gender, he is also attempting to change the particular set of power 
relations he is enmeshed in, and to gain a sense of mastery or control over this 
invisible web binding him to society. The political discourse of sex is also at the 
forefront of The Mad Man, where John Marr has to come to terms with the impact of 
AIDS on his own sexual landscape. He learns that Professor Mossman is unconvinced 
that Foucault died of AIDS, as "it's just people trying to lump him in with a lot of 
other promiscuous gay men" (Delany 1994b: 109). Indeed, "philosophers just don't 
carry on the way you apparently have to in order to get it" (1994b: 109). 
Mossman is indignant at the very suggestion that an intellectual of the calibre 
of Foucault could engage in the sort of licentiousness that was seen to result in AIDS, 
whereas Marr is indignant that Mossman could think less of Foucault for being a 
complete human being of appetite and desire - no matter what his sexual orientation. 
The fact is that we are all complex, multifaceted creatures prone to surprising and 
random behaviour in the face of what society expects, and often demands, of us in 
order to help maintain the social compact. Just as the knowledge that Foucault died of 
AIDS does not conform to Mossman's Ivory Tower view of the systems of the world, 
so is Bron deluded about his own motivations for changing gender. He decides to do it 
in order to regain control of himself and his world, but the fundamental problem is 
that he has failed to come to terms with his own complexity and diversity as a human 
being enmeshed in a far-reaching web of power relations. Mossman's comments leads 
Marr to write an extraordinary 73-page letter to Sam about AIDS, politics and 
sexuality, which he concludes with his own 'model of the self: 
There's a model for the 'self that has as much to do with the way we 
misunderstand each other as it does with what we understand: each person is 
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assumed to have a public life, a private life, and a secret life. And the relation 
between them is assumed to be that the public stands before the private, as the 
private stands before the secret, each masking the ones behind from view. 
Much the same notion: the secret self resides within the private self, which 
resides within the clearly public self. Such a model holds that to delve through 
to the private or to the secret is to explain and obviate the public area we've 
just passed through to reach them. (Delany 1994b: 182) 
At the end of his epistle, the bulk of which is a series of vignettes of varying 
sexual encounters, Marr tells Sam that describing to her what he does in bars and 
cinemas has not given her access to his most private, or secret, thoughts. Even though 
his letter is explicit to the point of pornography, it does not permit the reader to claim 
intimacy with Marr. "It doesn't tell you what I think of the books I read or the movies 
I see. It doesn't tell you how I greet Mrs Conkling or Mr Espedrosa on the stairwell 
... " argues Marr (1994b:181). In a similar fashion, Bron's gender change does not 
allow the reader access to his (or her) most intimate thoughts and desires before and 
after the deed. Perhaps Delany is deliberately silent on the anatomical specifics as a 
pointed lesson on the politics of sexual discourse and the model of the self as 
propounded by Marr. One cannot help· but think of Delany's disclaimer at the 
beginning of The Mad Man, and wonder how right he is: even to begin to impute 
autobiographical 'truth' to the novel is to fail to understand the socio-political 
discourse that informs it. 
So who is John Marr? The novel begins with his statement that, given his 
promiscuity, he is surprised he has not yet contracted AIDS. "My adventures with 
homosexuality started in the early-middle seventies, in the men's room of the terminal 
on the island side of the Staten Island Ferry," he comments matter-of-factly 
(1994b:7). The lightheartedness of the term 'adventures' rests uneasily with the 
somber weight of AIDS, while the fact that Marr began his apprenticeship in sexual 
deviancy in a place of public transport suggests a journey that has yet to end (or, 
perhaps, truly begin). Marr, "a young, bright, moderately middle-class black kid from 
Staten Island" (1994b: 10), achieves his undergraduate degree in philosophy, and ends 
up working with Professor Irving Mossman on 'Hasler studies'. 
Timothy Hasler is the sort of bright star in the firmament of academia that 
Mossman aspires to, and hopes to transform Marr into (given his own lack of 
transformation). Delany's summation of Hasler as an intellectual phenomenon cites a 
plethora of published papers and books - the first at 17, when Marr was "a cuddly 
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coffee bean of three" (1994b:l 1). These run the gamut from a semiotic analysis to SF 
stories "that, against titanic intergalactic backgrounds to dwarf Star Trek, Star Wars, 
and Dune, turned on some of the finer mathematics that informed his articles on the 
philosophy of natural languages" (1994b: 12). The fact that the SF extends Hasler's 
philosophical speculations helps to subvert the ingrained perception that, naturally, 
the latter is the more serious and important work. In terms of Marr' s model of the self, 
this constitutes Hasler's public persona. The private and secret enter the twilight 
realm of speculation and secrecy with Hasler's "own shocking death" (1994b:12), 
stabbed fatally in a bar in New York City, leaving his doctorate unfinished. One is 
unsure from the juxtaposition if Hasler' s untimely demise, or the fact that his work 
was so abruptly terminated, was the most shocking event. And contrasted against this 
is the less-than-heroic figure of Marr himself: 
. . . an underweight black cocksucker - with glasses - who knew that 
Wittgenstein was queer, not to mention Plato; and that there was this 
Frenchman some of my friends in college used to talk about, Foucault ... 
(Delany 1994b: 10) 
The private and secret begin to seep into the public when Mossman discovers 
that Hasler was gay. And that he was killed in a gay venue known ominously as the 
Pit. He sees it as deception and a betrayal that people who knew Hasler have kept this 
from him. The implication is that a person's public, private and secret selves are fluid 
and flexible: what is public to one is secret to another. One response to Mossman's 
indignation is that Hasler's sexual orientation was nothing of his business: '"You're 
supposed to be writing the biography of a philosopher!"' (1994b: 16). Mossman then 
begins to think that Marr has the intellectual edge on him in that he is gay, too. Marr 
comments: 
... when I remembered the three portrait photos, doubtless still in Mossman's 
office, I knew they looked quite different to him, now that they were a picture 
of two queers - with a bewildered Jewish (associate) professor off to the right. 
(Delany 1994b: 17) 
Mossman's biography on Hasler becomes "really problematic" (1994b:21) when he 
unearths evidence that "Hasler must have been indulging in the most degrading - and 
depressing - sexual 'experiments': bums on the New York City streets, homeless 
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alcoholics in Riverside Park, white, black, or Hispanic wmos ... " (1994b:22). 
Mossman notes further that Hasler' s only criterion had been "the dirtier the better" 
( 1994b:22), and concludes that he has "to consider seriously whether Timothy Hasler 
is the man I want to be writing about" (1994b:22). Mossman attempts to justify his 
response in a letter to Marr: 
You know the sort of person I am, John. Most people don't find me 
short on compassion. Especially for sexual oddities. 
But what sort of compassion can I be expected to have for a man who 
writes an eight-page description in his journal about finding a Doberman loose 
in the park, bringing it home, feeding it, sucking its penis to orgasm four 
times, then turning it loose again. (He wrote he wanted to get him back to the 
owner, but the dog got away from him when he took it out for a walk. So he 
said.) (1994b:47) 
Here Mossman is allowing his own innate prejudice24 and intellectual 
arrogance to get the better of him, as well as making the mistake of conflating 
Hasler's public, private and secret selves. He is also denying himself the opportunity 
of getting to know Hasler in all his multifaceted complexity as a human being, as well 
as revealing that he does not so much wish to write a biography as to remake Hasler 
in his own image of him. In other words, he wants to transform Hasler into the sort of 
person he would have been given the same opportunity. This desire for transformation 
is the same impulse that drives Bron to change his gender - to assimilate the Other 
and overcome the unknown by simply becoming the Other. Mossman is unwilling to 
take this step, but Marr is still young and curious enough to contemplate it. By 
attempting to trace the events leading up to Hasler's death, he begins a journey of 
discovery and self-realisation that culminates in a transmogrification as totalising and 
radical as that embarked upon by Bron. 
Marr visits the bar in which Hasler died in an attempt to glean information 
from some of the longstanding patrons about how this had transpired. The bartender is 
duly suspicious, and suspects Marr of being a reporter or a detective. He is rather 
taken aback when Marr informs him that he is a graduate student doing a Ph.D. in 
philosophy (1994b:352). The bartender explains that the Pit has its own philosophy or 
operating system by which it regulates social interaction: 
24 Mossman gives vent to his spleen by labelling Hasler "an obnoxious little chink with an unbelievably 
nasty sex life" (l 994b:47)- ignoring the irony that an academic of his standing can submit to such 
coarse prejudice. 
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You hang around for another hour, hour and a half. Even on Tuesday night, 
once you get past nine o'clock, nine-thirty, this place makes the New York 
Stock Exchange look like a Sunday-school picnic. You talk about philosophy 
- really it's a matter of the philosophy of a place like this. (Delany 1994b:353) 
Marr meets a homeless person known simply as Leaky, and finds himself 
intensely attracted to this shambling, seemingly simple-minded hulk of a man. Leaky 
proposes to Marr that '"you can climb on top of me and fuck my belly till you fill my 
hairy ol' belly button with cum. Then you can lick it out'" (1994b:362). At Marr's 
apartment, Leaky notices the laden bookshelves, and asks: "'You actually read all 
these fuckin' books? ... That's why Tony calls you the professor, huh?'" (1994b:362). 
Leaky says he is unable to read and write '"cause nobody ever really taught me"' 
(l 994b:362). Clearly there is an immense gulf between the two men, but they regard 
each other with mutual respect and affection. Marr seems attracted to the sheer 
physicality of Leaky, and the fact that basically he has been reduced to the sum of his 
bodily appetites - a more honest way of living, say, than the prevarication and 
snobbery perpetuated by the Mossmans of the world. Perhaps Marr finds in Leaky 
what his secret self is yearning for, and this brings it out into the public and private 
spheres as well. Leaky makes an extraordinary request of Marr - he asks him to nip 
down to the corner pet shop and buy him a dog collar: 
That I could wear on my neck. It don't have to have my name on it or 
anything. We stay together awhile, maybe we could get the name later. But 
just you givin' it to me, that would make me know you wanted me, like. And 
I'd feel better. Ifl knew I was your fucking dog. (Delany 1994b:395) 
Marr notes earlier on that this part of the novel is a love story (l 994b:333), 
priming the reader to expect a conventional infatuation and seduction scenario. 
Clearly with Leaky the word 'love' has to be used in its broadest possible 
connotations - but who are we to doubt Marr's feelings? Is he an unredeemable 
pervert, or more honest about his own feelings and desires than any of us would ever 
care to be? What is stranger: Bron changing gender, or a man seeking the sexual 
company of an indigent? I think the latter is more shocking to us, for Bron's gender 
change is as much a cerebral act as a physical one, while Leaky and Marr' s 
relationship is couched in the conventional terminology of a love affair, while being 
anything but conventional. Clearly Leaky wishes to be 'owned' by Marr, and the dog 
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collar is a symbol of his lover's proprietary stake, as well as a parody of heterosexual 
convention where the female is dominated or 'owned' by the male. The dog collar 
leads Marr to ruminate on the nature of ownership when he receives a letter from the 
Old Poet, Almira Adler, signed 'Yours truly': 
... what is contained in that most innocent of closings, 'Yours truly'? I am 
truly yours. I belong to you. And that belonging I mark with the terrible sign 
of 'truth'. Thus you are my owner. You own me. 
I have put a collar on you that allows you to roam and, because the 
collar is a true sign of belonging, of ownership, of the genitive in its 
possessive mode, lets you return ... to what comforts, what privileges, what 
responsibilities, what violences? 
Historical, political, and bloody, in a land built on slavery, what 
appalling connections were inscribed within that phatic figure? (Delany 
1994b:409) 
Leaky's friends visit Marr's apartment, and Marr is instructed to pay Tony a 
penny for Leaky. This exchange of currency also involves a social exchange, for what 
is being bartered is sexual favours and companionship. The corollary with slavery is 
obvious, as in the above quote, but the fact that such exchanges are consensual turns it 
into a purely commercial transaction. Perhaps it is this starkness, this parody of 
capitalist acquisitiveness, that makes the deed seem so infinitely more sinister. It is 
also ironic that the unit of currency is a penny, for in society's books these people are 
not worth even a ledger entry. 
'Tony,' I said. 'Why am I doing this?' 
'Huh?' 
'Leaky said you'd paid a penny for him?' 
' - yeah, when I bought him from Mad Man Mike.' 
' - and now I have to give you a penny back?' 
'Yeah.' He held the coin, copper tarnished nearly black, up between 
his fingers. 'Now you've bought him from me. He's officially yours now. We 
got beer - did they get the chicken?' (Delany l 994b:4 l 5) 
What follows is an orgy focused on "the combinations and permutations of everyone 
hooking up with everyone else" (1994b:441), during which Marr's apartment is 
befouled and he writes the word 'ekpyrosis' in excrement on the wall. Central to this 
encounter are the ubiquitous pennies, the currency of pleasure and desire, and the 
token symbol of possession: 
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What stays with me, of course, were those moments that seemed in 
excess of this endless systematic interchange: at one point (and years later, I 
decided it was probably significant), Leaky had pretty much everybody's 
pennies; and the Mad Man, by fiat, simply redistributed the wealth, as it were, 
as absolutely and autocratically as any avatar of Marx might have done. 
(Delany 1994b:442) 
Marr opens a pack of index cards belonging to Hasler sent to him by Adler, 
detailing a similar orgy with the Mad Man and his troop. Delany uses almost stream-
of-consciousness prose interspersed with bracketed numbers, but no text breaks, to 
portray the writing style of the cards. The index cards mirror the events in Marr' s 
apartment, but the corollary is that the cards form the raw data from which Marr 
constructs his own 'literary' event. Here the public, private and secret selves of both 
Marr and Hasler merge and become virtually indistinguishable. Just as Marr struggles 
to convey the sensory impact of the orgy, eventually resorting to Sade's "scary 
obsessiveness" (l 994b:44 l) in plotting the permutations of perversion, so does Hasler 
struggle to find a 'metalanguage' that can give voice to the totality of his experience: 
("... The sensation is as if [card 9] another language - a metalanguage I 
cannot speak - alone might be adequate to describe the ebullient feelings I 
have when I am around him, a metalanguage I am always yearning to 
understand when he is near: the madness of infatuation, of sex, of love.") 
Many read like rank pornography. "God, he's (card 12) got the biggest cock!") 
(l 994b:458) 
Events reach a climax when Marr finally learns the truth of Hasler' s mysterious and 
shocking death at the Pit, and sees Crazy Joe die in front of him in an eerie doubling 
of events. It transpires that the philosopher had been killed when interceding in an 
argument, and in so doing sacrificed his life for another. Life, indeed, is infinitely 
richer than a handful of pennies. 
I thought about presents. From inside the body. Timothy Hasler had, 
by throwing himself in the way of Dave Franitz, saved the Mad Man's life -
though it cost his own. But I had not been able to save Crazy Joe. And neither 
had Mad Man Mike. Once again, I thought, perfectly lucid: Hasler has proved 
to be not only a remarkable philosopher but a remarkable man - certainly 
more remarkable than I. (Delany l 994b:4 79) 
In a final twist, Marr receives correspondence from a student who visited 
Hasler the week before he died. He reports that, contrary to popular belief (which 
sustained the myth of Hasler's meteoric blaze into notoriety and perversity), the 
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philosopher's apartment had not been befouled, apart from a waterlogged ceiling. 
Though it seems as if the final veil has slipped from the 'truth', Hasler remains as 
enigmatic and unapproachable as ever. Marr makes the mistake of thinking that by 
catching a glimpse of the man's secret self he can lay claim to the philosopher's life 
as his own, but this proves futile from the beginning. The best way he can honour 
Hasler' s memory is to be true to himself, as he shows splendidly in his tender 
romance with Leaky. Mossman is thrilled that Marr has solved the riddle of Hasler's 
murder, but Hasler is adamant that it was no riddle at all: 
"It was just a matter of asking the right people the right questions. To a 
lot of people, it wasn't a secret at all. Only to the official forces - the police, 
people like that. It's a matter of getting yourself in the right system." (Delany 
1994b:488) 
Bron also strives to find the 'right system' in which he can be accommodated, but 
despairs that such a system exists. Rather than attempt the impossible and change the 
system, he decides to change himself. The notion of sex as discourse, which 
underpins much of Triton and The Mad Man, is suffused with what Foucault refers to 
as the '"polymorphous techniques of power"' (1978: 11), meaning the web of power 
relations that permeates society. 
In Triton, Delany portrays a society where sexual differentiation is 
institutionalised to the point where every imaginable whim or need can be catered for 
without infringing on the equally legitimate whims or needs of others. But the main 
protagonist, Bron Helstrom, is unable to 'fit in' into this best of all possible worlds; 
the interface between himself and the world he inhabits is incomplete. The question 
as to whether this is the fault of his society or is symptomatic of Bron's general 
failure as a human being, is left unanswered. 25 What interests Delany is the boundary 
between the two, and how these are continually crisscrossed by the web spun by 
societal pressures and individual human drives. All that Bron is left with at the end of 
the novel is existential crisis.26 As Celia Kitzinger notes: 
... the inability to predict or control events produces a state of existential 
anxiety. Ordinarily, existential anxiety operates at the unconscious level, 
producing a tension that drives us to seek relief from its otherwise 
25 One is led, though, to conclude that a society that makes an individual feel so dislocated is definitely 
flawed. 
26 This is precisely Foucault's point about the impact ofheterotopia. He states that the "sick mind 
[which can be taken to refer to Bron Helstrom] continues to infinity, creating groups then dispersing 
them again, heaping up diverse similarities, destroying those that seem clearest, splitting up things that 
are identical, superimposing different criteria, frenziedly beginning all over again, becoming more and 
more disturbed, and teetering finally on the brink of anxiety" (l 970:xviii). 
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immobilising effects. One major response to this existential uncertainty and its 
resultant anxiety is to enter into the cocoon of a power relationship. Power 
relationships create, both for the ruled and the ruler, the illusion that life is 
reasonably under control, at least if certain beliefs are upheld and behavioural 
conditions are met. (1994:127) 
Bron's ultimate discovery is that, even though he undergoes radical change by 
switching to a female sex, nothing else changes. He still inhabits the same social 
context, and the power imbalance between men and women is perpetuated. Indeed, he 
comes to realise that "the longstanding power imbalance between males and females 
is woven into the manifold arrangements that constitute the social context" 
(1994:128). This is indicated in Triton when Bron returns to work after her sex 
change, and Philip asks her if it "'goes all the way down"' (Delany 1976:282). 
Kitzinger points out further that "the potency of the gender role blueprint affects men 
and women across societies and across generations" (Kritzinger 1994: 126). If 
sexuality is a social construct, then the logical conclusion is that "sexual activity is 
translated into sexual identity" (1994: 195). Heterosexuals do not think of themselves 
as heterosexuals, for this is the dominant, and therefore normative, sexual identity. 
"'Heterosexual' is a silent term, a submerged and taken-for-granted aspect of the self, 
which is rarely consciously articulated" (1994: 196) . 
. . . sexuality has been prioritised as reflecting fundamental aspects of the 'true 
self, and sexual activity is held to have major identity implications for those 
who deviate from heterosexual norms. The social power serves to control and 
shape our purportedly 'basic' sexual activity, by forcing us to confront 
questions about who we 'really' are on the basis of what we do in bed. 
(Kritzinger 1994: 196) 
This leads Kitzinger to conclude that heterosexuality "in and of itself' 
(1994: 198) is the cornerstone of male power, with the heterosexual couple as the 
basic unit of this political structure. 27 Therefore it is difficult to change sexualities, as 
Bron discovers, for dominance and submission are the defining terms of sex in our 
culture. "We know we are having 'sex' and deriving 'sexual pleasure' when we act 
out the relationship between power and powerlessness, oppressor and oppressed," 
argues Kitzinger (1994:204). 
The language we use around sexuality is riddled with images of dominance 
and subordination. The word 'passion' comes from the same root as 'passive'; 
we are 'overcome', 'overwhelmed', or 'overpowered' by desire, we 'submit to 
a loved one' who has 'captured' our heart. Violence and sex are explicitly 
27 And sexuality is a deep aspect of identity. 
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linked ... The comparison of the penis to an instrument of domination, a gun, 
is commonplace .... (1994:206) 
However, Radtke and Stam note that "power is both the source of oppression 
in its abuse and the source of emancipation in its use" (1994: 1 ). If sexuality is a social 
construct, then so is gender, which "is constituted within a particular set of power 
relations and hence reflects those power relations" (1994:9). Another way to articulate 
this is to say that gender relations and power relations are two sides of the same coin, 
as "'female' and 'male' are shaped not only at the micro-level of everyday social 
interaction but also at the macro-level as social institutions control and regulate the 
practice of gender" (1994: 13). Bron thinks that changing sex is the answer to her 
societal maladjustment, as having been male will afford her a unique understanding of 
the male-female divide, and indeed enable her to bridge the gap. But her 
transformation raises more questions than it answers, questions such as those 
articulated by Bristow: 
Is erotic identity specific to one's sexed body? Or is it a fluid phenomenon that 
traverses a complex ensemble of gendered meanings - a whole range of 
femininities and masculinities that are not necessarily grounded in the 
anatomical distinction between the sexes? (Bristow 1997 :209) 
Bron herself provides a cogent summation of her predicament: 
At one point there had been something she had thought she could do better 
than other women - because she had been a man, known firsthand a man's 
strengths, a man's needs. So she had become a woman to do it. But the doing, 
as she had once suspected and now knew, was primarily a matter of being ... 
(Delany 1976:262-3) 
Bristow argues that "restrictive binary logic" (1997:211) has ensnared crtitical 
perceptions of sex and gender, and points to Judith Butler's reasoning that, "if sex is 
fashioned by nature, while gender is generated by culture, then these two phenomena 
emerge from divergent sources" (1997 :211 ). The obvious conclusion therefore is that 
gender does not necessarily follow from sex: 
Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical 
discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. 
Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that 
the construction of 'men' will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that 
'women' will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to 
be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will 
become a question), there is no reason to assume that genders ought also to 
remain as two. (Bristow 1997:211) 
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A binary gender system is based on the assumption that sex and gender mirror 
each other, but when gender is separated from sex, it is transformed into "a free-
floating artifice'', with the result that the terms male and masculine and woman and 
feminine are not restricted to male and female bodies respectively (Bristow 
1997:211). Thus it can be seen that Bron's revolutionary act of self-transformation, 
far from being as radical a social statement as he had envisaged it to be, instead 
perpetuates the prevailing binary gender system. Instead of setting himself free, he 
merely shifts his condition to the opposite end of the male-female divide. Butler 
states that gender must be envisaged as a "pluralising concept, one that envisages 
many different femininities and masculinities in all their variety" (Butler 1997:212). 
The true challenge is to recognise that heterosexuality is accorded its status as being 
natural and normal simply because "the binary structure of gender finds its 
complement in opposite-sex attraction" (1997:213). 
This is compellingly illustrated when Bron decides that she has integrated her 
new female persona sufficiently to contemplate opposite-sex interaction, and enlists 
the help of Prynn to recommend a place where she can meet men. Bron notes that the 
places she had used in the men's co-op for this purpose had been "places where 
people drank long and lingered late. It was a collection of reasonably happy men and 
women" (Delany 1976:304).28 She hopes to duplicate this process. It is revealing that 
Bron is basing her new existence on her past experiences and recollections, when her 
stated aim had been to cast herself anew. This attachment to an inseparable past is 
signified most obviously by the fact that Bron retains the name of her previous sex -
when naming is the most obvious level of identification and signification, and the 
easiest to change.29 Prynn describes the structure of the bar, which mirrors the male-
female power-relation split it is meant to facilitate: 
"This is the active side of the bar, i.e., if you want to check out the beauties 
languishing on that side, without being bothered," Prynn explained. "That side 
if you want to be approached by someone who's made up their mind from this 
side. And that there is free-range territory." (Delany 1976: 304) 
Bron seems to deny that her aim is a sexual encounter when a man approaches 
her, and she tells him that there are 150 other people '"more interested in it than I am. 
Now get lost. And if you don't, I'll kick you in the balls" (1976:306). We learn for 
the first time that, in Bron's past life as a Martian prostitute, he had been raped by 
28 This echoes Bron's musing at the beginning ifhe was reasonably happy or, happily, reasonable 
(1976:1). 
29 However, Walter Meyers points out that "first names have become no more reliable an index of 
gender than last names are of family descent" - hence The Spike refers to a woman, and Flossie to a 
man (1980: 184). 
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five women, which leads her to wonder that it is actually sex she is afraid of - but 
then she realises that "it was everything else that circled the sex" (1976:307), 
meaning the power relations enmeshed with and recomplicated by sexual identity. 
Bron sees Sam, approaches him, and asks him if he needs any new wives in 
his commune - this is the same Sam that Bron had dismissed early on in the novel as 
"just a standard, annoying type" (1976:30), who had once shocked him by revealing 
that he had undergone a sex change and been refixated on "'sallow, blonde, blue-eyed 
waitresses ... "' ( 1976:149). Bron's question to Sam is meant to be a deprecatingly 
ironic introduction of her new identity, but it merely pays lip service to the dominant 
male-female power relations. With no physical description of Bron in her new sex 
role, and with her retaining her old name, it is difficult for the reader to envisage this 
encounter as being male-female, which is perhaps Delany' s way of illustrating how 
entrenched dominant sexual identities are in terms of the power relations they 
underpin. Bron acknowledges that she is a woman made by a man for a man, as her 
therapist Brian tells her, when Sam rejects her offer: 
He could come here, could sit and wait, could prowl and search, as she had 
once sat or prowled, searching for the woman who would know, who would 
understand. Men could do that. She had done it when she was a man, and had 
found, prowling or being prowled by, five hundred, five thousand women? But 
she had no way to show she knew, because any indication of knowledge 
denied that knowledge's existence in her. (Delany 1976:313) 
Thus the ultimate irony of Bron's situation is that, instead of elevating herself 
above the male-female divide, a position she thought she would be afforded after her 
sex change due to her former male viewpoint, she now simply finds herself on the 
opposite, and lower, side of that divide. She has inside knowledge, so to speak, of 
how both male and female sexual identities are perceived and construed by society. 
But Bron also comes to realise that gender relations do not have to be defined solely 
by sexual identity, as when she says to Brian that she just does not "'feel like a 
woman"' (1976:296). 
"I mean all the time, every minute, a complete and whole woman. Of course, 
when I think about it, or some guy makes a pass at then me, then I remember. 
But most of the time I just feel like an ordinary, normal... . (Delany 
1976:296)30 
The fact that Bron cannot articulate her inadequacy is symbolic of the 
emptiness in her life, the space or buffer between herself and the society she inhabits. 
Ironically, Delany repeats the beginning of the novel right near the end: "She had 
30 The missing word here, of course, is man. 
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been living at the women's co-op (the Eagle) six months now. This one had been 
working out well" (1976:285). The Eagle suggests a perspicacity of vision that is 
Bron's too late, as when Sam's true worth becomes known - in the moment when he 
rejects her advances: 
But he was there, like all she could ever remember imagining, as new as now 
and as familiar as desire. She watched, numbing, knowing she had known him 
laughing among his hard-drinking friends, dark brows a-furrow in 
concentration over a problem whose solution might roll worlds from their 
orbits, carelessly asleep on a bed they had shared for the night, his eyes 
meeting hers in an expression that encompassed all the indifference of now but 
backed by the compassion of the unspeakably strong, the ineffably wise, and 
the knowledge of half a year's companionship. (1976:307) 
What had prevented Bron from realising Sam's true impact on her until now, 
or to take advantage of the companionship that had evolved between them, was the 
artificial divisions of class distinction. Bron's personal act of revolution against the 
power relations that keeps her in place in the society of Triton like a fly in amber, her 
sex change, does not alter that place, but merely shifts her position in relation to the 
people she interacts with: the Spike, Lawrence, Audri and Philip are all reperceived in 
the light of her personal transformation, which ultimately is a failure because Bron 
retains that which she is trying to escape from: her maleness. Woodward remarks that 
while we potentially have the means to exert an unprecedented degree of 
control over bodies, we are also living in an age which has thrown into radical 
doubt our knowledge of the consequences of this control, and of how we 
should control our bodily selves .... [T]he more we have been able to alter the 
limits of the body, the greater has been our uncertainty about what constitutes 
an individual's body, and what is 'natural' about a body. (1997:67) 
Perhaps a more defining act of Bron's personal revolution than her sex change 
itself occurs when she turns down Audri' s offer to form a co-op unit on the Ring, 
Triton's most exclusive residential area, representing a level of status that Bron had 
always aspired to. Delany complicates this picture in that it is unclear whether or not 
it is the notion of a lesbian relationship that Bron is objecting to. 
Near the beginning of the novel, Delany introduces the concept of the 'ego-
booster booths'. The function of the booths is to offer "minor credit" and "slightly 
more major psychological" support to the Government Information Retention 
Programme (1976:5). With the insertion of a two-franq coin into a slot, together with 
a government identity card, the viewer is afforded three minutes of personal videotape 
selected from the government's own information files. 
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Ten years ago a statute was passed that any citizen had the right to demand a 
review of all government information on him or her. Some other public 
channeller had made a stir about getting the government simply to stop 
collecting such information; but such systems, once again, insinuate themselves 
into the greater system in overdetermined ways: jobs depended on them, space 
had been set aside for them, research was going on over how to do them more 
efficiently - such overdetermined systems, hard enough to revise, are even 
harder to abolish. (Delany 1976:5) 
This is a somewhat ironic reversal of the 'Big Brother is watching you' 
syndrome, with the government cleverly disguising its blatant invasion of privacy in 
the form of a social service. Bron notes that, "for two years, while finding the booths 
derisively amusing in theory, he had never gone into one - as silent protest" (1976:6). 
But he then realised that this is the general feeling about the booths, which means 
that, contrary to his constant striving to be different, he is still part of the unfeeling 
masses. "He hated being a type,'' he thinks (1976:6). Lawrence notes: 
. . . everyone is a type. The true mark of social intelligence is how unusual we 
can make our particular behaviour for the particular type we are when we are 
put under particular pressure. (Delany 1976:6) 
Significantly, the phrase 'KNOW YOUR PLACE IN SOCIETY' is written on 
the sides of the booths (1976:4). Bron is first signified in the novel when his name 
appears in the screen of the booth, followed by a 22-digit government identity 
number. The booth, which has also been vandalised, breaks down when he attempts to 
access his personal three minutes of fame, and he panics about how to remove his 
card from the machine (1976:7). Bron spends the entire novel trying to determine his 
place in an overdetermined society. His ultimate solution to his existential crisis is to 
change sex from male to female, but sexual preference and gender identity are not 
neatly and conveniently separated by the interface of the human body. Our notions of 
who and what we are in terms of our identity are held in place, maintained and 
reinforced by a complex web of power relations that uses the human body as a site of 
difference and conformity, as Woodward notes: 
[O]ur bodies are constraining as well as facilitating, while they are alive and 
not simply because they die. Our bodies cannot be controlled at will and 
neither are they wholly accessible to us: a circumstance which helps to explain 
the power of social judgements and classifications on our self-image. 
(1997:73) 
She adds that the body is a point of view "on which we have no point of view" 
(1997:73), which indicates how the body can be linked to social inequalities. If the 
"bodily bases of people's actions and interactions are socially structured in different 
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ways", meaning that "our fleshly physicality is moulded by social as well as 'natural' 
processes", then it can be appreciated how crucial a site the body is as "it shapes our 
identities and structures our interventions in, and classifications of, the world" 
(Woodward 1997:65). This picture is not as simple as it sounds because, while 
science has given us an unprecedented level of control over the body, "we are also 
living in an age which has thrown into radical doubt our knowledge of the 
consequences of this control, and of how we should control our bodily selves" 
(Woodward 1997:67). This has made it difficult to determine the 'limits' of the body: 
... the more we have been able to alter the limits of the body, the greater has 
been our uncertainty about what constitutes an individual's body, and what is 
'natural' about a body ... Advances in transplant surgery and virtual reality 
exacerbate this uncertainty by threatening to collapse the boundaries which 
have traditionally existed between bodies and between technology and the 
body. (Woodward 1997:67) 
Woodward defines a 'body project' as a means of expression by an individual 
to increase his or her control over their flesh: "if one feels unable to exert influence 
over a complex society, at least one can have some effect on one's body" (1997:71). 
Bron's sex change represents such a body project, but instead of changing her 
relationship with Triton's society, it merely perpetuates the male-female divide that 
underpins the dominant societal power relations. Bron's ultimate failure is her failure 
to realise that the "rigid either/or" classification of the sexes is a "convenient social 
construct and not a biological reality" (1997:75). As Woodward observes: 
Given the variety of genetic types and hormonal conditions which characterise 
individuals, it is impossible to classify with absolute accuracy all humans into 
the restrictive categories of male or female . . . Why, then, does the view of 
women and men as opposites remain so popular? (1997:75-6) 
Another type of body project is represented by the transsexuals of The Mad 
Man, with whom John Marr feels a curious affinity that he is unable to explain. On 
one level it is because their sexual identities have placed then all beyond the boundary 
of conventional society but, on another level, Marr is also attracted to their radically 
subversive act - their assault on the source of their sexed and gendered identities, the 
wellspring of the power relations that has them trapped at its nadir (or zenith?) - their 
bodies. 
We are guilty that we are not them - are not those boys destined to run 
the systems and cities of the world: that puts a rift between us. They, on the 
other hand, are terrified, lest through some inexplicable accident, some magic 
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happenstance of sympathy or contagion, they might become us. In most of 
them, we know, that terror can be repressed before adolescent curiosity. But 
we also know that that terror, given the license of adult exercise in the 
darkness of unquestioned moral right, can assume murderous proportions: our 
deviance, our abnormalities, our perversions are needed to define, to create, to 
constitute them and make them visible to each other and to themselves. 
(Delany 1994b: 155-156) 
Triton represents a society where a conscious effort has been made to provide 
a societal and psychological space in which such deviance, abnormality and 
perversion can be harnessed for the social good - namely the u-1. Everything in Triton 
is strictly regimented, from its 40 or 50 basic sexes to urban planning, with the city of 
Tethys using seven different types of urban units - "though for practical purposes you 
only had to be familiar with two of them to find anything you wanted in most of the 
city ... " (1976: 187). Such regimentation is resisted and subverted by the concept of 
heterotopia, which contests the institutionalised nature of utopia. The society of Triton 
has a gritty social and political reality, but the reader finds it difficult to experience 
this as a lived reality with the same pungent immediacy and pathos of the transsexuals 
of The Mad Man, for example. Concepts such as deviance, abnormality and 
perversion are implicit in, but never explicitly referred to, in the somewhat sterilised 
world of Triton. 
One of the themes in Triton concerns sublimating gender, while The Mad Man 
addresses the issue of what it means to be truly human - and the indulgence of what is 
deemed depravity by society at large as a ritual act that can put us in touch with our 
baser, and perhaps truer, animal selves. It is this deeper atavistic connection that Bron 
is missing. He has lost touch with himself as a primal sexual being - this is not a 
question of gender, but an issue of animality and instinct, of primal sexuality. And of 
personal integration. Indeed, while Bron seems to think that the root cause of his 
problems is gender, and hence undergoes a sex change, Delany is de-emphasising 
gender by contextualising it as part of general psychological health - which suggests 
that Bron's real problem is his inability, whether male or female, to relate to others. 
Triton is a future society of infinite scope, where "experimentation could provide a 
radical contestation of the roles and sexual identities that modern society had imposed 
on all its members" (Miller 1993:255). 
Miller refers to the concept of 'ascesis', defined as "the labour that one 
undertakes by oneself in order to be transformed" (1993:258). Bron's own 'ascesis' or 
act of transformation is to change genders - which is merely a sociological adjustment 
in terms of his society, and not the revolutionary act it would be in ours. The Mad 
Man fleshes out this concept of transformation: in order to become fully human. To 
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transcend the limitations of the boundary between the self and society, one has to 
surrender to Foucauldian 'madness': 
No matter how strenuously a culture tried to outlaw the Dionysian impulses, it 
could only be fettered, never transcended: after all, Dionysus, in the 
Nietzschean view, symbolised the power of transcendence itself (Miller 
1993: 105) 
Transcendence through transgression is the particular journey of discovery 
traced in The Mad Man, with an emphasis on language and its role in stabilising the 
'systems of the world', which Delany uses as a general term for institutionalised 
society. Miller highlights three crucial aspects of Foucault's understanding of 
language and the 'order of things': that language "makes possible order and reasoned 
knowledge of the world", that language "makes thinkable the unreal and 
unreasonable", and that language 
therefore calls into question the world and ultimately itself in a dizzying spiral 
of possibilities and impossibilities, realities and unrealities, that may well 
climax . . . in a mad and lyrical embrace of the void, oblivion and death - that 
'formless, silent, unsignifying region where language cah free itself. 
(1993: 133) 
In The Mad Man, some of Hasler' s notes include the statement that language 
1s a 'stabilising' mechanism, as opposed to a 'producing' mechanism - in other 
words, it anchors or defines reality. But Hasler contends further that it is not 
contradictory to state "that the world is constituted entirely of language", which 
implies that it is "constituted by the structure of its stabilising forces" (Delany 
l 994b:68). A fundamental social construct such as power relations is also a construct 
of language, with the logical outcome that social reality can only be mediated through 
language, and not experience, as experience has to be articulated first before it is 
relevant in a societal context. Delany takes this idea even further by arguing that even 
thought is part of language, and cannot be separated from it as a separate 'stabilising' 
process: 
Thoughts are never not clothed in language - or, rather, that's not the relation 
between thought and words: the relation between a body and a suit of clothes. 
Thought is part of language. But everything we perceive, either through our 
senses, or through our bodily feelings, or through sitting in the dark with our 
eyes closed, remembering or thinking or figuring, is the linguistic signified. 
The whole range of human perceptions, of subject and object, is the 'meaning' 
part oflanguage. (1994b:305-306) 
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Delany' s comment that everything we perceive is the linguistic signified leads 
back to Mario Pei's contention in Babel-17 that society can only be perfected once its 
language is perfect. It is significant that heterotopia challenges the concept of utopia 
at the level of language, by contesting the "very possibility of grammar at its source" 
(Foucault 1970:xviii). Delany seems to suggest that, if we are defined by language, 
then the only legitimate way to change our self-definition is to cast the language itself 
anew, and the first two words in this vocabulary of social revolution are heterotopia 
and ekpyrosis. The all-consuming Heraclitean fire that rages at the end of The Mad 
Man is perhaps the ultimate form of deconstruction, where all binary opposites, and 
even the concepts of subject and object, dissolve into flux. 
What, within the systems of the world, I pondered, turning away, 
turned and returned eternally, posited about and around possession, truth, and 
the home - position and thesis, opposition and antithesis - among which I 
occupied one place and a man whom the world called homeless occupied the 
Other . . . even as I had dreamed of bringing him across the boundary between, 
into mine, through whatever marks he assigned me to assign him . . . . (Delany 
1994b: 407) 
And, by invoking ekpyrosis, this final boundary is crossed, rendering the world totally 
transparent, and infinitely rich, in its limitless possibilities of existence. 
Chapter Three 
The Body of the Text 
This chapter will look at 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' (1989), in order to 
illustrate Delany' s theoretical engagement with the broader concept of genre, and the 
implications this holds for SF itself From the outset it is necessary to indicate an 
initial position that Delany adopts with regard to the critical function of SF: 
Science fiction is not about the future; it uses the future as a narrative 
convention to present significant distortions of the present .... Science fiction 
is about the current world - the given world shared by writer and reader. But it 
is not a metaphor for the given world, nor does the catch-all term metonymy 
exhaust the relation between the given and science fiction's distortions of the 
given. (Delany 1984:47-8) 
This chapter will attempt to illustrate how Delany redefines SF as a signified, and 
how he uses this revitalised signified in the context of genre, a project that sees 
Delany going against the grain of conventional theorising and thought about SF, as 
indicated by his startling assertion that SF is not about the future. 1 Delany is not 
attempting to refute the accepted props of the genre that indicate its futurity, such as 
space travel and alien worlds - props which he himself uses in the course of his own 
work. 
Instead, Delany is referring to the relationship between SF and the real world. 
He is saying that SF is not about some future so unfathomably distant that it is totally 
divorced from our own lived reality, but that SF and the real world are in a continual, 
mutually-reinforcing dialogue with each other. As Kathleen Spencer remarks, 
Delany's main philosophical concern is the construction of models and, in particular, 
the role that language plays in the modelling process: 
How do the models adopted by individuals or cultures shape their perceptions 
and responses? How can we determine the relative coherence, accuracy, or 
appropriateness of comparative models? To what extent can a model actually 
succeed in mastering the thing it models? (Spencer 1985:60) 
Spencer argues that, as an SF writer, Delany raises these concerns in the light of a 
single overarching question: how does fiction model the real world? Given the 
1 For Le Guin this is akin to saying that SF has been regressive and unimaginative: "All those Galactic 
Empires, taken straight from the British Empire of 1880. All those planets - with 80 trillion miles 
between them! - conceived as warring nation-states, or as colonies to be exploited, or to be nudged by 
the benevolent Imperium of Earth toward self-development- the White Man's Burden all over again. 
The Rotary Club on Alpha Centauri, that's the size of it" (1989:94). 
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paradoxical notion that SF is not about the future, as Delany claims, then what exactly 
is its relationship to the real world? What sort of modelling process does it engage in, 
and what is the kind of model that results? Painted in broad strokes, these are some of 
Delany' s main theoretical concerns that will be highlighted in this chapter. 
Delany gives an example of the relationship between a model and what it 
models in The Jewel-Hinged Jaw (1977) where he describes how he made a drawing 
through a window of a tree in a garden in a rainstorm. Obviously, the real tree 
precedes the drawing, and the 'meaning' of the drawing results from repeating the 
recognisable pattern of the signified as 'tree'. However, Delany also points out that 
the modelling process is complicated by an intricate web of assumption and assertion, 
as mirrored in the relationship between fiction and reality (1977:71). 
Delany' s interest in the modelling process is illustrated by the fact that Triton 
and the Neveryon cycle have the overarching title of 'Some Informal Remarks 
Towards the Modular Calculus' (Samuelson 1994:22). Triton the novel is 'Part One', 
while Appendix Bis 'Part Two', and 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' is Part Five. 
Spencer comments that Triton marks Delany attempt "to explore the problems of 
modelling ever more directly and explicitly", meaning in ways that are "less and less 
traditionally fictional" (1985 :62). 
One of Delany' s critical aims is to explore the boundaries of SF as a marginal 
genre by applying non-generic theoretical techniques and concerns. Describing the 
structure of Triton, Spencer points out that, while the form of the novel is fairly 
traditional - that is, conventional - "there are some distinct peculiarities creeping in 
around the edges" (1985:62). The first is the fact that the novel has two subtitles, 'Part 
One' and 'An Ambiguous Heterotopia', a reference to the subtitle 'An Ambiguous 
Utopia' of Ursula Le Guin's 1974 novel The Dispossessed. 
Spencer argues that the subtitle referring to the 'modular calculus' is likely to 
puzzle readers for, while sounding vaguely scientific, it seems out of place in an SF 
context - as are the "formidably intellectual" (1985:62) epigraphs used in the novel, 
featuring Mary Douglas, Willard van Orman Quine, Michel Foucault, Spencer Brown, 
and Wittgenstein. Just as SF, a paraliterary genre, is perceived to be marginal to 
literature, so do Delany' s concerns in Triton seem to be marginal to SF itself 
Triton has two appendices, 'From the Triton Journal: Work Notes and Omitted 
Pages', and 'Ashima Slade and the Harbin-Y Lectures: Some Informal Remarks 
Towards the Modular Calculus, Part Two'. The first comprises deleted pages from 
early drafts, while the latter is a fictional essay by Ashima Slade dealing with the 
science of 'metalogic'. Slade is mentioned briefly in the course of the novel, but does 
not appear as a character, while the central protagonist, Bron Helstrom, is a 
metalogician. The appendix fleshes out some of the historical and philosophical 
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background of the world of Triton, but while its relationship with the novel itself 
seems totally arbitrary, it provides Delany with a crucial opportunity to explicate 
some of the philosophical ramifications of the preceding work. As Spencer notes: 
The appendix allows Delany to maintain a fictional stance and still 
discuss directly (non-representationally) the philosophical problems whose 
relevance the novel has just demonstrated. The second appendix, then, is both 
a guide to criticism of the novel and an additional text itself needing 
interpretation, its function as part of the artistic whole a question which must 
be answered to understand the point of the novel. (1985:63) 
But how does this relate to the first appendix, and how does the first appendix, 
in turn, relate to the novel as a whole? By including sections from a working draft, 
Delany is deliberately introducing a writerly element into his text to underline the 
fictional nature of his project, and to comment, in turn, on the nature of fiction itself 
The traditional ending or sense of closure of the novel seems to be disrupted by the 
appendices, but the appendices are crucial elements in understanding the novel as a 
whole, and to foregrounding the role of the author as the originator of the text. 
Spencer states that the function of the first appendix is 
to emphasise the fact that this work is fiction, a construct, not a segment of 
real history whose form is dictated by external events but something entirely 
controlled by the author. The inclusion of these extra pages serves to 
undermine the convention of verisimilitude which reigns within the body of 
Triton. This challenge to fictional conventions is what links the two 
appendices, for the second appendix, in addition to its philosophical and 
critical functions, also serves to challenge the readers' expectations about the 
nature of fiction. (1985:64) 
Derrida refers to aparergon or "supplement outside the work" (1982:55):2 
A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, the 
work done [fait], the fact [le fait], the work, but it does not fall to one side, it 
touches and co-operates within the operation, from a certain outside. Neither 
simply outside nor simply inside. (1982:54) 
This highlights the ambiguous and tenuous relationship of Triton's appendices 
to the main text: they are simultaneously part of, and removed from, the actual novel, 
and both attenuate it and extend it. Derrida argues that the question "of the frame, of 
the limit between inside and outside, must, somewhere in the margins, be constituted 
2 This may come from Arthur Schopenhauer's Parerga und Paralipomena (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1970). 
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together" (1982:55). 3 By existing in the margins of the novel, the appendices 'frame' 
the novel in the same way that a painting is usually considered marginal to the 
painting it encloses. This points to the complex relationship between the appendices 
and the novel itself The 'parergonal frame' of the appendices stands out as it is 
separated from the main text, but simultaneously merges or blends with it as it shares 
the same text, and forms part of the holistic construction of the novel and the 
discourse it inscribes. This raises further questions: 
Where does the frame take place. Does it take place. Where does it begin. 
Where does it end. What is its internal limit. Its external limit. And its surface 
between the two limits. (Derrida 1982:63) 
The appendices are identified as being separate from the main text as they are labelled 
as such, with the labels forming an artificial interface between the two textual 
components. The function of the appendices is clearly not to 'complete' the novel. 
Rather, they are intended to forestall such an expected closure by opening up the 
possibilities of the text into unanticipated new directions. 
'Appendix A' first appeared in issues 6 and 7/8 of Foundation in 1975, and 
then in a more detailed form as 'Shadows' in The Jewel-Hinged Jaw in 1977. This 
complicates their relationship to Delany' s fiction even further, as the appendices 
themselves are hybrid creations stemming from a process of cross-generic discourse. 
In the appendix to this collection of essays on SF, sub-titled 'Notes on the Language 
of Science Fiction', Delany comments that the essays "circle about, hover over, and 
occasionally home in on science fiction" (1977: 11). 'Appendix A' in Triton can be 
seen as introducing Delany's general readership to his theoretical thinking about SF, 
with the former novel itself as a convenient example and testbed of these ideas. 
Perhaps including such theoretical musings in an appendix tagged on to the end of the 
novel belies the importance of Delany' s ideas on the matter, and their ramifications 
for the body of his work as a whole, but this sense of playfulness is also very much a 
part ofDelany's theoretical project. 
John Clute comments that Delany' s most important work "may well be 
pedagogical" (1995: 169). He adds that his "several intensely demanding" works of SF 
criticism present an account of the nature of the genre that "must be grappled with by 
3 Delany highlights the "dazzling opening" of Foucault's The Order of Things, which referred to 
Velazquez's painting Las Meninas: " ... a painting which, despite its deceptively untroubled surface 
(unlike the self-referential play rampant in modem works, no such thing and its representation are 
simultaneously shown), is a nearly Escher-like visual construct; a painting of a painter painting a 
painting ... the several positions collapsed one into the other before a frame containing an image the 
artist alone could never have observed" (1999: 170). 
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any critic of the field" (1995: 169). An important implication of Triton's appendices is 
that SF, and SF theory, are two sides of the same coin, and should not be separated. 
As in Triton, SF and SF theory must supplement each other. This also relates to 
criticism and genre in general. The version of 'Appendix A' that appears in The 
Jewel-Hinged Jaw is more substantial, and opens with Joanna Russ's contention that 
"criticism of science fiction cannot possibly look like the criticism we are used to" 
(1977:51). Delany then elaborates on the nature of the critical function: 
... the critic is part of the work's audience. The critic responds to it, selects 
among those responses and, using them, makes, selectively, a model of the 
work that may, hopefully, guide, helpfully, the responses of the critic's own 
audience when they come to the work being modelled. (1977:53). 
But what are the implications for the modelling process when the work under critical 
scrutiny is SF? Delany examines this problematic through questioning whether or not 
SF "should be taken seriously as literature" (1984:46). The question about the 
relationship between SF and literature has several implications: 
Firstly, there is the presumption that the way literature is traditionally taken 
seriously is a good thing and has grown up historically as an accumulation of 
right knowledge in an appropriate response to the innate worthiness of the 
literary text. This means that what's really being asked here is this: Is science 
fiction, like literature, innately of value? Second is the much vaguer and more 
general presumption that science fiction and mundane fiction 4 work along the 
same general lines to produce their respective plays of meaning, so that they 
may be considered in the same way productively. (1984 :48) 
For Delany, this is the parting of the ways with conventional critical 
approaches to literature, and their application to SF in particular. Just as he maintains 
that SF is not about the future, but engages in a dialogue with the present through 
significant distortions of the contemporary world, so he argues that "the play of 
meanings, contradictory or otherwise, that makes up the SF text is organised in a way 
radically different from that of the mundane text" (1984:49). Derrida pointed out that 
any text, if studied closely enough, will produce contradictory denotations and 
connotations "that subvert each other, that interfere with each other in such a way that 
the very concept of 'knowing what the text means' begins to fall apart" (Delany 
1984:49). Arriving at an irreducible meaning of a text - be it SF or otherwise - is 
impossible due to the play of meanings engendered (the appendices of Triton 
4 Delany uses the term 'mundane' fiction to mean the same as 'realist' or 'mainstream' - that is, non-
SF. 
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highlight this dilemma through their intertextual and ambivalent relationship to the 
novel itself). 
The main issue is the structure of such a play of meaning in an SF text, and 
how it is generated and maintained. In order to answer this question, one has to start 
with the text or 'textus', as Delany refers to it in 'Appendix A': 
Text and textus? Text, of course, comes from the Latin textus, which means 
'web'. In modern printing, the 'web' is that great ribbon of paper which, in 
many presses, takes upwards of an hour to thread from roller to roller 
throughout the huge machine that embeds ranked rows of inked graphemes 
upon the 'web', rendering it a text. All the uses of the word 'web', 'weave', 
'net', 'matrix' and more, by this circular 'etymology' become entrance points 
into a textus, which is ordered from all language and language-functions, and 
upon which the text itself is embedded. (1976:333) 
In 'Shadows', Delany defines the problem of critical language as analysing a work to 
reveal its internal form or underlying structure, with "the implication that what the 
critic comes up with is somehow more basic than the thing under study" (1977:52). 
Though novels are clearly seen to be fiction, "the books of criticism about them are 
not" ( 1977: 5 2). Delany uses the analogy of a surgeon dissecting a body to remove the 
skeleton to illustrate the traditional view of criticism as a process with a tangible end 
result, but works of literature "simply do not have informative insides. There is no 
skeleton to be removed. They are all surface" (1977:52-3). But this notion itself is 
contradicted by the concept of the textus as something upon which a text is 
embedded. This embedding is given depth through the ordering of language - and, 
indeed, it is language that is the lynchpin for understanding the theoretical 
underpinnings of SF, and the different context in which these operate in the genre. 
In 'Appendix A', Delany writes about naming as a metonymic process, with 
metonymy being "a figure of speech that replaces the name of one thing with the 
name of something else closely associated with it" (Baldick 1990: 135). Delany 
comments on the functioning of the metonymic process: 
Sometimes it is the pure metonymy of associating an abstract group of letters 
(or numbers) with a person (or thing), so that it can be recalled (or listed in a 
metonymic order with other entity names). Frequently, however, it is a more 
complicated metonymy: old words are drawn from the cultural lexicon to 
name the new entity (or to rename an old one), as well as to render it (whether 
old or new) part of the present culture. The relations between entities so 
named are woven together in patterns far more complicated than any 
alphabetic or numeric listing can suggest: and the encounter between objects-
that-are-words (eg., the name 'science fiction', a critical text on science 
fiction, a science-fiction text) and processes-made-manifest-by-words (another 
science-fiction text, another critical text, another name) is as complex as the 
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constantly dissolving interface between culture and language itself (Delany 
1976:334) 
Delany argues that SF has been named through such a metonymic process, with a 
functional relationship existing between its constitutive metonyms. The 'science' part 
of the name comprises a varied selection of "bits of technological discourse (real, 
speculative, or pseudo)" that functions to "redeem various other sentences from the 
merely metaphorical, or even the meaningless, for denotative description/presentation 
of incident" (1976:336). As an example, Delany uses a single sentence from Robert 
Heinlein's novel Beyond This Horizon, namely "The door dilated": 
. . . the technological discourse that redeems it - in this case, discourse on the 
engineering of large-size, iris apertures; and the sociological discourse on 
what such a technology would suggest about the entire culture - is not explicit 
in the text. Is it, then, implicit in the textus? All we can say for certain is that, 
embedded in the textus of anyone who can read the sentence properly, are 
those emblems by which they could recognise such discourse were it 
manifested to them in some explicit text. (Delany 1976:336) 
Delany argues that this is the functional relation between the metonyms 
'science' and 'fiction', which allows SF to generate "images of the impossible ... 
through the labyrinth of technical possibility" by joining "the repertoire of sentences 
which may propel textus into text" (1976:337). In the texts that comprise the genre, 
we perceive an aspect of 'science' and 'fiction', and the interplay between the two 
leads to the difference that marks SF as a distinct genre. Not only is this fiction 
different, but it also enhances the potentiality of the genre, which has a "hugely 
increased repertoire of sentences to draw on" (1976:338). 
Delany argues that this means that the structure of SF' s fictional field is 
"notably different from the fictional field of those texts which, by eschewing 
technological discourse in general, sacrifice this increased range of nontechnological 
sentences - or at least sacrifice them in the particular, foreground mode" (1976:338). 
A further implication is that the relationship between foreground and background in 
SF also differs from ordinary fiction, "because the added sentences in science fiction 
are primarily foreground sentences" (1976:338). This also refers back to Derrida's 
concept of the parergon, and its complex relationship with the work it frames. 
The new sentences available to [SF] not only allow the author to present 
exceptional, dazzling, or hyperrational data, they also, through their 
interrelation among themselves and with other, more conventional sentences, 
create a textus within the text which allows whole panoplies of data to be 
generated at syntagmatically startling points. (Delany 1976:339) 
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The final conclusion that Delany draws from SF' s intrinsic difference is that the SF 
enterprise is 'richer' than mundane fiction in terms of its "extended repertoire of 
sentences, its consequent greater range of possible incident, and through its varied 
field of rhetorical and syntagmic organisation" (1976:341). However, he notes that the 
'web of possibilities' that comprises SF is far from simple, and presents a complex 
map that has to be learnt 'by exposure' in order to be negotiated: 
The contours of the web control the reader's experience of any given s-f text; 
as the reading of a given s-f text recontours, however slightly, the web itself, 
that text is absorbed into the genre, judged, remembered, or forgotten. (Delany 
1976:341) 
A crucial point here is that the language of SF - which, as Delany notes, is "a 
sub-language of the greater language it is written in" (1981:232) - has to be learnt 
through exposure and application, which has implications for the nature of reading SF 
itself, and presupposes a particular relationship between an SF text and its readers. 
Delany argues that SF is comprised of complex codes, like those for Elizabethan 
poetry, that are "overdetermined and segue into and mix inextricably with the codes 
for many other kinds of readings" (1994a:141). Delany's view of the codic 
conventions of SF starts from the basis of the sentence, in keeping with Noam 
Chomsky's view that the sentence is the basic unit oflanguage. 
A more complex example than the Heinlein quotation is the following 
fragment explored in Starboard Wine: 'Monopole magnet mining operations in the 
outer asteroid belt'. In order to be fully understood, this "demands a speculative 
context in science", and readers unfamiliar with the languages of science and SF may 
be unable to grasp these concepts and appreciate their speculative nature (Samuelson 
1994:25). The codic functioning of SF is highlighted in a further discussion of 
Heinlein's Starship Troopers in 'Appendix A'. Delany recounts how Heinlein's 
description of a mirror reflection and the mention of an ancestor's nationality lead 
him to infer that the first-person narrator is non-white. The fact that this is only 
passingly revealed about 250 pages into a 350-page book indicates to Delany that the 
'race problem' has been solved. Delany describes the impact ofthis realisation: 
The book as text - as object in the hand and under the eye - became, for a 
moment, the symbol of that world. In that moment, sign, symbol, image, and 
discourse collapsed into one, nonverbal experience, catapulted from 
somewhere beyond the textus (via the text) at the peculiarly powerful 
trajectory only SF can provide. (1976:339) 
As mentioned earlier, the locus or basic unit of this peculiarly SF effect is the 
sentence, with Delany declaring that he remains, at heart, a "sentence lover", for the 
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word is merely "a degenerate sentence, a fragmentary utterance, something 
incomplete" (1994a: 134). 
Without the sentence, the arena of the word has no walls, no demarcation. No 
contest takes place. Even historically, I suspect it's more accurate to think of 
the sentence as preceding the word. 'Word' - or 'logos' - is better considered 
a later, critical tool to analyse, understand, and master some of the rich and 
dazzling things that go in statements, sentences, utterances . . . . The sentence 
is certainly the better model for the text . . . . The word is monolithic. You 
can't argue with it. At best it's got an etymology - . . . And an etymology is 
only a genealogy, not a real history of material pressures and complex 
influences. (l 994a: 134-3 5) 
Barthes states that the sentence is the last unit falling within the ambit of linguistics, 
which "stops at the sentence" (1977:82). The sentence is also a constitutive unit of 
discourse, which has its own level of organisation, just like linguistics. 
Discourse has its units, its rules, its 'grammar': beyond the sentence, and 
though consisting solely of sentences, it must naturally form the object of a 
second linguistics. (1977:83) 
It is important to note that Delany' s analysis of the particular functioning of an 
SF text, and how it differs from a conventional text, focuses mainly on the basic 
constitutive unit, the sentence. There may be many sentences in an SF text that are 
perfectly conventional. Thus what needs to be examined is the discourse of the novel 
- that is, the manner in which all the constitutive elements, such as words and 
sentences, function together and interact to form an SF text; in other words, how the 
SF textus is woven from the web of its components. Delany states further that what 
interests him most about sentences "is the codes by which we make them", referring 
to both readers and writers (1994a: 135) - which brings us back to the role of the 
reader in the SF enterprise. A genre is a way or a protocol of reading, "a structuration 
of response potential" (1980: 176). 
A set of texts, over a period of time, to the extent they are different from other 
texts, produces a way of responding to these texts that is different from the 
way we respond to texts we might say belong to other genres. Still other texts, 
intended to be part of the genre, will be written in such a way as that particular 
protocol allows them to 'make sense' or make a richer sense than some other 
generic protocol would. And still other texts will require that this protocol be 
slightly shifted in order to produce richer readings. (Or possible weaker ones). 
Thus the genre changes over the years. (Delany 1980: 176) 
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Here Delany explains that a genre is a protocol, or a way of reading, formed 
over a historical period through the accumulation of many texts. This accumulation 
allows the specific generic protocol to be applied to other texts as well, and prevents 
the genre from being defined simply by a description of the texts themselves. Thus a 
genre such as SF is not a rigid construct, but is flexible and mutable, and can change 
over time. A notable implication of SF as a particular generic protocol is that, in order 
to be able to comprehend the genre itself, "a significant portion of the reading 
protocol that is the SF genre" (1980: 178) has to be learnt. Delany points out that, 
whereas ordinary fiction engages with the 'real' world, it often happens that the world 
in an SF story is not a given, but an ever-changing construct. 
This means that, in order to be able to 'read' an SF text, the reader must be 
committed to a more fluid and speculative process that contrasts each sentence of the 
text to the real world. Thus, through the accumulation of such sentences, "we build up 
a world in specific dialogue with our present conception of the real" - "for SF, as a 
genre, is a language" (1980: 178). But such a generic protocol is not as lucidly all-
encompassing as it sounds, for the very concept of 'reading' complicates the picture 
even further. Delany points to the view that reading is a transparent medium or 
interface connecting writing and understanding: 
It sees all problems of comprehension as lexically embedded: know the 
meaning of the word and you know the meaning of the sentence; know the 
meaning of the sentence and you know the meaning of the text. (Delany 
1980:180) 
Delany argues that the problem with this view is that 'economic distortions' 
are at work at every level, be it word, phrase, sentence, sentence cluster, paragraph, 
topic, or text (1980:180). The implication is that reading "is not transparent and 
unyielding but rather opaque and responsive" (1980:182). Around every text there 
exists an interpretative space, and this play of interpretation cannot be denied because 
"it comes into existence as soon as we recognise the words' meaning" (1980:189). Far 
from being transparent before the text, reading is our only knowledge of a text 
(1980:181). An implication of this is that genres themselves have a border of 
interpretative play around them, and cannot be defined rigidly. For example, 
attempting to define SF in terms of scientific subject matter is soon confounded by the 
number of texts that contradict known science, with such SF staples as faster-than-
light travel (1980: 188). 
Delany states that, for SF to maintain "theoretical plurality as an operative 
value", then the genre must be able to encompass conflicting theories across its range. 
Delany praises the dialectical freedom of SF, which is akin to its theoretical plurality, 
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and states that the discourse of SF and the discourse of literature - in terms of 
responses, reading protocols, and interpretative spaces - can encounter each other 
without "any significant rupture for literature" (1984:100). This implies a cross-
pollination between the two, and underlines the fact that a genre is far from a pure 
empirical construct. But literature is still the dominant discourse, and thus SF is 
perceived as a marginal offshoot. Delany has embraced marginality as a mode of 
theoretical orientation and experimentation in his ongoing SF project. Samuelson 
notes that Delany's varied output - from fiction and non-fiction to memoirs and 
criticism - constantly overlap, and subvert the view of literature as "a privileged mode 
of writing apart from life" (1994:34). 
. . . [T]he marginality of this genre offering alternatives to the present seems 
intimately connected for him with the marginality of the deprived. In a 
marginal genre, ruled by commercial concerns, Delany himself occupies a 
marginal position, as a gay black man driven by feminist, linguistic, and 
Marxist aesthetic concerns. . . . Delany seems to seek an ideal (para-)literature 
in which considerations of race and sexual preference are inclusive rather than 
exclusive, and in which science and technology take unexpected turns . . . . In 
the long run, gaining public attention slowly and through aesthetic and 
intellectual values is a more subversive tactic than open confrontation 
(1994:34-5) 
Delany comments that "writers are not assigned their genres by God", and that 
the notion of SF being more tolerant of the marginal - in that "it recognises the 
problems of life on the edges and welcomes them with insight and compassion" -
could just be "a somewhat na'ive anthropomorphism" (1987b: 151). However, in the 
same essay Delany remarks that "certainly one thing that must have drawn me to SF 
in the first place was a propensity for working in despised genres" (1987b: 154). The 
notion of 'despised genres' is explored further in the 'Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', 
the third part of Flight From Neveryon (1989), itself the third volume of the four-part 
Neveryon sequence. Delany's contention that SF does not deal with the future seems 
to have reached its logical progression in Neveryon, set in some magical, distant past 
at the cusp of civilisation's birth. 
In the same way that SF is marginal to literature, so does the Neveryon 
sequence form part of a genre that is marginal to SF itself, namely the subcategory of 
sword-and-sorcery (S&S), which Delany describes as "SF's despised younger cousin" 
(1987b:154). SF's relationship to S&S is akin to the way the former itself is viewed 
by the larger literary establishment: as being populist, superficial, and therefore not 
worthy of any critical consideration or attention. In explaining why he focused on 
S&S for a writing project that took ten years, and saw Delany veering markedly from 
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his SF oeuvre, his line of reasoning, however, is basically the same as the one he used 
to justify himself taking up the SF cudgel in the first place: 
What's intriguing about sword-and-sorcery is that it takes place in an 
a-specific, idealised past5 . . . . This means whatever happens in this vision of 
the past that may have something to do with us today doesn't filter through 
any recognisable historical events . . . it lets you look at the impact of certain 
cross-cultural concepts that nevertheless are often not given the same kind of 
spotlight in historical novels, concepts (like money, writing, weaving, or any 
early technological advances ... ) that go so far in over-determining the 
structure of the historical biggies: a war, a change of government, a large 
migration from country to city. 
What makes S&S historically a-specific also makes it rather 
anachronistic . . . . And because it's all supposed to be happening at an 
unknown time and place, there there be dragons! (Delany l 987b: 155) 
Neveryon is a speculative endeavour that, like SF, is in dialogue with the 
present, but through an "historic imaginative space" and a "paraliterary object 
priority", shared with SF, that allows Delany to "play with notions about how things-
in-the-world, including the socially contoured organisation of people's psyches, may 
be functioning in such correspondences" (1987b:155). Neveryon's link with SF is 
amplified further when Delany states that the overall plan or model for the sequence 
has been the 'series stories' that dominated SF in the 1930s and 1940s, such as 
Clifford Simak's City, Robert Heinlein's 'Future History', and Isaac Asimov's 
Foundation sequence (l 987b: 156). The flexibility of the series is that it can 
accommodate short stories, bulky novels, and novellas with equal ease, and provides 
the writer the opportunity to revisit and rethink certain parts of the series whenever he 
or she wants to. 
'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' has a far more complex function in the 
Neveryon sequence as a whole than simply restating or clarifying earlier ideas. 
Taking up roughly half of Flight From Neveryon' s 480 pages, it is written in the form 
of numbered journal entries that intersperse two divergent stories: an account of a 
mysterious plague that descends upon Kolhari, and an account of New York in the 
early 1980s at the advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In addition, Delany offers 
personal comment, reminiscences, autobiography and criticism. The central sequence 
of the novella is an account by the Master of how he traversed N everyon in his youth, 
eventually reached its boundary, but was unable to cross over. There are two other 
instances in the novella where Kolhari and New York do, indeed, merge. 
Delany recomplicates the double marginality of the Neveryon sequence - that 
is, its relationship to SF, and SF's relationship to literature as a whole - in this 
5 As opposed to an a-specific, idealised future of SF ... 
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complex novella, the main theme of which is the transgression of boundaries, be they 
physical borders on a map, the moral restrictions imposed by institutionalised society, 
or the limits of a genre. Delany argues that a genre "is almost always employed with 
ideological abuse" ( 1980: 182), adding that he distrusts the notion of a genre as a 
discursive space in which an author can exercise unrestricted literary freedom: 
Basically the idea that a genre, or even an age or epoch, gives a 
freedom (or, indeed, imposes restraints) that any old writer, once he or she 
plops down in the middle of it, can tum around and exploit wonderfully (or be 
totally stymied by) is one I've heard before- and distrust. (Delany 1987b:151) 
Just as Delany warns against seeing reading as a transparent interface between 
writing and understanding, so does he warn against seeing genre itself as a transparent 
medium in which a collection of texts nestle. 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', in 
its context as part of a paraliterary genre, introduces even greater marginality by 
disrupting and refracting the question and nature of genre itself It does this by 
examining the "interpenetrations and speciation of the paraliterary genres of science 
fiction and fantasy" (1987:65). By introducing elements of autobiography and 
criticism, Delany indicates that his concern is the functioning of genre in general. The 
relationship between SF and S&S is a reflection of this larger concern, and the 
particular form of 'speciation' that Delany attempts in the novella can be said to 
produce a different type of genre. 
The point is not so much the difference between the novella and SF and S&S, 
but that genre itself is endlessly mutable and flexible. Delany uses this reproductive 
and regenerative characteristic of genre to create a collage of disparate genres in the 
novella that, as a whole, partakes of the nature of genre itself, as well as at, the same 
time, being a distinctive marginal genre all unto its own. This might sound like a 
chaotic situation where all boundaries break down, and transgression is the only stable 
element. But it is transformed into a rich seedbed for sowing thoughts about the 
nature of genre itself, and how genres function and are constituted: 
We get a new genre when two old genres, joining, loose their membranous 
separation, mix and interpenetrate on some intimate genetic level, which 
results in a spurt of growth, multiplication, and the separation of modes, some 
of which, against an economic and social environment supportive enough, are 
able to flourish and become genres. (1987:68)6 
Delany notes that genre marks have a particular problematic within the 'paraliterary 
precincts' of SF and fantasy. Derrida links the question of genre to the question of 
6 This can also be termed genre hybridisation. 
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law, as a genre is defined and maintained by a particular set of rules. In order to 
understand what genre is, one has to focus on the explicit and implicit rules by which 
it functions, and in tum what external influences and factors impact on those rules. 
Derrida ponders the 'question of genre' as reflecting on such larger issues as law and 
classification: 
The question of genre - literary genre but also gender, genus, and taxonomy 
more generally - brings with it the question of law, since it implies an 
institutionalised classification, an enforceable principle of non-contamination 
and non-contradiction. But genre always potentially exceeds the boundaries 
that bring it into being, for a member of a genre always signals its membership 
by an explicit or implicit mark .... (Derrida 1992b:221) 
Derrida begins with what seems to be an unequivocal statement: "Ne pas 
meller les genres", translated as "Genres are not to be mixed" - however, the French 
phrase can be translated as an infinitive or an imperative, an undecidability that 
Derrida capitalises on (1992b:223). Any attempt to conceive of the word 'genre' 
immediately poses a limit, with its attendant norms and interdictions. This means that, 
in attempting to put a framework around the concept of genre, one is obliged 
automatically to exclude everything external to the concept, or that which might 
contaminate or influence it. 
Thus, as soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm, one must 
not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, anomaly or 
monstrosity. (1992b:225) 
Delany' s stated intention in the Neveryon sequence is to engage in a dialogue 
with a particular subcategory of SF, namely S&S. In 'The Tale of Plagues and 
Carnivals', Delany's aim is not only to subvert the generic conventions or reading 
protocol of S&S, but to throw a critical light on the nature of genre itself What do we 
make of Derrida's contention that genres are not to be mixed in the face of a novella 
that actively ruptures several generic categories and makes them flow together into a 
single new reading protocol that nevertheless partakes of all the identities of the 
individual genres it encompasses? Derrida's argument anticipates such an eventuality: 
What if there were, lodged within the heart of the law itself, a law of impurity 
or a principle of contamination? And suppose the condition for the possibility 
of the law were the a priori of a counter-law, an axiom of impossibility that 
would confound its sense, order and reason? (1992b:225) 
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Delany argues that what interests him lies "beyond the margin to what is 
'outside of literature and art'" (1987:65), which can be understood as implying such 
paraliterary gemes as SF and S&S. This can be understood as implying that "every 
text participates in one or several gemes" (Delany 1987:63), but that such 
participation does not equate to belonging. This is not due to "an abundant 
overflowing or a free, anarchic and unclassifiable productivity, but because of the trait 
of participation itself, because of the effect of the code and the generic mark" 
(1987:63-4). Delany quotes Joanna Russ's contention that "'worrying about the purity 
of the gemes is like worrying about the purity of the races"' (1987:64), implying that 
not only is such an attempt futile, but that it is to commit to a rigid and shortsighted 
classification that stunts the potentiality and growth of geme. What, exactly, is 
Derrida's 'generic mark'? Delany states that it is 
... a mark that no text escapes, implicitly or explicitly, and is yet a mark always 
outside the text, not a part of it - such as the designations 'science fiction' or 
'fantasy' on the book spine or cover - a mark that codifies the text on bookstore 
shelf or under hand, calling into play the codes and reading protocols by which 
the texts become readable. (1987:65) 
Derrida argues that the edge of a text is the title, and it is this edge that allows us 
to approach a text as a distinct entity (1979:81). But the edge of a text is also a 
"running border" - comprising the "supposed end and beginning of a work, the unity 
of a corpus, the title, the margins, the signatures, the referential realm outside the 
frame" (1979:83). This leads to a situation of 'overrun' that disrupts the boundaries 
and divisions encompassed by the notion of a 'text'. Derrida argues that a 'text' can 
only be referred to as such for strategic reasons, as it is 
henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a 
book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring 
endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces. Thus the 
text overruns all the limits assigned to it .... (1979:84) 
Barthes argues that, although the text is an object, it cannot be 'computed' or 
properly delineated because it is a "methodological field" and exists in a "process of 
demonstration", speaking according to, or against, various rules. The text is "held in 
language", and can only be said to exist in a "movement of a discourse" (1977:157). 
He defines a 'work' as the physical representation of a text, for example a book on a 
library shelf The defining characteristic of a text, or its "constitutive movement", is 
that of 
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. . . cutting across (in particular, it can cut across the work, across several 
works) .... it cannot be contained in a hierarchy, even in a simple division of 
genres .... If the Text poses problems of classification (which is furthermore 
one of its 'social' functions), this is because it always involves a certain 
experience of limits . . . . ( 1977: 15 6) 
Barthes continues that a text, which "practises the infinite deferment of the signified", 
is only approached and experienced in response to the sign, and therefore a text is, by 
its very nature, "radically symbolic". It generates the "perpetual signified" through a 
play of deferred meaning in the "field" of the text. This is done not according "to an 
organic process of maturation or a hermeneutic course of deepening investigation, 
but, rather, according to a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings, 
variations" (1977: 158). 
The idea of structure embodied in a text is as ambivalent a notion as the 
structure of language - that is, it is "a system with neither close nor centre" (Barthes 
1977:159). Furthermore, a text has a plurality of meaning, which does not imply more 
than one meaning, but rather that the meaning of the text is itself irreducible. This 
leads Barthes to conclude that a text is a 'plurality': 
The Text is not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; 
thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, 
a dissemination. The plural of the Text depends, that is, not on the ambiguity 
of its contents but on what might be called the stereographic plurality of its 
weave of signifiers (etymologically, the text is a tissue, a woven fabric). 
(1977: 159) 
This is akin to Delany's notion of the textus as a web. What web, then, does he weave 
in 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals'? The first point of note is the extra-textual 
boundaries that enclose the novella: it is the third part of a novel, which itself is part 
three of an overarching series or sequence of novels and stories. This structure seems 
to impose a logical progression and order. 
The next most obvious boundary is the subtitle ('Some Informal Remarks 
toward the Modular Calculus, Part Five'), which is linked to, and thus forms an 
integral part of, the main title by dint of a comma and the word 'or', but is printed in 
smaller type a few spaces down to indicate its lesser, or lower, status. The two titles 
are disparate, and the use of the linking word 'or' seems to indicate an ambivalence 
on the part of the author. Once again, 'part five' seems to indicate a sense of logical 
order, and a hint of a larger plan. But the reader who is unfamiliar with Delany' s work 
might be intimidated that he or she is only approaching the larger text at part five, 
while the reader who is familiar with Delany will be puzzled equally by the nature 
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and function of the modular calculus, which runs a gamut of genres and textual forms 
from Triton to the Neveryon sequence. 
In addition, the chatty colloquialism of the phrase 'some informal remarks' 
sits uncomfortably with the imputed high-brow nature of the 'modular calculus'. 
Apart from the subtitle, the latter is never referred to in the novella again. Thus its 
reference and ultimate meaning is intertextual - that is, it can only be properly 
understood as a signified by referring to other texts. Thus from the outset Delany 
indicates the fluidity of the boundary of his text, and the fact that it can be recrossed. 
The modular calculus is first encountered in the subtitle to Triton itself, and then in 
the subtitle to 'Appendix B'. Its inclusion in the titles, which are the primary 
signifieds of the text, seems to lend it veracity as a concept. This view is 
recomplicated when the reader learns that it is part of a fictional statistical modelling 
process in the novel called 'metalogic'. 
'Appendix B' provides some background detail on its inventor and main 
proponent, Ashima Slade, who himself does not appear in the novel as a character. It 
also includes some extracts from lectures he gave on the modular calculus. It is only 
in Return to Neveryon that Delany confronts directly the question of what the modular 
calculus actually is, stating that - if it were to exist - it would comprise a "fixed set of 
algorithms" to produce a template. The defining problematic of the modular calculus 
is "how do we know when we have a model of a situation; and how do we tell what 
kind of model it is?" (1989c:380).7 'Some Informal Remarks toward the Modular 
Calculus', explains Delany, are a model of a system but, although the 'remarks' are 
clearly numbered from Triton onwards, from part one to part five, it is unclear what 
the modular calculus actually includes and excludes. 
Delany adds "that any rich system tends to function through an interchange 
between what is inside the system and what is outside the system (with what is 
outside frequently fuelling the system proper)" [1989c:387]. Thus the modular 
calculus is a point of convergence for several of Delany's most important themes: 
models and systems, and their boundaries or margins. Both Triton and Neveryon are 
'model' societies - one projected into the future, and the other reclaimed from the 
past. Both are refractions and reflections of our existing society, and form a dialogue 
or discourse in relation to it. Spencer adds that the Triton appendices also function to 
indicate that the novel is a work of fiction or a construct, "not a segment of real 
history whose form is dictated by external events but something entirely controlled by 
the author" (1985:64). In Neveryon, however, even the distinction between the 
modelled history of a text and the real history preceding it is blurred, for the 
7 Delany answers his own question, and says it "is a model of late twentieth-century (mostly urban) 
America" (1989c:380). America, of course, is the quintessential discursive 'utopia'. 
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ostensible basis of the entire series is a 900-word, neolithic narrative fragment known 
as the Culhar Fragment or Kolhare Text. 8 
In an appendix to the first volume, Tales of Neveryon, SL Kermit writes how 
the text was translated and reclaimed for modern times by K Leslie Steiner, a black 
female theoretical mathematician. While this is entirely fictional, with both Kermit 
and Steiner aliases for Delany himself, Spencer states that the real events on which 
the fiction is modelled are the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, and the real 
archaeologists and linguists Schliemann and Ventris (Spencer 1985:84). In this way 
the relationship between the history of the text and the history of the real world is 
recomplicated even further. This appendix is also part of the modular calculus. In 
'The Culhar Correspondence', an appendix to volume two, Neverjiona, Delany - in 
the guise of Kermit, writing ostensibly from "a dig in the desert" (1985:89) -
responds to criticism from real academic Charles Hoequist. Such obfuscation 
obviously complicates the 'veracity' of the Neveryon sequence? 
In 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', Delany states that the entire sequence, 
"from first tale to last", is "a document of our times . . . and a carefully prepared one, 
too" (1989b:322). Towards the end of the novella, Kermit and Leslie debate the 
notion of the sequence as a social document. The criticism is serious and sustained, 
but the fact that the debate is engendered by two fictional personas of the author 
himself further recrosses the boundary between fiction and 'reality'. 'The Tale of 
Plagues and Carnivals' is preceded by three quotations that serve to signpost integral 
themes that are interwoven throughout the novella. Like the quotations used in Triton, 
these are of an academic nature, signifying that Delany is extending the traditional 
S&S model. As with Triton, the model that Delany constructs in Neveryon is, at the 
same time, a comment on the modelling process itself As Ashima Slade explains in 
'Appendix B', the central problematic of the modular calculus is "how can one 
relational system model another?" (1989b:356). The three quotations are as follows: 
Ours, too, is an age of allegoresis ... 
-Allen Mandelbaum 
8 Foucault's following comment on history in his introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge are 
appropriate: " ... ever since a discipline such as history has existed, documents have been used, 
questioned, and have given rise to questions; scholars have asked not only what these documents 
meant, but also whether they were telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so, 
whether they were sincere or deliberately misleading, well informed or ignorant, authentic or tampered 
with. But each of these questions, and all this critical concern, pointed to one and the same end: the 
reconstitution, on the basis of what the documents say, and sometimes merely hint at, of the past from 
which they emanate and which has now disappeared behind them; the document was always treated as 
the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile, but possibly decipherable trace. Now ... 
history . . . has taken as its primary task, not the interpretation of the document, nor the attempt to 
decide whether it is telling the truth or what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and to 
develop it" ('Post-structuralism' 1999). 
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Inferno, Introduction 
'If you believe that,' the tutor remarked, 'you'd believe anything! No, it 
wasn't like that at all! ... ' 
-Joanna Russ 
Extra(Ordinary) People 
Does this amount to saying that the master's place remains empty, it is not so 
much the result of his own passing as that of a growing obliteration of the 
meaning of his work? To convince ourselves of this we have only to ascertain 
what is going on in the place he vacated. 
-Jacques Lacan 
The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis (Delany 
1989b:237) 
It is difficult to infer from the first quotation whether the 'age' referred to is 
that ofNeveryon, our world itself, or both. Allegory is "a story or visual image with a 
second distinct meaning partially hidden behind its literal or visible meaning" 
(Baldick 1990:5), and thus 'allegoresis' can be taken to mean the process by which 
allegory functions, or is employed. The process can be seen to function in the novella 
in that the foregrounded subject matter is the overarching concern of the entire 
sequence: the mysterious and magical realm ofNeveryon itself 
The plot concerns how the capital, Kolhari, is struck by a devastating plague. 
Interspersed with this is a story of New York in the early decades of the HIV/ AIDS 
epidemic. Clearly, HIV/AIDS is the "second distinct meaning" inferred by the 
concept of allegory. But there is a further hidden meaning that underpins both stories: 
the modelling process itself Neveryon is the 'false' representation, while the New 
York account is the privileged discourse as it is based on 'true' events. However, both 
are models of representation, and they differ in their degrees of removal from that real 
world. The boundaries separating the two models become permeable as events are 
interwoven, until the two finally mix and merge, which not only challenges the 
dominance of the main discourse, but topples it from its throne of privileged 
representation. 
The difficulties associated with fictional representation, especially of 'true' 
events, is indicated by the second quotation, which reveals that meaning is not 
transcendent and unified, but is instead plural and dispersed. The third quotation 
grapples with the nature of discourse itself, and the role that the author - the 'master' 
referred to (there is also a character in the novella called the Master) - plays in 
defining the boundaries or parameters of his text. Delany' s relationship to his 
discourse is complicated and multilayered: he is author and originator, character and 
observer, and reader and consumer. 
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The novella begins with Delany' s description of "a contemporary Bridge of 
Lost Desire" in New York, which he states is "on -th Street, just beyond Ninth 
Avenue" (1989b:239). Here the author demands a familiarity with the symbolic 
landscape of Neveryon, for the Bridge is an area in the Old Market of Kolhari where 
prostitutes ply their trade. The bridge is a symbol of the vital flow of trade and 
influence between the old and new markets of the port city and, in the context of 'The 
Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', conjured up right at the beginning and right at the 
end, is also a symbol of the link between that ancient realm and the world of New 
York, and becomes the symbolic means by which the two worlds finally merge. 9 The 
novella opens on a gritty note of plague, with this bridge being where one of the many 
main characters, Joey, "beside the towering garbage pile beneath it, . . . smelled the 
first of the corpses" (1989b:240). It is interesting to note that, given the realism ofthis 
opening, Delany does not pinpoint the exact location of the bridge, as if' -th Street' is 
meant to indicate the psychological space or frame of discourse in which Neveryon 
functions. 
Though the novella starts in New York, seeming to foreground this strand of 
the narrative as the primary discourse, Delany' s reference to a. contemporary 
equivalent of a Neveryon landmark seems to indicate that both worlds are equally 
tangible. It is also a succinct example of the modelling process, for the version of the 
bridge in New York can be said to represent the Bridge of Lost Desire in Kolhari, 
though it seems clear that it could be the other way round as well: "except for ... 
twentieth-century detail, it has the air of a prehistoric structure" (1989b:239). Another 
interesting aspect of the opening is that it is numbered ' 1. ', with each subsequent 
'entry' numbered, as ifthe novella were a journal. The numbered sequence progresses 
sequentially, with Delany obviously using simple arithmetical progression, but what is 
unclear is how he decides on the length of each individual segment. Thus the overall 
effect of the opening of the novella is to hint at the Neveryon/New York dichotomy, 
which will be made more explicit as the novella progresses, representing a boundary 
that will ultimately be crossed - a boundary of genre, reader/author function, and 
textual possibility. 
The next entry, marked '2.1 ', is a vignette of Neveryon, but this is not 
explicitly referred to. Instead the reader has to deduce the transition from the use of 
the phrases 'kitchen girl', 'servant woman' and 'Lord Vanar', who is ill from some 
mysterious illness. S&S is often characterised by a primitive class structure, as a 
symbol of it being located in some inchoate form of the past, and thus it is possible to 
attach a generic label to the vignette. But the difference in Neveryon, and a signpost 
9 New York City, of course, is itself a city of bridges. 
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of Delany' s interest in the marginal, is that the servants are not just background 
extras, but participate actively in the narrative. The next entry, '2.2', is a discourse on 
Susan Sontag's comment in Illness as Metaphor that "diseases should not become 
social metaphors" (1989b:240). It is also the first time that Aids is mentioned in the 
novella, which causes the reader to re-evaluate the previous two entries in light of this 
new information. 
It seems that, with Sontag's statement, Delany is subverting his narrative 
strategy, the ostensible aim of which is to take the societal models of Neveryon and 
New York, and introduce a disruptive external element in the form of a plague or 
disease, and examine how the models cope with the intrusion or are altered by it. But 
Sontag's comment warns precisely against this process of turning a disease like Aids 
into an element of allegoresis. 
When diseases generate such metaphors, the host of misconceptions and 
downright superstitions that come from taking them literally (misconceptions 
that, indeed, often determine the metaphors themselves in a system of 
reciprocal stabilisation) makes it impossible, both psychologically and socially 
- both in terms of how you feel and how others, with their feelings, treat you -
to 'have the disease' in a 'healthy' manner. 
'Dis-ease.' Non-easiness. Difficulty .... 
Metaphors fight each other. They also adjust one another. (Delany 
1989b:241) 
This metaphoric process of conflict and adjustment refers to the production of 
meaning from sign systems, or semiotics. Delany explains that, in the third and fourth 
volumes (so far the last of the sequence), the tales embrace "a more general 
semiology", described by Roland Barthes as: 
'the labour that collects the impurities of language, the wastes of linguistics, 
the immediate corruption of any message: nothing less than the desires, fears, 
expressions, intimidations, advances, blandishments, protests, excuses, 
aggressions and melodies of which active language is made.' This idea of 
semiology as the excess, the leftover, the supplement of linguistics brings us 
round to Jacques Derrida's logic of the supplement, without which semiology 
and, indeed, poststructuralism, in general would be hugely impoverished. 
(1987b:355) 
Delany states that it was his intention to end the sequence with 'The Game of 
Time and Pain', but in the particular system of signs or signification circumscribed by 
the Neveryon sequence, 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' can be seen as the 
semiological notion of the excess or leftover, the spillage from the overarching 
126 
discourse. In explaining this structuralist interpretation of a text, Hugh J. Silverman 
comments that it can be seen as "an open field participating in the proliferation of sign 
production" (1994:29): 
. . . the text is an open system of signs with plural meanings. The plurality of 
meaning arises because the serniological notion of signification (based on the 
act or process of a signifier combined with a signified) has been broken open 
by the stress on the chain of signifiers. The signifying chain produces multiple 
significations .... (1994:31) 
However, Julia Kristeva notes that Saussure indicated originally that semiology could 
not be an abstract science like logic and linguistics, "for the semiotic universe is the 
vast realm of the social" (1989:297). Therefore semiotics draws on the gamut of 
human sciences, as it has "to devise for itself a theory of signification before it could 
formalise the systems it wanted to tackle", implying that the "science of the sign 
would thus become inseparable from a theory of signification and knowledge" 
(1989:297). In the Nevecyon sequence, Delany constructs a particular sign system 
based on the S&S template, which is a system of signification in its own right, as well 
as commenting on the process by which such systems are formulated. 
The three opening entries of the novella reveal its basic structure: interspersed 
accounts of New York and Neveryon, with the boundary between these crossed 
further by writerly discourse on the part of the author. Delany also crosses the 
boundary separating the novella from the rest of the sequence, thereby indicating that 
its separate elements are not isolated components, but part of a greater significatory 
system. This also raises such questions as how do the particular sign systems of SF 
and S&S, for example, generate their particular meanings? 
The fourth entry, '2.3', introduces one of the most important characters in the 
novella, simply referred to as the Master ( 1989b :241 ), who is a symbol of the author 
and the authority he exerts over the text (and his continuing influence, even though he 
is, in a sense, absent from his own work), to the moral and institutional authority that 
underpins the society ofNeveryon. As Delany comments in Return to Neveryon: 
The Neveryon series takes place at the edge of the shadow of the late French 
psychiatrist Jacques Lacan, from the slaves who have vacated the collars in the 
first pages of the first tale (gone to what manumissions, executions, or other 
collars, the child Gorgik never knows, though the rest of his life can be looked 
at as an attempt to find out) to the series of vanished authorities and their 
empty citadels, such as Lord Aldarnir and his castle: the Dead father, the 
Absent father, the Name of the Law. (Delany 1989c:356) 
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The point is that these authorities are not vanished, for the law they represent 
is part of the institutional fabric of society; they are an integral element of the 
semiotic system by which society itself is signified. Delany writes how, "pondering 
questions of disease, magic and power, the Master sat alone" (1989b:243) - but the 
Master is never alone; he is the centre of an intricate web of power relations. The 
'absence' that Delany refers to is also the referential space in which signification 
takes place, such as the "conceptual turbulence" of Aids as metaphor (1989b:243), 
especially with the initial connotations of labelling the disease the 'gay plague'. 
Clearly the 'plague' in the title of the novella refers to this connotation, but the plague 
that decimates Kolhari, though reminiscent of Aids in that it strikes the homosexual 
population first, does not have the same significatory or semiotic baggage that 
HIV I AIDS has been burdened with. 
The Kolhari plague can be seen as a model for the HIV/ AIDS epidemic, and 
Delany contrasts this with the progress of the disease's conceptual and metaphorical 
definition in our own time, and thereby suggests that our model for assimilating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is just that - a model - and can be transformed: "[P]erhaps the 
job is to find a better metaphor and elaborate it well enough to help stabilise" the 
system of signification by which it is given meaning (1989b:244). This refers back to 
the idea that language stabilises social interaction, thereby underpinning the way that 
society is constituted. Delany gives the reader a glimpse of life in Kolhari through a 
series of character vignettes, and follows each with a brief note on the psychological 
motivations for that particular character. Each of these interludes begins similarly -
"if a mid-twentieth century orthodox Freudian" - as if to indicate that they are all part 
of some greater critical discourse underpinning the novella. 
This transgresses the boundary between the author and the text, with the 
author taking over the critical function normally reserved for those interpreting the 
text. It also crosses the boundary between the author and the textual characters, for the 
added analysis fleshes out the characters in a manner suggesting that they are fully-
rounded autonomous entities. Finally, it blurs the boundary enfolding the novella 
within the S&S fold by applying twentieth-century theory to a genre often concerned 
with an unspecified historical past, precisely so that it can jettison the shackles of the 
present and invent its own history. By using Freudian models to map out the borders 
of his own characters, Delany suggests that the entire model ofNeveryon can be used 
as a litmus test for the present, as these are contemporary psychological theories 
applied to a mythical past. The theories he suggests are as follows: penis envy can 
explain Nari's "girlish desire for a son'', and sublimation can explain her "new 
success in her work" (1989b:251); and repressed homosexuality "as the basic force 
128 
behind civilisation" with reference to Zadyuk (1989b:254). In terms of Pheron, 
Delany imagines his response to the above theories to be as follows: 
'The only thing is, I envy them too. And I've got one. Nor is it small. 
And heaven knows, I don't sublimate. I go right for it!' 
And if the orthodox Freudian went on to present the theory of 
'repressed homosexuality' as the basic force behind civilisation, Pheron's 
comment would most likely have been: 
'But what makes you think it's repressed?' (Delany 1989b:256) 
Interestingly, in each instance Delany himself states that such an analysis is 
false, which serves to open up, rather than limit, the interpretative space his characters 
inhabit. In the case of Pheron, Delany suggests that such an interpretative space is also 
an absence of meaning, a distance between the author and his creation, or a break in 
the articulation of his own discourse. He is writing about the past - and an imagined 
past, at that - but is rooted firmly in the present, which raises questions about the 
modelling function of Neveryon itself Can it truly be a representative alternative 
model that can be projected on to the present to see where the borders overlap or 
diverge, or is it merely an incomplete or imperfect copy of the dominant model, 
namely our own society? 
4.32 There is something incomplete about Pheron. (Since there is no Pheron, 
since he exists only as words, their sounds and associated images, be certain of 
it: I have left it out). My job is, then, in the course of this experiment, to find 
this incompleteness, to fill it in, to make him whole. 
But at this point, however, there's a real question where to look for the 
material: in the past? in the future? on the roaring shore where imagination 
swells and breaks? in the pale, hot sands of intellection? in the evanescent 
construct of the here and now - that reality always gone in a blink that is 
nevertheless forever making history? (Delany l 989b:256) 
This creates added intimacy between the reader and the author, for the latter 
has privileged the former with an insight into the dynamics of the creative process 
itself It also serves to jolt the reader into an awareness that the text is a constructed 
document. It is far more than the physical object it encompasses, the main boundary 
of which is circumscribed by the cover, but is a web of discourse intertwined with the 
present. In the passage following the above, Delany projects his doubts and worries 
about the text on to the Master worrying about Toplin, one of his students. This 
indicates that the Master is a representation of the author function. Speculating about 
presenting the Master with any of Freud's concepts, Delany states that the Master 
"has too many carefully worked up theories of his own" (l 989b:258). The final 
"reception of theory" is applied to a "nameless old servant" who 
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. . . thought of Lord Vanar and, as an aged woman might at that time, pondered 
magic, disease, power, and felt ... 
An absence? She noted somehow it was hers. No. It's been inflicted on 
you by ... 
That's me, of course, protesting ineffectually across the ages. But my 
inability to reach her on that morning, millennia ago, only confronts me with 
my own failings, incompletions, absences. (Delany l 989b:258-59) 
The sense of intimacy between reader and author, and the complicated 
interrelationship both share with the text, is heightened further by the 
autobiographical account that follows the above. Delany recounts his daughter's tenth 
birthday, which coincided with a final rewrite of 'The Tale of Fog and Granite', and 
marvels at the inner life of this "micro person" - "a life which I've always known was 
there, wanted to be there, but, as a parent, I so rarely catch signs of' (1989b:26 l ). He 
remarks that it is odd that such simple domestic moments are denied Zadyuk and Nari 
"by an offstage quirk of biology", but notes that these quirks are precisely what the 
novella is about. 
Odd also that, ten years ago, just before my daughter's birth, when I began the 
Neveryon series, I wouldn't have thought it odd in the least. (Delany 
1989b:262) 
Given the critical attention focused on Delany, and the attendant scrutiny of his 
private life, the fact that he is homosexual has been used to justify or explain his 
pursuit of the marginal. However, until the publication of his autobiography, few 
readers were aware that Delany was, indeed, married at one stage, and has a daughter. 
Thus, just as Delany uses the theoretical musings on the motivations of his characters 
to deepen the reader's understanding of them, so does he use this brief 
autobiographical interlude to transform the reader's perception of himself as an 
ordinary individual, and not as Delany the respected critic, writer and homosexual, 
who in a sense has become a persona in his own theoretical and fictional pursuits. 
This is the basic narrative strategy that Delany follows in the novella: to reveal 
differing, and sometimes opposing, levels of meaning, which are then subverted or 
recomplicated by additional layers, so that no single meaning is legitimized. 10 
10 This is what Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as 'heteroglossia' in The Dialogic Imagination: "The novel 
orchestrates all its themes, the totality of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the 
social diversity of speech types and by differentiating individual voices that flourish under such 
conditions. Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of characters are 
merely those fundamental compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel ... " 
(Bakhtin 2001). In Voprosy literatury i estetiki, Bakhtin writes: "Languages ofheteroglossia, like 
mirrors that face each other, each of which in its own way reflects a little piece, a tiny comer of the 
world, force us to guess at and grasp behind their interreflecting aspects for a world that is broader, 
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However, the autobiographical interlude adds another layer, especially Delany' s 
comments on procrastinating about an editorial deadline, and the fact that he began 
the Neveryon sequence ten years ago. 
In that time, the series - which in a sense is about the construction of history 
itself - has garnered its own publishing history. Like his daughter and the characters 
in the novella, the series has its own inner life, absences, and incompletions when 
conceived of as a whole. On the most basic level, Delany is the 'father' of the text. 
But this implies a hierarchical relationship between author and work, when in fact the 
creative process is indeed more diffuse and even ephemeral. The title of this third 
volume, Flight.from Neveryon, indicates a desire to escape from the boundaries of this 
fictional realm, which over the course of a decade has generated a critical weight akin 
to a gravity well around a star - attracting all to its light, but keeping it there. Thus an 
important function of 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' is to shatter such a static 
concept of history as an accumulative process, and to subvert the sign system that 
Neveryon itself has put in place in order to critique the general sign system of S&S. 
But as Norema notes: "It is not that easy to flee ... " (Delany 1989b:297). This is 
also what the Master discovers when, at the age of 19, he decides to abandon his title, 
which is what keeps him shackled to a particular social role, as well as mediating 
society's perception of himself However, he discovers that this "simple act of 
unnaming" merely lowers the defenses around the interpretative space created by that 
very title, starting a fable that is perpetuated "quite apart" from any intervention of the 
Master himself. 
Oh, there've been moments when my reputation seemed a light 
rippling out into darkness, myself its central flame. More often, however, it's 
some gnarled, preposterous monster, inhabiting my city with me, whom I've 
never met, but whom, for incomprehensible reasons, people who should know 
better still mistake for me. It goes about, parodying with misquotation, mocking 
me with stupidities and homilies, giving my actions false motives .... (Delany 
1989b:266) 
The Master is like the author who, over the course of a career, has generated an 
impression with readers that sometimes bears little resemblance to the living writer in 
question. In Delany' s case, however, he parodies this notion of the writer as a victim 
of his own text by creating his own fictional personas, such as Steiner and Kermit, 
more multi-levelled and multi-horizoned than would be available to one language, one mirror" 
(Bakhtin 200la). Perhaps this is what Delany means when he refers to the 'mirrors of night' in The 
Mad Man - heteroglossic interfaces that dialogise the world (1994b:43 l). 
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and inserting himself in his own text as a character. However, this strategy could also 
be an elaborate form of camouflage, for one is never sure who the 'real' Delany is. II 
Similarly, the elaborate intertextual play in the novella means that the reader has 
to redefine his or her generic expectations constantly, for Neveryon treats the 
boundary between S&S and literature as being totally malleable, and thus forces the 
reader to come to terms with certain things that normally lie outside the ambit of this 
particular genre. The aim is not only to broaden the generic scope, but to highlight the 
mechanisms and conventions by which genre functions, and thereby to shatter the 
double boundary of S&S: as a subcategory of SF which, in tum, is a paraliterary 
genre of literature itself. 
An example of this strategy is when Delany inserts a quotation by Walter 
Benjamin from 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire': 
'The time is not distant when it will be understood that a literature which refuses 
to make its way in brotherly concord with science and philosophy is a 
murderous, suicidal literature.' (1989b:267) 
The effect of this is not so much to disrupt the narrative flow - that is, to alter its 
progress from a readerly to a writerly discourse - but rather to refract the narrative 
and to point out to the reader larger issues and concerns that are touched upon. In 
other words, Delany aims to expand the reader's awareness beyond the potentially 
limiting confines of a particular genre itself Benjamin's notion of a "brotherly 
concord" of literature suggests a utopian situation where the gamut of genres 
interrelate to form a cohesive whole, and where such diverse subjects as science and 
philosophy complement each other. Such an example of an 'ideal' genre is surely SF 
itself, where the 'hard' technological trappings of the modem world are harnessed to 
the 'softer' concerns of the social sciences to produce a dialogue or discourse with the 
present in the form of a template or model that can illuminate our own society. 
S&S adds to this potentiality by introducing the concept of history as a fluid 
tabula rasa on which both the past and the future are transcribed in service of the 
present. Later on Delany notes that the meaning of the Benjamin quotation is altered 
when its context changes from, for example, paraliterature to scientific literary 
naturalism. In the former instance the quotation "dialogises heatedly with the text" -
that is, it is so anomalous in this specific context that it interrupts the narrative - while 
in the latter it is simply part of the plot, and "merely approves or condemns the 
specific narrative tropes" (1989b:275). This serves to illustrate Delany's notion of SF 
11 How can the reader verify any biographical information offered by the author, when memory is as 
elusive as the shimmer of light in water? 
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as a way of reading, meaning that the sentences comprising it have to be interpreted in 
a ~pecific manner in order to decode the information giving it a peculiarly SF slant. 
Delany recounts how the Master "took off on a trip from one end of 
Neveryona to the other" (1989b:267), which is a metaphor for what Delany as author 
has been doing in the Neveryona sequence as a whole: using words to map his 
fictional realm from one end to the other. Significantly, in 'The Tale of Plagues and 
Carnivals', the Master does attempt to move "beyond our odd and undefinable 
border" (1989b:409), which marks the edge of Delany's fictional enterprise - an 
undefinable, amorphous edge where it merges with our own world. 
The Master is distraught that fundamental facts pertaining to his journey have 
been misrepresented upon retelling, which he states is "a sign of the pressure toward 
misunderstanding that haunts all social communion" (1989b:274). This 
misunderstanding refers to the fact that meaning (and especially narrative) is plural 
and pervasive, and subject to the vagaries of interpretation and circumstance. The 
process of semiosis itself becomes unlimited in the face of such an explosion of 
meanings. Delany illustrates the difficulty of ascribing textual meaning, in particular, 
by including a lengthy 'stream-of-consciousness' passage where the only punctuation 
is variable spacing and paragraph breaks. Given Delany' s comment that he is a 
"sentence lover" at heart, this passage challenges the process of signification by 
breaking down the basic building block of a text, namely its sentences. By its very 
disorder and randomness, this passage also serves to illustrate the high level of 
organisation, and its nature as an artificial construct, of even a readerly text. 12 
6. with a thumbnail, nudged and nipped the dark, beneath bark's brown the 
yellow wood beneath green, copper under oil the ashy slate 
stepped into hip-high troughs with hides floating, nudged them 
with poles while the gray gunk you waded in took the hairs off the leather later 
on the sandy ledge examined his newly hairless thigh 
Zadyuk had never worked in the tanning troughs but he had six 
months at seventeen (1989b:276) 
The passage is followed by a quotation from Grammatical Man by Jeremy 
Campbell, who claims that about 50% of English is redundant when considering 
samples of eight letters at a time, a figure that skyrockets when taking into account 
whole pages or even bigger textual units such as chapters. This means that "much of 
what we write is dictated by the structure of the language and is more or less forced 
upon us" (1989b:278). It is this for this reason that the reader is able to comprehend 
12 It also reflects the continuing influence of Joyce on Delany, which has been prevalent as far back as 
Dhalgren. 
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the passage above - Delany has simply taken out the redundant parts, which makes its 
appearance less legible as conventional text, but leaves the basic meaning intact. 
The main signified of the novella is the mysterious plague that strikes Kolhari, 
which has its counterpart in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in New York in the early 
l 980s. 13 Delany states that, "in Neveryon there is, of course, a model for the outbreak 
of the disease", referring to an earlier epidemic that had struck the outlying Ulvayn 
islands (1989b:283). Another model is provided by a lengthy quotation from Artaud 
describing the collapse of social order with the advent of a full-scale epidemic, and 
the anarchy and mayhem that ensue. 
'The dead already clog the streets in ragged pyramids gnawed at by animals 
around the edges. Entire streets are clogged by the piles of dead. Then the 
houses open and the delirious victims, their minds crowded with hideous 
visions, spread howling through the streets.' (Delany l 989b:279) 
An interesting aspect of the Artaud account is that no specific date or 
historical period is attributed to it. Instead, like the Kolhari plague, it transcends the 
limitations or strictures of history to become a timeless model of a particular society's 
response to an all-engulfing disaster. A disturbing aspect of the Artaud account is that 
the social energy unleashed leads to a reversal of traditional societal roles, and gnaws 
through the moral fibre that originally held that particular society together. In a sense 
the plague is the ultimate signified that negates all meaning, the all-encompassing 
absence that brings death and destruction, and in the face of which nothing can be 
done except to tum the society that is doomed on its head as a last, final protest. This 
is the first intimation of the Bakhtinian notion of the carnivalesque in the novella. 
'Neither the idea of an absence of sanctions nor that of imminent death 
suffices to motivate acts so gratuitously absurd on the part of men who did not 
believe death could end anything. And how to explain the surge of erotic fever 
among the recovered victims who, instead of fleeing the city, remain where 
they are, trying to wrench a criminal pleasure from the dying or even the dead, 
half crushed under the pile of corpses where chance has lodged them ... ' 
(Delany 1989b:280) 
The Kolhari plague provides a model or backdrop against which the 
contemporary response to the HIV/ AIDS crisis can be evaluated. An example of such 
behavioural modelling is Pheron's 'corning out' to his father, who initially rejects 
him, but then admits that he had been wrong, and says he wants Pheron to be his son 
"any way you are" (1989b:291). Neveryon is supposed to be a land steeped in the 
13 It also brings to mind The Plague by Albert Camus, in which the town of Orin finds itself in the grip 
of a virulent plague and at the same time is cut off from the rest of the world. 
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mists of history, but in terms of social relations it is as modern as the most 
enlightened tenets of gay liberation, as this encounter between father and son reveals. 
The difference between Neveryon and 'our' world is the significatory weight attached 
to homosexuality, bearing in mind the impact of cultural differences. 
Delany's reference to Artaud paves the way for him to signpost Kolhari's 
initial response to the plague, which is to dispatch an Imperial deposition "to the very 
borders" (1989b:294) of the Queen's empire to extend an invitation to Gorgik the 
Liberator to pay a visit to Kolhari. In honour of this special event it is announced that 
the entire city will celebrate with a week of carnival. Just as Gorgik went about his 
life's work of freeing all the slaves of Neveryon, so is it anticipated that he will free 
the land of the plague, or transform the people's understanding of it - which turns out 
to be the same thing. Significantly, Gorgik never makes a physical appearance in the 
novella, with the consequences of his passing being the only intimations of himself as 
a character. Like the Master, he can be seen as another incarnation of the author 
function, which is by definition removed from the text, although inscribing its 
indelible mark upon it. Yet another version of the author function is to be found in the 
travelling storyteller Norema, who provides a critical commentary on Jhe decision by 
the High Court of Eagles to invite the Liberator. 
The mention of Carnival, and they act as if, finally and at last, they've trapped 
their Liberator, hauled him back from what moment of flight, and fixed him in 
one of their empty halls, like a beast or a prisoner chained in some void 
cistern. Will he be strong enough to act from within court walls, to make 
himself heard through the granite that, from now on, surrounds him? Will he 
be able to thrust his arm through the fog of protocol, tradition, habit, the very 
constitution of power with which he now becomes one? Will he be powerful? 
What is possible from within the paralysing citadel? (Delany 1989b:297-98) 
The notion that the Liberator has somehow managed to escape the boundaries 
of Neveryon, or in a sense has been freed from the history cast about himself by his 
own exploits, is hinted at by the fact that a deposition has to be sent to the borders of 
the realm in order to extend the Queen's invitation, which is more like an invocation. 
Norema notes that the Liberator has been "hauled back from what moment of flight" 
by the desire. of the people to claim him for themselves. The "paralysing citadel" she 
refers to is a symbol of institutional society itself, and the web of power relations that 
enmesh and define it. This is referred to as a "fog of protocol", but the tangible effect 
is like chains in a prison: it shackles and restricts. The most profound blurring of the 
character-author distinction in the novella occurs when Norema describes how, 
"sitting on high rocks by the sea, I inked my skins with notions for 'The Game of 
Time and Pain"'. 
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Who is the giver in such situations? Myself? The sea? The rocks I sat on? 
Time? Or the nameless god of language skills, who is at once so niggardly and 
so profligate with the blessings she holds back from living song to bestow on 
silent record? (Delany 1989b:298) 
Here Delany has transposed himself onto Norema, who is wondering where 
her ideas or inspiration come from. Being a primitive people, she would rather 
attribute this to the "nameless god of language skills" than her environment. Just as 
the Neveryon sequence has allowed Delany to create contrasting models of history 
and genre, so does he invoke Norema as a model of the author, who travels the land 
telling and collecting tales as a sort of trade. She recounts how she was set upon twice 
by bandits who thought her a smuggler, but managed to escape both times when they 
found her cart "contained nothing of saleable value, but rather the old marked-on 
skins where I work out my tales" (1989b:298). However, upon a third occasion, the 
criminal became so enraged when he recognised that what Norema was transporting 
was writing that he set about destroying most of her skins, as if this would negate the 
very act of the writing process itself 
Towards the end of the novella a man in the carnival procession takes a 
hammer to the Bridge of Lost Desire in an attempt to assuage his fears about the 
plague by destroying the physical structure of the bridge. In both instances, the 
writing and the bridge are merely the visible signs of a process of signification with a 
built-in redundancy, meaning that the actual signifieds can indeed be destroyed, or 
decay with time, but they are only one link in a recomplicated chain of meaning. This 
leads Norema to contemplate the creative process, and how it functions when she 
composes a sentence to convey a particular thought or idea. The comparative image 
she settles on is Pheron weaving and unweaving at a single row, which is akin to her 
choosing and discarding words and sentences as she compiles the fabric of her tales. 
Did his slow, bright pattern bring it to mind, then? As his shuttles went in and 
out and under, carrying colour over, dropping one hue beneath another, I 
thought: That is what I do when I make a tale! Whatever god oversees the 
making of webs and nets and fabrics must also oversee the construction of 
stories. (Delany 1989b:300) 
The image of a text as a web recalls Delany' s idea of the textus in Triton, an 
idea that is particularly applicable to the Neveryon sequence, where Delany has cast 
the net of his series over a collection of stories and a novel. This greater textus is 
reflected in the structure of 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals' itself, which cast its 
own net from Artaud to semiotics to weave a dense fabric of allusion and magic, and 
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where the author himself appears in various guises and characters, recomplicating the 
process of signification and genre definition. 
In contemplating the carnival itself, Norema recounts a festival on the 
"marginal island" of her origin where everyone swopped clothes, genders, and social 
roles - from chief hunters and head wives pretending to be beggars and outcasts, to 
social pariahs being treated like kings and queens for a day. Norema states that this 
was "a wonderfully healing practice", as it gave people the opportunity to realise that 
social roles are constructs and not inviolable givens. 
The fact that women pretend to be men and vice versa implies that, in 
everyday life, even gender is circumscribed by a male/female binary opposition in a 
patriarchal society that privileges male power. Instead gender roles are fluid, rather 
than being chains that bind sexual identity. Norema's account of the festival is 
reminiscent of Artaud's description of social behaviour in the aftermath of a plague, 
where a similar role reversal takes place when people realise that the only thing 
holding them to a particular position or viewpoint in society is the social compact 
itself 
Artaud writes how purity comes to the lecher and generosity to the miser, 
while "'the warrior-hero sets fire to the city he once risked his life to save"' 
(1989b:280). It is this hint of darker forces and passions that leads Norema to 
contemplate the corning of the Liberator in the same light as the plague that is 
descending upon Kolhari - as a force of social disruption and upheaval. Opposed to 
the carnival, which is a celebratory festival, there will be a darker ceremony known as 
the Calling of the Arnnewor, an ancient Neveryon deity from some neglected 
pantheon, who will be beseeched by his supplicants to spare the city from death and 
destruction, which is the particular vocation of this god. Delany contrasts the 
Arnnewor with a serial killer stalking the underbelly of New York, murdering 
homeless derelicts. Darkness and light, desire and depravity, plague and carnival, 
Liberator and storyteller - these are some of the fundamental binary oppositions that 
Delany sets against each other in his text. Norema sums up the implications of the 
carnival for Kolhari and Neveryon as a whole: 
... when I think of what those songs, that laughter must mean to those who are 
excluded from it, I want to flee this city, this country, this land ready to think 
of anything but the pain within it. Only considering what lies on the other side 
of such flight stops me. And when I consider, I imagine in place of my 
personal exile, some text, a tale I might weave together, here, now, in this 
room at the end of this Kolhari alley, a luminous fabric that leaps from the 
loom of language for a monstrous, phthartic flight, soaring, habromanic, 
glorious as song and happy as summer, till finally it sinks into the savage and 
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incicurable complexities of its own telling, to be torn apart by what impelled 
it: angry criminals fall to ravage a cartful of parchments. 
This will be a fine celebration. 
This will be a dark carnival. (Delany 1989b:301) 
Norema's tale, of course, is 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals'. In this 
moment, the intra-textual text, and the larger text encompassing it, collapse into a 
single fluid form, and the boundary separating the two falls as Delany becomes 
Norema, and New York turns into Neveryon. Ted recounts to Chip - which is 
Delany' s nickname to his friends, indicating yet another role for himself in his text, 
namely that of father-confessor - that he was wandering around "-th Street, just 
beyond Ninth Avenue", and crossed a bridge where a carnival was taking place, with 
torches on the bridge walls, bizarre costumes, and copious nudity. When Ted looked 
back after the crossing, the entire scene was gone, and he says to Chip: "It sounds like 
something out of one of your stories" (1989b:353). Delany comments that the notion 
of suspension of disbelief associated with fantasy, SF and S&S, whereby the reader is 
asked to be an accomplice in various violations of physical or scientific reality in the 
interests of the fictional discourse at hand, is problematic because "it makes art 
(however willingly) a kind of cheat". 
Delany argues that he believes art to be "wholly a formal enterprise", 
encompassing certain tenets from Flaubert and Baudelaire to Pater and Wilde "that 
have made the twentieth century's experimentation possible" (1989b:371). In other 
words, literature has a lineage, and any modern writer - of SF or any other genre - is 
at the end of a long chain of experimentation with regard to process and meaning. If 
this seems like a hierarchy that arranges the achievements - and, by association, 
genres - of literature into a strict order of importance and value, one only has to note 
Delany's comment that "we all have our personal pantheons - there are no canons 
anymore" (1989b:316). 
The question inevitably arises of how Delany can broach a serious subject such 
as HIV/AIDS in the context of S&S, or how anything that he says in such a context 
can be taken seriously. Given the gravity and grim reality of this modern epidemic, 
interspersing it with a totally fictional narrative seems to tarnish its significance. 
However, this view contains an implicit value judgement as to the intrinsic validity of 
S&S as a literary genre, and it is precisely such judgements that Delany is trying to 
subvert. I would argue that his views on HIV/AIDS, its social consequences and 
implications, and the terrible toll of suffering and loss that has ensued from it, are no 
less forceful for being expressed in an S&S context. Delany is using this context to 
model alternative social responses to the large-scale outbreak of an epidemic, and 
Neveryon provides an opportunity to place contemporary responses in context, and to 
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judge them objectively, without being ensnared in the chains of signification that bind 
modern views of HIV/AIDS, which became known as the gay plague, or God's wrath 
upon the collected deviancy and perversion of humanity - as if there could ever be a 
receptacle robust or big enough to contain such a daunting concept. 
In 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', Delany includes a letter written by a 
woman whose anonymity lends her views a representative resonance, transforming 
them not only into a mouthpiece for her gender, but confronting the prejudice and 
stigmatism in general that underlies all discrimination, be it sexual or gender-related: 
'What really angers me about the Aids business is that women, we, find 
ourselves in the position of helping men. . . . Where were they when we were 
fighting the health-care system because of what it routinely did to women? ... 
'What we must do, politically, is make it clear that the bigotry that sees Aids 
as a sinner's punishment (or merely assumes that gay men's lives are expendable 
or trivial or not important) is the same bigotry that hates and fears women and 
wants to keep us in our place ... 
'To be morally upset about how people take their sexual pleasures is surely the 
weirdest human quirk ever.' (Delany 1989b:292-93) 
In 'Appendix A' of Return to Neveryon, Delany emphasises that the entire series 
is a model of late twentieth-century America. He argues that the important question is 
not whether it is accurate or inaccurate, but what relation it bears to the thing being 
modelled - which, in the case of Neveryon, is "rich, eristic, and contestatory (as well 
as documentary), I hope" (1989c:381). As a musician remarks in 'The Tale of Plagues 
and Carnivals': " ... I would hear some particularly wondrous tale from a teller that 
revealed in the pattern of its narration a fine and fundamental organisation in the real 
world it mimicked" (1989b:337). 
The boundary between the text and the real world is broached as the reader seeks 
to find the organisational order implicit in a text in the world around us or, not finding 
it, seek to impose such textual unity. The text serves as a model that helps to represent 
society in an orderly, clear fashion - and by this model we can learn how society 
functions and is constituted. And the basis of the meaning of society, and civilisation 
itself, is language, which Delany states in 'Appendix A' "is first and foremost a 
stabiliser of behaviour, thought, and feeling, of human responses and reactions - both 
for groups and for individuals" (1989c:360). 
In other words, language is the basic substrate upon which society is 
constructed. But the relationship between society and language is not nearly so 
simplistic, for social authority and power relations have to be taken into account: 
these are also constructed like a language in that they stabilise behaviour in favour of 
the dominant patriarchal discourse. Delany argues further that attaching "appropriate 
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signifiers to appropriate powers, functions, and artifacts" represents a "Symbolic 
alignment" akin to that alignment used by patriarchal society to stabilise itself as the 
dominant discourse. In a sense, the Neveryon sequence provides a model of this 
aligning process, as it takes place in an ancient time when writing is still a new 
invention. 
In terms of the plague that strikes Kolhari, it provides a model of how this 
fictional society copes with the disease, and how it is assimilated by institutional 
society. This is contrasted with the alignment process by which the signification of 
HIV I AIDS has become stabilised in our society. Delany argues that it is during this 
crucial aligning process that a particular signification system is fixed or privileged 
and, once entrenched, is very difficult to dislodge from its position of discourse, as it 
is fixed by language itself Such a recasting of the fundamental myths of a civilisation 
is represented by the Neveryon sequence itself, based on the Culhar Fragment, "that 
most ancient of ancient texts on which the stories in this series are all, in part or in 
whole, based" (1989c:353). 14 
From the basis of this fictional fragment, the fundamentals of the birth of 
civilisation - money, writing, slavery - are recast in a new light. The logical 
conclusion of this process is 'The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals', where a social 
model is constructed from that society's response to a potentially devastating 
epidemic - a model that can be used to gauge our own reactions and responses to a 
similar situation. Delany also provides a sustained critique of the novella in the form 
of a dialogue between Steiner and Kermit, two of his own authorial personas. Kermit 
levels the criticism that Delany fails in both his stated aims: of depicting "the feel of 
the gay community between '82 and '84, when he was apparently writing his story 
and the Aids coverage was at its height", and of depicting the "day-to-day life of the 
ancient people" ofNeveryon (1989b:443). 
He's just playing at their lives, anachronisms all over the place; and his rituals 
and gods are obviously phony to the core! I mean, even in terms of his own 
allegory, just look at what he's done. He starts off promising us a story about 
various and sundry little people, trying to deal with a medical catastrophe, but 
slowly and inexorably the Discourse of the Master displaces everyone else's, 
until finally, it completely takes over. (Delany 1989b:444) 
I do not think it is Delany' s intention to scupper any and all criticism of the 
novella by jumping the gun, so to speak, in critiquing it himself Rather, all that he is 
doing is providing an alternative interpretation or outlook on the text. A point to note 
14 The Culhar fragment is an imaginary parergon or supplement, as it is referred to, but not included in 
the text. 
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is that Kermit seems to suggest that Delany loses focus, in that his initial aim of 
giving a representative overview of the views of the populace gradually eroded into 
the singular edifice of the Master's discourse. Rather than being a mistake, I would 
argue that this was his intention all along, for the voice of the Master in its guise as 
various characters represents the ultimate stabilising system of the text as discourse. 
The Master can stake a claim to objectivity by representing alternative viewpoints, but 
these all have to be filtered first through his own singular viewpoint. Thus, when the 
text is stripped to its bare essentials, all that remains is the discourse of the Master, or 
the absence or interpretative space that he circumscribes. 
Kermit notes, too, that the '"worldly Discourse of the Master is replaced by the 
transcendental rhetoric of the Priest . . . saying more or less the same thing the Master 
said" (1989b:444). This refers to the Priest presiding over the ceremony of the Calling 
of the Amnewor, which ironically takes place in Gorgik the Liberator's old 
underground headquarters, and involves the attempted resurrection of a corpse on a 
throne. The same throne features in 'The Tale of Fog and Granite' during a 
sadomasochistic sex scene mimicking a slave/master relationship, where the dominant 
player on the throne achieves orgasm through the debasement of ~he lower party 
enchained at his feet. The fact that the Calling of the Amnewor takes place at the 
same venue indicates the ceremony's attempt to subvert the fundamental link between 
sex and death, and procreation and destruction. This link is emphasised further when 
it is revealed that the Priest is actually a character called Hibiscus, from the 
contemporary strand of the narrative, in another guise. Hibiscus and the Cockettes 
were a theatre troupe from San Francisco in the 1970s, with Delany describing the 
former as 
. . . a scrawny young man dressed in a white slip, with a maroon stole about his 
shoulders and collapsing basketball sneakers showing beneath his hem ... 
(Delany 1989b:313) 
It is ironic that this colourfully eccentric figure is the model for the Priest presiding 
over a ceremony as portent-laden as the summoning of a deity, but the Amnewor is 
described as "'a god of edges, borders, and boundaries'" (1989b:438-39). Hibiscus's 
magical reappearance in Neveryon is an indication of the transgression of such 
boundaries. 
The novella returns to the Master's account of his youthful attempt to cross 
Neveryon, and retrace the footsteps of the famed inventor Belham. After many 
misguided etf orts to untangle myth and rumour from historical fact, the Master 
concludes that he has no right to "presume to retrieve the true tale of Belham", as his 
"own story was congruent with his neither in time nor in space" (1989b:406). This 
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revelation occurs at the point when the Master finds himself at the southernmost edge 
of his map - "and that map was Neveryon" (1989b:407). Thus he had journeyed as 
far as he possibly could "to the points of Belham' s birth and death" as he was able, 
but what he had failed to realise was that the two points were separated by more than 
distance. What was also important was the significatory space that defines these two 
points, which raises the question of what, if anything, lays beyond the 'mappable' or 
definable: 
I felt as if I might also be face to face with something new, something 
in no way involved with Belham, something not called Neveryon, something 
wondrous I might see or feel if only I was free .... For here was also the 
possibility of leaving behind all the tangles of humanity and history Neveryon 
herself seemed to have made hopelessly problematic .... (Delany 1989b:407) 
With Neveryon not being "mapped to a precise edge", and the Master having 
reached the edge of the physical map signifying this realm, the possibility is presented 
of stepping beyond the defined boundary of Neveryon into the totally unknown, 
which signifies a wholly new interpretative space. This is precisely what the Master 
attempts one night: to step beyond the "odd and undefinable" (1989b:409) border of 
Neveryon itself "My body seemed to glitter blackly in the midst of this transgression 
of a boundary all but inarticulable," he states (1989b:410). 
The Master encounters some "monster god" that roams the borders ofNeveryon, 
and flees before its imagined wrath at his potential transgression. Delany follows this 
account with a brief comment on the SF models for the Neveryon sequence, 
indicating that what the Master encountered was perhaps signification or 'modelling' 
personified. What separates Neveryon from the real world is not only that it is 
historically or temporally obscure, but that it is a specific historical model of society 
and its functioning. If that boundary is transgressed, then the difference between the 
two will be diluted, and the distinctiveness of Neveryon as an alternative model will 
be compromised. Significantly, the Amnewor is described as a monster "common to 
us all": 
... prowling the border between one and another, or even between us and a land 
more different still from ours? I assure you, these are as real as the monster that 
guards what is, after all, the other's boundary as much as it is ours. For she does 
not care what distinctions she guards, or how we sex her in a homage to the 
concept of distinction itself. She only cares that distinctions exist. (Delany 
1989b:439) 
The point here is that a boundary is essentially an interface, and in this instance 
it is the divide between Neveryon and New York. Ted remarks to Delany that Gorgik 
142 
the Liberator is a Saturday afternoon regular at a pornographic moviehouse on Third 
Avenue. Upon visiting the venue and spotting the person referred to, Delany wonders 
in consternation how his friend could have seen the lineaments of Gorgik in this 
"large, hulking, blond(!?), most likely Polish" figure. He concludes: "Well, each to 
his own Liberator" (1989b:465). 
Delany recounts how, walking through Riverside Park one night during a cold 
wet spring, he sees a person squatting at a fire he had built to keep warm. The fact that 
the person is one-eyed indicates that this is Noyeed, a character from Neveryon. In 
broken English, and with a vaguely Middle Eastern accent, he tells Delany that he had 
attended the Calling of the Amnewor, and later had left Kolhari for the north, where 
he had somehow miraculously (magically?) harnessed a dragon, and achieved the 
impossible: a flight from Neveryon. The ultimate boundary is ourselves, and is one 
that we only transgress at death (birth is a boundaryless becoming, since the newborn 
does not experience any boundaries to him- or herself). Hibiscus describes this 
boundary at the ceremony for the Calling of the Amnewor: 
'He reels ... for you are the border he must pass, transgress, obliterate with some 
terminal motion to become one with what animates him.' (Delany 1989b:441) 
The Amnewor is only given dominance through the power of signification, and 
when it is realised that this signified is arbitrary, it ceases to become the purveyor of 
an absolute truth. Hibiscus hopes that "some informative contradiction remains to be 
untangled, which may define the distance between our lives and the plague" 
(1989b:441-442). The answer to the plague lies in the language by which it is defined. 
By confronting the constructedness of language, we can begin to articulate new 
definitions, and start to redefine our own implicit assumptions and beliefs. This is the 
fundamental realisation that Rydra Wong achieves at the end of Babel-17, leading to 
the creation of a new language, and a new understanding. 
When Delany asks Noyeed to tell him about his miraculous flight on the 
dragon, he says he must use his own language, referred to as "the softly singsong 
syllables of that long-ago distant tongue" (1989b:471). That Delany is able to 
understand him shows that he is part of the text himself, and has authored the meaning 
of this encounter. But when Delany asks Noyeed what he thinks of contemporary 
New York, the communication between the two breaks down, and understanding fails. 
143 
'Tell me,' I said at last, 'since you've only been here a little while, how 
do you find our strange and terrible land? Have you heard that we have 
plagues of our own?' 
Curious, he looked at me across the fire, turned to the river, glanced at 
the city about us, then looked at me again. 
And I would have sworn, on that chill spring night, he no longer 
understood me. (Delany 1989b:475) 
It is in this final instant that Neveryon and New York merge, and where the future 
becomes palpable, as it has yet to be signified. It is in this absence of meaning, this 
margin of desire and discourse, where Neveryon's gods stalk, and its dragons take 
flight. 
Chapter Four 
Signs and Cities 
In this chapter I have chosen to focus on Dhalgren (1974) and Stars in My Pocket like 
Grains of Sand ( 1984) in order to demonstrate the complexity and diversity of 
Delany' s critical project. 1 Separated by a decade, these widely disparate novels 
contest the notion that SF is a construct fixed in (and fixated on) popular culture, 
lacking the depth and resonance to be sounded out by the tools of modem literary 
criticism. Being labelled SF seems to suggest that they are singular components of a 
polymorphous unity. And yet their divergence, from each other and the popular SF 
mainstream, 2 demonstrates the potentiality of the genre for transforming its 
boundaries into frontiers. 
Despite its central SF conceit of a city in the grip of some unknown cataclysm 
that has affected the very nature of space/time, Dhalgren is resolutely realist in its 
depiction of the marginal underbelly of Bellona. 3 Ironically, a character remarks that 
"'I suspect the whole thing is science fiction'" (1974:414). In Stars, on the other hand, 
an exotic space opera crowded with alien beings and different worlds, a character 
remarks '"that the alien is always constructed of the familiar"' (1984b:183). In the 
course of this chapter, I wish to show how Delany incorporates postmodernisrn into 
his fictional strategy, and how this has developed from his forays into 
poststructuralism. First one has to investigate what postmodernism is. Bearing in 
1 John Clute refers to Dhalgren as Delany's magnum opus, and an articulation of"a language, based on 
modem literary critical theory, with which to describe and to defend SF as a geme of importance" 
(1995:169). Clute adds that the novel "became a cult text, and Delany became something of a guru" 
(1995: 169). However, his and Peter Nicholls's assessment in The Encyclopaedia of Science Fiction is 
more reserved: "His critics see it as perilously self-indulgent and flabby ... other critics saw it as his 
most successfully ambitious work to date" (Clute and Nicholls 1993:316). Stars also evoked an 
ambivalent response: "clotted and self-consciously insistent" (Clute 1995: 169) on the one hand and, 
one the other: "a complex narrative again asks questions about the arbitrary and parochial nature of our 
ethical expectations, using various forms of enjoyed degradation to make the point" (Clute and 
Nicholls 1993:317). The value of Delany from a critical point of view is his ability to generate such 
rich, and often contrary, opinions about his work. 
2 That is, the texts on the bookshelves that sell. 
3 Delany has said that 1967 to 1968 represented his first extended experience with communes, 
experience that proved invaluable in writing Dhalgren. Indeed, Heavenly Breakfast: An Essay on the 
Winter of Love (1979) can be read in conjunction with the novel (Peplow and Bravard 1980:33-34). 
'Radical' adaptations are the norm in communes: '"human being to human being across each 
individual's personal political space: male to female, female to male, black to white, white to black, 
private individual to politicised group, or group to individual.' The living space was physically 
cramped, involving 'four rooms on the second floor of a Lower East Side [New York] tenement: 
bathtub in the kitchen; two pantry-sized rooms railroading off that; and a fifteen-by-twenty back room, 
largest in the apartment.' In this small space anywhere from twelve to twenty people slept, ate, bathed, 
and worked. Sex was casual and varied: 'In a communal situation bisexuality has to be of at least 
passing interest to everyone ... "'(1980:33). 
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mind that there are as many definitions as there are literary critics, Brian McHale 
simply says that "there 'is' no such 'thing"': 
Or at least there is no such thing if what one has in mind is some kind of 
identifiable object 'out there' in the world, localisable, bounded by a definite 
outline, open to inspection, possessing attributes about which we can all agree. 
(1992:1) 
Chris Baldick explains that postmodernism is 
a disputed term that has occupied much recent debate about contemporary 
culture since the early 1980s. In its simplest and least satisfactory sense it 
refers generally to the phase of 20th century Western culture that succeeded 
the reign of high modernism, thus indicating the products of the 'space age' 
after some time in the 1950s. More often, though, it is applied to a cultural 
condition prevailing in the advanced capitalist societies since the 1960s, 
characterised by a superabundance of disconnected images and styles ... 
(1990: 174) 
The theoretical positions encompassed by postmodernism range from 
Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence to Foucault's analysis of knowledge 
and power, but Hutcheon points out that "these all share a view of discourse as 
problematic and of ordering systems as suspect (and humanly constructed)" 
(1989:24). This is illustrated in Lethen's list of the opposing characteristics of 
modernity and postmodernity respectively: 
Hierarchy 
Presence 
Genital 
Narrative 
Metaphysics 
Determinacy 
Construction of a world-model 
Ontological certainty 
Anarchy 
Absence 
Polymorphous 
Anti-narrative 
Irony 
Indeterminacy 
Deconstruction of a world-model 
Ontological uncertainty 
(quoted in McHale 1992:7-8) 
McHale argues that the dominant of postmodernism is ontological (1987: 10), 
meaning the defining aspect of a work of art - that is, the rules that govern its shape 
and form. However, the dominant is not hierarchical, and McHale is careful to point 
out that a single text may display many dominants, depending on the analytical slant 
applied to it. Ontology is defined as the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature 
of being, which in a postmodernist context also refers to the world at large in which 
this notion of being is expressed or constrained. McHale refers to Thomas Pavel's 
definition of an ontology as a '"a theoretical description of a universe"' (1987:27). 
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Postmodernist ontological questions are what Dick Higgins terms '"post-cognitive"' 
ones, and range from the ontology of the literary text itself to the fictional world it 
portrays: 
Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to do it? 
... What is a world?; what kinds of world are there, how are they constituted, 
and how do they differ?; what happens when different kinds of world are 
placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds are violated?; 
what is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the mode of existence of 
the world (or worlds) it projects?; how is a projected world structured? 
(McHale 1987:10) 
While it is obvious that a gamut of ontological themes or attitudes is available 
to the postmodernist writer, they all share one thing in common: the foregrounding of 
ontological concerns through a repertoire of fictional strategies, which McHale 
defines as the poetics of postmodernism. However, he is careful to avoid privileging 
postmodernism as being part of some sort of literary canon, which again invokes the 
spectre of a totalising hierarchy, and stresses instead "it is only against the 
background of general theories of literary ontology that specific postmodernist 
practices can be identified and understood" (1987:27). The 'possible worlds' 
approach to ontology as predicated by postmodernism has a profound implication for 
the relationship between fiction and reality, as the previously-inviolable boundary 
between the two is weakened by the notion that reality itself is a construct, and not an 
immutable given - and thus can be forged anew: 
The possible-worlds approach not only complicates fiction's internal 
ontological structure, it also weakens its external boundary or frame. Classical 
mimetic theories . . . had a vested interest in maintaining this conceptual 
boundary, since without a sharp initial distinction between fiction and reality 
there could be no relation of similarity or mirroring . . . They make it possible 
for us to understand the passage or circulation that occurs across that 
boundary. Fiction's epidermis, it appears, is not an impermeable but a 
semipermeable membrane. (McHale 1987:34) 
The 'possible worlds' strategy seems as much a part of SF as it is of postmodernism, 
and indeed McHale points out that SF, too, is "governed by the ontological dominant" 
(1987:59). But he goes much further than this: 
Indeed, it is perhaps the ontological genre par excellence. We can think of 
science fiction as postmodernism's noncanonised or 'low art' double, its 
sister-genre in the same sense that the popular detective thriller is modernist 
fiction's sister-genre. (1987:59) 
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McHale refers to SF's critical reception as postmodemism's '"low art' 
double", even with it being the epitome of the ontological dominant. This implies that 
he believes SF to be inherently inferior, and that it can only aspire to copying other 
forms, instead of being a unique literary form in its own right. He gives a nod to 
Darko Suvin's description of SF as the "'literature of cognitive estrangement"', 
indicating that 'estrangement' means "confronting the empirical givens of our world 
with something not given, something from outside or beyond it", which Suvin defines 
as the novum (1987:59). However, McHale argues that Suvin's definition of SF is 
flawed, because any generic fiction contains at least one novum, or element that does 
not exist in our own world, and that is the main protagonist. 
Thus the concept of the novum cannot be used to differentiate SF from other 
literary genres. Instead McHale points to Robert Scholes' s definition as being more 
indicative of the true functioning of SF. The point is not that SF contains novums -
that is, elements that diverge in varying degrees from the world as we know it - but 
how these novums relate to each other and the world as we know it to produce the 
effect of estrangement as mediated through cognition: 
Fabulation . . . is fiction that offers us a world clearly and radically 
discontinuous from the one we know, yet returns to confront that known world 
in some cognitive way. (Scholes 1975:29) 
Scholes also highlights the basic structuralist tenet that "all systems of notation offer 
us models of reality rather than descriptions of it" (1975:4), which is translated into 
the 'possible worlds' strand of the ontology of postmodemism. The fact that reality 
cannot be recorded or transcribed means that "all writing, all composition, is 
construction", meaning that a writer does not mimic the world, but merely presents 
one version of it. 
And, as postmodernism poses, if one version, why not many? Scholes 
comments that one response to the dilemma of representing reality in a fictional form 
has simply been to "redefine the aesthetic act itself', and write about "the possibilities 
and impossibilities" of fiction. This refers to John "'old analogy between Author and 
God, novel and world"' (McHale 1987:29): 
. . . no longer content with invisibly exercising his freedom to create worlds, 
the artist now makes his freedom visible by thrusting himself into the 
foreground of his work. He represents himself in the act of making his 
fictional world - or unmaking it, which is also his prerogative. There is a 
catch, of course: the. artist represented in the act of creation or destruction is 
himself inevitably a fiction .... (McHale 1987:30) 
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In the instance of a writer transforming him- or herself into a novum in his own text, 
then the relationship of that text with himself or herself, the audience, and reality as it 
is commonly perceived must inevitably change. The consequence is that the 
artificiality of the text, or its true nature as a construct, is foregrounded, and "the 
devices of art are laid bare" (1987:30). This theme is prevalent in postmodernism, 
especially given its concern with the nature of fiction and reality, and how to 
manipulate the constructedness of both. 
Perceived as a low-art g-enre, SF is not commonly seen as the domain for such 
theoretical concerns - and it is one of the particular achievements of Delany that not 
only has he opened up the genre to such possibilities, but has revealed that it is as rich 
a field in this regard as that offered by postmodernism itself The response that 
Dhalgren elicited from within the boundaries of SF itself suggested just how 
reactionary the novel was deemed to be in comparison with 'mainstream' SF. 
Reviewing the book for the Los Angeles Times, Harlan Ellison declared that he had 
abandoned the tome at page 361, as it was "not a novel but a 'career'" (Delany 
1984:36). Barry Malzberg stated that the novel was nothing but '"tenth-rate Joyce 
pastiche"' (1976:78). These views seem to suggest that Delany had harnessed serious 
literary concer~s onto the popular bandwagon of SF and, in doing so, had somehow 
betrayed the populist cause of SF. That he was enriching the genre by expanding its 
perceived boundaries was not given due consideration by these critics. The main bone 
of contention was the suspicion that Delany had written the book for an audience of 
critics, and not the general reader - that is, his supportively loyal fan base, who were 
subsequently baftled by, and felt strong resentment towards, the shot fired high over 
their brows. Delany comments on this issue as follows: 
Well, it was definitely written to appease a certain rich critical response in 
myself - a response which, in myself, I associate with something mature and 
measured. I wanted to read a book - solid, sedate, sexual, and complex - full 
of mysteries that proliferate in orderly fashion by the very fact of their 
solution, a book I could sink my mental teeth into after they had been 
sharpened by what I'd found valid in the art and aesthetic discourse of the past 
century-and-a-quarter. But if it was written 'for critics', it was not written for 
any fancied reward to be gleaned from any critical commentary. (1989:37) 
The main issue at stake here is a writer's motivation to write, and what 
compels him or her to put pen to paper. This, of course, is followed by a lengthy 
process by which the writer's work is run through the mill of the publishing process, 
whereby it has to satisfy certain commercial and/or artistic criteria. The fact that 
Dhalgren achieved success in both aspects has led Delany to declare that the book 
"has found its audience" (Delany 1989:58) - despite the vituperative critical response 
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that greeted its publication. Delany contends that the book received almost no 
publicity from its initial publisher, Bantam, 4 and even the few favourable reviews it 
garnered warned that the book, "besides long, is involuted, obscure, and difficult - if 
not downright tedious" (1989:58). But ultimately the reputation it gathered was 
sufficient to ensure it an audience: 
It is not the runaway audience of the manufactured bestseller. It is not the all 
too swayable and, finally, all too nai:Ve audience of hardcore science fiction 
readers. Because it is neither of these, we may speculate that it might well be 
the basis for that most important of audiences, the vertical audience of 
concerned and alert readers interested in the progress of American fiction. 
(Delany 1989:58) 
This sounds portentous, and Delany is too cavalier in dismissing the hardcore 
SF audience, as this audience supported him from The Jewels of Aptor onwards. 
Interestingly, the major SF novels that followed Dhalgren, namely. Triton and Stars, 
though clearly SF in the most obvious ways that Dhalgren was not, proved even more 
problematic for the genre to assimilate. Perhaps a more telling criticism was that 
Dhalgren' s astronomical sales were partly motivated by a prurient audience - with SF 
readers being mostly adolescent and male - intrigued by the frank descriptions of 
marginal sex in the novel, including a three-way heterosexual/homosexual 
relationship. Writing as K Leslie Steiner in an essay that gave birth to Delany's first 
fictional pseudonym, and which was perhaps a fitting response to such a postmodern 
novel5 - Delany remarked that 
Thirty-five odd of Dhalgren's near nine hundred pages do deal with 
copulatory mechanics, [which] is simply not a high enough percentage -
especially with the real and near-real pornography seldom more than a 
bookrack away. Also the 'sex' in Dhalgren is too psychologically portrayed 
for real arousal. From the beginning to the end of it the characters never stop 
thinking. (1989:57) 
With such a phrase as "copulatory mechanics", it is clear that Delany had his 
tongue firmly in his cheek, and never took his detractors seriously. Even with such a 
pointed remark that Dhalgren was not SF, he responded as follows through Steiner: 
4 Interestingly, Delany notes that "no book I've ever published has received less attention than Flight 
from Neveryon" (1999: 127). 
5 Both novels deal with writing and the process of signification: in Dhalgren, the nameless main 
protagonist tries to wrest his own meaning from the time-warped landscape in which he finds himself, 
while in Stars Rat Korga becomes a symbol of survival. K Leslie Steiner extends both these themes 
into the authorial and fictional persona of Delany himself, to the extent that Steiner has evolved into a 
potent symbol herself. 
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What? Yes, it is science fiction: the hero enters over a bridge into a parallel 
world - see, silly! - into an alter-version of an American city where '. .. the 
ordinary laws of time and space', as they used to say, 'no longer apply'. I 
mean, really! (1989:93) 
Frivolity and playfulness aside - which, after all, are hallmarks of postmodernism -
Delany' s purpose in unleashing Dhalgren on an unsuspecting SF world was very 
definite and very serious. He refers to the novel a "frontal attack on the field" 
(1989:93). With postmodernism being an established genre with a large output and a 
deep pool of talented writers, it would be presumptuous for a single writer "to hope 
that a single work, or even a series of works, might restructure to whatever extent the 
concept of the form" (1989:35). It must be remembered that Delany was commenting 
on the nature of the genre at the time of Dhalgren in the early 1970s, when the genre's 
respectability was still in its infancy. In terms of SF, 
it is not so preposterous for a writer to hope that a single work, fermenting in 
the acknowledged live area of the field, might loosen and recontour the web of 
possibilities, charging that web at each repositioned intersection of possible 
word and possible word. I think, in exactly in that slow and inevitable way that 
causes shrieks both of rage and delight, Dhalgren is doing that. And I like it. 
(Delany 1989:35) 
Delany comments further that he did not desire to see the genre littered with 
imitations of Dhalgren, but that his wish was for the field to sensitise itself to the 
"textures and organisation" of his novel, and thereby enrich its scope. He admitted 
that the line between the content of the text and the external world "is frequently 
foggy - especially for the writer": 
As an SF writer I frequently see myself as trying to reach the boundary, the 
edge, the limit of fiction, a journey that can only be made on paper. Similarly, 
I am tempted to come as close to the line as possible from the critical side -
one wants to live not just dangerously, but dangerously and intelligently. 
(1989:35) 
Dhalgren diffuses the boundary between itself as text and the external world due to 
the fact that the novel 'begins' in the middle of a sentence.6 This disrupts the 
conventional framing of a novel, and challenges our conception of a beginning. It also 
creates unease in the reader, who is plunged unceremoniously into the text without the 
sense of control or mastery usually afforded by beginning at a clearly discernible 
starting point. Derrida questions what is the beginning of a text, which has various 
6 This is perhaps a conscious reference to James Joyce's Finnegans Wake. 
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frames or borders, such as the cover, title page, index, and publishing and catalogue 
details. All this serves to complicate the notion of a proper 'beginning': 
If we are to approach a text, it must have an edge . . . all those 
boundaries that form the running border of what used to be called a text, of 
what we once thought this word could identify, i.e., the supposed end and 
beginning of a work, the unity of a corpus, the title, the margins, the 
signatures, the referential realm outside the frame, and so forth. What has 
happened, if it has happened, is a sort of overrun [debordement] that spoils all 
these boundaries and divisions and forces us to extend the accredited concept, 
the dominant notion of a 'text' ... that is henceforth no longer a finished 
corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a 
differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other 
than itself, to other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits 
assigned to it ... (Derrida 1979:83-4) 
What Derrida is calling for is a re-evaluation of a text as an object bound 
between covers, which symbolises the clear division between the textual and real 
worlds. A text cannot enclose that which it enfolds because it is comprised of 
language, and the units of language are arbitrary and relational, resulting in a web of 
differential, sliding traces. However, as Barthes points out, language also creates the 
illusion of the textually-ordered space in which a writer operates. And language is 
both boundary and frontier, beginning and end, of a text: 
It enfolds the whole of literary creation much as the earth, the sky, and the line 
where they meet outline a familiar habitat for mankind. It is not so much a 
stock of materials as a horizon, which implies both a boundary and a 
perspective; in short, it is the comforting area of an ordered space. (Sontag 
1982:31) 
In terms of the language of Dhalgren, Robert Elliot Fox argues that the novel 
crosses the boundary between fiction and contemporary criticism, adding that this is 
the result of postmodernism jumbling "the borders between these ostensibly different 
sorts of texts" (1996:129). He refers to Kid's description of his book of poems as "'a 
complicitous illusion in lingual catalysis, a crystalline and conscientious alkahest"' 
(1996: 129). Fox explains that 'alkahest' is a prized universal solvent, while 'catalysis' 
refers to the modification of a chemical reaction by a catalyst. The former term is 
from alchemy, and the latter from chemistry, with the one suggesting magic, and the 
other science. Both refer to processes of change or transformation, and this is also the 
very nature of the language in which these terms are articulated: 
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Whatever its materiality, there still is something magical about language, as 
with all our arts: our language may change as we change, and we may also be 
changed by language. (Fox 1996:129) 
The notion of change and transformation is central to Dhalgren, represented 
by the bridge that the nameless protagonist crosses over to enter Bellona, the city of 
signs, and by which means he attempts to leave at the novel's end. Or does he? This 
ambiguous mirroring of the novel's beginning leaves this, and many other questions, 
unanswered. All that matters is change itself, which cannot be undone. Once crossed 
over, the boundary itself is transformed into a frontier. 
Don't you know that once you have transgressed that boundary, every atom, 
the interior of every point of reality, has shifted its relation to every other 
you've left behind, shaken and jangled within the field of time, so that if you 
cross back, you return to a very different space than the one you left? You 
have crossed the river to come to this city? Do you really think you can cross 
back ... (Delany 1974:536) 
Delany undermines the "ontological stability" of the world represented in 
Dhalgren by incorporating self-contradiction, repetition and denial, and throwing into 
epistemological doubt certain key events such as the beginning and ending. This leads 
to the conclusion that the city "is not a state of mind but a state of being; an 
ontological condition" (McHale 1987:71). The beginning of the novel provides an 
example of the "two modes of fictive authority" (Delany 1984: 72) that characterise 
Delany' s textual strategy in Dhalgren. 
The nameless protagonist crosses over a bridge into the devastated city, where 
he meets a mysterious Oriental woman. They make love (the book's first sex scene of 
many occurs on page 3 ), and she leads him to a cave where he retrieves a chain of 
prisms, mirrors, and lenses. The woman runs away into a field and, while trying to 
catch her, she turns into a tree. (Delany manages this difficult, fantastical transition 
with a haunting economy.) .soon after that the (still-unnamed) protagonist thinks to 
himself: "No, the Daphne bit would not pass-" (Delany 1974:11), adopting an ironic 
postmodernist stance to his own perceived experience. 
Either the protagonist actually experienced this event, or it is some sort of a 
hallucination - but, instead of privileging either explanation, the text actively 
encourages a shifting dialectic between the two. Delany himself warns against holding 
up this myth as a template for the novel as a whole. He concedes that "the hero, after 
an encounter with the Goddess, is struck with madness and poetry", which is also the 
substance of the myth, but warns that "to specify any more than this is to violate the 
book" (1984:84). Delany points out that a major theme of the novel is deconstruction 
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itself, and the way that signs can be broken up and recomplicated. Neither foreground 
nor background is privileged in the novel, creating a shimmering, constantly altering 
perspective as the two shift between and glide over each other. Steiner explains this 
Derridean strategy of endless deferment: 
What Delany has done is construct not an impoverished, but a rich text, 
that deals specifically with the break up of social signs . . . and in which the 
various social privileges of the text (in its various modes) simply cannot be 
held onto, because each is laid against a fictive foreground plane that, as we 
perceive it, vanishes into the background and is swallowed up in a concert of 
possible deconstructions. (Delany 1989:77) 
The beginning of the novel also highlights the constructedness of Delany' s 
prose in terms of his careful choice of words and phrasing, with the result that the 
reader has to wrest the meaning( s) from the text - that is, become an active participant 
in generating the text's meaning. But this readerly task is undertaken with the caveat 
that there is no ultimate base-line or immutable meaning, for one of postmodernism's 
main characteristics is to resist closure or ending. 
to wound the autumnal city. 
So howled out for the world to give him a name. 
The in-dark answered with wind. 
All you know I know . . . (Delany 197 4: 1) 
Fox unpacks some of the dense allusions in this opening, suggesting that 'autumnal' 
refers to the "twilight of Bellona", with the city itself being emblematic of all cities. 
In terms of perceiving the city as a symbol of capitalist society, the plight of Bellona 
can bi seen to represent the fate of capitalism itself - what Fox terms "an 
Ozymandian realm in which the pride of late capitalist society has been (at least 
within this particular circle) shaken, if not yet fully humbled" (1996:129). The point is 
that the text does not resist such readings, but actively encourages them. 
My reading of Bellona is that it is a symbolic representation of Derrida's 
concepts of dijferance and the supplement, with Kid's journey symbolising the 
process of signification itself At the beginning, lacking a name, he is a signified 
without a signifier. But then he is named 'Kid', which demonstrates the arbitrary 
nature of signs, as this is not his real name, but signifies the person he becomes in the 
course of the novel. At the beginning the mysterious Daphne figure says to him: 
"'Things have made you what you are. What you are will make you what you will 
become'" (Delany 1974:4). 
She asks him four questions: what he wants to change in the world, what he 
wants to preserve, what he is searching for, and what he is running away from. To all 
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four he replies: nothing, but adds that his 'purpose' is '"to get through the next 
second, consciousness intact"' - that is, to signify, to constitute some meaning or 
identity. The Daphne figure is unimpressed, and replies: "'Then be glad you're not 
just a character scrawled in the margins of somebody else's lost notebook: you'd be 
deadly dull'" (1974:5). 
The spiralbound notebook is one that Kid picks up; with the righthand side of 
the pages already filled up, he uses the lefthand margin for a journal that becomes the 
novel itself Kid, as signified by his temporary appellation, is a tabula rasa upon 
which the meaning of Bellona can be inscribed: he becomes the city's signifier. In the 
course of the novel, Kid asks Lanya: "'Do you think a city can control the way people 
live inside it?"' (1974:279), meaning, generally, what role does urban geography play 
in the socialisation process and in cementing identity and, specifically, to what extent 
is Bellona part of himself? 
Elizabeth Grosz argues that the body can be reconceived as a socio-cultural 
artifact, which involves "a kind of turning inside out and outside in of the body" - that 
is, "how the subject's exterior is psychically constructed; and conversely, how the 
processes of social inscription of the body's surface construct a psychical interior" 
(1995:103). In other words, she wants to render permeable the boundary between the 
body and the external social world, and see how the two interact with, and influence, 
each other. 
The city is one of the crucial factors in the social production of (sexed) 
corporeality: the built environment provides the context and co-ordinates for 
contemporary forms of body. The city provides the order and organisation that 
automatically links otherwise unrelated bodies: it is the condition and milieu 
in which corporeality is socially, sexually, and discursively produced. (Grosz 
1995:104) 
Grosz points out that the relation between bodies and cities is "more complex 
than may have been realised" ( 1995: 104). She defines a 'body' as its biological 
reality, in terms of organs and bones, which are unified "through the psychical and 
social inscription of the body's surface" (1995:104). But a body requires "social 
triggering, ordering, and long-term administration" (1995:104) in order to realise its 
latent potentiality. A body becomes a person "only through the intervention of the 
(m)other and, ultimately, the Other" (1995:104) This 'Other' is the external context or 
interface provided by the prevailing social order. This produced body is structured 
and regulated to "become part of a social network, linked to other bodies and objects" 
(1995:104). Grosz describes a city as 
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a complex and interactive network that links together, often in an unintegrated 
and ad hoc way, a number of disparate social activities, processes, relations, 
with a number of architectural, geographical, civic, and public relations. The 
city brings together economic flows, and power networks, forms of 
management and political organisation, interpersonal, familial, and extra-
familial social relations, and the aesthetic/economic organisation of space and 
place to create a semipermanent but everchanging built environment or milieu. 
(1995:105) 
It is important to note that, though localised, a city is always changing, and 
represents a dynamic interface between its social and psychical structure. These 
definitions form the basis of two pervasive models of body/city interrelation. Firstly, 
"the city is a reflection, projection, or product of bodies" (1995: 105). This implies that 
bodies, viewed in naturalistic terms, predate the city. The corollary of this view is that 
a city is an alienating environment denying the body an authentic context. In this 
model, all social and historical production flow from the sovereign human subject. 
Humans make cities, which are reflections of human endeavour in terms of physical 
labour and "the conceptual and reflective possibilities of consciousness itself' 
(1995:105). 
Grosz notes several problems with this view: in the body/mind binary 
opposition, the former is subordinate. Also, the relation between body/subject is 
perceived as a one-way causal link in which the body is the effect, and the city the 
cause. A more sophisticated reading acknowledges the possibility of a negative 
feedback loop in this relation, which could result in alienation. Secondly, the body 
and the city, or the body and the state, are seen as isomorphic reflections of each 
other, as reflected in the seventeenth century when the King was seen to be the 'head' 
of the state, and the populace the 'body politic', with the law as its nerves, the army as 
its arms, and commerce as its stomach, for example. Grosz interjects pertinent, though 
impish, questions about such correspondence: 
. . . in this pervasive metaphor of the body politic, the body is rarely attributed 
a sex. What, one might ask, takes on the metaphoric function of the genitals in 
the body politic? What kind of genitals are they? Does the body politic have a 
sex? (Grosz 1995: 106) 
This model is phallocentric due to the "implicit masculine coding" (1995: 106) 
of the body politic. Additional problems are that the ideal forms of culture are 
moulded by nature, with the artificial construct of the body politic superseding the 
natural body. 7 This model also legitimises various forms of ideal government and 
socialisation by the process of naturalisation. If the interrelation between body and 
7 Of course, this is also highly culture specific. 
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city is neither causal or representational, then a compromise is m order. Grosz 
suggests taking elements from both models and combining them to produce the view 
that the interrelation between body and city functions by means of an interface - or a 
permeable boundary that is crossed and recrossed as the need arises. 
What I am suggesting is a model of the relations between bodies and cities that 
sees them, not as megalithic total entities, but as assemblages or collections of 
parts, capable of crossing the thresholds between . . . This model is practical, 
based on the productivity of bodies and cities in defining and establishing each 
other. It is not a holistic view, one that would stress the unity and integration 
of city and body, their 'ecological balance'. Rather, their interrelations involve 
a fundamentally disunified series of systems, a series of disparate flows, 
energies, events, or entities, bringing them together or drawing apart their 
more or less temporary alignments. (Grosz 1995:108) 
In Dhalgren, the city of Bellona is as much a character as Kid, Lanya, or 
Denny - in fact, it is a crucial element of the ontological signified. The interrelation 
between these bodies and their city is as complex as Grosz suggests - neither can 
exist without the context of the other, as both are interdependent on the other for their 
self-definition. This is intimated when Kid questions Ernest Newboy, a famous poet, 
as to the worth of his own work. Newboy replies that the interpretative value of the 
poems is entirely dependent on the context of their composition, and thus their worth 
can only be gauged meaningfully by what people outside of Bellona know about the 
city. 
When you ask me the worth of these poems, you are asking me what place the 
image of this city holds in the minds of those who have never been here. How 
can I presume to suggest? There are times, as I wander in this abysmal mist, 
when these streets seem· to underpin all the capitals of the world. At others, I 
confess, the whole place seems a pointless and ugly mistake, with no relation 
to what I know as civilisation, better obliterated than abandoned. I can't judge 
because I am still in it. (Delany 1974:395) 
Once again we see how the text proliferates contradictory meanings: on the 
one hand, Bellona is representative of cities in general, an archetypal signifier of 
urbanism, while on the other it is seen as an aberration on a blighted landscape. The 
catastrophe that struck Bellona is never explained, or even alluded to - it is merely 
accommodated as a necessary condition of its existence. Fox reveals that, in classical 
mythology, Bellona is the sister of Mars and thus the goddess of war ( 1996: 13 0) -
though the only thing that the city seems to be at war against is itself As early as page 
15 of the novel we learn that "very few suspect the existence of this city", with mass 
communication and the laws of perspective having "redesigned knowledge and 
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perception to pass it by". Thus Bellona is a supplement unto itself, occupying and 
decentring its own significatory space in the ontological landscape of the novel. 
We learn that the population of the city has dwindled from two million to a 
mere 1 000 (Delany 1974:23). Tak says that the city is dangerous in terms of 
criminals and looters, but that the peculiar freedom afforded by Bellona in that there 
are no laws to break, and everything is for the taking, means that "'very quickly, 
surprisingly quickly, you become exactly who you are"' (1974:23). This returns me to 
the beginning of the novel, and Kid's unformed injunction of " ... to wound the 
autumnal city" ( 197 4: 1). The verb 'wound' is paradoxical, for if Bellona is in its 
twilight, as suggested by the adjective 'autumnal', then how can Kid inflict further 
damage? (Fox 1996: 132) And how exactly will he do this? Fox states that this is the 
inverse of the classic quest, where the aim is salvation of that which is dying. 
Or are we to read 'wound' as a form of the word 'wind', meaning that 
somehow Kid is to draw the energies of Bellona into himself like a spring? And, yet 
again, to what purpose? Perhaps a clearer interpretation of the phrase can be found by 
looking at other uses of 'wound' in the text. Newboy says to Kid: "'You have 
received that holy and spectacular wound ~hich bleeds ... well, poetry'" (Delany 
1974:288). In one of the margins in the journal-cum-novel into which the text 
fragments at the end, Kid writes: 
Speech is always in excess of poetry as print is always inadequate for speech. -
A word sets images flying through the brain from which auguries we recall all 
extent and intention. I'm not a poet because I have nothing to give my life to 
make it due, except my attention. And I don't know if my wounded sort is 
enough. (Delany 1974:783-4) 
Kid is a poet, and his function is to write. The notebook that he finds forms the 
basis for his journal, which becomes/is the novel itself (that he has[d] already 
written). His task is to 'wound' the autumnal city - to make it bleed through his 
writing, for blood is the symbolic substance of life and creativity. This theme of art 
and the artistic consciousness or process is an integral aspect of Dhalgren, which, on 
one level, is about the rigours of artistic creation. Steiner explains that Dhalgren 
interweaves three internal texts: Kid's poems, which are published as Brass Orchids 
(though belaboured over at great length, they are never quoted in the actual text, thus 
foregrounding the circumstances of their creation); The Bellona Times, a newspaper 
published and edited by Roger Calkins, which Delany uses to 'report' on certain 
events in the novel, such as the inexplicable sightings of the double moon and the 
bloated sun; and the journal revealed in fragments throughout the novel, finally 
merging with it in Chapter VII (Delany 1989:61). 
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Steiner explains that this tnruty of inner texts - poems, newspaper, and 
journal, as well as the metatext in which they are all embedded - are all debunked of 
their traditional authority in the course of the novel. No two editions of the newspaper 
have a consecutive date, the authorship of the poems is thrown into doubt at Calkins's 
party, and at the end the journal recontextualises, as well as seemingly continuing the 
story, which is not what a traditional journal does (1989:62-3). Thus conventional 
artistic forms and their processes of creation and legitimisation are thrown into doubt. 
What are the implications for Delany' s notion of art and artists? Kid reads the 
following entry in his notebook: 
Poetry, fiction, drama - I am interested in the arts of incident only so far as 
fiction touches life; oh no, not in any vulgar, autobiographical sense, rather at 
the level of the most crystalline correspondence. Consider: If an author, 
passing a mirror, were to see one day not himself but some character of his 
invention, though he might be surprised, might even question his sanity, he 
would still have something by which to relate. But suppose, passing on the 
inside, the character should glance at his mirror and see, not himself, but the 
author, a complete stranger, staring in at him, to whom he has no relation at 
all, what is this poor creature left ... ? (Delany 197 4: 401) 
Here Delany is questioning the relationship between author and character, and 
whether or not characters are merely fragments of a writer's consciousness or separate 
entities. The corollary, of course, is to what extent the author himself is a fiction, and 
to what extent his characters can be 'real' in an ontological sense. In keeping with the 
novel's diffraction of repeated events, what Kid reads about the mirror incident in his 
notebook transpires in the novel. Walking past a dressing mirror, he sees what he 
thinks is an older version of himself, but which is actually an image of Delany: 
He glanced down at the other hand. Where his was caged in blades, the 
reflection held - his notebook? But the correspondence . . . was too banal for 
relief Wanting to cry, he gazed full at the face, which, mirroring him twitch to 
twitch, for all its beard and glasses (and a small brass ring in one ear!) gazed 
back, with confusion, desperation, and sadness. (Delany 1974:377) 
Despite Kid's distaste at the "vulgar autobiographical sense", this passage 
demonstrates that Kid and Delany are the same self - or that Kid's real name, which 
remains unknown even at the novel's end, could be Samuel R Delany. The two are 
elements of the same sign. The Motion of Light in Water and Heavenly Brealifast 
clearly dovetail with the world of Bellona. But the point is not to accumulate an 
exhaustive one-to-one concordance. Instead the constant shimmer between reality and 
perception is one of the central themes of Dhalgren. 
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Kid represents the criminal-artist, a recurring figure in Delany' s fiction from 
as early as Babel-17. Missing a sandal, and somewhat hippie-like, he does not 
represent the conventional image of a poet as a refined scholar and student of life. 
Ernest Newboy, on the other hand, is a broad parody of the successful writer, whose 
auspicious arrival is first trumpeted in The Bellona Times, which serves to indicate the 
poet's social prominence. Earlier on Kid glimpses a headline that reads 'NEW BOY 
IN TOWN!' (1974:77), and erroneously thinks that the newspaper is referring to him 
- which, perhaps, on one level, it is. Newboy informs Kid of the maxim that "'all 
poetry is about love, death, or the changing of the seasons"' - but in Bellona the 
seasons are changeless, which represents either synthesis or stasis. He then puts 
forward two views of the artist: the one gives his or her all, which may not be 
reflected in the published output, but is evident in countless drafts. The other has 
'discovered' that he or she is a poet, and '"dedicates himself [or herself! to living, 
according to his [or her J concepts, the civilised life in which poetry exists because it is 
part of civilisation"' (1974:392). Clearly Kid is the former kind of artist, who is 
concentrated on his work, while Newboy represents the latter, as he is more 
concerned with the poetic lifestyle or consciousness. However, Newboy is aware of 
the limits of his idealism: 
'All good poets tend to be idealistic. They also tend to be lazy, acrimonious, 
and power-crazed. Put any two of them together and they invariably talk about 
money. I suspect their best work tries to reconcile what they are with what 
they know and feel they should be ... ' (Delany 1974:393) 
Acknowledging these traits in himself, Newboy says that, should he overcome 
them, his work '"would become empty of all psychological insight"' as it would 
'"only [be] concerned with the truth ... which is trivial. '"8 (1974:393). Of course, the 
question in Dhalgren is what is the truth? Postmodernism teaches that reality is 
mutable and undecidable, and that even the 'truth' of art is open to self-doubt. Kid 
suspects that he might not even be the author of his 'own' poems: 
Are these poems mine? Or will I discover that they are improper descriptions 
by someone else of things I might have once been near: the map erased ... 
(1974:519) 
When asked why he has come to Bellona, Newboy replies that the city has an 
'"underground reputation"' (197 4: 519), which appealed to him, as his constant 
exposure to the limelight of literary fame has made him "'rather protective of [his] 
anonymity"' (1974: 177). Commenting on the artistic process, Newboy explains that, 
8 A highly postmodernist point of view. 
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through the medium of his or her work, an artist translates some meaningful inner 
experience. But his emphasis on the "'Artistic Community"' as an Ivory Tower-type 
structure leads him to denounce the idea that the reader's experience can be anything 
like that of the writer's. 
Dhalgren parodies this idea of the reader/artist opposition by presenting 
several internal texts written from first to third person, and not privileging any one as 
the reader remains unsure about who wrote what. By exposing the relations and 
interdependencies between seemingly disparate, hierarchical elements, 
postmodernism serves to level the literary and critical playing field. Newboy refers to 
Kid's writing ability as a wound of consciousness (1974:288), which is made to bleed 
by the creative process, thus producing the life-affirming substance of both life and 
literature. 
There's no reason why all art should appeal to all people. But every editor and 
entrepreneur, deep in his heart of hearts is sure it does, wants it to, wishes it 
would ..... Publishers, editors, gallery owners, orchestra managers! What 
incredible parameters for the creative world. (Delany 1974:288) 
It is these creative parameters that Dhalgren subverts, with the mam 
protagonist symbolising the artistic process itself as he creates and gives meaning to 
the very text in which he is embedded, thus subverting the centrally-focused notion of 
author and character. Newboy's advice to Kid is "'be true to yourself that you may be 
true to your work"', as well as the converse: "'be true to your work so that you may 
be true to yourself" (1974:288) Both statements are facets of a single proposition, 
and postmodernism serves to highlight the supplementarity of these viewpoints. 
This can also be seen as being Delany' s manifesto to himself: to be true to a 
work dedicated to charting the undefined waters beyond the traditional boundaries of 
SF. Newboy also refers to the idea of the artist as a madman or criminal, a wanderer 
on the edges of society transcribing the boundaries he or she transgresses. The artist 
has no choice but to partake of this solitary condition due to the 'gift' of his or her 
artistic consciousness, which, by its very nature of introspection and contemplation, 
sets the person apart from the mainstream of society. In this sense the wound of 
artistic consciousness is as much a site of pain and conflict as it is the wellspring of 
creativity and reinvention. Delany describes artistic consciousness as a 'hole', 
meaning both a wound and a void: 
You begin to suspect, as you gaze through this you-shaped hole of insight and 
fire, that though it is the most important thing you own - never deny that for 
an instant - it has not shielded you from anything terribly important. The only 
consolation is that though one could have thrown it away at any time, morning 
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or night, one didn't. One chose to endure. Without any assurance of 
immortality, or even competence, one only knows one has not been cheated 
out of the consolation of carpenters, accountants, doctors, ditch-diggers, the 
ordinary people who must do useful things to be happy. Meander along then, 
half blind and a little mad .... (Delany 1974:291) 
Given this discourse, it is surprising that Steiner comments that Dhalgren 
"could not expect much commentary" (Delany 1989:37) as it is "practically all 
foreground" (1984:38). Foucault distinguishes between foreground and recit: the 
former is "referential representation" - that is, describing the underlying components 
of the narrative, such as its physical backdrop - while the latter is "written 
commentary that occurs within fictive discourse" (1989:37), such as Newboy's 
elaboration on artistic consciousness. Granted, such discourse does not comprise the 
bulk of the novel, but surely it is disingenuous, and an example of the tortured 
vacillation of the writer who, scratching his 'wound', comments: 
. . . it would be presumptuous for me to suggest that the language within the 
text was rich, complex, or worked. It may well (and from my own, most 
unprivileged position, despite what anyone says, I shall never know) be simply 
flabby, opaque and confusing. (Delany 1989:38) 
This, indeed, locates the novel firmly in the postmodern moment, as the 
central authority attached to the text, its author, throws cold water on the extent of his 
artistic achievement. But the logic of the supplement dictates that this contrary view is 
as valid as the author's affirmation of his own work. Another underlying discourse of 
the novel is Delany' s view of the nature and functioning of SF as a literary genre, as, 
at the time of starting work on Dhalgren, he had completed 'About.Five Thousand 
Seven Hundred and Fifty Words', which was to become part of The Jewel-Hinged 
Jaw. This essay attempts to explain how fiction functions, with the story being what 
develops or accumulates as a reader takes in one word at a time, until the end of the 
story is reached (Delany 1977:36). The effect of this accumulation is a constant 
recomplication or expansion of the 'word-view' of the novel: 
The process as we move our eyes from word to word is corrective and 
revisionary rather than progressive. Each new word revises the complex 
picture we had a moment before. (Delany 1977:37)9 
Every word has a certain 'margin of meaning' in which play and difference 
operate. Delany argues that "a 60 000 word novel is one picture corrected 59 999 
times", which is a nascent expression of his view that SF is a particular mode of 
9 This implies that reading this dissertation, for example, is an equally accumulative process, a slow 
accretion building up to ... what? 
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reading or discourse, articulated more fully in his next novel, Triton. However, 
Dhalgren does represent an advance on this view as it takes into account its implicit 
structuralism, and extends it into the postmodernist conflation of foreground and recit, 
with Delany arguing that the urban landscape is "a vastly recomplicated code of 
human signs (or semes)" (1989:42) that can be decoded like a language: 
The entire visible surface of every urban landscape we walk or ride 
through, as well as ninety-nine percent of the visible surface of every human 
being in it, is constituted of signs of specifically human actions, human 
reactions, class and individual histories, ordered in informative, syntactic 
relations. (Delany 1989:43) 
Bellona, as an urban landscape, is also constituted of signs, but there is no 
final meaning or closure that can be arrived at, which is also a feature of 
postmodernism. 10 Delany notes further that Karl Marx's statement that '"the means of 
production affect the political, spiritual, and economic life of the people'" refers, in 
terms of literature, to the "web of commentary" (1989:43) generated by the simple 
description of an object 
just beyond direct apprehension yet nevertheless strongly felt as one reads the 
texts to hand, on the politics, economics, and religion of both the material and 
the fictive world, charging the whole work with significance and a sense of 
coherent worldly knowledge. (1989:43) 
The corollary of this is that Marx's theory of the means of production can also 
be used to illustrate how "human-made, human-charged, and human-structured signs 
may be translated into its political, economic and spiritual equivalent" (1989:44). This 
means that a sign is much more than its constituent components of signifier and 
signified. It also refers to a web of sociopolitical and economic relations whereby 
signs are woven into the fabric of everyday life. Fox even hints that this 'leftist' 
political view of the economics of production and consumption is reflected by the fact 
that Kid is has no shoe on his left foot, all the lefthand pages in his notebook are blank 
(indicating a margin or supplement to the prevailing discourse), and he is lefthanded 
( 1996: 13 2) - which is plausible, but seems a bit contrived. 
Another concept explicated in 'About Five Thousand Seven Hundred and 
Fifty Words' that is relevant to Dhalgren is Delany's distinction between naturalistic 
fiction, reportage, and fantasy, which are all characterised by "a distinct level of 
10 One hesitates to conclude that such a lack of closure is a defining marker that the novel is, indeed, 
postmodern, for not all novels that lack closure are by default postmodern. This highlights the dual 
problem of definition and categorisation. 
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subjunctivity", meaning "the tension on the thread of meaning" running between 
signifier and signified (1977:43). Delany uses all three different levels of 
subjunctivity in Dhalgren: for example, our experience of Bellona' s bloated sun is a 
firsthand encounter on the part of Kid, Lanya, and Denny. It is recounted as a natural 
event, but is pure fantasy, as it has no scientific rationale - even the astronaut Captain 
Kamp, who has travelled to the moon and back and has come to Bellona for the 
chance to see and do new things (1974:510), is totally flummoxed. Later on the event 
is reported by The Bellona Times, which adds a different perspective, as well as 
legitimising the event through the authority of newsprint and journalese. During the 
conversation between Newboy and Kid on the nature of art and the role of the artist in 
society, Kid's notebook falls open at the following passage: 
. . . The sky is stripped. I am too weak to write much. But I still hear them 
walking in the trees; not speaking. Waiting here, away from the terrifying 
weaponry, out of the halls of vapour and light, beyond holland and into the 
hills, I have come to. (Delany 1974:292) 
Delany' s comments about the importance of individual words and how they 
are recomplicated in a shimmering intaglio of signifieds to generate what is 
conventionally referred to as meaning is illustrated here by his use of the curious word 
'holland'. There is a Holland Lake in Bellona, which is the location of a monastery. 
Fox argues against this being a typographical error, as "holland is Middle English, 
from the Dutch holtlant, meaning woodland" (1996: 131). Interestingly, Delany seems 
to set up a nature/city dichotomy at the beginning and ending of the novel when Kid 
appears mysteriously from the woodlands and the hills to 'wound' the urban 
landscape. Nature is associated with disorder, while the urban environment is 
structured, but Dhalgren presents the opposite: it is the urban environment that is 
emblematic of chaos, while nature - in terms of the Daphne figure at the beginning -
represents intimations of a greater order or scheme of things. 
The passage quoted above, of course, is the exact ending of the novel on page 
879, throwing into doubt the very meaning of an ending, as it is apparent that this 
particular ending has already been written, and thus has already transpired. 11 The 
reader's conventional anticipation of linear progression of a narrative is subverted, as 
Delany refracts the chronological and textual sequence of his novel to lay bare the 
devices of art. It seems that the final sentence of the novel is the missing part of the 
11 Derrida's comments on Maurice Blanchot are equally applicable to Delany: "The 'recit' which he 
claims is beginning at the end . . . is none other than the one that has begun from the beginning . . . and 
in which, therefore, he gets around to saying that he begins, etc. And it is without beginning, or end, 
without content and without edge. There is only content without edge - without boundary or frame -
and there is only edge without content" (1992:217). 
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incomplete sentence at the beginning, thus turning the novel into a seamless 
circularity without what can be conceived of as an ending or a beginning. Delany 
notes that "a circle is not the only closed figure possible to inscribe on a plain sheet of 
paper", and argues that a Necker cube portrays more accurately the shifts of 
perspective made possible by Dhalgren's structure. 
A careful reading of Dhalgren shows that the connecting nodes of various 
textual modes of discourse give rise to a figure more closely resembling a 
Necker cube than a simple circle. The resultant shifts in authority of the 
various fictive planes, leaping back and forth as we observe them, are, we feel, 
crucial to the appreciation of Dhalgren. (Delany 1984:68) 
The focus on the artist and the artistic process seem to suggest that Dhalgren 
is actually a modernist novel, but the way that the artistic process becomes part of the 
narrative, and how certain fictional functions tum into plot elements, suggests instead 
that it is postmodernist (the vacillation between these two interpretive or analytical 
modes is itself postmodernist). McHale lists some of these effects: 
Bellona' s inexplicable isolation from the rest of the country, its impossibly 
fluid and unstable topography . . . the similar instability and variability with 
which time unfolds there; and its spectacularly implausible astronomical 
phenomena .... (Delany 1987:71) 
The main postmodernist device in Dhalgren is the internal texts it circumscribes 
within the larger text of the novel itself K Leslie Steiner points out that the reader's 
interpretation of, and response to, these intertexts determines his or her approach to 
the novel: if Kid's journal existed prior to the novel, and his exit from Bellona is a 
true event, then the opening - that is, all events external to Bellona, such as the 
Daphne vision - are a hallucination. 
If the novel existed prior to the journal, then the ending is a fiction based on 
the true account at the beginning. It is this conflict between truth and fiction that 
results in the narrative breakdown at the end, "and out of which, as we swing round to 
the beginning, the true fictive discourse of the book arises" (1989:75). 'Reading' truth 
or fiction into the beginning or the end is not important, but should rather be 
experienced as a postmodern moment, described as shifting "back and forth between 
possible textual authorities, like the shift between foreground and background of the 
vertical planes of the Necker cube" (1989:75). This shift of perspective, or deferral of 
meaning, highlights Dhalgren' s logic of the supplement, differance overflowing the 
margins of its discourse: 
If Kid really entered the city, then he never truly left it. 
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If Kid really left the city, then he never truly entered it. (Delany 1989:75) 
The highly structured and deliberate nature of the text can be illustrated by 
referring to the marginal entry on page 869, which is continued on page 731. The 
point is that Chapter VII, which is Kid's journal, is not random and disorganised, but 
represents a purposefully fragmented chronology meant to decentre meaning and any 
privileged authorial intentions. There is more than one chronology of events, and all 
these versions are in dialogue with each other. "These alternate chronologies play as 
alternate signifieds beneath the fixed signifier of the musically satisfying order of the 
fragments as presented in the text" (1989:78). The ultimate message of the text, if 
such a hierarchical or ordering concept can be allowed, is that there is no such thing 
as "socially privileged certain knowledge". All that we can be sure of is the paradoxes 
unveiled by careful reading, and the logic of the supplement, which displaces and fills 
out meaning at the same time. Steiner blows Delany' s trumpet: 
Dhalgren accomplishes the Herculean task of presenting us with a totally 
coherent foreground which, by the fictive geodesics it establishes throughout 
the contours of its fictive field, allows not one plane of meaning to hold to any 
one single level. The task of treating the major problem of modem aesthetics 
in such a rich and recomplicated model in the already deprivileged field of 
science fiction is certainly an impressive undertaking. Symbolically what the 
concert of Dhalgren's illusions says is that we cannot trust too deeply in any 
socially privileged certain knowledge. All we may trust are our own readings 
of the paradoxes of the world, until we encounter evidence that things are not 
as we have thought, and our reading drops into the background and a new 
reading springs to the fore. (Delany 1989:79) 
This is all very well, but it can be argued that the novel boils down to 
postmodernism for postmodernism' s sake. Just as Kid wonders where Bellona' s 
centre is (1974:425), what is Dhalgren saying that is radically different - bearing in 
mind that Delany' s mission is not just to be different, but to cross boundaries and tum 
them into frontiers? As said earlier, Delany refutes the notion that the novel is not SF, 
arguing that it partakes of one its central themes, that of parallel or alternate realities. 
Indeed, Tak says that he suspects the "whole thing" - implying the situation in 
Bellona - is SF. 
'Huh? You mean a time-warp, or a parallel universe?' 
'No, just . . . well, science fiction. Only real. It follows all the 
conventions.' (Delany 197 4: 415) 
Kid is unconvinced by this argument as he has not seen any spaceships or ray-
guns, symbols of the epistemological shock of the new which signify SF to him. Tak 
166 
replies that he obviously has not "'read the new, good stuff"' (1974:415), 12 implying 
that SF has something of a disreputable past. Kid elaborates on the 'three 
conventions' of SF: first, that the course of an entire world can be changed by a single 
person; second, that "'the only measure of intelligence or genius is its linear and 
practical application"' and, thirdly, that "'the Universe is an essentially hospitable 
place"' (1974:415). 
Thus Bellona is like an undiscovered, habitable planet budding with promise 
and ripe for the plucking. The fact that Kid is unable to identify with this view is "'a 
comment on the paucity of our imaginations - none at all on the wonders here for the 
taking"' (1974:415). With "nothing safe about the darkness of this city" (1974:24), 
which is "without definitions" ( 197 4 :44 ), Bellona seems to represent a slowly 
unfolding disaster zone or site of some incomprehensible cataclysm that has affected 
the nature of space/time itself 
The city is also a larger representation of Kid's 'wound' - its seeming chaos 
and lack of form are the raw material of potentiality, of transformation of the 
prevailing social order, of crossing the boundary enfolding us within the normative 
ambit of society. Everything in Bellona is free for the taking, and thus .even the nature 
of crime has changed, with gangs like the Scorpions living in 'nests' and stalking the 
city in defense of their perceived territory, adorned in hologrammatic light shields 
representing a gamut of animal shapes. 
That Kid himself does not understand the extent of the collapse or compaction 
of civilisation in Bellona is evidenced by the fact that he accepts a paying job with the 
Richards family to help them move to a more desirable location in their apartment 
building. Mrs Richards' s response to anarchy and entropy is to pretend that, if she 
ignores them like unwanted visitors, they will eventually lose interest and leave her 
alone. Her belief in the prevailing social order is so strong that '"suddenly you begin 
to feel she's changing the world into her own ideas"' (197 4: 194 ), reminding us that a 
prevailing discourse is only as powerful as the strength of the belief that sustains it. 
Kid's singular revolutionary act - though this is not how he perceives it - is to 
enter into a three-way relationship with Lanya and Denny, the consummation of 
which is described in graphic, though never lurid - and surprisingly tender - detail. 
The remarkable thing about the description of these three-way sexual encounters in 
Dhalgren is that they are grounded in a mundane level of reality - genitals, body 
fluids, endearments, mutual pleasures and passion - that it seems, and becomes to be 
in the course of the novel, perfectly normal. Heterosexual monogamy is the privileged 
sexual discourse in mainstream society, and Delany subverts this status quo by 
12 Perhaps referring to Delany's own work? 
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presenting a transgressive alternative in the very language of the privileged discourse 
itself The trio represent a deeply subversive affront to social norms as they not only 
cross the explicit boundary defining the nuclear family, but their complex 
interrelationship also decentres the phallocentrism that is fundamental to any 
heterosexual coupling. 
Delany also tackles the controversial issue of interracial sex and violence 
against women in the figure of George Harrison, who is notorious in Bellona for 
having raped June Richards, the daughter of the family Kid works for. Harrison is an 
underground celebrity in Bellona, with nude posters of himself being circulated 
among admirers. He is a symbol of power and virility, with sexuality being the other 
side of the coin of artistic creativity. When a double moon rises inexplicably in 
Bellona's sky, one is named George in honour of Harrison. 
So you have seen the moon! So you have seen George - the right and left 
testicles of God, so heavy with tomorrow they tore through the veil to dangle 
naked above us all? (1974:524) 
It transpires that the 'rape' had been concocted by those "'afraid of female sexuality, 
and trying to make it into something that wreaks death and destruction all about it'" 
(1974:277). Kid shudders to think of Mr Richards's reaction '"if he found out his 
sunshine girl was running around the streets like a bitch in heat, lusting to be 
brutalised by some hulking, sadistic, buck nigger"' (Delany 1974:278). 
Harrison is a broad parody of a particular black stereotype, and Delany uses 
that stereotype itself as the main features of George's character in order to 
decontextualise such characteristics. In this sense, the decimated Bellona can be seen 
to symbolise the ravaged inner city ghettoes of the great American cities, which are 
populated largely by blacks. Another stereotype is Bunny, the gay go-go dancer at 
Teddy's, who espouses the philosophy of "radical effeminism" (1974:359). Delany's 
choice of character names - Captain Kamp, Purple Angora, Ernest Newboy13 -
suggests that the dominant features of the peripheral characters of Dhalgren are 
pastiche and irony. This is because Bellona is the font of signification, where all such 
stereotypes are levelled on the linguistic playing field of postmodernism. Literary 
playfulness aside, the issues of black and gay consciousness are crucial to a proper 
understanding of Dhalgren, and the trinity of Kid, Lanya, and Denny represents an 
amalgamation of these arbitrary social divisions based on race (Kid is American 
Indian) and sexual orientation. 
13 This could be an echo of Thomas Pynchon's 'parodic names'. 
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At the beginning of the novel, Kid is given an orchid, a bladed bracelet, as a 
weapon, which he rarely takes off. 
Kid was completely astonished when Denny's hands joined hers, and with no 
clumsiness, the blades opened, fell away: the harness was lifted from his 
tingling wrist. 
Lanya put it on the window ledge by the blind, where it stood, upright, 
a long, bright crown. (Delany 1974:466) 
The image of the weapon being transformed into a symbolic crown is emblematic of 
the larger transformation that Bellona enacts not only on its urban landscape, but on 
the people who inhabit it as well. The Reverend Amy Taylor (whose church 
distributes the erotic posters of George Harrison as a social service) exhorts her 
congregation in a sermon: 
Pray that this city is the one, pure, logical space from which, without being a 
poet or a god, we can all actually leave .... (Delany 1974:536) 
This space, or "lingual gap" ( 197 4: l7 5), is the tyranny of signification itself, which 
cements meanings and social divisions and the societal structures they inscribe. This 
theme is expanded further in Stars, featuring Delany's other great 'lost' character, Rat 
Korga, who is deprived of the entire world he inhabits. If Dhalgren can be said to still 
fall near, or under, the shadow of modernism due to its obvious Joycean parallels, 
such as the open ending and beginning, then Stars is a truly modern postmodern 
novel. In terms of SF, it represents perhaps the culmination of Delany's engagement 
with poststructuralism. The novel also revisits the particular field of SF that Delany 
explored in Babel-I 7, namely space opera, as well as one of his most persistent 
themes: the nature of language, and how it structures society and our relation towards 
it. 
The plot of Stars is simple to the point of parody: Delany imagines a galaxy-
spanning structure known as the Federation of Habitable Worlds, which comprises 
about 6 000 planets (1984b:94), and is referred to colloquially as the Web. All the 
worlds are linked by GI or General Information, a sort of galactic Internet that anyone 
can tap into by thought alone. There are two main competing forms of social 
organisation in the Federation, referred to as the Sygn and the Family. In a prologue 
entitled 'A World Apart', Delany recounts the slavery of Rat Korga on the planet 
Rhyonon, the backwardness of which is reflected by the fact that it is not linked to GI. 
Korga also has a learning difficulty, and is subjected to the lobotomising process of 
radical anxiety termination, the acronym of which becomes his name. 14 
14 Like Kid in Dhalgren, this highlights the arbitrary nature of signs, as 'Rat' is not his real name. 
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Just before Rhyonon is destroyed by Cultural Fugue, a term to describe the 
cumulative result of social and political tensions, Korga is rescued by the Web. He 
happens to be the perfect erotic object of one Marq Dyeth, an "industrial diplomat1" 
from the planet Velm, which is affiliated with the Sygn, and becomes a pawn in a 
complex galactic interplay. Damien Broderick succinctly - if rather glibly -
summarises the plot as "boy loses world, boy meets boy, boy loses boy, boy saves 
world" (1995:142). This sounds simple enough, but Martha Bartter points out 
immediate problems that arise. The conventional model of textuality is based on the 
fact that the reader derives the story from what the author tells us, and how he or she 
tells it. Thus we take the template of the text and base it on our own perceived social 
reality: "The better the fit, the better we 'understand' the story, and the more apt we 
are to enjoy it" (1990:327). 
It is precisely this lack of convergence with social reality that led many 
readers to reject Dhalgren as being "essentially implottable" (1990:328). The 
problematic nature of Stars is signposted by its structure: a prologue, a section of 13 
chapters or monologues entitled 'Visible and Invisible Persons Distributed in Space', 
and an epilogue. The "novella-length third-person" (Broderick 1995: 140) prologue 
seems totally adrift from the main body of the text: Rat Korga and his world are 
introduced in great detail, only for him to disappear and re-emerge briefly on the 
periphery of the main events, while the main section does not read like a series of 
monologues, and is narrated in the past tense. 
Key elements of the plot and character motivations are either ignored or left 
open, with the promised second novel of the diptych, entitled The Splendour and 
Misery of Bodies, of Cities, yet to appear (a brief extract was featured in the autumn 
1996 edition of The Review of Contemporary Fiction, at least confirming the 
existence of a sequel). 15 However, Bartter refutes the criticism that "Delany has 
forgotten how to construct a plot, or that his interest in critical theory has irretrievably 
poisoned his writing ability" (1990:328). This speaks for SF readers who are 
frustrated by Delany' s frustration of the conventions of space opera, which are 
unambiguous and far from open-ended. Broderick's initial assessment of the novel 
suggests the best way to approach the text: 
Delany has written a novel as heavily concentrated on recit, on nuanced 
observation of social interaction and its meaning, as any by Jane Austen or 
Thomas Mann. . . . . Stars is a strikingly postmodernist science fiction text, a 
15 Delany comments: "In the rather darker second volume, I hope to show that subversion is more 
apparent than actual - precisely because it is not analysed, because it is not deconstructed" 
(1994a:212). 
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place where the tropes of the other intersect with the tropes of overlay and 
repetition, of pastiche and subversion by rhetorical overkill. (1995:142) 
Bray comments that the Web, "the fictional organisation that oversees the flow 
of information in the galaxy and seems also ~o oversee the evolution of galactic 
civilisation" (1996:153) is an adumbration of the 'web as textus' idea put forward in 
Triton, "signing the fabric upon which text is printed as well as the fibre of which it is 
spun" (Bray 1996:153). When Rat is purchased illegally by a woman to be her slave 
forever, she fits him with a glove-like neural device that bypasses the damage of the 
radical anxiety termination, and enables him to perceive GI as "a web, a text weaving 
endlessly about him" (1984b:53). Thus the Web refers to the social structure of the 
Federation, and the rich informational substructure it is grounded in through GI, 
"brooding like a semiotic oracle over the cultures which employ it and those which 
refuse its service" ( 1984b: 151). An obvious implication of the GI system is that, with 
hegemonic control over the flow of information, the Web defines the very nature of 
social organisation in the Federation, with the bulk of its citizens reading an invisibly 
inscribed text through their lives. The neural device lets Korga partake of this living 
text: 
All sensations, as well as the faintest memories associated with them, 
were given a word and three written versions of it, in syllabics, alphabetics, 
and ideographs, each of which dragged behind it connections, associations, 
resonances .... (Delany 1984b:53) 
This refers to the Derridean concept of 'play', where signification is not 
merely a one-to-one association between signifier and signified, but a constant 
deferring of meaning through difference and contrast. The key to understanding the 
web that the text weaves, and the Web it inscribes, is language, which Marq Dyeth 
notes is mutable under social pressures, as indicated by the fact that the word 'he', for 
example, signifies differently on different worlds. The basic question to gauge the 
differentiation of this signification is: "What's the special meaning of 'he' among the 
women of that part of that world?" (1984b:98). 
Immediately the reader is confused, for Delany seems to have conflated the 
terms of common sexual differentiation. However, just as the Web has two different, 
and competing, forms of social organisation in the Family and the Sygn, so does it 
have two diverging languages. Standard English is the mode of communication for 
those sentient species with two sexes, where the term 'he' indicates patriarchal 
privileging and phallocentrism. But for those societies of the 6 000 worlds of the 
Federation that are alien and/or have more than two sexes, Arachnia is the preferred 
mode of communication, which again suggests that language is like a spider-spun 
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web. The gender convention of Arachnia is that all sentient beings of whatever 
species or gender are 'women', "taking the pronouns 'she' and 'her' except when the 
entity referred to by an individual is an object of 'her' sexual excitement, when 'he' is 
appropriate" (Broderick 1995: 143). The effect of this is "declaring publicly those 
states of personal, intimate desire which our culture treats as private and protected" 
(1995: 143-44). 
Delany has taken the basic structuralist maxim that the relation between 
signifier and signified is arbitrary, and turned it into a poststructuralist play on the 
gender conventions that underpin society as we know it, and which determine the 
hierarchical power structure that privileges the male, and marginalises everything 
outside its ambit. This makes Stars a much more convoluted reading experience than 
Dhalgren, for example, as the surface meaning of the text cannot be taken at face 
value, with the reader having to trace the very fibres of meaning in the web of the 
text. 
Characters called women in Stars are most often not female and 
frequently not humans. Nor can readers automatically envision human males 
in picturing scenes that use the word he. Both new categories demand 
perception and increased attention to text. Without habitual linguistic cues, 
descriptive details provided are not always sufficient for readers to picture a 
character as alien or human, for instance. (Broderick 1995: 154) 
It is clear that language is an area of contestation in the Web, as indicated by 
the following exchange between Korga and Marq Dyeth. Korga has been entangled in 
the Web long enough to realise that his home planet, Rhyonon - indeed a 'world 
apart' as indicated by the title of the prologue - is the exception rather than the norm. 
It is much closer to our own society than the worlds of the Web, and is thus the 
syntagmatic starting point for the SF elucidation of an alternative lifestyle that 
follows. 
'Don't you ever persecute people here for their sex?' 
'Oh no,' I said. 'I mean, I told you, a long time ago, in the north-' 
'The language,' he said. 'That's what I mean.' (Delany 1984b:270) 
The main area of contestation is the division between the Family and the Sygn, 
which are the "two contrasting models for social structure at play in the novel" (Bray 
1996: 15 5). The important word here is 'play', as it suggests the differential interface 
between the two structures. The Family is described as "trying to establish the dream 
of a classic past as pictured on a world that may never even have existed in order to 
achieve cultural stability" (1984b: 112). This world, of course, is Earth, whose 
similarity to Rhyonon has been lost in time, and it has instead been romanticised as 
172 
the cradle of galactic civilisation. By privileging one world over the thousands of 
others in the Web, the Family reveals its focus on logocentric hierarchy. In total 
contrast to this 'closed-system' view, where cultural stability is a hard-fought-for 
victory, and has to be cemented in social structure (and strictures, for stasis is an 
obvious outcome of this view), the Sygn is a dynamic plurality celebrating difference 
wherever it finds it as an enriching medium for growth: 
. . . with the Sygn committed to the living interaction and difference between 
each woman and each world from which the right stability and play may 
flower, in a universe where both information and misinformation are 
constantly suspect, reviewed and drifting as they must be (constantly) by and 
between the two, a moment when either information or misinformation turns 
out to be harmless must bloom, when surrounded by the workings of desire 
and terror, into the offered sign of all about it, making and marking all about it 
innocent by contamination. (Delany 1984b: 112-113) 
This ornately convoluted description is typical of Delany' s prose in Stars, and 
is in total contrast to the heightened realism employed in Dhalgren. It is interesting 
that, just like Derrida's term differance, the Sygn is only discernible as a signifier. Its 
adherents seem to suggest that the model of social organisation it represents is as 
natural and inevitable as meaning flowing from language. The Sygn acknowledges 
that it is not perfect, but neither does it strive to be, for 'misinformation' has its place 
in the scheme of things as an arbiter of difference. This social model is premised on 
the notion that diversity is the very fibre of the relational web that holds it together. 
Of course, the Sygn must have a sign - in keeping with Delany' s postmodern play on 
arbitrary signifiers - and this is the 'cyhnk'. Broderick notes mischievously that 
the Sygn are a kind of poststructuralist religion. Their insignia or floating 
signifier is the 'cyhnk', described variously (what else?) but often having a 
form readable as unity-in-diversity: it is at once a sign, an ankh, the 
synchronic and, not impossibly, the kitchen sink. (1995:149) 
Of course, the meaning or signification of the cyhnk is not as simple as a one-
to-one relation to the Sygn, with there seeming to be as many different cyhnks as 
there are worlds or dogmas - though each version or interpretation adds up to the 
signified totality of the Sygn. 
. . . on many worlds the cyhnk signifies . . . a difference between one cyhnk and 
another. But on other worlds . . . it signified the difference between one cyhnk 
and another, the difference between the myriad kinds of cyhnks that exist on 
myriad worlds, the difference between the myriad dogmas, each one different 
for each different part of each different world, that make up the institution so 
frequently known as the Sygn. (Delany 1984b: 172) 
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'Institution' is a curiously concrete word for as slippery a signified as the Sygn, but 
perhaps it is an indication of the web of meaning it spins that it can embrace such a 
term as well. It is the fate of Korga that, having survived the Cultural Fugue that 
destroyed his (admittedly backward) world, the web of signification that endlessly 
defers the meaning of the Sygn transforms him into the 'living sign' for the 
"possibility of surviving it". The only survivor of an entire world - which, in the 
grand tradition of space opera, is destroyed in a few sentences - Korga literally 
becomes a transcendental signified, a tabula rasa upon which the Sygn can inscribe its 
ongoing clash with the Family, which '"is in the process of creating a schism 
throughout the entire galaxy, concerning just what exactly a woman is"' (1984:249). 
This echoes one of the enduring themes of Dhalgren, namely that of the nature 
of sexuality, and how it is inscribed by gender and social stereotypes. The Thants 
from Zetzor, which represent the Family, criticise Yelm, the home ofMarq Dyeth and 
representative of the Sygn, for its 'licentious' custom of dedicating open 'runs' to 
sexual intercourse for the use of different species. The Family sees this as perversion 
and contamination, in contrast to their "older, purer, human" (Delany 1984b:407) 
way. They fail to see that they are merely buttressing a crumbling status quo that is 
out of keeping with the times (not to mention the very multiplicity of the Federation), 
and are rejecting the rejuvenating force of difference, which binds the strands of the 
Web together, and at the same time keeps them apart so as to make space for the logic 
of the supplement. 
The novel ends inconclusively and abruptly, as there can obviously be no 
resolution to the Family/Sygn schism, as it represents a social dialectic. Our final 
glimpse of Marq Dyeth is on a colony ship en route to some nameless destination. The 
one certainty that he does glimpse ever so briefly is the endless play of the signified 
universe, whereby "to leave one part of a world in order to visit another is to indulge 
in a transformation of signs, their appearances, their meanings". Marq Dyeth has been 
touched by the transformative power of difference, and contemplates the symbolism 
of renewal and deferral of meaning associated with leaving a world at dawn: 
But to leave a world, and to leave it at dawn, thus delaying all possibility of 
what one might learn in a day, is to experience precisely the problematics of that 
identity at its most intense: to see that identity shatter, fragment, and to realise 
that its solidity was always an illusion, and that infinite spaces between those 
referential shards are more opaque to direct human apprehension than all the 
star-flooded vacuum. (Delany 1984b:45 l) 
Marq Dyeth realises that identity is as much a construct as the W eh itself and, 
even though Korga was found to be his perfect erotic object "'out to about seven 
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decimal places"' (1984b:225), he is still unable to piece together the "referential 
shards" that make up his identity due to the "infinite spaces" between them, which is 
the significatory space where dif.ferance endlessly defers meaning. Marq Dyeth 
contemplates the nature of meaning, which is an accumulative process of shifts, 
displacements, and uncertainties (1984b:53). For example, he takes the metaphor of 
'dawn rising', and the immediate associative image it evokes. But the planet Klyvos 
"keeps a single face towards its sun and is therefore surrounded by an unmoving band 
of half-light", while its human inhabitants refer to the symbol of chyani as the planet's 
"eternal circle of morning" (1984b:461): 
... it serves as a metaphor for chaos, for violence leading to no end, for Cultural 
Fugue itself - not so much destruction ending in death, but rather the perpetual 
and unremitting destruction of both nature and intelligence run wild and without 
focus, where anything so trivial and natural as either death or birth is irrelevant. 
(Delany 1984b:461) 
This concept is similar to that of 'ekpyrosis' in The Mad Man, the "Heraclitean 
notion of change and flux raised to such a level beyond flux or rage that nothing can 
escape it, that no man's or woman's flow can quench it" (Delany 1994b:480). It is 
from the dry flint of chyani or ekpyrosis that signification strikes the spark of 
meaning. While bemoaning the fact that this realisation has robbed his own world of 
its uniquely-perceived particularity, Marq Dyeth' s vision of the universe embraces the 
full implication of the philosophy of the Sygn: a celebration of total difference and 
absence of centredness or structured meaning. The supplement to this is that the 
Family, represented by the Thants, wishes to prevent the Web from realising its true 
potential. And poised between these opposing dialectical tensions is the embryonic 
relationship between Korga and Marq Dyeth, which gives new meaning to the phrase 
'star-crossed lovers' .16 The novel ends with an affirmation of the infinitude and 
richness of the universe, implying the process of signification itself: 
. . . can you know anything about my home, my world, the universe in which I 
live? It's a beautiful universe ... wondrous and the more exciting because no 
one has written plays and poems and built sculptures to indicate the structure of 
desire I negotiate every day as I move about in it. It's a universe where hands 
and faces are all luminous, all attractive, all open for infinite contemplation ... 
(Delany 1984b:455) 
It is assumed that a social structure such as the Federation must have a centre or 
point of origin, with the Family focusing on an idealised Earth as their significatory 
anchor point. But the alternative name for the Federation, the Web, suggests that there 
16 Though not exactly the kind that Shakespeare had in mind. 
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might not be a centre at all, with the structure held together simply by the tension 
between its various components. 'Structure' and 'centre' are key concepts in both 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, and need to be examined further. Derrida 
writes of the 'rupture' or 'redoubling' that occurred in Western philosophical thought 
when the concept of the "structurality of structure" came into play (1978:279). When 
it became generally understood that language itself was a structure, it became possible 
to conceive of the idea of structure itself, and how all systems are structured (Klages 
1999). This was the instant when "philosophers began to see their philosophical 
systems not as absolute truth, but as systems, as constructs, as structures" (1999). 
Derrida points out that any structure has a centre, as this is what holds it 
together, and organises it, as a cohesive and coherent system (Derrida 1978:278). The 
centre is the crucial component of any structure, as it represents the point where 
nothing further can be substituted (Klages 1999). However, the centre also "closes off 
the play which it opens up and makes possible" (Derrida 1978:279): 
The function of this centre [is] not only to orient, balance, and organise the 
structure - one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganised structure - but above 
all to make sure that the organising principle of the structure would limit what 
we might call the play of the structure. (Derrida 1978:278) 
'Play' is anathema to structure because it replaces solid foundations with 
linguistic quicksand. The centre is seen to organise the coherence of a particular 
system so as to "permit the play of its elements inside the total form" (Derrida 
1978 :279) - that is, to harness or control the degree of play, which is unescapable as 
the supplement of structure. However, the "permutation or the transformation of 
elements" is not allowed at the centre, as this would dilute its essence and render it 
ambiguous, and therefore contradict the very notion of structure itself This means 
that the centre enjoys a privileged position in structurality, as it is "that very thing 
within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality" (Derrida 
1978:278). The implication is, paradoxically, that the centre is simultaneously inside 
and outside the structure, requiring a shift of perspective like the Necker cube which 
Steiner uses to explain the circularity of Dhalgren' s plot. 
The centre is at the centre of the totality, and yet, since the centre does not 
belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its centre 
elsewhere. The centre is not the centre. (Derrida 1978:279) 
Both Kid, who wonders where the centre of Bellona is, and Marq Dyeth, who 
comes to the realisation that the privileged centre of his existence, his home world, is 
but one of 6 000 planets in the totality of the Web, assimilate this fundamental 
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postmodern realisation: that the concept of a centred structure 1s inherently 
incoherent, or "contradictorily coherent" (1978:279). 
The concept of centred structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a 
fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental 
immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of play. 
And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is 
invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being 
caught in the game, of being as it were at stake in the game from the outset. 
(Derrida 1978 :279) 
This play, this game, is the decentred essence of both Bellona and the Web, 
which means that the very concept of structure has to be redefined "as a series of 
substitutions of centre for centre, as a linked chain of determinations of the centre" 
(1978:279). Like dif.ferance, the centre is not a fixed location, but should rather be 
perceived of as a function or a process, "a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite 
number of sign substitutions came into play" (1978:280). Derrida marks this moment 
as the instant when "language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, 
in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse" ( 197~ :280 ), and is 
. . . a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental 
signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The 
absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely. (Derrida 1978:280) 
The 'transcendental signified' is the "ultimate source of meaning, which 
cannot be represented (or substituted) by any adequate signifier" (Klages 1999). An 
example is God: some religions have no written or spoken name for God, and yet God 
is the ultimate referent of all signifiers in this regard, as He created the system. 
Another example is an author, which represents the ultimate organising principle of a 
text. How, then, does one think about systems and centres without falling into the 
same trap of making a new system with its own centre? Both Dhalgren and Stars 
present a postmodern answer to this problem: the systems they circumscribe -
namely, the city of Bellona and the Web of the Federation - have no really discernible 
centres, and even where these might be located are thrown into doubt and 
ambiguity. 17 
The crucial problem is that any particular system cannot be discussed without 
using its own particular terms of reference. For example, one might take the concept 
of the sign: the only way that it can be claimed that any semiotic system lacks a 
transcendental signified, implying that all signs have free play or infinite ranges of 
17 This is seen in the absence of any government structures or officials in the Web. 
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meaning, is to use the word 'sign', which does, indeed, have a fixed meaning. "And 
then you are back in the system you are trying to 'deconstruct'" (Klages 1999). 
As an example of such a rupture in the contiguity of the perception of 
structure, Derrida points to Levi-Strauss's discovery that incest is a universal 
prohibition in that every culture has such a prohibition, but it is also specific in that 
every culture defines this prohibition on its own terms. "So how can something be 
both universal and particular, nature and culture?" questions Klages (1999). She says 
that this is the "heart of deconstruction": 
. . . deconstruction looks for binary pairs of oppositions - things that are 
supposed to stay neatly on their own side of a slash. Then they look for places, 
or examples, where something disrupts that neat slash - something that fits on 
both sides ... (1999) 
As soon as this happens, it is possible to deconstruct a system. Structure depends on 
binary oppositions for stability, and, if these are challenged, then it puts into play all 
the elements of the system (1999). This opens up two courses of action: first, one can 
jettison the entire structure as being fatally flawed, or one can attempt to reconstitute 
the structure without any inconsistencies. But Derrida has already shown that this 
essentially means "substituting one centre for another", and therefore is not a 
workable option. The second course of action is to "keep using the structure, but to 
recognise that it is flawed" (1999). This means no longer applying a 'truth value' to a 
structure or system, but seeing a particular system as a construct focused on a central 
idea holding it together (Derrida 1978:284). Derrida uses Levi-Strauss's terms of 
bricolage (the method) and bricoleur (the person doing it): 
The bricoleur ... is someone who uses 'the means at hand', that is, the 
instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already 
there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation 
for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt 
them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try 
several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogeneous -
and so forth. There is therefore a critical language in the form of bricolage, 
and it has even been said that bricolage is critical language itself (1978:285)18 
18 Delany notes: "The French bricoleur is a figure who is not really a part of the American landscape. 
The closest translation we can make is 'handyman.' But he is also a plumber, a carpenter, and an 
electrical repairman as well. His job is to solve whatever problems arise. His tools are available 
materials. The engineer takes a problem and, applying overarching principles to it, works down to the 
specific, well-formed solution. Contrastingly, the bricoleur starts with the local problem, solves one 
part, then the next, until often rather quirky, Rube-Goldberg-style structures arise, which nevertheless 
can be both stable and efficient" (1999:152). 
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Delany himself can be seen as a bricoleur, as he is not interested in reifying 
the concept of the system itself, but in understanding how the different elements 
signify the totality of a particular system. This system, of course, is SF, and the 
elements itself are its generic themes and tropes. On a more fundamental level, this 
takes Delany to the very organisation of language itself, producing a complex 
bricolage or discourse of literary theory and generic dissection. Opposed to the 
bricoleur is the concept of the engineer. Whereas the former does not subscribe to the 
notion of absolute truth, and is only concerned with the coherency of systems, the 
latter is only interested in stable systems that have little or no play, and considers him-
or herself as the centre of his or her own particular discourse (Klages 1999). Derrida 
argues that the engineer "is a myth produced by the bricoleur", and that "every finite 
discourse is bound by a certain bricolage" (1978:285). 
The engineer can be said to be an expression of the idea of totalisation, which 
is the desire "to have a system, a theory, a philosophy, that explains everything", such 
as the Puritan belief that God is at the centre of the universe (Klages 1999). Derrida 
argues that this is impossible, simply because any single system may have too many 
divergent elements to account for. The fact that all the disparate elements cannot be 
fixed and measured means that there is too much play in the system for totalisation to 
be possible: 
If totalisation no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a 
field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the 
nature of the field - that is, language and a finite language - excludes 
totalisation. This field is in effect that of play ... . (Derrida 1978:289) 
This 'play' becomes infinite in the absence of a centre, and is limited or 
eliminated in its presence. This is the divide between which all systems fall, leading 
Derrida to highlight the concept of the supplementarity of the centre. The sign which 
replaces the centre in its absence is added as a supplement or a surplus, and therefore 
prevents totalisation, because it is an undecidable element: 
... this movement of play, permitted by the lack or absence of a centre or 
origin, is the movement of supplementarity. One cannot determine the centre 
and exhaust totalisation because the sign which replaces the centre, which 
supplements it, taking the centre's place in its absence - this sign is added, 
occurs as a surplus, as a supplement. (Derrida 1978:289) 
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Derrida adds that "the overabundance of the signifier, its supplementary 
character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must 
be supplemented' (1978:290). This leads to a tension between play and presence, with 
the latter defined as the stability or fixity emanating from the centre. Something can 
be said to be fully present when it is stable or fixed, as opposed to being provisional 
or mobile, with the concept of play signifying the disruption of presence (Klages 
1999). The idea of play can be approached with a nostalgic mourning for the loss of 
the fixity of meaning, and a longing to return to simple beliefs like God being at the 
centre of the universe (or the Author at the centre of a text). "Or you can play along, 
rejoice in multiplicity and affirm the provisional nature of all meaning" (1999): 
. . . the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of 
becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and 
without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. (Derrida 1978:292) 
In 'Omegahelm', a short story written in 1973, Delany adds substance to 
V ondramach, an important historical figure in Stars, which, of course, was published 
in 1984 - signifying a gap of 11 years between the two. The short story contains 
important details elaborated upon in Stars, such as nurture streams, primary and 
secondary jobs, the concept of the family, and sygns and cyhnks: 
'It is only a sygn, Vondra,' Gylda said, as one repeats the obvious to 
one who has rejected it long ago. 'A signifier, they used to say, whose 
meaning - whose signified - shifts from place to place, world to world, person 
to person.' (199lb:317) 
'Omegahelm' serves to disrupt the reader's perception of Stars as a coherent totality 
functioning within, and defined by, its own particular discourse. The short story, in 
effect, displaces the novel as being the centre of its own discourse, for it is a 
supplement. It reveals Stars as being part of a process of discourse, and not as a 
hermeneutically-sealed entity conceived of, and bound by, the covers of a single 
book. And this process of discourse is ongoing, moving both backwards and forwards 
in an endless chain of signification, where the separate links are the books, stories, 
and other media, forming the chain of the author's career. Both Dhalgren and Stars 
are part of the same discourse, helping, in tum, to decentre the author himself as the 
transcendental signified of his own work. This is Delany' s truly postmodern 
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affirmation: a rejection of totality as the essence of sterile stability, and the rejection 
of the centre as the anchor of that stability. And as Derrida states, this must not be 
mourned as a loss of transcendental meaning, but as a joyous acceptance of active 
interpretation. 
Chapter Five 
Writers and Lovers 
In April 1998, Delany was awarded the University of Massachusetts's (UMass's) 
Chancellor's Medal, "the highest campus honour bestowed on individuals who have 
rendered exemplary and extraordinary service to the university" (Beeber 1999). Carey 
Goldberg remarks that "it is one more stranger-than-truth" aspect of Delany's life 
that, though he dropped out of college after a single semester, he was a tenured 
professor at UMass, as well as being acting head of the comparative literature 
department for two terms (Beeber 1999). The presentation of the award at the 
university's Distinguished Faculty Lecture Series, where Delany delivered an address 
entitled 'An Inquiry into Some Modes of Urban Sociality' (Beeber 1999), marked an 
extraordinary point in his career to date. 
Commenting on the recessionary state of the American publishing industry, 
Goldberg points out that, despite having two Hugo and four Nebula awards under his 
belt - SF's highest honours - and having inspired "a small secondary industry of 
books by others who interpret his work" (1999), 1 Delany was still unable to make 
ends meet as a writer. Beeber explains that Delany was a victim of the radical 
downsizing of the American publishing industry in the 1980s, which saw twelve of 
the author's novels - in print for 20 years - "dropped like dead wood" (1999), with 
the number of publishers in New York City declining from 79 in 1980 to only about 
fifteen at present. 
Living in a rundown apartment in urgent need of painting, Delany commuted 
by bus to Amherst, where he taught comparative literature for three days a week 
(Beeber 1999).2 Beeber quotes Delany as stating that, in 1988, when he became "a 
casualty of publishing flatliners", he was "'very generously and graciously pursued'" 
by UMass, which "called looking for someone with his teaching credentials, 
publishing record and a vita full of critical writings" (1999). Since then the academic 
press, most notably the Wesleyan University Press, has reissued the bulk of Delany's 
work, beginning in 1996 and including new essay and fiction collections (1999). 
Writing in The New York Times in 1996, Goldberg commented that, "rescued by 
enthusiastic new publishers, [Delany] appears poised for a resurgence" (1999): 
1 Goldberg quotes Delany: "'I have what I call my 'Delany five-and-a-half-inch bookshelf' of books 
about me .... Those and $1,50 will get you a ride on the New York City subway'" (1999). 
2 A synopsis ofDelany's latest book, 1984, on Amazon.com notes that the author currently has a 
professorship in English at the University of Buffalo, New York. 
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Even as his science fiction undergoes something of a renaissance, 
though, Delany is moving away from that genre . . . focusing more lately on 
historical fiction, essays and criticism. 
"When you live in interesting times, you tend to write about what's 
going on," he said. (Beeber 1999) 
Goldberg also noted Delany' s foray into "what one critic called 'promiscuous 
autobiographising'" (1999), referring to The Motion of Light in Water, published in 
1990, and winner of the Hugo award for best non-fiction title of the year. Despite 
Delany' s contention that the times he lived in were interesting enough to write about, 
his autobiography's subtitle, 'East Village Sex and Science Fiction Writing: 1960-
1965',3 centred on a pre-HIV/AIDS world, celebrating the bacchanalian element in 
his life, and exhorting society literally to seize the day. Given his penchant for 
including autobiographical elements in his writing,4 The Mad Man (1994) however 
contained the following purposeful disclaimer: 
The Mad Man is a work of fiction - and fairly imaginative fiction at that. No 
character, major or minor, is intended to represent any actual person, living or 
dead. (Correspondences are not only coincidental but preposterous). Nor are 
any of its scenes laid anywhere representing actual establishments or 
institutions. (Delany l 994b:xiii) 
This apparent contradiction between 'promiscuous' autobiographising on the 
one hand, and uncharacteristic and puzzling reticence on the other, points to a larger 
contestatory margin that Delany is operating in at present. He is being showered with 
praise by academia, with a noted critic of his work, David Samuelson of California 
State University, hailing Delany as the James Joyce of science fiction, while yet 
another scholar has referred to him as "'America's answer to Michel Foucault"' 
(Goldberg 1999). However, Capper Nichols points out that, not only has Delany's 
audience becoming increasingly specialised, but that it is shrinking (1996:149). 
Goldberg remarks that Delany' s recent output, such as The Mad Man and Bread and 
Wine, "go so deeply into the kinkiest of sex that even his most devoted fans slam 
them closed" (1999). Nichols articulates the crux of the debate: 
However, is my interest in and fascination . . . the interest and 
fascination of a graduate student in literature - a symptom of a shrinking and 
3 The Arbor House/William Morrow edition of 1988 was subtitled 'Sex and Science Fiction Writing in 
the East Village 1957-1965', while the revised Paladin edition of 1990 saw the dates in the subtitle 
changed to ' 1960-1965'. It is unclear what prompted Delany to revise the text. 
4 But is autobiography a transparent medium giving an uninterrupted view of the writer's thoughts and 
intentions? Despite Delany's candour, for example, the reader never really gets close to the truth of 
why he separated from Marilyn Hacker, or how he 'came out'. Perhaps this is because the story 
becomes refracted and opaque, like the motion of light in water. 
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specialised audience for Delany' s work? Does his more recent work appeal 
only to those who, like me, are part of academia? For some readers it seems 
the answer to these questions is yes. Over the last couple of years - at an SF 
convention in Minneapolis, an academic conference in Riverside, California, 
and at various bookstores - I've heard again and again that Delany' s earlier 
work was 'real' SF, that this stuff he's been doing for the last ten years or so 
... is just some kind of academese, that he's been corrupted by his time spent 
working at various universities and has gone off the intellectual deep end, that 
his work is unreadable, too experimental, too theory-laden, too inaccessible. 
(1996: 149) 
In this chapter I will attempt to show that, far from having gone off the deep 
end, works such as The Motion of Light in Water and The Mad Man are an integral 
component of Delany' s artistic output, and are indeed extensions and amplifications 
of some of the themes and issues raised in his SF and fantasy novels. I believe that the 
fact that there is such disparity at present between Delany' s critical and popular 
reception indicates "an audience wanting an artist to produce more of the same kind 
of work, resisting any change in direction" (Nichols 1996: 149). Nichols says this 
points to a lack of discernment or maybe even sophistication on the part of Delany' s 
reading audience (1996:150). For example, readers were taken aback when he 
seemingly abandoned SF and resorted to sword-and-sorcery in the Neveryon series, 
but failed to realise that the strong structuralist and poststructuralist concerns voiced 
in this series could be traced back to Delany' s first novels. 
Nichols writes approvingly of Delany' s increasing tendency to "insert himself 
into his narratives", as this "involves very self-conscious and explicit discussions of 
the process of making fiction, of making meaning", as well as focusing on the 
minutiae of his own life (1996:150). However, readers in general disagree, arguing 
that Delany's oeuvre has become "too (lengthily) autobiographical, that he's given up 
fiction" (1996:150). Nichols concedes this point, stating that the Neveryon books, for 
example, "don't inscribe transparent, modernist fictional narratives" (1996: 150). But 
the reason for this is simply that much of Delany' s recent writing "is explicitly not 
fiction" (1996:150), with him instead producing writings "that are documents of their 
times" (1996: 150). The basis of these writings are depictions of sexualities that hint at 
"a transformation in terms of the possibilities of sex" (1996: 151).5 
5 Nichols states that, in terms of Delany and sex, lots of images come to mind: "In Dhalgren, Kid and 
Denny and Lanya having sex in their loft bed; in Stars in my Pocket like Grains of Sand, Rat Korga and 
Marq Dyeth (each the other's perfect erotic object) visiting the 'runs' on Velm; in The Motion of Light 
in Water, Delany as a young man visiting St Marks Baths for the first time, seeing an 'undulating mass 
of naked, male bodies, spread wall to wall'; in The Tale of Dragons and Dreamers, the lovers Gorgik 
and Small Sarg, one of whom must wear the iron slave collar, 'a symbolic distinction between slave 
and master ... necessary to desire's consummation'; in The Tale of Rumour and Desire, Clodon's foot 
and hand fetish; in The Tale of Plagues and Carnivals, Delany's matter-of-fact statement that between 
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In Delany' s work sexuality is always plural, but alternatives are not inscribed 
as perverse or concealed. On the contrary, what is striking to me about the 
various sexualities in Delany' s work is their ordinariness. That attitude, that 
demystification of sex, is what I find so appealing. (Nichols 1996:151) 
Autobiography seems the perfect format for Delany to practise his role as a 
commentator of his times, by using discourse about his own life as a canvas to paint 
broader themes about changing social mores. Robert Smith notes that autobiography 
is a contested genre, just like SF and sword-and-sorcery, and thus it continues the 
theme of Delany working in the margin of literature to articulate marginal concerns -
in other words, occupying "that margin as a site on intervention" (1995:61). Another 
reason why the autobiographical format surely proved so attractive to Delany is the 
opportunity it offers to dismantle the autobiographical subject in linguistic terms. 
To represent itself in order to constitute itself, the autobiographical subject 
needs a means of representation, a language in short. And soon as language 
becomes an issue for autobiographical theory, any last footing 'the 
autobiographical subject' may have had gives way. (Smith 1995 :58) 
This means that, although the very nature of autobiography seems to privilege 
the centred subject, it raises larger questions about representation and language 
function that paradoxically decentre the subject. Thus Delany' s strategy in The 
Motion of Light and Water is to reveal as much as he obscures, "for the bone of 
contention is the subject or self and whether it is whole, or fragmented; self-
determining, or wrought with political and conceptual barbs" (1995:57). As Leigh 
Gilmore stresses, the issue is how the self is constructed in autobiography "by 
questioning the methodologies that produce and reproduce its cultural identity" 
(1994:5). Sidonie Smith warns, however, that the material body itself cannot be 
ignored when discussing matters of the self as subject. Thus Delany' s pursuit of 
matters of the flesh can also be seen to centre the autobiographical subject in its true 
locus: the body itself. Smith speculates: 
We may even speculate that subjectivity is the elaborate residue of the border 
politics of the body since bodies locate us topographically, temporally, 
socioculturally as well as linguistically in a series of transcodings along 
multiple axes of meaning. (1994:3) 
1977 and 1983 he averaged 300 sexual contacts a year, mostly at particular movie houses, public 
bathrooms, and other places men would meet for anonymous sex" (1996: 151 ). 
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In his autobiography, Delany writes how he had been informed of a particular 
cruising spot, which he visited, only to find that it bore no resemblance to its 
description. 
I went once to the docks, stood across the street, under the street lamp, 
watching the trucks almost twenty minutes - and saw nothing of the mass 
orgies Simon had described. Now and then, a lone man in jeans wandered 
across to disappear among the parked vehicles - some driver checking his 
van? 
But that was all. 
"No," Simon told me the next afternoon, "you have to cross over and 
walk around between them. And you still probably won't see much." 
"Isn't that kind of scary?" I asked. 
"You got it,'' Simon said. 
A few nights later, I went back. And crossed over. (1990:192) 
James Sallis notes that "borders, of course, are both boundary and frontier" (1996:94). 
Delany' s simple act of crossing the street to the side of the trucks is a symbol of his 
career and life - of confronting boundaries and crossing them. But, as Sallis points 
out, the act of transgression is only one side of the coin, with transformation being the 
other. Just as a boundary imposes limitations, so does it define possibilities. In his 
autobiography Delany deals with the issue of boundaries in terms of his relationship 
with Marilyn Hacker - of what they could do and could not do, as well as their mutual 
transgression. He recounts how, when he and Marilyn were involved with a character 
simply named Bob, he went cruising for sex, impelled by curiosity at what the 
experience would be like beyond the boundary of their three-way relationship. 
The man that Delany eventually picks up reveals that he himself has been 
involved in a three-way relationship. Delany states that this random and unexpected 
doubling of his own experience had the effect of altering it into a "socially shared" 
one, albeit only between two people. He does not tell the man about his own 
involvement in a similar set-up as he feels that, even though they have been sexually 
intimate, there is a boundary between them due to his inability to communicate his 
own feelings. Delany locates this inability in the functioning of language itself, as a 
problem of articulation and definition. 
At the same time this doubling had placed between this man and me a 
boundary, a silence, which, while saliva, semen, and perspiration had crossed 
it back and forth, I'd been barely able to penetrate with a sympathetic cliche 
and my name. 
Already I'd decided there was little point in telling Bob and Marilyn 
about him. It wasn't something current; it was something that had been and 
was over. (Perhaps a week later I changed my mind; their response was merely 
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interest). Now the boundary seemed primarily to halt a certain order of 
language. 
At the same time I was the boundary, the place where language stalled. 
(1990 :408-9) 
However, Delany notes that the articulation of boundaries is the first step in 
transforming them into frontiers. He uses the incident of the anonymous man 
randomly doubling his own life as a metaphor for the relationship between a writer 
and his audience, where the former transmutes his own experience into a "socially 
shared" reality for the latter. Thus the act of writing itself transgresses or displaces the 
boundary between the writer and his audience, creating an intimate space in a flux of 
discourse where the two can, however briefly, converge. 
Those silences, those boundaries, were the gaps between the columns. 
Yet even to conceive of them, to articulate them, to tell the story of 
their creation, constitution, or persistence, even to yourself - wasn't that to 
begin to displace them? To speak, to write - wasn't that to break the boundary 
of the self and let your hearer, your reader become the boundary instead of 
you . . . but a boundary so much easier to cross now because she or he has been 
written to, spoken to? (1990:409-10) 
David Samuelson notes that the marginality of SF as a literary genre becomes 
for Delany a crucial link with the "marginality of the deprived" (1994:34). "In a 
marginal genre, ruled by commercial concerns, Delany himself occupies a marginal 
position, as a gay black man driven by feminist, linguistic, and Marxist concerns" 
(1994:34). Delany, who is sufficiently light-skinned to be labelled as white, articulates 
a similar idea in his autobiography: 
So, I thought, you are neither black nor white. 
You are neither male nor female. 
And you are that most ambiguous of citizens, the writer. 
There was something at once very satisfying and very sad, placing 
myself at this pivotal suspension. It seemed, in the park at dawn, a kind of 
revelation - a kind of centre, formed of a play of ambiguities, from which I 
might move in any direction. (1990:92) 
From a literary and social point of view it might seem relatively simple to 
impute a direction to the path that Delany has pursued in his professional and private 
life by commenting on his 'struggle' about 'coming to terms' with being black, gay, a 
writer, and an academic - and having being a child prodigy, to boot (Lunde 
1996:116). 'Struggle' is an ideologically fashionable term that lumps all the marginal 
aspects of Delany' s character under the conveniently unitary banner of contestation. 
The danger of this is that it oversimplifies the discourse, and seeks to impose 
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analytical conformity on what is fruitful anarchy.6 Delany is not admitting 
indecisiveness or prevarication by stating that his marginality meant he could "move 
in any direction". This should rather be seen as a prescient acknowledgement of the 
potentiality offered by that marginality, which is not a liability or a burden, as Lunde 
seems to imply. 
Samuelson notes that Delany' s engagement with the marginal is not confined 
to the safe margin of his writing, but that he has often lived in dilapidated urban 
neighbourhoods in order to view society from its underbelly. However, this 
explanation "seems an after-the-fact rationalisation, too cerebral to be real, which 
begs more than it explains" (Samuelson 1994:35). It is apparent from Delany's 
autobiography that he "seems to crave a degree of danger in his life" (Samuelson 
1994:35). 
The friends, acquaintances, and passersby that drift through the pages of his 
autobiography include petty criminals, underappreciated artists, historical personages 
such as Albert Einstein and WH Auden, and an oddball assortment of deviants and 
perverts, with Delany himself sensitised to such marginal categories by having 
undergone voluntary psychotherapy in 1964 to in order to cope with what amounted 
to, but is never stated as, a nervous breakdown. This leads Samuelson to conclude that 
Delany has always "criticised establishment rules and attitudes more by practice than 
by preaching", as "acts of transgression, if not outright criminality", are the inevitable 
outcome of crossing or transcending boundaries (1994:35): 
Delany transgresses social and literary codes in several related ways. A 
writer on the racial and sexual margins of a predominantly white, heterosexual 
society, he provides a role model for readers otherwise disenfranchised. His 
art provides examples of individuals and whole societies celebrating cultural 
(including 'racial' and sexual) diversity. As both fiction-writer and critic, he 
has helped to expand literary boundaries to embrace the paraliterary, as well as 
to transform the boundaries of SF itself (Samuelson 1994:36) 
The portrait of Delany that I have painted so far seems inclusive and resonant, 
encompassed by the boundary of its own representation. But to attempt to understand 
Delany's critical project, it is vital to cross a boundary, and ask a question that no one 
- least of all the writer himself - might be able to answer: who is Samuel R Delany? 
An answer implies the hierarchical imposition of an ultimate meaning. It is the 
uniqueness of a name combined with our society's belief in a determinate, 
circumscribed identity which implies that such a question can indeed be answered. It 
6 Lunde goes even further: "Delany attempts to come to terms with these facts about himself by 
working them out, directly and indirectly, in his art. And that art provides templates upon which we can 
assess our own efforts toward self-knowledge and self-acceptance" (1996: 124). 
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cannot by definition be answered because this would stop the play of signification 
dead in its tracks, and conflate the border and frontier encompassed by a boundary 
into an unyielding brick wall. In his life and his work, Delany has always resisted 
closure, and the more he seems to reveal of himself, of who he actually is, the further 
and faster he spins away from the reader's grasp, in a motion as fleeting and dazzling 
as that oflight in water. 
It is revealing to compare the markedly different author photographs used 
throughout Delany's career. Taken together, they suggest that his literary persona is 
not a unitary construct, but is composed of many different facets. The photographs 
also reveal that Delany does influence readers' perceptions of himself by 
manipulating his own image. The photograph used in Twentieth-Century American 
Science-Fiction Writers (1981) shows a bearded Delany dressed respectably in a 
jacket and tie, smiling confidently at the camera - and, by implication, directly at the 
viewer. It is a strikingly handsome photograph, and conveys some of the energy and 
magnetism of a gifted young writer with a blossoming career. The cover photograph 
used in the Paladin edition of Delany' s autobiography, taken by Bernard Kay in 1961, 
is of a Bohemian young writer, shirtless and strumming a guitar, staring seductively at 
the camera. Gone are the jacket, tie and beard. This is a provocative image of the 
writer as sex object, just as the text is an object of consumption for the reader. 
In total contrast, the photograph used in The Review of Contemporary Fiction 
presents an older Delany wearing glasses and smiling impishly at the camera, and 
sporting a full beard that makes him look like a Biblical figure. He is wearing what 
looks like a casual denim shirt, with one sleeve rolled up to reveal an intricate tattoo. 
The first photograph seems more like the conventional image of a professor of 
comparative literature at UMass, while here Delany looks like one of the truck drivers 
or dock workers that feature in his autobiography. Another recent photograph, used on 
the back cover flap of Hogg (1994), shows Delany-with a radically trimmed beard -
striking what can be only be described as a somewhat camp pose, throwing a hand up 
towards a backdrop of stars. The earnest young man, the bohemian, the brooding 
edifice, the poseur - these are all equally valid images of Delany, and reveal the 
complex refraction of his literary persona. 7 
7 Peplow and Bravard provide the following fascinating description of the young Delany's life: "It is 
easy to regard Delany as a sort of Artist as a Young Man during the 1960s. Something of a flower 
child, Delany lived a gypsy life, moving restlessly from apartment to apartment, city to city, country to 
country. He was very much of 'the bohemias of New York', to borrow a phrase from Thomas Disch, 
mixing easily with the art, music, theatre, and literature crowds in Greenwich Village and elsewhere. 
He even looked the part: colourful clothes, full beard, a single earring worn constantly from 1967 
through 1975" (1980: 19). 
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Aged 57 (in 2000), Delany published his first novel, namely The Jewels of 
Aptor, in 1962, aged 20. His latest published works include Shorter Views: Queer 
Thoughts and the Politics of the Paraliterary (1999), and the graphic novel Bread and 
Wine: An Erotic Tale of New York City (1999), illustrated by Mia Wolff This portrays 
his relationship with Dennis Rickett, who sold books from a blanket on West 72nd 
Street for many years before they met (Goldberg 1999, Seligman 1999).8 In a review 
of the book, Craig Seligman comments that what held him "truly spellbound, and a 
little horrified, was the outlandish exhibitionism of it all" (1999). Noting the social 
realism of the text, he adds that 
Delany probably couldn't rise to this level of conviction if he weren't such an 
exhibitionist. Of course, most writers are, on some level - writing is 
performance, after all - just as readers are, by definition, voyeurs. But he's 
more flamboyant than most of us, both on the page and off With his regal 
bearing, his portly stature, his dapper cane and his colossal white beard, he 
must have cut quite a figure in the porn palaces [of Times Square]. Despite his 
(uncharacteristic and unconvincing) assertion that 'a certain reticence is 
appropriate when discussing if, he doesn't shy away from letting us know that 
'on a scale of small, medium, and large I fall directly on the border line 
between the latter two.' That's nice. (Seligman 1999) 
Seligman' s point is that this conveys more information than he needed - that 
1s, the novel transgresses the boundary between the reader's expectations of the 
author, and the author's expectations of his readers. In this case, Seligman feels that it 
goes beyond the normal bounds of explicitness into the more shadowy realm of the 
private and the personal. But then he begins to question the reasons for this, and 
acknowledges that Delany "had the power to make me step back and examine my 
own discomfort" (1999): 
What bothers me about it? Obviously not the explicitness, which I like in 
pornography. The level of personal exposure? Maybe - but I seem to feel a lot 
more embarrassed for Delany and Dennis than they do for themselves. Why 
should I care? Partly, I imagine, because I had to face some of the same issues 
Delany had to in writing . . . How much do I want to reveal about myself to a 
bunch of anonymous readers? (Seligman 1999) 
Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (1999) continues this theme of 
Delany' s incessant self-exploration, and weaves together personal reminiscences and 
theoretical speculation to provide a social history of late twentieth-century Times 
8 Dennis is not mentioned by surname in Bread and Wine, though he was mentioned in a feature story 
on Delany in The New York Times in 1996 by Carey Goldberg. Interestingly, in Hogg Delany notes his 
gratitude "to Dennis Rickett for his contribution of the cover illustration and ornaments" (1994). 
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Square in New York, focusing on the area's porn-theatre and sex-club district, which 
has since been 'gentrified'. 9 Seligman says that though "Delany has worked in many 
genres, most notably science fiction, he's also an ebullient memoirist and an erudite 
essayist" (1999). The Publisher's Weekly review of this book notes that "acclaimed 
SF writer Delany . . . proves himself a dazzlingly eloquent and original social 
commentator". 
Indeed, with the only sign of Delany' s continued activity in SF being an 
extract from the unpublished The Splendour and Misery of Bodies, Of Cities 
appearing in a 1996 edition of The Review of Contemporary Fiction, one can be 
forgiven for thinking that the 'acclaimed SF writer' has become nothing more than an 
'original social commentator'. But it is rash to draw conclusions about the direction 
Delany' s present interests will take him in, or what he will produce next. James Sallis 
remarks that: 
As one looks back on thirty-plus years of work, it becomes clear that all along 
Delany has searched for some ideal form, some mode of writing at once true 
and imagined, real and fictive, that might encompass it all, that might be able 
to contain the world's multifarious leanings, vectors, veerings, and 
prevarications. ( 1996: 95) 
Michael Hemmingson comments that Delany is "an enigma of literature" in 
that he is both a "serious writer and author of pornography" (1996: 127). He argues 
that anyone encountering Delany's work "must question this duality" (1996: 127). 
Hernrningson is referring in particular to Hogg (1994), and says that some will no 
doubt wonder why Delany has chosen to be associated with this work, or not opted 
instead for a pseudonym, or why even he has pursued publication at all of what, he 
implies, is such a thoroughly reprehensible book. Hernrningson argues that "Hogg 
may very well be the most vile, disgusting personality to emerge from contemporary 
American fiction" ( 1996: 126), as the following description from the book proves: 
"They call me Hogg 'cause a hog lives dirty. I don't wash none. And when I 
get hungry, I eat my own snot. I been wearin' these clothes since winter. I 
don't even take my dick out my pants to piss most times, unless it's in some 
cunt's face. Or all over a cocksucker like you. What I usually do is park the 
truck in the sun with the light comin' in the window and piss my pants up 
something terrible . . . Yeah, boy; all that nice, hot stuff, running down my leg, 
and squirmin' my ass around in it ... I got worms, boy - had 'em ever since I 
was a kid. But I won't get rid of 'em 'cause I like the way they make my 
asshole itch . . . I gotta drink a lot of beer and eat a lot of pizza pies and 
9 Exactly how personal is indicated by the fact that some of the "truly unsavoury" characters Delany 
bumped into include a "stud-tumed-crackhead" called "Joey-Who-Needs-a-Bath", and "the sadly 
demented Mad Masturbator" (Seligman 1999). 
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French-fried potatoes to keep a gut like this and all of them little fuckers fed. I 
got a hairy ass and it sure cakes up crusty. But I just don't believe in wipin' 
when I got a freaky little son of a bitch like you to eat it out for me." (Delany 
1994c:24-5) 
This description of Hogg is so baroquely prurient that it is almost laughable, a 
point that Hemmingsen misses. Granted, the subject matter is distasteful: the narrator 
first encounters Hogg raping and beating a woman in an alley, and then engages in 
fellatio and sodomy with Hogg, who is a 'rape artist' and general terroriser for hire 
(1996: 126). At first it is unclear if the narrator is spectator or victim, but he eventually 
succumbs to the moral destitution represented by Hogg, and helps to brutalise a 
woman and her crippled daughter. The novel's depiction of depravity is so studied 
and beyond the pale of everyday experience that a reader's reaction is as much 
fascination as it is repulsion, which is perhaps Delany' s main point: that the marginal 
is attractive precisely because of its potential danger. But, as Hemmingsen notes 
shrewdly, much of this fascination is centred around the author himself: it seems 
incongruous that a respected SF trailblazer, critic, and academic like Delany would 
give life to a thoroughly detestable protagonist who in the course of the novel runs the 
entire gamut of depravity, humiliation, brutality, and degradation known to society 
(1996:127). 
Hogg transgresses the boundary that critics and readers alike have placed 
around Delany, confounding the notion that he can be comfortably defined or 
quantified. Delany himself comments on the novel, arguing that the attraction of the 
pornographic novel is that it gives a writer an ideal opportunity to structure some of 
his or her inchoate fantasies (1989: 12). Just as Delany used the SF template to tum the 
genre on its head in such provocative novels as Dhalgren, so does Hogg cross 
pornography's own boundaries. Delany comments that the social template forming 
the basis of Hogg is the fact that "power in our society is overwhelmingly allotted to 
men", and that "women are almost always society's victims" (1989:13). However, in 
the light of the comment that the pornographic novel is an opportunity to explore 
"inchoate fantasies", it is unclear if this is just an after-the-fact rationalisation of the 
novel's inherent misogyny. 10 
10 In a general discussion on misogyny and pornography, Delany comments that "Sade goes to great 
pains to show that the idea that women are the upholders of the values of society and civilisation is an 
illusion fostered on them partly to get the better of them - so they may be raped, enslaved, and all 
money and economic power they may be fortunate enough to have inherited or actually to have earned 
in their own work can be stripped from them the more easily" (1989:4). Delany is clearly aware of the 
misogynistic elements of pornography, and exploits these to highlight gender inequality. But one could 
also argue that the misogyny of his pornographic fiction is a reflection of his own internalised 
misogyny, particularly when bearing in mind that gay men in general are notoriously unsympathetic to 
women (and vice versa?) 
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What is also troubling is that the social template of Hogg is presented as an a 
priori reality, with no alternative offered, and thus it can be argued that the novel 
underpins or reinforces the status quo. Despite the delayed publication, it is important 
to realise that Hogg is an early Delany novel, and is perhaps as inchoate as its writer's 
own fantasies. A much more successful treatise on a similar subject, and definitely a 
much more revolutionary statement, is The Mad Man (1994), discussed in the 
previous chapter in the context of the heterotopian novel Triton, which seamlessly 
conflates Delany' s autobiographical and critical concerns in the context of a murder 
mystery. 
The Mad Man is arguably the most plot-driven of Delany' s novels to date, or 
the most readerly, but it is also arguably his most sustained fictional statement on 
marginality in terms of sexual orientation and lifestyle. Ray Davis remarks that, 
written 20 years after Delany' s first two porn novels, The Mad Man is Delany' s "most 
thoroughgoing push towards a 'new age of moral chaos"' (2000). In his 
autobiography, Delany comments on his motivation for writing about a time even 
before the sexual revolution of the 1960s, let alone the spectre of HIV/ AIDS, which 
hangs over The Mad Man like a pall. Delany refutes the argument that, through his 
autobiography, he is indulging in "nostalgia for a medically unfeasible libertinism" 
(1990:268), arguing instead that the marginal is gradually being co-opted into the 
mainstream, and therefore allowing for a greater play of freedom, particularly with 
regard to sexuality. 
. . . it is my firm suspicion, my conviction, and my hope that once the Aids 
crisis is brought under control, the West will see a sexual revolution to make a 
laughing stock of any social movement that till now has borne the name. That 
revolution will come precisely because of the infiltration of clear and 
articulate language into the marginal areas of human sexual exploration . . . . 
Now that a significant range of people have begun to get a clearer idea of what 
has been possible among the varieties of human pleasure in the recent past, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, females and males will insist on exploring 
them even further. (Delany 1990:268) 
What is significant about this statement is its all-inclusiveness, as Delany is at 
pams to include men and women, homosexuality and heterosexuality. The 
'libertinism' he is predicting is that humanity in general rediscover its sexual nature, 
and indulge in the pleasures of the flesh in a non-prejudicial and totally accepting 
manner. He is arguing that the boundary defining sexuality in contemporary society 
should be transgressed in the name of transgression itself and, to this revolutionary 
end, The Mad Man is a clarion call. John Marr, in essence, is Everyman, whose 
debasement is transformed ultimately into a journey of socio-sexual enlightenment. 
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He is a black graduate student working on a thesis on the life and work of philosopher 
Tim9thy Hasler, killed a decade earlier in mysterious circumstances. The novel begins 
with Marr' s declaration that he is glad to be alive in a time of plague: 
I do not have Aids. I am surprised that I don't. I have had sex with men 
weekly, sometimes daily - without condoms - since my teens, though true, it's 
been overwhelmingly . . . no, more accurately it's been - since 1980 - all oral, 
not anal. My adventures with homosexuality started in the early-middle 
seventies, in the men's room of the terminal on the island of the Staten Island 
Ferry .... (Delany 1994b:7) 
Marr informs the reader that the story he is about to relate is not that 'unusual', 
though it does contain elements of "depravity, murder, mystery, love" (l 994b:9). The 
starting point he chooses for his tale is looking at a photographic frame in Professor 
Mossman's office containing separate pictures of Hasler, Marr, and the professor. 
Only Mossman is white - the first two are Korean-American and Afro-American 
respectively. All three are marginal: philosopher, student, and obscure academic. 11 
The photographic frame represents the three figures as separate people, but 
through the course of the tale the boundaries separating them will be crossed. We also 
learn that Hasler had formed a "fabled friendship" with poet Almira Adler, and that 
his output included six SF stories, the last called 'The Black Comet', which "turned 
on some of the finer mathematics that informed his articles on the philosophy of 
natural languages" (1994b: 12). At this early point anyone who has read Delany' s 
autobiography about his early years will be wondering if the author is not perhaps 
turning his own life into fiction: Delany has stated that, for some time now, his sexual 
proclivity has been oral in the face of Aids; he had met the fabled poet WH Auden; 
and Comet Jo was a character from Empire Star. Admittedly these are small details, 
but their resonances with Delany' s life are clear. However, he begins the novel with 
the forceful disclaimer referred to earlier, namely that The Mad Man is an imaginative 
work of fiction. This tells the reader that although the story seems to bear some 
relation to Delany' s own life, such correlations are neither obvious nor intended. 12 
In his autobiography, Delany recounts receiving fan mail from a person 
convinced that 'Samuel R. Delany' was a pseudonym for AE van Vogt: 
11 The 'marginal' is itself a very slippery signified, for current US society in particular is characterised 
by so many forms of marginality, or exclusion or difference, that the 'non-marginal' is almost a 
meaningless term. 
12 There does seem to be something disingenuous about this denial though. After all, this is a professor 
of literature writing about a fictional professor of literature and one of his students. 
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If you took the first and last letters from Samuel and followed them by the 
fourth and fifth letters in Delany, it spelled Slan, the title of Van Vogt' s most 
famous SF novel. And, besides, the writer went on, he'd never heard of an SF 
writer named 'Samuel R. Delany' before and he knew all the SF writers there 
were. (1990:280) 
Just as there are dangers in overworking a text, so must there be a point where 
attaching autobiographical significance to fictional details can lead a reader totally 
astray, which is perhaps the message of the disclaimer. However, one must remember 
that Hogg and The Mad Man saw publication at roughly the same time and, as 
Hemmingsen notes, part of the fascination generated by these eclectic novels was 
directed at the author who produced them (1996: 127). What sort of a man was he? 
Was he as weird, or perhaps even weirder, than his characters? Had he engaged in any 
of the activities he had described? One can imagine Delany' s frustration at such 
speculation - when all the critical attention should be focused on his texts, he found 
that he himself was under the microscope. But surely Delany himself has opened this 
door by turning his own life into the stuff of his fiction. 
His strategy in The Mad Man is to include details or write about events just 
similar enough to his own life experiences to suggest verisimilitude, and then to state 
in a disclaimer that any connection was 'preposterous'. This could goad a nosy reader 
into inferring even more autobiographical detail, for the disclaimer is patently false, 
but the boundary between truth and fiction is so blurred by now that Delany' s identity 
merges with his own text. His strategy of 'revelation through obfuscation' is actually 
a form of camouflage that places a veil between the text and its creator, through which 
only shadows can be glimpsed. But this also promotes the author as an object of 
mystery, and furthers the mystique surrounding him. This begs the question: what is 
an author? Barthes writes that the notion of the author is a 'tyrannical centre' meant to 
anchor the meaning of a particular text, or to act as a depository to contain and define 
such meaning. 
The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred 
on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions .... The explanation 
of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were 
always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, 
the voice of a single person, the author 'confiding' in us. (Barthes 1977b:l43) 
However, Barthes notes that it is language which speaks and performs, and not the 
author who, by the very nature of writing, must partake of a "prerequisite 
impersonality" ( l 977b: 14 3) in order to reach this paradoxical point of origination, 
described as a "neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away" 
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(1977b:l42). The subject, of course, is the author, whose identity is filtered through 
and subsumed by writing. 
As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to it acting directly on 
reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other 
than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disassociation occurs, 
the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. 
(1977b: 142) 
As Susan Sontag notes, Barthes's point is that language is everything: "all of 
reality is presented in the form of language - the poet's wisdom, and also the 
structuralist's" (1982:xx). 13 A speaker does not impart meaning to his or her 
utterances, but such meaning is produced by the linguistic system itself The 
implication for literature is that both the author and 'reality' are jettisoned as 
departure points for interpretation. This results in the notion of an "open-ended, 
polysemous literature" (Sontag l 982:xi), with the implication for criticism being that 
the critic is also a creator of literature, or an inventor of meaning. Barthes comments 
further: 
Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes 
quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on the text, to furnish 
it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism 
very well, the latter allotting itself the important task of discovering the 
Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: 
when the Author has been found, the text is 'explained' ... (1977b:l47) 
Perhaps this is why Delany balks at outright autobiographical attribution in 
The Mad Man, for he wishes to prevent the closure of meaning and instead open up 
his text to the possibilities of interpretation. In Barth es' s terms, Delany is an ecrivain, 
an author working "intransitively insofar as he devotes his attention to the means -
which is language - instead of the end, or the meaning" (Sturrock 1979:65). The 
ecrivant, on the other hand, intends his or her text to have only one meaning - the 
meaning he or she wishes to convey to the reader. Barthes concedes that writers are 
varying mixtures of these qualities, "sometimes conveying a predetermined meaning 
and sometimes playing with language to see what emerges" (Sturrock 1979:66). He 
regards the ecrivain as the writer of the future, who works towards meaning rather 
than from a singular, essentialist meaning. 
This has profound implications for the relationship between the reader and the 
writer as well, for it is conventionally taken that a writer knows what he or she wants 
13 This emphasis on the primacy of language seems to negate social realities and bodily experiences, 
and is an important criticism of poststmcturalism in terms of its perceived anti-humanism. 
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to say, and then works toward the goal of communicating this. But the opposite 
approach - "that an author had first decided how to say and only then discovered what 
'it' was" (Sturrock 1979:67) - upsets this one-way relationship between writer and 
reader, instead supplanting it with a two-way flow whereby the reader is as much a 
participant in a text's meaning as the writer. The ecrivain is 
the paradoxical hero of structuralism: the creature of the system, in this 
instance language. No longer is the author to be seen as a Subject full of 
conscious but as yet private meanings who will take advantage of language to 
make them public. (Sturrock 1979:67) 
What this means is that the boundary between author and reader is dismantled 
to its simplest interface: the text itself The author is not linked to any external 
political or social reality, but is simply defined as "'the watcher who stands at the 
crossroads of all other discourses"', as opposed to being a "purveyor of doctrine" 
(1982:xxi). 14 Thus literature becomes "a gratuitous, free activity" (1982:xxii); it is 
unbounded. The instrument of subversion proposed by Barthes is the act or process of 
writing itself Sontag explains that 
For Barthes, it is not the commitment that writing makes to something outside 
of itself (to a social or moral goal) that makes literature an instrument of 
opposition and subversion but a certain practice of writing itself: excessive, 
playful, intricate, subtle, sensuous .... (1982:xxi-xxii) 
Delany employs such a playful and sensuous writing style in The Mad Man, 
where he tantalises the reader with pseudo-autobiographical elements. His writing 
incorporates the poetic (the 'proem' at the beginning) to the epistolary (John Marr's 
long letter to Sam), as well as diary entries and even an article from the medical 
journal The Lancet appended onto the novel. The notion of 'writing at play' leads 
Barthes to distinguish between lisible or readerly and scriptible or writerly texts. The 
former are consumed passively, while in the latter the reader participates actively in 
the production of the text. 
However, lisible and scriptible is a scale of value, as no text is purely one or 
the other (Jefferson 1986: 108). The emphasis is on open-endedness, with the 
scriptible being a process whereby the generation of meaning "is seen as an essential 
part of the activity of the text, and is not subordinated to an ultimate signified" 
14 Sturrock's definition does seem to imply political intent: "The ecrivain is withdrawn but he is no 
dreamer; rather, he is a toiling language-worker whose isolation lasts only for as long as he is actually 
writing and for who, far from washing his hands of the world, is its conscience ... "(1979:66). 
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(1986:108). The scriptible gives the reader access to '"the magic of the signifier, to 
the pleasure of writing"' (1986: 108). This pleasure is induced in a scriptible text by 
the act of writing, which highlights the nature of a text as an artificial linguistic 
creation, and simultaneously celebrates this arbitrariness: 
The Text is a sort of verbal carnival, in which language is manifestly out on 
parole from its humdrum daily tasks. The writer's language-work results in a 
linguistic spectacle, and the reader is required to enjoy that spectacle for its 
own sake rather than to look through language to the world. (Sturrock 
1979:69) 
Barthes postulates an erotic relationship between writer, text and reader, with 
the 'body' of the writer speaking and being offered to the 'body' of the reader in a 
shared intimacy. The Mad Man and The Motion of Light in Water deal with bodily 
appetite, consumption and satiation. This metaphor can be extended to the writing 
process itself as an act of desire consummated by the reader. Although a text does not 
have a single unified meaning, plurality of meaning must still have a point of 
convergence - and that point is the reader. The pleasure of the text is derived from the 
ineffable interface between the two, creating what Barthes terms a seam, fault, or 
flaw. The boundaries of the interface are, firstly, "an obedient, conformist, 
plagiarising edge" (Barthes 1975:6) and, secondly, a mobile or blank edge "which is 
never anything but the site of its effect" (1975:6). Barthes's explication of an erotics 
of reading highlights the dynamic and complex interrelation between writer and 
reader. 15 An important corollary of the pleasure of the text, which highlights writing 
as an organic process and the impact or effect of this process, is that "as institution, 
the author is dead" (1975:27): 
. . . his civil status, his biographical person have disappeared; dispossessed, 
they no longer exercise over his work the formidable paternity whose account 
literary history, teaching, and public opinion had the responsibility of 
establishing and renewing. (Barthes 1975:27) 
Writer and reader need each other, and express this mutual desire through the medium 
of the text. The figure of the author is neither representation nor projection, but the 
result of a particular textual function: 
15 The idea of an erotics of reading is propounded in The Pleasure of the Text, where Barthes 
distinguishes betweenplaisir or pleasure, associated with lisible writing, andjouissance or enjoyment, 
associated with the scriptible (1975:vi). Jouissance derives from "the semantic anarchy which is 
inseparable from the authentic Text and by the flaunting of the author's neuroses (his 'body')" 
(Sturrock 1979:72). 
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The text is a fetish object, and this fetish desires me. The text chooses 
me, by a whole disposition of invisible screens, selective baffles: vocabulary, 
references, readability, etc.; and, lost in the midst of a text (not behind it, like a 
deus ex machina) there is always the other, the author. (Barthes 1975:27) 
Just as Barthes dispels the notion of an author's essential integrity or unity, so 
does he apply his "philosophy of disintegration" (Sturrock 1979:53) to himself in 
Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975). Here Barthes's main aim is to avoid 
definition of himself - whether as a person in terms of his life, or as a thinker and 
writer in terms of his output - for definition implies closure and finality. 
What he is fighting against is the idea that he must become an object of 
attention, for objects are as good as dead - they are known, fixed quantities, 
without either mystery or the potential for radical change. (Sturrock 1979:52) 
The idea of biography itself is countered by Barthes's notion of the death of the 
author - that is, the author's dissolution into a textual function, and his diffuse 
relationship with the reader through the pleasure of the text. What Barthes attempts in 
his autobiography is anti-biography - to designify himself, as being named is to die 
the inevitable textual death of the author. Sontag points out that what Barthes is 
aiming for is the "dismantling of his own authority" (1982:xxx). That is, he wishes to 
remove himself from the critical pedestal he has placed himself on by virtue of his 
own writing. His anti-biography is an attempt to reclaim his freedom as a writer, who 
ultimately "is the deputy of his own ego - of that self in perpetual flight before what 
is fixed by writing, as the mind is in perpetual flight from doctrine" (1982:xxxii). 
It is in this context that I wish to examine Delany' s own attempt at Barthesian 
anti-biography, an intention indicated by its central running metaphor: that of light in 
water. Delany writes about an aunt and uncle who had gone to see the Jewel Box 
Review, a group of drag artists, and how he overheard that the master of ceremonies 
was a counsellor he had met at summer camp. For Delany it is a revelatory moment in 
which seemingly disparate portions of his own life experience suddenly showed 
themselves to be part of an intricate web of coincidence and interaction, as well as 
revealing that the boundaries separating the compartmentalised sections of his life 
were as illusory as the shimmer of light in water: 
And for a moment (and only a moment), it was as if a gap between two 
absolute and unquestionably separated columns or encampments of the world 
had suddenly revealed itself as illusory, that what I had assumed two was 
really one; and that the glacial solidity of the boundary I'd been sure existed 
between them was as permeable as shimmering water, as shifting light. 
(Delany 1990:85) 
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The book's jacket photograph has been overlaid with a colour spectrum as a 
symbol of this shimmer. We see the picture of Delany through this shimmer in the 
same way that his character or persona is refracted through the text. The metaphor of 
light in water is meant to suggest the fluidity and openness that Barthes himself 
celebrated in his pursuit of the secrets of language. It is tempting to ask the question: 
why write an autobiography? And why conclude the attempt at such an arbitrary point 
if the intention is to reveal the nature or character of the writer himself?16 The focus is 
exclusively on the young Delany, the SF prodigy. There is little trace of the mature 
writer of The Mad Man or Bread and Wine. It is important to note that Delany's 
autobiography concerns a pre-Aids era. In a modern age where casual unprotected sex 
can precipitate a death sentence and where, as a result, a certain puritanism has 
stiffened the public debate about matters of the flesh, the sensual cornucopia 
represented by Delany' s autobiography seems a revolutionary act. 
Delany comments that his autobiography is his "vague and illformed attempt" 
to write his "own, brief, limited, and inadequate chronicle, story, emplotment of that 
rippling and evanescent tapestry" that is individual perception (1990:148). The brief 
12-page first section, 'Sentences: An Introduction', relates Delany' s memories of the 
death of his father, whom he thought died of lung cancer in 1958 when he was 17. 
However, when Peplow and Bravard contact Delany about collaborating on a 
biographical essay to preface their bibliography of his then 16-year output, it 
transpires that Delany had actually been 18 when his father had died in 1960 
(l 990:xiv). 
He explains that while truth or factual accuracy is crucial to historical and 
personal credibility - especially in terms of autobiography - an account containing 
only the initial statement would be incorrect. But one that omitted it, or failed to 
allude at its relationship with the second, would be incomplete. Even something as 
seemingly concrete as biographical detail is subject to the shimmer of light in water, 
as it partakes of the substance of memory, which is equally ephemeral, and of history, 
which has to be contested and negotiated in order to generate and sustain meaning. 
Peplow and Bravard' s biography is exactly what Delany' s autobiography is 
not: an exacting chronological account of the writer's life and career. But just as the 
two contradictory sentences about Delany' s recollection of his father's death are both 
needed in order to arrive at some understanding of the truth, so is Peplow and 
16 Delany ends the autobiography at the point where, in his late twenties, he was about to depart for 
Europe (1990:529). One has a strong sense that his 'adventures' are only about to begin, which 
confounds the traditional sense of closure. Delany comments: "I've always thought I had an interesting 
life between the ages of thirteen and twenty-seven or thereabouts. After that, I hope, the work becomes 
interesting" (l 994a:25 l ). 
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Bravard's work an equally illuminating companion piece. In a sense, the two accounts 
function in the margins of each other, with one inscribed over the other to create a 
multilayered and intertextual palimpsest. However, neither one of the two is a 
privileged text, for this would suggest a hierarchy of preference that runs against 
Delany' s values of free play and fluid discourse. Instead the boundary separating the 
two is as refracted as the motion of light in water. Delany comments that the 
seemingly intractable problem of autobiography - of where the boundary of truth lies 
- is actually a fertile ground for re-evaluation and consolidation. 
Honesty? Accuracy? Tact? These are the problems of all biographers, 
auto- or otherwise. But the very broadness of the questions obscures the 
specific ways each can manifest itself Few of us are ever biographised -
especially during our lifetime. No one is born a biographical subject, save the 
odd and antiquated royal heir; I have never seen a book on how to be a good 
one. But, like anything else, having your life researched and written about is 
an experience, with particular moments that characterise it, and make it what it 
is. (Delany 1990:xiv) 
As a public figure, Delany' s life has been researched and written about by 
readers and critics eager to glean the slightest nugget of biographical motivation or 
intention from his texts. Delany obviously knew that his autobiography, which 
brought his own sexuality into the open for the delectation of a much wider audience 
than his SF output, for example, had received, would be the equivalent of throwing 
wood onto the fire. There is also a sense that a biography is a summation or a coda, a 
capstone ending the edifice accumulated gradually by a career, in the same way that 
limestone percolates from water (which shimmers with the refraction of the light it 
gives forth). But far from such lofty aims, the autobiography can be seen as merely 
another textual and authorial experiment. Alluding to his own motivations for penning 
it, Delany quotes from The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, 
Written By Himself as a preface: 17 
If, then, the following narrative does not appear sufficiently interesting to 
engage general attention, let my motive be some excuse for its publication. I 
am not so foolishly vain as to expect from it either immortality or literary 
reputation. If it affords any satisfaction to my numerous friends, at whose 
request it has been written, or in the smallest degree promotes the interests of 
humanity, the ends for which it was undertaken will be fully attained, and 
every wish of my heart gratified. Let it therefore be remembered that, m 
wishing to avoid censure, I do not aspire to praise. (Delany 1990:vii) 
17 This is a founding text of African American slave writing, and by quoting from it Delany is alluding 
to his own heritage. 
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There is something disingenuous about this particular quotation, as certainly 
no legitimate claim can be made that Delany' s narrative is uninteresting - it won the 
Hugo Award for best non-fiction title of the year in 1990. As to the notion of its 
having been written for his friends at their behest, it seems an extraordinarily public 
means of conveying the intimate and no doubt sensitive details of one's life. As for 
the claim that it might promote the 'interests of humanity', the inclusion of graphic 
sexual detail and questionable morality raised an eyebrow among some reviewers: 
The Library Journal, for example, declared that "the book is less about fiction writing 
than it is about sex" (1999). 18 On the other hand, it can also be seen as a self-affirming 
and courageous act. Biographies are usually associated with dead legends, and to take 
charge of his own early self-definition in such a controversial fashion is an indication 
of Delany' s predilection of crossing all boundaries from taste to literary convention. 
Recounting only the early part of his life, Delany is by no means suggesting 
that his career is over, for his autobiography is an opportunity of assessing the author 
anew - to go back to those early texts, and look for those formative traces scattered 
throughout The Motion of Light in Water that can perhaps even reveal pointers for the 
future. The fact that Delany quotes another autobiography in order to back up his own 
motivations is symbolic of the double boundary he is labouring under: the 
demarcation between himself and the reader, which is to be broached by the text 
itself, and the boundary between the author's 'real' person and his 'autobiographical' 
persona in the text. 
Peplow and Bravard begin their biography with the following quotation taken 
from their correspondence with Delany: "'The biographical - or perhaps 
autobiographical - problem is that I am tempted to write you a dozen autobiographies, 
each from a different point of view"' (1980: 1 ). Delany attempts to solve this dilemma 
in his autobiography by including all the information at his disposal, such as with the 
account of his memory of his father's death. The 'untrue' sentence, which he thought 
had been validated by memory, but had been disproved by logical deduction, forms a 
parallel column running side-by-side with the 'legitimised' text, "in a second column 
of type that doubles the one that makes up this book" (1990:31). The boundary 
separating the two columns forms the discursive space where they interact to produce 
the rich tapestry of the text. Included in this parallel column are what Delany terms 
the "basal and the quotidian" ( 1990: 31 ), meaning those events, peculiarities, and 
disruptions that make up everyday life, but are not necessarily considered 
biographical material. 
18 Publisher's Weekly was less reserved, and called it a "self-indulgent, portentously titled hodge-
podge" of slender autobiographical snippets that only revealed sporadically how Delany's controversial 
science fiction emerged. The final verdict: "Fans of his SF will be disappointed" (1999). 
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Peplow and Bravard do not take this parallel column into account, as they 
adopt a strictly linear and academic approach to the problem of defining Delany as a 
biographical subject, and thereby aim to arrive at his essential nature as a person and a 
writer. In order to make the subject under study more amenable to close observation, 
Delany' s early life is immediately divided into three distinct sections. This is a classic 
instance of the observer changing the condition of what is being observed. Peplow 
and Bravard's categories are arbitrary, and depend as much on their own experiences, 
prejudices, and influences as any discernible boundaries in Delany' s life. Such 
categorisation also creates the erroneous impression that a writer's life is like a text, 
and can be separated into neat chapters and sections. 
Interestingly, The Motion of Light in Water is basically a collection of 
numbered vignettes, 19 but instead of producing an effect of compartmentalisation, the 
overall impression is diffusion and arbitrariness, representing Delany' s life 
experiences and recollections as a slowly accreting and constantly vacillating process. 
Peplow and Bravard also do not indicate that the boundaries separating their 
categories are totally permeable, and that movement between them is essential to 
convey the complexity of their subject matter.20 In their concluding summation, 
Peplow and Bravard state that an "important, controversial and worthy" point to 
consider is Delany's position as a black writer, with "women's rights and gay 
liberation" being two causes that "he has adopted and which affect his work" 
(1980:53): 
Our correspondence with Delany, our reading of his novels, stories and essays, 
and our survey of the fans, critics and scholars have convinced us that Delany 
is in a unique position. He has already created memorable works of fiction, 
and he will continue to do so. He may even produce 'The Masterpiece' some 
of his fans expect. . . . . Obviously no finished portrait of this complex man can 
emerge at this time. (Peplow and Bravard 1980:57)21 
This is as true now as when it was written in 1980. One of the more important 
events in Delany's so-called 'middle period' is the birth of the pseudonym Leslie K 
Steiner, a name that Delany originally appended to a mock-critical essay he had 
19 Publisher's Weekly noted that the "the book's paragraphs and sections are numbered, divided and 
subdivided like a dissertation", which produces a "detached" style (1999). One of the most notable 
difference between the 1988 and 1990 editions ofDelany's autobiography is the numbering or indexing 
system used. 
20 Section one is '1942-1960: Boyhood and Schooling', section two is 'The 1960s: Emergence of the 
Wunderkind', and section three is 'The 1970s: Toward the Middle Period' (Peplow and Bravard 1980). 
21 Peplow and Bravard quote from a 1959 letter written by Delany's English teacher: '"You have the 
potentiality of becoming a writer by profession. You have originality, a gift of observation, and an 
ability to recreate the exact feeling of an experience, an excellent ear for speech and a daring approach 
to word use. With youth and energy on your side, you can achieve something that will leave its mark"' 
(1980:17). 
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written entitled 'Some Remarks Towards a Reading of Dhalgren', and which received 
a mention in an article in Science-Fiction Studies by Peter Alterman ( 1980:48). 
Peplow and Bravard state further that the Steiner persona surfaced again in 'The Anti-
Pornography of Samuel R. Delany', written as a companion piece to The Tides of Lust 
and Hogg, and in an appendix to Tales of Neveryon in 1979, where it is revealed that 
"Steiner is in fact a woman of Afro-American and Jewish ancestry, and a 
mathematician and linguist of great repute" (1980:49). 22 
At the time of the Alterman reference, Delany "recalled as many copies of the 
Steiner piece as possible" (1980:48), but his later elaboration of the Steiner persona -
and his adoption of additional alter egos such as SL Kermit - mark the beginning of 
Delany' s quest for Barthesian plurality and dissemination through the medium of his 
own work. Ironically, in a 1990 interview in the very journal that gave critical 
substance to Steiner, Science-Fiction Studies, Delany comments that he inhabits a 
world where Samuel R Delany as author is non-existent: 
I've never really read anything he's written. I know a lot about him. I've even 
looked over his shoulder while he was working. But there's a veil lying 
between me and his actual texts - it lets me see the letters he puts down, but 
completely blocks the words. All I finally get to do is listen to him sub-
vocalise about a text he hopes he's writing - and, when I try to reread it later, 
again I only hear his subvocal version of the text he wished he'd penned. 
(Philmus 1990:314) 
What are the implications of this 'veil' that exists between Delany and his 
texts for his own autobiography? Was he able to cross the boundary dividing his 'real' 
self from his 'written' and 'read' selves, or did this just serve to compartmentalise his 
persona even further? Peplow and Bravard's limited biography is remarkable for what 
it excludes - that is, what it relegates to the parallel column of discourse. There is 
limited physical description of Delany, the world he inhabits, and nothing of the 
social minutiae and everyday routine that combine to create reality. A reader amasses 
such necessary detail to create the base in which the author as person or individual 
can be anchored. Without this base, the author becomes a free-floating enigma, 
dappling the text with the restless and inconclusive shimmer of light in water. Barthes 
questions precisely this interest in the 'daily life', and suggests that the very plethora 
22 Delany comments on Steiner's origins: "She had begun merely as a voice, writing down wonderful 
things in the nebular dark where wishes are whispered aloud. I had stood (in that darkness) at her 
shoulder, transcribing what she'd muttered over to herselfas she'd written it" (1989:xii-xiii). He adds: 
"Today Steiner seems a kind of joke, played, I realise, largely on myself. It is time to give her up ... " 
(l 989:xiii). 
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of detail which is taken to be the detritus of reality is as much a fantasy as the 
authorial persona itself - and indeed perpetuates this illusion: 
Why this curiosity about petty details: schedules, habits, meals, lodging, 
clothing, etc.? Is it the hallucinatory relish of 'reality' (the very materiality of 
'that once existed')? And is it not the fantasy itself which invokes the 'detail', 
the tiny private scene, in which I can easily take my place? (Barthes 1975:53) 
The structure of Delany's autobiography seems to be designed in such a 
manner so as to subvert the very notion of structure. The only hint of the type of 
categorisation employed by Peplow and Bravard is in the subtitle, 'East Village Sex 
and Science Fiction Writing: 1960-1965'. As I have mentioned, the book comprises a 
brief introduction called 'Sentences: an Introduction,' while the main section is 
entitled 'The Peripheries of Love', again indicating Delany's interest in marginality. 
He begins the autobiography randomly and innocuously, when he and Hacker moved 
into the East Village. Delany questions why they had married, "this Jew from the 
Bronx, this black from Harlem", adding that such an easy and stereotypical 
categorisation both conceals and reveals the truth (1990: 15). Earlier on Delany had 
written that "a careful and accurate biographer can, here and there, know more about 
the biographical subject than the subject him- or herself' (1990:xxi). 
But what the biographer cannot know or even acknowledge is the parallel 
column of the discourse, with its doubts, silences and spaces shadowing and sparring 
with the legitimised text. Delany argues that this attempt at autobiography is not the 
final word on this particular period of his life - and nor is it meant to be. If the author 
has died, as Barth es claimed - with such a death being part of the bliss of succumbing 
to the pleasure of the text - then surely the autobiography is a kind of rebirth of the 
author, and an acknowledgement of the plural and ephemeral nature of the authorial 
fiction. 
I am not about to try here for the last \vord on event and evidential certainty. T 
hope it's clear: despite the separate factual failing each is likely to fall into, the 
autobiographer (much less the memoirist) cannot replace the formal 
biographer. Nor am I even going to 11)'. I hope instead to sketch, as honestly 
and effectively as I can, something I can recognise as my O\\TI, aware as I do 
so that even as I work after honesty and accuracy, memory vvill make this only 
one possible fiction among the myriad - many in open conflict - anyone might 
write of any of us, as convinced as any other that what he or she wrote was the 
truth. (Delany 1990:xxi) 
Delany comments that the power of writing is its ability "to hold sway over 
memory, making it pubiic, keeping it private, possibly, even, keeping it secret from 
oneself' (1990:39). Thus the apparent simplicity and factual clarity of the 
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autobiographical format is, in fact, an elaborate screen selectively concealing the 
truth. Delany comments further about the "trade-off between writing and desire" 
(1990:40). An author has the tendency ''to keep the word at bay and restrain it from 
the paper" (1990:40), so that he or she retains and refines it in his or her mind, but this 
is countered by the fact that "all forces drove to realise the word on paper" (1990:40), 
resulting in a potent feedback loop where "imaginative specificity" is balanced by 
"experiential richness" (1990:41). 
Writing is not simply a case of putting word to paper, as it is also the outcome 
of a complex dialogue or discourse that an author engages in with him- or herself. 
Nowhere is this notion of an authorial discourse more prevalent than in the 
autobiography, where the author engages dialectically with history and memory. An 
example of this discourse is Delany giving more than one version of events, as he 
searches for a margin "within and round what's already written" (1990:51) in which 
to inscribe the totality of his experiences, for the written narrative sometimes places 
certain things "outside of language" (1990:51 ). This does not form a "consecutive 
report" (1990: 51 ), and neither is it attached to the main narrative in a conventional 
format such as footnotes. Instead it is a "double narrative, in its parallel columns" 
(1990:54). 
An important event in The Motion of Light in Water in the sense of what it 
reveals about Delany's approach to the workmanlike aspect of writing - and one 
which is not even mentioned by Peplow and Bravard- is Delany's acquisition of his 
first notebook, in which he began an intermittent journal that he has maintained ever 
since (1990:66). Indeed, his autobiography is structured like a random pastiche of 
oddly-numbered journal entries, symbolising the fragmentary nature of memory and 
experience itself. That first notebook became an indispensable part of Delany's school 
baggage, containing impressions, journal entries or random jottings and homework in 
the front, and masturbation fantasies in the back: 
The entries . . . would move closer and closer together, like complex 
graphic parentheses, eating from both sides the diminishing central sheath ... 
till, sometimes, they interpenetrated. 
Then, writing itself would seem to be - whether devoted to reality or 
fantasy, material life or lust, whether at the beginning or at the end of a 
notebook - marginal to a vast, empty, unarticulated centre called the real 
world that was displaced more and more by it, reducing that centre to a margin 
in its tum, a mere and tenuous split between two interminable columns of 
writing ... (1990:67) 
If an autobiography reveals the complex interrelationship between an author, 
his personal life, and his read or written life, then a journal is further evidence of the 
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Barthesian notion that an author is not a discrete entity, but a collection of elements or 
a process in which the author's being is articulated. Barthes notes that a journal has 
four main characteristics: it presents a text imbued with a writer's style or 
individuality; it records the "traces of a period" in exacting detail; it presents the 
author "as an object of desire" in the sense that one is interested in the intimate details 
of his or her life; and, lastly, the journal represents a "workshop of sentences" 
whereby the author refines his craft and contends with the mutability of language 
(1982:481-482). Barthes adds that the journal also symbolises an attempt by an 
author to combine his or her lived and textual lives, to merge the two so that a unified 
sense of identity can result. But an author is by definition a fragmentary and 
discontinuous construct, and thus the journal can be no 'truer' an account of that 
identity than anything else the author produces. 
In other words, I never get away from himself. And if I never get away 
from myself, if I cannot manage to determine what the Journal is 'worth', it is 
because its literary status slips through my fingers: on the one hand, I 
experience it, through its facility and its desuetude, as being nothing more than 
the Text's limbo, its unconstituted, unevolved, and immature form; but on the 
other hand, it is all the same a true scrap of that Text, for it includes its 
essential torment . . . . By which it must be understood that it cannot prove, not 
only what it says, but even that it is worth the trouble of saying it. (Barthes 
1982:494-5) 
The crucial difference between Delany's autobiography and Peplow and 
Bravard's biography is that the former contains a lot of chaff, while the latter 
concentrates on the polished kernels of the author's life: those events, happenings, and 
circumstances that can reasonably be interpreted as having had some significance to 
the future development of the author's life and/or career. However, the detritus of 
daily living that clutters Delany's account is equally important as it gives the reader 
insight into the author's mind itself, as well as demystifying and decentralising the 
position of the author as a privileged representative of experience. 23 
Another important event that Delany includes, but Peplow and Bravard 
exclude, is how he came to the realisation that what he ·wished to pursue in his literary 
career was SF. The jacket description recounts that Delany, "walking across the 
Brooklyn Bridge one spring afternoon, decided to commit his full intellectual and 
23 One is reminded of William Wordsworth's question 'What is a Poet?': "He is a man speaking to 
men: a man, it is true, endued with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a 
greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common 
among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other 
men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as 
manifested in the goings-on of the Universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not 
find them" (Wordsworth 1820). 
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artistic energy to writing SF" (1990). By representing this event in such stark 
isolation, it is robbed of its entire context, so that the event becomes excluded from 
the processes of its realisation. In other words, the parallel column of the narrative is 
ignored. This is a :fundamental problem with Delany as a critical and biographical 
subject: he partakes of so many marginalities himself - black, gay, academic, SF 
writer, once married to a female Jewish poet - that to attempt to write about him 
means inevitably to descend to a level of pat generalisation that can tidy up and 
rearrange this messy and divergent complexity into a neat bundle of influences and 
expectations. 
That evening on the bridge I decided, about as cold-bloodedly as any twenty-
year-old could who'd suddenly realised that, through a largely preposterous 
fluke, part of his meagre livelihood might now come from making novels, 
that, in my SF, I would try for science-fictional effects comparable to those 
that, in my other reading, had so struck me. (Delany 1990: 172) 
Delany's use of the phrase 'making novels' refers to writing as a particular 
craft, but can also be taken to suggest that the creative process is as intimate as 
procreation itself What is interesting is the suggestion that Delany's commitment to 
SF was the result of an evolutionary process, as opposed to arr instantaneous 
conversion. Similarly, Delany's more recent writing on pornography and gay issues 
represents such a process of assimilation, as he attempts to transcribe, and propel, the 
silent parallel discourse into the privileged mainstream narrative of everyday life. The 
most fascinating, and perhaps ultimately the most revealing, aspect of this 
autobiography is that the reader learns that Delany's SF output is only a byproduct of 
an extraordinary life - and that only in his later years has he attempted to articulate 
the circumstances of this formative period, and indeed to transform these 
circumstances into his fictional oeuvre: 
But I no more considered writing about what the women who came to 
my house were talking about than I would have considered discussing with my 
mother-in-law, over Friday night's overdone roast beef, the mutilated cock in 
the men's room. (1990:168) 
Another important aspect of Delany's autobiography, and which is related to 
Barthes' s notion of the pleasure of the text, is its strong Dionysian impulse. Delany 
writes that "the parallel column containing the discourse of repetition, of desire ... 
forever runs beside one of positive, commercial, material analysis" (1990:204). In 
other words, any transaction, behaviour, or event is underpinned by the dominant 
discourse, which comprises the prevailing power relations that circumscribe society. 
Barthes questions whether a text is "an anagram of the body", in the sense that it can 
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be said to have a human form or figure, which recomplicates the notion of "the 
infmite perversity of the critic and of his reader" (1975: 17), as when attempting to 
unravel the most intimate textual secrets of an author's work. Barthes goes so far as to 
label a text as a "fetish object" (1975:27), arguing that, "no sooner has a word been 
said, somewhere, about the pleasure of the text, than two policemen are ready to jump 
on you: the political policeman and the psychoanalytical policeman": 
An old, a very old tradition: hedonism has been repressed by nearly every 
philosophy; we fmd it defended only by marginal figures . . . . Pleasure is 
continually disappointed, reduced, deflated, in favour of strong, noble values: 
Truth, Death, Progress, Struggle, Joy, etc. Its victorious rival is Desire: we are 
always being told about Desire, never about Pleasure. Desire has an epistemic 
dignity, Pleasure does not. It seems that (our) society refuses (and ends up by 
ignoring) bliss to such a point that it can produce only epistemologies of the 
law (and of its contestation), never of its absence .... (1975:57) 
In other words, the parallel column is destined to remain unarticulated or 
hidden behind the veil of the prevailing social order. But now and again that veil is 
snatched aside, and we can gain a privileged insight into the alternative discourse - in 
the same way that a reader feels privileged at sharing the implied intimacy of a text 
with its author. In this vein Delany argues in his autobiography that ''the first direct 
sense of political power comes from the apprehension of massed bodies" (1990:266). 
In other words, politics springs from the human body as a tangible and lived reality, 
and is not just the product of social forces, or a site of contestation for opposing 
discourses. Writing about his first visit to St Marks Baths in New York, Delany 
recounts the libidinal shock of entering a room that was "an undulating mass of 
naked, male bodies, spread wall to wall" (1990:265): 
Only the coyest and the most indirect articulation could occasionally indicate 
the boundaries of a phenomenon whose centres could not be spoken or written 
of, even figuratively: and that coyness was medical and legal as well as 
literary; and, as Foucault has told us, it was, in its coyness, a huge and 
pervasive discourse. (Delany 1990:268-69) 
The Motion of Light in Water can be said to be Delany's attempt to place 
himself in that discourse in terms of his O\vn history and experiences, and to articulate 
it for himself and his readers. He warns that "a writer's evaluation of his/her own 
work is probably the least trustworthy judgement" (1990:276), and surely this applies 
to the author's life as well. But this is not the point, for Delany himself states that it is 
not a 'true' autobiography, but a memoir or a "collection of fragments" (1990:348). 
The theme of the autobiography is "trying to bring out some single and unified 
meaning from the chaos of memory" (1990:313-314). A related theme, of course, is 
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trying to interpret the signifier 'Delany' - a process that is not nearly as simple as it 
sounds. Foucault comments that the relationship between a text and an author refers to 
a specific "manner in which the text points to this 'figure' that, at least in appearance, 
is outside it and antecedes it" (1984: 101 ). In other words, the author is both part of, 
and separated from, his or her own text; he or she produces the text and, in turn, is 
also defined by this process. Foucault states that this raises the important question of 
whether it matters who is speaking. This arises because of several dominant 
characteristics of contemporary writing, or ecriture (recalling Barthes's definition of 
the two main sorts of writers). First, Foucault points out that "today's writing has 
freed itself from the dimension of expression": 
Referring only to itself, but without being restricted to the confines of its 
interiority, writing is identified with its mvn unfolded exteriority. This means 
that it is an interplay of signs arranged less according to signified content than 
according to the very nature of the signifier. Writing unfolds like a game (jeu) 
that invariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses its limits. In 
writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a 
subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which 
the writing subject constantly disappears. (Foucault 1984:102) 
This is precisely the effect that Delany achieves in The Motion of Light in 
Water. He transgresses the limits and conventions of the autobiographical genre in a 
kind of textual game that does not pin himself down as a subject like a specimen on a 
dissecting board, but uses language to create a significatory space in which this game 
of identity and allusion/illusion can be played out to maximum effect. Second, 
Foucault says that writing has a particular relationship to death. Whereas narrative 
used to be seen "as something designed to ward off death" (1984:102) - in other 
words, immortalising its subject in writing - it is now seen as contributing to the death 
of the author him- or herself. This is a logical outcome of the view that writing creates 
a space of significatory obfuscation in which an author is effaced or dispersed: 
Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he writes, 
the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. As a 
result, the mark of the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of 
his absence; he must assume the role of the dead man in the game of writing. 
(Foucault 1984:102-103). 
Foucault examines various concepts in order to elaborate the notion of the 
death of the author. The function of criticism is not to elucidate the relationship 
between work and author, nor to reconstruct a particular thought or experience 
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through the medium of the text, but to look at the work as an architectural edifice with 
its own structure, intrinsic form, and play of internal relationships (Foucault 
1984: 1 03 ). This raises the question of "what is this curious unity which we designate 
as a work?" (1984:103): 
Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still 
ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work ... 
. And what about the rough drafts for his works? ... The deleted passages and 
the notes at the bottom of the page? ... What if, within a workbook filled \vi.th 
aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or 
a laundry list: Is it a work, or not? (Foucault 1984:103) 
Foucault is questioning the boundary between an author's 'work' in the form of the 
writing that he or she produces, and the life or lived existence of that author. This 
boundary is not as artificial or definite as the cover of a book: text and lived reality 
spill over and interweave in a constant interplay. Perhaps it is for this reason that 
Delany has structured his autobiography in the form of a journal, for this 
acknowledges that the boundary between text and life is contiguous. Similarly, he 
includes omitted journal pages at the end of Triton to subvert the notion that a novel is 
a closed or holistic entity. The messy spillover engendered by this inclusion 
transgresses the boundary between the author's work and the lived reality of which it 
is an expression or an affirmation. 
What, then, is an author's name, and how does it function? What do we mean 
when we say 'Delany', for example? This question is critical if we are to examine the 
space or absence left by the author's disappearance.24 Foucault urges that we must 
"follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that 
disappearance uncovers" (1984:105). As a proper name, 'Delany' is the equivalent of 
a description, for one can immediately say that he is the author of such-and-such a 
text. But "a proper name does not have just one signification" (1984:106), and 
therefore our description of 'Delany' can be widened to include the fact that he is a 
gay, black SF writer and academic. 'Delany' as proper name and author name are 
conflated; he has come to represent or stand for certain themes or issues that exist 
independently of who he is as a 'real' person - and even if this real person changes, 
24 Sometimes this disappearance can be literal, as with 111omas Pynchon climbing aboard a bus and 
vanishing into the hills when in 1963 Time magazine dispatched a photographer to bring back a picture 
of the 26-year-old prodigy. "The problem was Pynchon didn't want his picture snapped - he reportedly 
felt his buck teeth made him look like Bugs Bunny" (Gamer 2001). 
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such as through ageing, the significatory force underpinning his proper and author 
names will not diminish. In other words, the signifier 'Delany' has come to denote a 
particular discourse, and it is this particular discourse that defines a text as having 
been produced by Delany the author. Foucault writes: 
It would seem that the author's name, unlike other proper names, does not 
pass from the interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who 
produced it; instead, the name seems always to be present, marking off the 
edges of the text, revealing, or at least characterising, its mode of being. The 
author's name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and 
indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a culture. (1984: 107) 
Foucault then examines discourses imbued with what he terms the 'author 
function', which is "characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and 
functioning of certain discourses within a society" (1984: 107). Such a discourse has 
certain features: discourses are "objects of appropriation" in that there are strict rules 
governing such aspects as author rights, author-publisher relations, and rights of 
reproduction. This holds out the possibility that discourses can be transgressive if any 
of these rules are flouted (1984: 108). Foucault points out that "the author function 
does not affect all discourses in a universal and constant way" (1984:109). For 
example, 'scientific' and 'literary' texts are perceived differently with regard to the 
role of the author, as are autobiography and fiction, for example. The corollary of this 
is that the author function is the result of a "complex operation" (1984: 110) revolving 
around the concept of the 'author'. If the relationship between discourse and author 
function is so complicated, then how "can one attribute several discourses to one and 
the same author?" (1984: 110). 
How can Delany be perceived as an SF writer and a purveyor of gay polemic 
at one and the same time? The answer is that "the author is also the principle of a 
certain unity of writing - all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by the 
principles of evolution, maturation, or influence" (1984: 111 ). The fact that Delany is 
active in SF, gay polemic, literary criticism, and other genres does not indicate 
terminal dissonance. His forays into gay polemic, for example, are the result of a long 
process of elucidation and experimentation spread out over an entire career in which 
various ideas and concepts were tried and tested, and finally received unified 
expression in such diverse works as The MadMan and Bread and Wine. The author is 
central to this view, as he or she is the lynchpin to providing a comprehensive 
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encapsulation of his or her career. This flies in the face of the idea that the author is 
effaced in a particular text, with all traces of individuality erased by the linguistic 
spaces created by writing. In terms of the author function, the author is central to 
signifying his or her own discourse. This 'discourse' may also be a tight knot of 
varying strands that have to be unraveled if the author's function is to be properly 
understood. Foucault explains somewhat lyrically: 
It is easy to see that in the sphere of discourse one can be the author of much 
more than a book - one can be the author of a theory, tradition, or discipline in 
which other books and authors will in tum find their place. (1984:113) 
I believe that this is Delany's singular achievement with The Motion of Light 
in Water. By painting his early forays in SF into the larger canvas of his extraordinary 
life, Delany extends the frame in which he has been operating. In effect, he paves the 
way for such masterpieces as The Mad Man, and simultaneously illuminates and 
legitimises similar thematic concerns in his SF. His autobiography is like a vast 
deconstruction of the signifier 'Delany'; like an intricate flower, it is opened up into a 
much richer significatory space - the space of the endlessly deferred margin. 
Delany's discourse is the discourse of marginality and desire. His own 
marginal status has always predisposed him to marginality in all its forms and guises. 
In a time of literary criticism where the notion of the author and his or her function in 
a text has been thoroughly dismantled, he has written an autobiography that both 
celebrates Barth es' s notion of textual dissolution, as well as paradoxically celebrating 
his materiality as a living human being with desires and appetites. It also challenges 
Foucault's notion that the author is effaced in the course of his work, while 
simultaneously celebrating the elusiveness and ambiguity of the concept of the author 
function. As The Motion of Light in Water reveals, there is always room for another 
column in the parallel discourse that traces the prevailing order of things. 
Conclusion 
The Place of Excrement1 
Wisdom, like other precious substances, must be torn from the bowels of the 
earth (Foucault 1965:22) 
Discussing Delany's theoretical contribution inevitably means tackling the thorny 
issue of defining SF itself Damien Broderick neatly avoids this pitfall by stating, at 
the outset, before launching into an explication of Delany's own brand of semiotics, 
that "we must ask if the notion of [SF] as a genre needs to be replaced or expanded" 
(1995:37). Bearing this in mind, we can see how Delany's perceptions and theories 
push the envelope of traditional SF theory. This promises to be far more fruitful than 
the conventional approach of forcing Delany's writing to conform to some 
preconceived critical mould, and then analysing the bits that stick out, or that do not 
fit (and often lopping them off as part of a literary pruning exercise). 
Broderick argues that we need to see SF as a 'mode' instead of as a 'classical 
genre', and its constituent texts as forming part of a "specialised [SF] 'mega-text"' 
(1995:37). In other words, SF is a particular process of literary production and 
consumption. Rather than being an immutable object, it is part of the dynamic 
1 This is the title of Part Four of The Mad Man, the opening line of which is equally memorable for its 
declarative simplicity: "The remainder of this tale is a love story" (Delany l 994b:333). The Yeats 
poem that the title refers to, 'Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop', is quoted at the beginning of Part Five, 
'The Mirrors of Night' (only lines 14-18). The full poem is as follows: 
I met the Bishop on the road 
And much said he and I. 
"Those breasts are t1at and fallen now, 
Those veins must soon be dry; 
Live in a heavenly mansion, 
Not in some foul sty.' 
'Fair and foul are near of kin, 
And fair needs foul,' I cried. 
'My friends are gone, but that's a truth 
Nor grave nor bed denied, 
Learned in bodily lowliness 
And in the heart's pride. 
'A woman can be proud and stiff 
When on love intent; 
But Love has pitched his mansion in 
The place of excrement; 
For nothing can be sole or whole 
That has not been rent. (Yeats 2001). 
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expression of "the epistemic fiction of Western scientific culture" (1995:64). 
Broderick centres Delany firmly in this critical and cultural milieu by arguing that he 
is "the most persuasive theoretician of [SF] as thatspecies of storytelling native to a 
culture undergoing epistemic changes implicated in the rise and supersession of 
technical-industrial modes of production, distribution, consumption and disposal" 
(1995:64). This is clearly a Marxist theory of literature, which David Forgacs notes 
"is a theory of economics, history, society and revolution before it has anything much 
to do with literary theory" (1986:166). Forgacs's somewhat disapproving tone can be 
seen to reflect the attitude that the purity of 'literature as literature' must not be 
despoiled by some secondary link to social reality. 
But the strength of a Marxist - and, by implication, Delany's - approach is 
precisely its link to a larger legitimising context. In this context Delany can best be 
understood in all his enigmatic and elusive totality - as "anomaly and paradigm 
conjoined: black, gay, father, dyslexic college drop-out, multiple prize-winning and 
bestselling [SF] and fantasy novelist" (Broderick 1995:64). This is also how we can 
best comprehend the evolutionary path from such disparate novels as Babel-17 to The 
Mad Man, and how they form part of the mega-text of Delany's own corpus. In my 
vie\v, the fundamental question when attempting to come to terms with Delany is how 
to reconcile such disparate novels; how such a promising SF author, pushing the 
boundaries of a commercial genre into the stratosphere of literary theory, could 
meander through such a cross-pathed career to end up with The Mad Man, a rather 
lurid gay thriller. 
In attempting to deal with this conundrum, many fans and readers have 
compartmentalised Delany in order to render him safe and comprehensible. They only 
read his SF, ignoring his gay polemic, pornography, and even his literary theory as 
beyond their capacity of understanding or life experience. This is nonsensical: one 
does not have to be a sado-masochist, or even homosexual, in order to enjoy and 
understand The Mad Man, in exactly the same way as one does not have to be an alien 
from Mars in order to enjoy and understand Babel-17. Once one begins to view 
Delany's corpus as a mega-text, as Broderick suggests, then you can begin to 
appreciate Delany's particular and revolutionary achievement: that Babel-17 and The 
Mad Man can be read in exactly the same way, and are indeed part of a single text 
defining Delany's continuing evolution of the themes and interests that are uniquely 
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his own. Through his theory of SF as a particular mode of reading - that is, a process 
of production and consumption with its own internalised rules and conventions -
Delany has offered the key to comprehending Babel-17 in the context of The Mad 
Man, and vice versa. 
One of the literary effects that SF strives for is cognitive estrangement or 
'sense of wonder', namely immersion in an experience or reality far removed from the 
reader's own. Bahel-17 details a far-future galactic empire and its fight for survival; 
The Mad Man details the marginal underbelly of a prototypical present-day city. Both 
are equally exotic; indeed, it could be argued that The Mad Man is as much SF as 
Babel-17. The boundary between so-called SF and so-called gay fiction is only one 
amongst many that Delany crosses or dislocates: the boundary between his work and 
his life, the boundary between SF and canonical literature, the boundary that separates 
his own novels from each other due to conventional classification are all breached. All 
boundaries and distinctions are dissolved and ruptured in the postmodern 
concatenation of Delany's oeuvre, the realisation of which is a detonation like the 
Heraclitean fire consuming all difference at the apocalyptic conclusion of The Mad 
Man, or Rydra Wong's final induction into the mystery of Babel-17 and its 
dissolution of the self 
A typical example of how the themes of Babel-17 and The Mad Man can be 
conflated in a meaningful and intelligent manner is provided in Delany's short story 
'Among the Blobs' (1991 ). It begins with a protagonist named Joe on a subway car 
accidentally bumping into a woman, describing the feeling of the impact as "not a 
pain nor even a feeling, but rather a sensational ghost, an unformed blob, where she 
had lurched against his army jacket" (1991:431). The word 'blob' provides the reader 
with his or her first link to the title, which sounds like a lurid B-movie pastiche. Then 
the story segues seamlessly into just such a pastiche, hurtling the reader into a totally 
different cognitive realm: 
(2) And Bat D-, in a rocket of luciprene-6 with vytrol fittings, careened at 
ballistic speeds through interstellar night. Flakes had fallen off the black, 
letting light stars. Bat was dubious and alert .... His would be the first human 
encounter with the Blob - which had been reported flutchiilating (a form of 
communication? digestion? play?) in sector E-3. Till this report Bat D-, of the 
blazing death-laser, slayer of twenty-seven seven-foot Uranites, hero of the 
Kpt rebellion on Formalhaut-G, had poohed the existence of the Blobs, but the 
closer his luciprene hull swooped toward Galactic Council, the more 
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indubitable seemed the Blob's particular order of ontological resolution- what 
an earlier, less vulgar epoch would have called her 'reality'. (Delany 
1991 :431-432) 
Bat D- and Joe seem to be mirror characters, with the subway car becoming a 
spaceship, and the female that Joe bumps into becoming the female Blob. Getting off 
the subway car and moving through the rush-hour press of people, Joe thinks "of 
these crowds as a Blob, to which he was by and large indifferent" (Delany 1991:432). 
Joe has a particular gendered relationship to these people, which the story then 
amusingly classifies: he is "vaguely resentful" (Delany 1991 :432) of getting into too-
close contact with the men as "they might suspect he was not a heterosexual lustful-
panting-monster". He is equally "vaguely resentful" of brushing against the women, 
"since everyone knew all men were heterosexual lustful-panting-monsters". In the 
case of accidental contact, he had to "come on far more deferentially than any normal 
human should be expected to establish that, indeed, he was not a heterosexual lustful-
panting monster" (1991 :432-433): 
At twenty-six, actually, he knew how to deal with the men: stand or sit where 
you want and fuck 'em. They could move. The women, however, confused 
him a little, bewildered him. (Delany 1991 :433) 
Joe's ambivalence or lack of knowledge about women seems to be contrasted 
with Bat D-'s quest for the elusive Blob: the former's quest for identity and 
assimilation is transformed into the latter's physical quest for the elusive alien. The 
story follows Joe into a public restroom, and then it abruptly shifts to the Galactic 
Council: 
Each member entered the High and Icy Hall (here and there still crossed with 
traces of unbreathable fumes) to linger, silently and intently for an arbitrary 
while, before what looked to Bat D- for all the world like something from a 
book on Twentieth-Century toilet fixtures. (Delany 1991 :433) 
This is the public restroom rendered alien by SF, with the fumes referring to the 
antiseptic miasma in Joe's version of reality, and the members pausing before what 
could only be urinals. The transition back to Joe is made more abrupt by its explicit 
detail: 
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(5) Joe lingered at the next-to-the-end urinal. He had a thing for older guys 
with big, heavily veined cocks and small hands with overlong nails . . . . 
(Delany 1991 :434) 
Two things are clarified immediately by this scene: that Joe is, indeed, not a 
"heterosexual lustful-panting-monster'', and that, in terms of his own social context, 
he is as alien and exotic as Bat D-. What Delany achieves with the juxtaposition of 
Bat D- and Joe is to reverse the automatic, and geme-conditioned, perception that the 
former is the exotic and marginal element in the story. This is brought about through 
the text's insistence on Joe's obvious distance from 'normal' social reality. Joe is only 
an 'ordinary' person in that he is human - his sexual proclivity automatically assigns 
him the status of a possibly dangerous, and perverted, deviant. When this deviancy is 
clarified in the story, the nagging suggestion in the reader's mind that he could be 
imagining Bat D- as a front for his own tenuous grip on reality gains significance. 
The continuing detail in the scene is as precise as the description of Bat D- and his 
interstellar mission, and helps to concretise Joe's reality. 
While it is a given of SF as a genre to invent such detail in order to anchor it in 
a fictitious, or suspended, reality, it usually eschews explicit detail about sexual 
habits, for example, as such a focus on the corporeal could make it harder to sustain a 
suspension of disbelief2 It is also interesting to note how Delany begins the story with 
Joe's musings and misgivings about women, but then transforms this misogyny into a 
smokescreen for a deeper deviancy. 
A bum lurched through the door (probably not as old as this guy beside 
him with those long, long nails the colour of aluminium in winterlight. In his 
own too wide, too horny hand, at the memory only a second old - rather than 
what was beside him - Joe hardened ), moustache full of mucous, missing a 
lot of hair over orie ear, missing shirt buttons; and the breast pocket gone. His 
pants leg was ripped, knee to cuff, showing a shin like a soap. (Delany 
1991 :434) 
The 'bum', surely at a lower rung of the social ladder than Joe himself, has no 
delusions about what he encounters in the public restroom, and his disgust and 
reprobation are immediate and automatic: "'Aw, Jesus Christ, nothin' in here but a 
bunch of ... "' (1991 :434 ). The exact word is left unspoken, indicating, through 
2 Or it could be that SF, like detective and romance fiction, is simply very conservative due to its need 
to please a wide audience. 
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silence, the marginality of the activity (which yet finds space to express itself in the 
silences and interstices of the social matrix). 
It is clear that the 'bum' does, indeed, regard homosexuals as a lower example 
of the species than his own fallen status. Delany uses the 'bum' as the voice of moral 
outrage, by implication that of the 'reasonable reader', but the fact that his dismissal is 
uttered by such a clearly repulsive figure, whose mucous-laden moustache makes 
Joe's erection seem even more abnormal in the circumstances, reveals just how 
prejudicial and subjective such 'moral outrage' actually is. At this point it is unclear 
where Delany intends to take the story, for what started off as SF pastiche has 
unexpectedly been grounded in graphic social realism of a decidedly odd bent. While 
a clear sense of humour comes through in the ruminations of Bat D-, there is a 
disturbingly intense lasciviousness to the activities of Joe back in the 'normal' world. 
Delany has set up an artificial boundary between the two parts of his story, 
perhaps as a reflection of the boundary between SF and mainstream literature itself, 
but now he is crossing his own boundary by dislocating convention and expectation. 
Ironically, this is precisely what SF attempts to achieve with cognitive estrangement 
or sense of wonder (though Delany's intention is perhaps closer to Barthes's 
jouissance). The reader becomes acutely aware of this effect of dislocation when 
To Joe's right, two members of the Galactic Council glanced at each other, 
smiled. One shook his head. Hands down before white porcelain, busy with 
calculations, they manipulated and manipulated. (Delany 1991:434) 
At this point, the two separate realities of the story seem to merge, but the 
ontological tension between the two is maintained, and even heightened, because it is 
unknown if Joe actually saw the Galactic Council members or not. Joe's experience in 
the restroom ends with orgasm or consummation, suggesting a teleological climax. 
The use of the word 'lens' to refer to glasses (another indication that Joe is not a 
prime human specimen) makes the scene oddly alien: 
Joe turned back to the man beside him: grey hair, Vandyke beard, 
glasses. They exchanged glances, an.xious, enthusiastic, eye to lens, lens to 
groin. That crank (Joe had grown up in Seattle), those nails: Joe felt the 
warmth of orgasm heating the backs of his knees. (Delany 1991 :435) 
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Just as the reader seems to be getting into the flow of the story, as it were, it shifts 
again abruptly jo Bat D-'s climactic encounter with the Blob, whose femaleness is 
accentuated by the previously all-male interaction: 
She quivered there within the high, luminous geometries of Sumpter 
VII, contracting her gargantuan bulk inward from those bloated pseudopods 
into which her viscid soap-collared stuffs had spread. Nucleoli and vacuoles 
and just plain bubbles puckered her membrane. She could sense him, Bat 
could tell. Languorously, she heaved herself forward. (Delany 1991 :435-436) 
This description seems as graphic as that of the 'bum' in the restroom, but because it 
is of a fictitious creature, its physical reality is distanced from the reader. That is, its 
impact is muted, with cognitive estrangement here functioning as a sort of shield to 
prevent ontological contamination of the reader's own sense of reality. 
However, precisely due to the graphic nature of what transpired m the 
restroom - which distorts conventional human sexuality, but is still recognisably 
human - this description of the Blob assumes a heightened immediacy and obscenity, 
particularly with reference to its lack of form and its bulk, and the use of such 
suggestive words as 'membrane', 'puckered' and 'stuffs'. What follows is another 
version of the climactic moment in space opera when man and beast, alien and 
human, clash and meet: Bat D- employs his 'death-laser' - a phallic referent to Joe's 
own deployed member? The Blob replies: "'Burble, burble ... burble" (1991:436), 
rather deflating the seriousness of the occasion (or underlining the absurd inadequacy 
of language in such a situation). Bat D- fires, and is promptly attacked by the Blob, 
though the word 'attacked' is a pale approximation of the shockingly intimate 
encounter between the two. The description recalls Joe's sense of impending orgasm 
as a feeling of penetrating, permeating warmth: 
She smacked him with a strange and violet warmth that flattened him to the 
ground. She rolled across him, was in him at every orifice - ears, urethra, 
anus, mouth, nostrils. She was without him. She was within him. She rolled 
through him. She flowed around him. (Delany 1991: 436) 
This all-engulfing experience goes beyond the superficiality of a mere sexual 
encounter to approach what can only be described as a merger between the two. The 
violence and totality of the act also represents a kind of rape, with the Blob invading 
every orifice in an approximation of male sexual violation. It is also a symbolic 
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representation of the assimilation of the strange or alien, in which both parties are 
changed irrevocably by the physical act of union. What transpires next is the most 
radical moment of dislocation or discontinuity in the whole story, shattering all 
preconceived notions of the Blob and, indeed, the entire world of Bat D-. Whereas all 
previous dislocations are earmarked by parenthetical numbers, this one is embedded 
smoothly in the text itself, and flows with it, through it, and around, saturating it with 
its consequences just as the Blob embraced Bat D-: 
While he lay, gloriously stalled within her circling torque, with her 
within him within her, the Blob said: "Honey, what's with this shit resenting 
strange niggers on the subway? That sort of double-think earns you no 
popcorn coupons from the Big Movie Theatre in the sky. Try to imagine an 
older, less vulgar epoch. Just be your sweet self - you have a lovely smile. But 
Lord, this luciprene is getting to me. Tastes like old airplane glue!" (Delany 
1991 :436-437) 
Although we are firmly in the context of the Blob, the reference to the subway 
disconcertingly returns us to Joe's world, while the reference to "strange niggers" 
leads to a lucent flash of comprehension that Joe must be black and gay. The last 
thing the reader expects is the Blob speaking like a streetwise black person (and in 
particular to Bat D-, as this is more appropriate to Joe, suggesting that the two are one 
and the same person). The reference to the unpalatable taste of luciprene is both 
comic and a sly reference to the acts of fellatio in the restroom. It is also confirms the 
ontological centre of the Blob's version of reality, meaning that the reader is doubly 
disconcerted (just as Joe is doubly marginalised). 
Delany's point is that perhaps black gay people are just as alien to normal 
society as a make-believe creature like the Blob. Indeed, they pose a threat to 
conventional social morality, and could be seen as a negative influence on others. 
When Bat D- attempts to shoot the Blob - that is, to act like a typical aggressor or 
violator - the Blob attempts to assimilate him (and also to neutralise his ability to 
counterattack) in order to make him aware of her nature so that he does not have to 
fear her alienness, and instead can become enriched through this symbolic merger. 
What he finds, to his utmost surprise (and no doubt that of the reader), is that the 
supposed alien converses with him on Joe's level - as a gay black male. The Blob 
escapes, and we return to the restroom, where "Joe leaned his forehead on the tile 
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above the urinal, taking deep breaths" - not because he is actually Bat D- and is 
recovering from the encounter, but due to his exertions with the older man: 
The man beside him zipped his fly, squeezed Joe's jacketed elbow 
(with thatfine hand), and whispered: ''You know, fellow, you really get into it, 
don't you?" (One of the Council's feyer members had actually applauded. 
Another had gotten scared and run). (Delany 1991:437) 
The immediate question posed by this story is why Delany combines the two 
distinct narrative strands. Does it not detract from the social realism of Joe and the 
attendant message about marginality and tolerance to have this intertwined with a 
pastiche of SF tropes? And does not the SF pastiche emerge even more garish and 
fake for the contrast with the sordid realism of Joe and the restroom? 'Among the 
Blobs' is a difficult read, and is likely to frustrate conventional SF readers. But this is 
Delany's aim. He is attempting to show that the props of SF are not just literary 
scaffolding holding up the conventions of a skimpy story, but can form the skeleton 
for pressing issues and themes to be built upon. SF's playfulness and intertextuality 
expose a new horizon of signification, and offer the opportunity to rejuvenate what is 
often perceived to be a juvenile genre. 
'Among the Blobs' can be seen as an experiment that takes the marginal genre 
of SF, and contrasts it with social realism on the edge of ordinary society. In so doing, 
Delany breaks down the artificial boundary between SF and the world, and shows 
how SF, by imaging far distant futures, is actually reinvigorating the present by 
engaging in a purposeful dialectic with the here and now. This boils down to a 
declaration of intent: SF is serious fiction. Another lesson offered by the story is the 
particular modes of reading it engages, and what this means for how we interpret and 
understand everyday reality around us. Commenting on his first collection of critical 
essays, The Jewel-Hinged Jaw (1977), Delany writes in the Preface: 
The centre provides a fine view of certain aspects of our object of 
consideration and a very poor one of others. Among the poorest it provides is 
a view of that object's edges. (1977: 12) 
Combined with his view that his essays exhibited "a consistency in their 
movement toward a language model" (1977:12), it can be seen that the seeds of 
Delany's interest in the 'margin of the margin' and structuralism were sown early. But 
Delany's critical path has evolved and matured considerably since 1977, when he 
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took a resolutely formalist stance at the outset: "Put in opposition to 'style', there is 
no such thing as 'content"' (1977:33). It is clear why a literary-critical mode such as 
Russian Formalism would appeal to Delany - a school of literary theory that 
developed in Russia in 1915, it focused on 'literariness', or "the sum of 'devices' that 
distinguish literary language from ordinary language" (Baldick 1990:195-196). 
In terms of SF, Delany wanted to delineate the devices that make it function as 
a genre, and to incorporate this into a single overarching theory. He argues that "a 
distinct level of subjunctivity informs all the words in an [SF] story at a level that is 
different from ·that which informs naturalistic fiction, fantasy, or reportage" 
(1977:43). Subjunctivity is the 'tension' that runs between signifier and signified. The 
'subjunctivity level' for naturalistic fiction, for example, is something that 'could 
have happened', whereas that for fantasy is clearly something that 'could not have 
happened' (1977 :44). 
But when spaceships, ray-guns, or more accurately any correction of 
images that indicates the future appears in a series of words and marks it as 
[SF], the subjunctivity level is changed once more: These objects, these 
convocations of objects into situations and events, are blanketly defined by: 
have not happened. (1977 :44 )3 
The particular subjunctivity level of SF has sub-categories as well, including 
events that 'might happen', such as ''technological and sociological predictive tales";· 
events that 'will not happen', such as "science-fantasy stories"; and events that 'have 
not happened yet', such as "cautionary dystopias" (1977:44). Delany details this 
elaborate schema in order to outline the potentiality of SF. He argues that "the 
particular subjunctive level of [SF] expands the freedom of the choice of words that 
can follow another group of words meaningfully", but cautions that "it limits the way 
we employ the corrective processes as we move between them" (Delanyl 977:44). 
Clearly at this early stage of his theoretical development, Delany would have 
had great trouble with a story such as his own 'Among the Blobs', which deliberately 
conflates several subjunctivity levels, and makes rather a mockery of his neat theory 
of the purity of the various levels. In order to illustrate how these different levels 
work, Delany takes the sentence 'The red sun is high, the blue low' as an example. If 
this is read as naturalistic fiction, we can only judge the sentence in terms of what we 
3 An interesting question is: could they have happened though? To what extent is SF about predicting 
or anticipating the future? 
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can observe, while fantasy allows us 'pseudo-explanations'. But the sentence 
functions best in terms of SF,4 because in this instance it can be seen to draw on "the 
physically explainable universe'', which has "a much wide range than the personally 
observable" (Delany 1977:45). Delany comments on the agility of SF to tum 
comprehensible what is mere nonsense on other subjunctive levels: 
The particular verbal freedom of [SF], coupled with the corrective process that 
allows the whole range of the physically explainable universe, can produce the 
most violent leaps of imagery. (Delany 1977:45). 
But how do sentences combine to form an SF text, for example? Delany 
explains that we have to start with the proposition that "the story is what happens in 
the reader's mind" (1977:36). As one word is read after the other, they accumulate in 
"numerous inter- and over-weaving relations", but the process itself is "corrective and 
visionary rather than progressive" (Delany 1977:36). The result is that "each new 
word revises the complex picture we had a moment before" (Delany 1977:36-37). 
Broderick comments that this is an "unlikely but thoroughly engaging model of 
reading which Delany advances in some detail" (1995 :66). What is clt:l,ar is that SF is 
indeed a process of reading, in that information is presented to the reader that can only 
be evaluated or corrected in terms of later information. For example, the word 
'flutchiilating' in 'Among the Blobs' is never explained properly, as it is fictitious, but 
we gradually gain a clearer picture of what it might mean as we learn more about the 
alien creature and her particular subjunctive or ontological level. 
In his 1994 essay collection, entitled Silent Interviews, Delany maintains that 
the notion of SF as a way or process of reading has been "the fundamental notion 
governing most of my SF criticism for the last 15 years" (l 994a:273). Therefore the 
importance of these early theoretical forays cannot be denied in shaping the trajectory 
of Delany's critical path. Broderick comments that, while the validity of this "parable 
of the reading process" (1995: 67) is questionable, particularly in the face of modern 
semiotics and linguistics, where the whole concept of words and their meanings is 
minutely analysed, "it nicely allegorises some of the processes of coding and 
decoding called up by genres and generic hybrids alike" (1995:67). 
4 Delany comments dramatically: "Look! We are worlds and worlds away. The first sun is huge ... The 
landscape crawls with long red shadows and stubby blue ones ... Look at the speaker himself. Can you 
see him? You have seen his doubled shadow ... "(1977:40). The point is not so much that SF pennits 
such flights of fancy, but that it renders them intelligible, purposeful, and entirely rational. 
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An important corollary of this is that the subjunctivity of SF can be seen as 
referring to a mega-text or "vast intertextual 'hyper-text': part encyclopaedia of 
knowledge drawn from current scientific data and theories, part iconography 
established in previous [SF], part generic repertoire of standard narrative moves, their 
probability-weighted variants, and their procedures for generating new moves" 
(Broderick 1995:67-68). Importantly, this approach also emphasises the close 
relationship between text and reader, as the reader is largely responsible for 
generating a text's meaning - a relationship that Delany has developed throughout his 
career. However, his simple taxonomic classification of the subjunctive levels of 
different kinds of fiction was to develop into the recomplicated view that SF is 
'paraliterature', or "received categorically other than 'literature"' (Broderick 
1995:70). If SF is a process of reading, then what prevents one applying a different 
kind of reading process; and would the results be the same? Broderick examines this 
question of demarcation: 
Demarcation 'becomes one with the problem of intention and richness: 
1s it clear or unclear that the writer intended a particular complex to be 
employed; and is it clear or clear that a text reads richly under a particular 
protocol complex? The situation that continually contours our critical 
responsibility is this: we are free to read any text by any reading protocol we 
wish'. (Broderick 1995:71) 
This problem is clearly illustrated in a story such as 'Among the Blobs': is it a 
mainstream story with SF elements added, or an SF story with mainstream elements 
included? And does the meaning or intention of the story change depending on which 
viewpoint is adopted? Another possibility, of course, is that Delany merely wanted to 
highlight the problem, without any desire for resolution: "'The criterion is simply how 
useful and interesting the resultant discussion is, how it enriches our sense of the 
reading"' (Broderick 1995 :71 ). However, Broderick argues that no text can be 
indeterminable, as it must, by definition, contain certain clues as to its subjunctive 
level, as it were: 
. . . one cannot, finally, posit a plurality of effective reading codes without 
supposing that readers do, and should, strive to adjust their coding protocols 
on the assumption that the writer knowingly put some detectable set of codes 
into play in any given text, even if these codes are then pitted against one 
another in a self-reflexive novel .... (Broderick 1995 :71) 
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As I have shown, Delany himself is a supreme practitioner of pitting codes 
against one another: Broderick uses the term 'allographer' to describe his vocation: 
"one who writes the Other" (1995: 117). He continues that Delany "inscribes in his 
texts' signifiers and syntagms the elusive face of the excluded, the unadmitted ... the 
other" (1995: 117). 5 Broderick defines Delany' s later development as a theoretician 
and writer as examining the cultural coding of society itself, and detailing alternative 
models of social reality in his fiction: 
Delany has recently focused on the cultural schemata or scripts which underlie 
or imbricate those inscribed discourses we 'read' through our competency in 
cultural coding. Delany's own fictive discourse has increasingly involved a 
paradoxical search for rich ('valid') heuristic models of this kind which are 
immediately subjected to ceaseless revision, inversion and deconstruction ..... 
One principle way, for Delany, is by refusing to respect conventional limits 
between fiction and reflections on fiction. . . . . And it is in precisely this self-
reflexive distancing . . . that at last we are sure how appropriate it is to read 
Delany's fictions as allegories of their own production and consumption. 
(Broderick 1995:128-129,134) 
How can a story like 'Among the Blobs' be interpreted as an allegory of its 
own production and consumption, and how valid is this to Delany's other fiction? 
'Among the Blobs' models the process by which reality is constructed or mediated 
through language by presenting two seemingly similar but crucially divergent takes 
on parallel versions of a particular experienced reality. Neither reality is foregrounded 
to the extent that the reader can lay claim to the pre-eminence of one over the other. 
The two do not exist in a seamless dialectic; rather the seams are rough and obvious in 
order to highlight the juxtaposition. 
Delany's concern with language and modelling is evident in as early a novel 
as Babel-17, so it seems distorting to argue that his critical path aspired to this 
particular developmental point. But how does such a disparate novel as The Mad Man 
share the same theoretical concerns? Is it a continuation of Delany's theoretical 
forays, or a branching into a totally different direction? How does this novel reflect on 
Broderick's notion that "one can trace through [Delany' s] essays a critical trajectory 
5 Broderick comments: "If his first published novel was a gaudy exercise in romantic quest, by his 
eighth he was writing a veritable mythology of undecidability, and this in 1966, before Derrida had 
arrived in America with the first tidings of deconstruction" (1995:117). This, of course, was The 
Einstein Intersection, "a meditation on difference and a manifesto for textual and cultural 
dissemination" (1995:117). 
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launched from a distrust of the content/form antithesis and peaking in an idiosyncratic 
blend of semiotics, Marxism, psychoanalysis and deconstruction"? (1995:67). 
First, it is important to note that The Mad Man is very much a novel of the 
'other' - namely, that which is excluded from society or exists on its periphery or 
margin. In SF terms, this 'other' is often categorised as being 'alien' in the sense that 
it is physically removed from Earth in terms of space and evolutionary development. 
In Babel-17, these are the Invaders; in The Mad Man, they are simply homeless 
people, but the social periphery they inhabit in terms of their relation to the social 
centre is equally valid.6 By applying deconstruction to unravel the binaries and 
hierarchies that underpin our society, Delany reveals that this 'other' or 'alien' is a 
social construct, and how the power relations underpinning this binary opposition are 
constituted. Terry Eagleton offers the following exposition of one of the most 
fundamental binary oppositions, namely man/woman, of which the equivalent binary 
in SF is human/alien: 
Woman is the opposite, the 'other' of man: she is non-man, defective man, 
assigned a chiefly negative value in relation to the male first principle. But 
equally man is what he is only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out this other 
or opposite, defining himself in antithesis to it, and his whole identity is 
therefore caught up and put at risk in the very gesture by which he seeks to 
assert his unique, autonomous existence. Woman is not just an other in the 
sense of something beyond his ken, but an other intimately related to him as 
the image of what he is not, and therefore an essential reminder of what he is. 
Man therefore needs this other even as he spurns it .... (1983:132-133) 
What Eagleton is saying is that the 'other', through its oppositional nature, 
also has a definitional role to play in anchoring social reality. The gap between the 
two is not a sterile divisive space; rather it is a sliding interface of active interpretation 
and reassessment. But Eagleton goes even further by stating that this very exclusion is 
the critical component of self-definition, for what is excluded is done so through fear 
and ignorance of contamination; the suppressed possibility is that the 'other' could 
6 Ursula K Le Guin comments: "Where are the poor, the people who work hard and go to bed hungry? 
Are they ever persons, in SF? No. They appear as vast anonymous masses ... existing for one purpose: 
to be led by their superiors .... I think it's time SF writers - and their readers! - stopped daydreaming 
about a return to the age of Queen Victoria, and started thinking about the future. I would like to see ... 
some serious consideration of such deeply radical, futuristic concepts as Liberty, Equality and 
Fraternity. And remember that about 53 per cent of the Brotherhood of Man is the Sisterhood of 
Woman" (1989:95-96). 
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become normal, and is, indeed, part of normality itself, and exists only because it is 
defined by that normality: 
... one reason why such exclusion is necessary is because she may not be quite 
so other after all. Perhaps she stands as a sign of something in man himself 
which he needs to repress . . . Perhaps what is outside is also somehow inside, 
what is alien also intimate - so that man needs to police the absolute frontier 
between the two realms as vigilantly as he does just because it may always be 
transgressed, has always been transgressed, and is much less absolute than it 
appears. (Eagleton 1983: 132-133) 
One of Delany's main interests is this 'absolute frontier' and its possible 
transgression. An example of how he turns his own texts into models of their own 
production and consumption is the dialogue or dialectic between KL Steiner, "a 
mathematician specialising in 'Naming, Listing, and Counting Theory'", and SL 
Kermit, a "gay but conservative archaeologist" (Broderick 1995:134).7 In 'The Tale 
of Plagues and Carnivals', Leslie and Kermit engage in a spirited discussion about the 
shortcomings of Delany's fictional account of the impact of an AIDS-like epidemic 
on a primitive society. Their main objection is that "'inexorably the Discourse of the 
Master displaces everyone else's"' (1989b:443-444). The Master represents the 
author, whose privileged position as arbiter of the text's meaning represents 
authoritarianism, conservatism and patriarchal society in general. By dislocating the 
traditional role of the Master/ Author through such narrative devices as the SL 
Kermit/KL Steiner debate, Delany engages with the very constructedness of his own 
fiction, and holds this up as a mirror to social reality as well. 
By blurring the boundary between generic protocols - introducing a strand of 
semiotic debate in Babel-17, disrupting the social realism of The Mad Man with a 
mythical beast traipsing around the Hudson, conflating SF elements and everyday 
events in 'Among the Blobs' - Delany is pushing the envelopes of the genres in 
which he works, and opening them up to new possibilities and potentialities. Ray 
7 See, for example, Kermit's comments in Neveryona (1988): "'What is Grafton books? (Hopefully a 
more recherche line out of some small North English university press. But I doubt it.) And who is this 
Delany? ... Leslie used to be enamoured of a bizarre species of anti-literature (more generously called 
'paraliterature' ... ), published under gaudy paper covers - 'scientifiction' or some such .... It sounds 
like she's gotten me involved, somehow, in this 'SF', as she used to call it. (She actually would try to 
get me to read the stuff!) If that's what she has gotten me involved with, I shall never be able to set 
boot in the mahogany-panelled halls of the Spade and Brush Club again. (Professor Loaffer will guffaw 
and bang me on the shoulder, and invite me for a pint, and ask rude questions about flying saucers 1mtil 
I have to say something rude in retort .... (532-533). 
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Davis points out that "generic-specific content is not a sign of weakness. Only a sign 
of genre", and goes on to point out that "a given piece of fiction can fit more than one 
set of protocols" (2000). 'Literary' reading protocols are characterised by their 
flexibility, meaning that they can be adapted or changed to suit an author's own 
interpretation of a particular genre. This is a risky enterprise, because a 'fan' 
conditioned to a particular genre through repeated exposure has certain expectations, 
and might feel betrayed at the flaunting of convention (and then refrain from buying 
any more Delany titles). But what Delany demands from his readers - those who are 
prepared to read The Mad Man as easily as they would read Babel-17, for example -
is to widen their reading horizons, through dislocation, and to go beyond the 
limitations ofliterary protocols and genre conventions: 
. . . a fan of a genre, who responds positively to genre-specific content for its 
o\vn sake, might appreciate within the genre more quickly (and feel more 
betrayed when genre conventions are sabotaged). But fannishness is not 
required. Sufficient to begin with is a willingness to let down one's guard, to 
admit that a book devoted to telepathy and mutants can tell us things a 
mainstream book can't. So can a book devoted to careful descriptions of 
sexual acts, although porn is especially subject to dismissal-by-genre content. 
(Davis 2000) 
The explicit subject matter of The Mad Man seems to indicate that it is 
pornography. But the marginal sexual practices depicted, though graphic, are entirely 
consensual, and linked to a strong narrative development. This immediately confuses 
the book's categorisation as gratuitous titillation. Indeed, this definition becomes 
dislocated, and the genre it is supposed to be shoehorned into is suddenly enriched 
with new possibilities. Similarly, the linguistic issues raised in Babel-17 add a new 
dimension to the surface gloss of this unabashedly lurid space opera. Delany's 
particular achievement with this practice of dislocation is that such concerns do not 
seem tacked on as peripheral dressing to the story at hand. He works within the strict 
confines of generic convention but, paradoxically, dislocates convention at the same 
time.8 
8 Delany holds words (and worlds) up to the light to show them shimmer. A good metaphor for this is 
provided by the title of The Motion of Light in Water. Both seem transparent mediums, but a ray of 
light is diffracted and refracted by water to reveal the hidden palette of the colour spectrum. Delany 
does the same with gemes and reading protocols: they shimmer into a colourful, and seemingly infinite, 
cascade of possible diversions and inversions. 
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The key question is not why Delany could produce such a 'perverse' novel as 
The Mad Man, which seems light-years apart from Babel-17, that should engage our 
attention, but why we respond to it in precisely this fashion. This response reveals the 
social conditioning that spurns the marginal and the outcast in order to stabilise the 
social fabric in terms of conventional social mores. It is also important to realise the 
scale of the obstacles that Delany confronts in The Mad Man - in a sense he is 
attempting to 'normalise' perversity, but he cannot do this in a tragic context that 
might suggest that the perversion itself is the cause of the hero's moral downfall. This 
requires a very delicate balancing act or, as Davis eloquently puts it, "a very different 
contract of marriage between heaven and hell, between desire and the world": 
... to introduce the 'perverse' into a tragic situation is by default to imply that 
perversion itself is to blame. A serious story involving the perverse (that is, a 
story in which sexual activity plays a pivotal role, since all sexual activity, 
closely observed, partakes of the perverse) must ensure that 'perversity' in 
itself cannot be mistaken as the cause of a tragedy which would've been 
averted by some universal (and unexamined) 'normal' sexuality. Or at least it 
must do so if it's to have any hope of disturbing the status quo. (Davis 2000) 
'Normal' sexuality remains unexamined, meaning it is taken for granted, 
precisely because the "history of sex in narrative art - particularly of gay and lesbian 
sex - is a history of double-cryptology, of codes which may be overlooked by the 
many" (Davis 2000). The Mad Man sets out to normalise transgressive sex by being 
"a realistic novel about promiscuous gay sex in the age of Reagan" (Davis 2000). 
Davis says that, given the "insanely dangerous" sexual habits it depicts - dangerous in 
the sense of HIV and even ordinary STD infection, in a time when the full 
consequences of Aids were first being fathomed- the most 'shocking' thing about the 
novel "is not just that it's so clear-sighted, but that it's so happy" (2000): " ... the 
structural puzzles of Delany's other novels would be out of place here, in a book 
dedicated to the pleasure of shaping one's life - philosophical, economic, social, and 
sexual life - out of emotional and physical messiness" (2000). This is reflected in a 
straightforward and colloquial style that does not beat about the bush, so to speak, in 
conveying its message: 
'Yeah ... !' The big man said, and took another swallow of beer. 'Ain't 
nothin' like peein' on a white boy, is there?' Nodding to us, he turned- 'It just 
makes everybody feel good, don't it?' (Delany 1994b:l43) 
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Broderick comments that Delany's literary theories, developed through his 
fictive texts, "urge deconstruction and the obliteration of auctorial centrality or 
regnancy", but notes that his stories "are blatantly derived from the stuff of 
biography" (1995: 138) - even if this is equally blatantly denied, as in The Mad Man: 
So while Delany is a declared poststructuralist, his fiction is articulated 
about a semiotic programme which seems, at its limit, to merge with humanist, 
albeit highly relativist, liberal pluralism. Even in his most strenuous efforts to 
attain the transgressive, to treat the human subject as an object of cultural 
manufacture, he seems to be writing his own life and his apologia for it from a 
position of extreme and admirable wilfulness. (Broderick 1995: 13 8) 
Delany's achievement lies equally in his decoding of cultural systems and institutions, 
and his transcription of his own lived experiences. This leads to the paradox that, 
while arguing that society is a construct, and the human subject is an "object of 
cultural manufacture", his own unique and irreducible individuality always comes to 
the fore. This leads David Samuelson to conclude that Delany "both clings to and 
defies genrefication" (Samuelson 2000), as his stated aim of dislocating genre 
boundaries can only take place within the context of genre itself: "Frequently 
dissolving borders between fiction and non-fiction, he interweaves critical, 
theoretical, and autobiographical elements into both" (Samuelson 2000). With regard 
to the explicit nature of The Mad Man, and what it might portend for Delany's future 
output, he notes that his age has had an impact on his subject matter: 
As a gay man pushing fifty, I'm aware that the older person knows 
much of what she or he does about sex through the holes and absences in the 
personality its increasing failure begins to highlight. 
Those absences are the site of pure desire - sometimes the most 
painful of states, which the young, by and large, simply do not have to contend 
with. 
. .. I write about homosexuality because it's been the site of most of my 
own sexual experience. (Delany 1994a:219) 9 
Sex is an important subject matter, for questions of the flesh are entangled 
with questions of power relations, and how society mediates both desire and deviancy. 
Homosexuality, on the other hand, is equally important, because it is marginal to the 
9 Delany notes that his sexual encounters are "down to about 75 to 100 times a year. Up until 1992, this 
was closer to 300 times a year. But then I established a permanent (open) relationship. I get an HIV test 
every year. And I remain HIV negative" (Delany 1999:461 ). 
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prevailing sexual discourse, and Delany' s main area of concern is the marginal. He 
describes himself as "this weird Delany guy" (1999: 119), and as '"a science fiction 
writer- a black science fiction writer, who dabbles in gay studies"' (1999:98). Delany 
adds that "of course you can't write effective fiction without putting something of 
yourself in it" (1999: 120) - and in his autobiography, for example, he has shown how 
his life and fiction have merged from as early as Babe l-17. 
Delany's contention that he only 'dabbles' in gay studies seems disingenuous, 
for The Mad Man is his biggest novel in terms of length since DJUJ!gren, while his 
recent output, such as Bread and Wine, Times Square Red/Times Square Blue, and 
Shorter Views, are all about 'gay studies'. Is one to conclude, then, that the SF writer 
has been transformed into a gay writer? And what impact has the 'SF output' had on 
the 'gay writing' (and continues to have), and vice versa? Which aspect of Delany's 
marginality do we privilege in the discourse we construct around and about him? This 
leads to the problem of definition - of Delany himself, and of the margin in which he 
operates: 
The idea of 'definition', with its suggestion of the scientific, can be associated 
easily with the idea of 'mastery' - which, in tum, can be easily associated with 
the idea of 'origin' and 'craft.' But the fact is, we do not master an art - and 
certainly we do not master it through knowing the 'proper definition' or 
'mastering its origins' or simply learning its 'craft.' (Delany 1999:238) 
In other words, Delany's authority on matters gay and black stems from the 
fact that he himself is gay and black. However, this does not mean that Delany can be 
'defined' - only that he occupies a particular 'positionality'. It follows then that his 
experience of society, and the power relations that he is enmeshed in, differ from the 
experience and social subset of, say, a white straight SF \\'Titer. It also implies that 
Delany cannot ignore or subsume the fact that he is black and gay, even in his SF 
output, which ostensibly has nothing to do with these issues. 
It's too easy to reduce the problem of 'the gay writer' to the split 
between those gay writers (like myself) who, one the one hand, feel that all art 
is political one way or the other and that all they write is from a gay position -
and, in my case, from a black and male position as well - and those writers 
who, on the other hand, feel that all they write is fundamentally apolitical, 
even if it involves gay topics; that they are just writers who happen to be gay, 
or, indeed, black, or female, or male, or Jewish or what-have-you. (Delany 
1999:111) 
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Delany states that, while he was married in 1961, by 1964 he had decided that 
he was gay. In 1967 he had published 'Aye, and Gomorrah ... ', about a "future 
perversion, clearly an analogue of current homosexuality" (1999:90), and 'Time 
Considered as a Helix of Semi-precious Stones' in 1968, "about homosexual S&M 
which went on to win both a Nebula and a Hugo" (1999:90). 10 Delany continues that, 
by 1969, "it was common knowledge throughout the [SF] field that I was gay" 
(1999:90), even though he was still living with his wife, Marilyn Hacker. In 1975, he 
taught his first university class and, within the first two weeks, told them that he was 
gay (1999:91). This sense of polymorphous identity lead to the criticism that Delany's 
published persona differed from who he was in real life, and that he was in effect 
trying to pull the wool over reader's eyes:11 
In the middle seventies I received a harsh criticism from a gay friend 
because a biographical paragraph that appeared in the back of a number of my 
books mentioned that I was married to the poet Marilyn Hacker, that we had a 
daughter, and that Marilyn had won the National Book Award for Poetry. Not 
only was I trying to gain prestige through Marilyn's reputation . . . I was 
falsely presenting myself as a straight man, happily married, with a family, 
even though in those years Marilyn and I no longer lived together. (Delany 
1999:91).12 
Delany recounts how, in 1977, he sat on a panel on 'gay SF' at the World 
Science Fiction Convention in Phoenix, Arizona, and remembers that "it was the first 
time I'd sit in front of an audience and talk about being gay" (Delany 1999:92). 
After the panel had taken place, I was astonished how quickly I 
became 'Samuel R. Delany, the black, gay [SF] writer' in the straight media 
... Any newspaper mention of me ... seemed obliged to tag me as gay (and 
black), and if the article was by a straight reporter, usually the tag appeared in 
the first sentence. (Delany 1999:93) 
10 Delany states that he thought most readers would assume he was gay, but from my own personal 
experience, it did not even enter my mind when I read these stories (this was long before Delany's 
'promiscuous autobiography' stage). One of the main aims of SF is to construct future social scenarios 
and, combined with the fact that one not familiar with gay culture would certainly not recognise this as 
an underscoring theme, the stories seemed sin1ply to be radical versions of future societies. 
11 I think it was also inferred that, by identifying himself as being gay, Delany was perceived as 
admitting that his marriage had been a mistake or even a travesty. This is clearly incorrect: Delany 
came to the realisation that he was gay as part of a long process of 'coming out' and acceptance. He has 
a daughter, of course, and remains friends with his wife, who helped him in this process as well. 
12 Delany says he innocently included the fact about his wife's award out of a sense of altruistic pride. 
Conceding that "my friend's criticism had its point", he tried to change the blurb, but the exigencies of 
publishing meant that this only came into effect a year and a half later (1999:92). 
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This leads back to Delany questioning the value of definition, as it is a totalising 
phenomenon. By being 'tagged' in the media as a gay, black SF writer, a particular 
signification was being developed to represent his authorial and personal identity. 
Delany remarks that, "after only a little while, the situation began to seem vaguely 
hysterical, as if, through an awful oversight, someone might not know I was gay" 
(1999:93). This form of 'tagging' or identification is also a means of pigeonholing 
Delany, of getting a handle on who he is, and thereby preventing messy social 
contamination or slippage between the boundaries of society and any possibly 
transgressive forces. 
Delany continues that, in the late 1970s, when his and Marilyn's daughter was 
four, he was instrumental in establishing a gay fathers' support group, known 
unofficially as The Daddies (his daughter's term) (1999:93,96). By the mid-1980s, he 
was giving regular lectures in which the personal examples he cited came from his 
own life as a gay man (1999:94). In 1987 he began writing "a memoir, focusing 
specifically on changes in attitudes toward sex - gay sex at that - from 1955 through 
the sixties". This, of course, was The Motion of Light in Water. AfI these varied 
incidents are examples of 'coming out', the term made fashionable at the time to 
describe the act of the public declaration of one's homosexuality. 13 This statement of 
sexual definition is as problematic as Delany being defined as a gay, black SF writer, 
for it places a boundary between homosexuality and the rest of society. As Delany 
notes, "there seemed to be an oppressive aspect of surveillance and containment 
intertwined with it" (1999:90-91): 
One does not come out once. Rather, one comes out again and again and again 
- because the dominant discourse in this country is still one of heterosexist 
oppression and because it still controls the hysteria to know who's gay and 
who's not. Heterosexuals do not have to come out - indeed cannot come out -
because there is no discursive pressure to deny their ubiquity (and, at the same 
time, deny their social contribution and the sexual validity of their growth and 
development, the event field-effect of their sexuality) and to penalise them for 
their existence. This is the same discourse that constrains 'coming out,' for all 
the act's utopian thrust, to a condition of heterosexist surveillance. (Delany 
1999:96-97). 
13 Dr Deirdre Byrne, my thesis supervisor, instructed me to insert the following: "Somewhere, my dear, 
you need a footnote saying that you are gay". 
234 
Delany says that 'coming out' in Phoenix "meant that the straight media could 
now define me, regularly, as a 'gay [SF] writer'" (1999:97). This placed a convenient 
label on him to make it easier for people to 'read' who he was, but Delany argues that 
he strongly resists the idea that such a label can reveal the totality of his identity. It is 
part of a greater societal discourse in which his marginality has to be partitioned off in 
order to accentuate its supplementary, or inferior, status. Delany notes that the 
experience of being gay "changed me, and changed me for the better" (1999:97): 
... though [it] showed me much and changed my life in ways that I can only 
celebrate, I cannot claim that [it] identified or defined anything of me but only 
illuminated parts of my endlessly iterated (thus always changing) situation. 
Firmly I believe that's how it should be. (Delany 1999:97)14 
What is clear from this brief account of Delany' s own 'coming out' process is 
that the discourse which states that The Mad Man is an aberration on the part of a 
successful and respected SF \vriter is a patently heterosexist construction, for the 
novel is the latest product in a long process of Delany using his own lived experience 
to fuel his fiction. It also leads to the larger problem of definition as a conceptual tool 
used to entrench a dominant discourse. By stating that Delany is a gay, black SF 
writer, have we come any closer to determining who he 'really' is, or just reiterated a 
simple statistical fact? 
the rhetoric of singular discovery, of revelation, of definition is one of the 
conceptual tools by which dominant discourses repeatedly suggest there is no 
broad and ranging field of events informing the marginal. This is true of [SF] 
versus the pervasive field of literature; art as compared to social labour; blacks 
as a marginal social group to a central field of whites; and gay sexuality as 
marginal to a heterosexual norm. That rhetoric becomes part of the way the 
marginal is trivialised, distorted, and finally oppressed. (Delany 1999:74) 
Delany avers that "it is in the margin between claims of truth and the claims of 
textuality that all discursive structures (that which allow us to read rhetoric) are 
formed" (1999:48). The fact that Delany is a gay, black SF writer and the output he 
14 This applies to a 'geme definition' as well, which "is a wholly imaginary ol:Jject of the same 
ontological status as unicorns, Hitler's daughter, and the current King of France. 'Definitions' of[SF] 
are impossible for the same reason that 'definitions' of poetry, the novel, or drama are impossible .... 
What we are dealing with here is a dialogue, a collection of dialogues, a set of debates, a range of ideas 
and a range of thinkers, of which only a larger or smaller fraction can be of interest to any particular 
person" (Delany 1999:148). 
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produces - which is not always SF; and, when ostensibly SF, is often disputed as such 
- produces a discursive or dialectic space in which a discourse can be generated. 
Delany's own marginality, and the paraliterary arena on which he is focused, produce 
a tension between them, and help to generate 'the margin of the margin' as a critical 
concept. Delany maintains that "a far more appropriate model for any art work is that 
which takes place in the margin of another margin. Thus the paraliterary arts, such as 
[SF], may become a privileged model for analysing the ways in which all art is 
produced, is disseminated, and functions" (1999: 172 ). However, the word 'privileged' 
is problematic, for while paraliterature is conceived of as "a generically constant body 
of writing that lurks around outside the library of serious or authentic literature" 
(1999:203), there is a danger that new works are slotted into its 'upper ranks', or that 
Delany is perceived as its main proponent or representative, as demonstrated by his 
own work: 
As an artist I (I want to add, 'of course') resist the idea of my work 
containing any summary of itself. As I understand it, such a summary would 
make - or at least take steps toward making- the rest of the work superfluous. 
(Delany 1999:123). 
This leads Delany to position himself "at the particular boundary of the 
everyday that borders the unspeakable, where language, like a needle infected with 
articulation, threatens to pierce some ultimate and final territory - however unclear, as 
we approach it, that limit is (if not what lies beyond it) when we attempt analytic 
seizure" (1999:61 ). An example of such "analytic seizure" is the act of definition 
itself, while the "ultimate and final territory" Delany refers to is marginality itself, or 
the 'unspeakable': 
The unspeakable is, of course, not a boundary dividing a positive area 
of allowability from a complete and totalised negativity, a boundary located at 
least one step beyond the forbidden (and the forbidden, by definition - no? -
must be speakable if its proscriptive power is to function). If we pursue the 
boundary as such, it will recede before us as a limit of mists and vapours. 
Certainly it is not a line drawn in any absolute way across speech or writing. It 
is not a fixed and locable point of transgression that glows hotter and brighter 
as we approach it till, as we cross it, its searing heat burns away all possibility 
of further articulation. (Delany 1999:61) 
Definition, therefore, does serve a purpose in that it permits articulation. 
Delany says that the notion of the 'unspeakable' as a fixed boundary between 
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normality and its transgression is false, for the closer we try to approach this boundary 
in either speech or writing, the further it recedes, until it dissolves totally in the 
dissolution of marginality. Instead of the concept of the boundary, it may be best to 
think of "a set of positive conventions governing what can be spoken of (or written 
about) in general" (Delany 1999:61). This is crucial, because "the forbidden, by 
definition . . . must be speakable if its proscriptive power is to function" (Delany 
1999:61). And speaking, or writing about, the 'unspeakable' helps to bring it into the 
ambit of normal discourse. 
What margin does the unspeakable inhabit? Once again we are confronted 
with the problem of definition. Delany comments that "the unspeakable is always in 
the column you are not reading" (1999:65), and that, for him, difference "is still the 
source of information, of interest, or, indeed, of pleasure" (1999: 133), with the aim of 
"the liberation of a range of subjects frequently marginalised under the rubric of 'the 
perverse"' (1999:111). 'Difference', of course, refers to poststructuralism and the 
decoding of binary oppositions, and teasing out the power relations in which they are 
intertwined: 
It is the story of two opposing forces whose right and proper relation is one of 
hierarchy, of subordination. It is the story of the battle of the sexes, the 
antagonism between man and woman whose right and proper positionality is 
for woman to stand beside, behind, and to support man. It is the story of the 
essential opposition between white and black whose proper resolution is for 
black to provide the shadows and foreground the highlights for white . . . . It is 
the Other as the locus, as the position, as the place where the all-important Self 
can indulge in a bit of projection . . . . It is the story in which the frail, fragile, 
and erring body is properly (as property, as an owned place) a vessel for the 
manly, mighty, and omnipotent mind; where masturbation (or, indeed, 
homosexuality or any of the other 'perversions') is a fall-back only when right 
and authentic heterosexuality is not available; where the great, taxing, but 
finally rich literary tradition, with its entire academically established and 
supported canon, occasionally allows us to give place for a moment to those 
undemanding (because they are without power to demand) diversions (those 
objects we find when we tum from our right place of traditional responsibility) 
of paraliterary production - mysteries, comics, pornography, and [SF]. 
(Delany 1999:143) 
Bearing in mind Delany's exhortation that he resists any summation of himself 
through his own work, one could hold up the above quote as a cogent and trenchantly 
ironic summation of his thematic concerns, with the poststructuralist mode of 
discourse providing "a good chance for us to forge a dialogue in which to speak with 
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both passion and precision" (1999:178). However, as with definition, Delany warns of 
a tendency within poststructuralist thinking towards "a totalising urge, a will to 
knowledge-as-power, a desire for mastery" (1999: 141 ), which underpins those 
'themes' outlined above. Poststructuralist philosophy teaches that 'totalising urges' 
"are distorting, biasing, untrustworthy, ideologically loaded, and finally blinding", 
meaning that they "must be approached with continuous oppositional vigilance" 
(1999: 141 ). This vigilance needs to be directed at the notion of a 'theme' itself: 
. . . this same critique of the totalising impulse to mastery holds that even the 
social process of constituting a theme is, itself, an example of the same 
totalising urge. The critique holds: A 'theme' has the same political structure 
as a prejudice. (Delany 1999:141) 
Delany explains that both theme and thesis derive from a Greek word meaning 
"to place, to pose, to posit, to position, or to let stand" (1999:141). This means that, 
from an etymological point of view, a 'theme' is grounded in the concept of "having, 
or holding to, a position" (1999: 142), implying a predetermined ideological 
standpoint. The question then arises of what extent a particular theme is imposed on a 
text, and why these themes are imposed. What is the ideology underpinning these 
themes? 
No matter how much we talk as if themes were objects we found 
present in, or positioned by, a text, this critique maintains that themes are 
actually patterns that we always impose on a text ... No matter how much we 
claim to have found objective evidence of one or another theme present in one 
or another text, the constitutive elements of that 'theme' have already been 
politically in place, i.e., posited, before we made the blind move of 
recognising it. (Delany 1999: 142) 
An important component of deconstruction is to maintain an "alert and severe 
analytical stance" toward themes (Delany 1999: 142), particularly while dissolving 
such binary oppositions as those cited above. This is because of the possibility that, 
while deconstructing a hierarchy such as male/female, it may be simply inverted 
instead of being properly dismantled. 
. . . the reversal of the hierarchy can only be an interim move to highlight the 
positionality under (over?) the content. But when the hierarchy fixes in its 
reversed form - which all too frequently happens - nothing changes in the 
oppositional structure's characteristic organisation. (Delany 1999:145) 
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Indeed, this becomes one of the survival strategies of such hierarchies: 
inversion enables them "to recoup themselves and heal themselves against various 
attacks" (1999: 145). Therefore deconstruction must involve depositioning without 
any attendant repositioning. Delany explains that "deconstruction sets the oppositional 
terms in motion - and retains its force only as long as the terms remain in motion" 
(1999:146). This concept of 'motion' or 'play' is the engine of deconstruction, and 
becomes particularly relevant when deconstruction itself is the subject of analysis, and 
is transformed from an analytical process to a thematic object (Delany 1999:146). The 
word 'object' has to be used with caution, as deconstruction is more a process or 
dialogue than a thematic unity: 
We are not defining our object of inquiry here because it is not an 
object; it is a vast and sprawling debate (or, better, a collection of debates), a 
great and often exciting dialogue, a wrangle between many voices, many 
writers .... (Delany 1999: 178) 
These "many writers" are, of course, unique individuals, all joining their 
/ 
voices to the dialogue of deconstruction. It can be argued that the individual is an 
example of a totalising theme, a will to mastery over a singular identity. But 
deconstruction has revealed that the constitutive elements of the individual function 
together to produce something greater than the sum of its parts. The individual is not 
an entity contained within the boundary of a body, but a web of interrelations linking 
it to the social matrix. The materiality of the body in its physical sense, and its 
immateriality in terms of the web of power relations of which it is the centre, create a 
complex dialogue that effectively deconstructs the individual as a totalising 
phenomenon. Delany comments: 
I am the sweeping tapestry of my sensory and bodily perceptions. I am their 
linguistic reduction and abstraction, delayed and deferred till they form a 
wholly different order, called my thought. I am, at the behest and prompting of 
all these, my memory - which forms still another order. I am the emotions that 
hold them together. Webbing the four, and finally, I am the flux and filigree of 
desire around them all. 15 
Perhaps, though, I am only the interpretation of all of them - that I call 
reality. (Do I write with my pen? Does another daemon hold the pen and write 
15 As Walt Whitman writes in Song of Myself: 
I celebrate myself, and sing myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. (Whitman 1994: 27) 
239 
with it?) Am I the sexual surge and ebb that cannot quite be covered by any of 
the above, but that impinge on all the others and often drown them? What of 
the bodily apparati in general, as they fall, pleasingly or painfully, into the net 
of myself? I am always an animal excess to the intellectual system that tries to 
construct me. I am always a conscious sensibility in excess of the animal 
construction that is I. And that is why I am another, why my identity is always 
other than 1. 16 (1996:150) 
The interplay between animality and intellectuality is important to Delany, as 
indicated by the Foucault quote that prefaces The Mad Man: "The bios philosophicus 
is the animality of being human, renewed as a challenge, practiced as an exercise -
and thrown in the face of others as a scandal". When Delany states that his identity "is 
always other than I", he is referring to the web of power relations in which he is 
enmeshed, and the thematic structures woven out of these strands, such as the 
totalising statement that he is a gay, black SF writer. This statement is totalising in 
that it is meant to provide a definitional endpoint cutting off any further debate or 
discourse - containing a total thematic summation. But the concept of 'play' favoured 
by deconstruction has, as one of its aims (one certainly cannot claim a 'main' aim) the 
construction of new models, and the depositioning (as opposed to inversion) of old 
ones, in a constant process, or shimmer, of discourse: 
Nothing we look at is ever seen without some shift and flicker - that constant 
flaking of vision which we take as imperfections of the eye or simply the 
instability of attention itself; and we ignore this illusory screen for the solid 
reality behind it. But the solid reality is the illusion; the shift and flicker is all 
there is. (Delany 1996: 254) 
What, then, is the new model that can be constructed from the shift and flicker 
of discourse, bearing in mind that it has to go beyond simply revising an old model 
and rearranging or adjusting its elements? What is involved in a 'radical' position, as 
opposed to a conservative one - that is, one maintains the status quo of the current 
model? In terms of fiction, how can one progress beyond cliche and formula, 
especially in a genre such as SF, which is largely predicated on cliche and formula? 
. . . it is the combination of fulfilling and violating structural expectations that 
makes fiction not just a craft, but an art. If there is a distinction to be made 
between good art and art that we think of as great, often it lies in the area of 
what structural expectations to violate. But the violation of expectations very 
16 Dr Deirdre Byrne scribbled the following note after this: "Marginal comment. Only a man could 
oppose mind and body like this!" 
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quickly, over a period often or fifteen years, can tum into an expectation itself 
.... (Delany 1999:457) 
The fulcrum of this shift and flicker between expectation and violation is the 
deconstructive notion of play as the lubricant of discourse, allowing meaning to slip 
and slide: 
Play - play both in the sense of the slippages and imperfect fits that occur in 
both machines and in language, and in the sense of joy and playfulness, 
jouissance if you prefer, that leads the writer to let the language write him or 
her into meaning - and even a play of styles that has led more than one critic 
to comment that any truly intellectual performance is necessarily a comic act. 
(Delany 1999:184). 
This sense of play is clearly evident in Delany's work, from the linguistic puzzle of an 
alien language that lacks the concept of the individual in Babel-17, the joumal-
within-a-novel circularity of Dhalgren, and the metafictional framing appendices of 
Triton, to the disclaimer of The Mad Man, and the gender inversions of Stars. 'Play' 
is also very much part of The Motion of Light of Water, where it produces the 
shimmer and flicker of discourse. Instead of illuminating Delany, and providing a 
capstone to his career and persona, it is refracted and recomplicated into this dazzling 
shimmer. What this 'shimmer' does is help to avoid reductionism in attempting to 
come to grips with Delany - that is, reducing him to the 'defining' elements of being 
a black, gay SF writer, as if this were the total sum of his identity. 
A good metaphor to illustrate this elusive quality of play, which infuses the 
language that writes the writer into being, is provided by the section entitled 'A 
Dragon Hunt' from Stars in my Pocket, depicting Marq Dyeth and Rat Korga on a 
'hunting trip'. Generic convention immediately lets the reader conceive of the classic 
British fox-and-hound scenario. But while Delany initially plays along with this 
convention, he contrasts it with details that dislocate the stereotype, and help dissolve 
the boundaries that anchor it in a particular discourse. In other words, he frees it so 
that play can suffuse the elements and cause them to shimmer or flicker. 
'Well, while you are hunting dragons, I shall be hunting you. And 
maybe when we have finished our day, we can sing of our catch to one 
another.' Her paws came down on the warm soil. 'Remember, young hunter, 
as you aim through the sights and sails of your bow, I'll have you centred 
through my sights and sails.' (Delany l 984b:327) 
241 
The exotic phrase 'hunting dragons' takes on a more ominous note when Rat 
Korga is informed that he will be hunted at the same time, harking back to his time on 
Rhyonon when he was a slave and had similar treatment meted out to him. Korga 
infers from this that the Old Hunter is an avowed enemy, but Marq Dyeth inverts this 
assumption: 
'She's our best friend in the world ... the Old Hunter, and hunters like 
her, are the reason that in some of the southern geosectors, evelmi and humans 
can live as one society.' (Delany 1986:328) 
The Old Hunter's interest in the difference between evelmi and human, as evinced by 
her interest in Korga, forms the interface between the two opposing cultures. 
Therefore the predatory connotations of the word 'hunt' are transformed into the 
active assimilation of difference. When Korga finally settles the crosshairs of his bow 
on a dragon in flight, and pulls the trigger, he does not unleash death or destruction -
the judgement of a superior culture on what it deems to be lesser animals - but 
'merges' with the dragon, and shares its own perception of itself. 17 Korga describes 
this startling wrench in awareness as 'throwing himself through himself (1986:333), 
suggesting that he has transgressed his own bodily boundary, and entered the 
ontological domain of another being. 
'I was a dragon ... ' he said, voiceless enough for a whisper. 'I was a 
dragon? ... I was a dragon! It was as if, for a moment, for a year, I was a 
dragon myself.' (Delany 1986:336) 
Korga is unable to tell exactly how long the experience lasted, but is told it 
was probably no more than two to three seconds. Thus the temporality of the 
experience is in stark contrast to its totality. The Old Hunter equates the experience to 
reading a book, and informs Korga that he is obliged to 'sing of his catch' (1986:33). 
Marq Dyeth is worried that Korga, being unable to convey the full panoply of the 
experience, will upset some of the alien customs and practices that border this 
particular social interchange, but Korga shows a natural adaptability and willingness 
to learn. Marq Dyeth is forced to revise his view ofKorga: 
17 Delany explains the process: "'The radar-bow hooks on to a pretty complete mapping of the dragon's 
cerebral responses and, after a lot of translation, plays it back on your own cerebral surface'" 
(1986:33). In the best SF tradition, this is just vague and pseudo-scientific enough to seem 
authoritative. 
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... I realised that most of my fears for the stranger loose in the alien land were 
unnecessary. Whether he observed the proper information on his own, picked 
it up by whatever method from me, or figured it out on his fingers, whatever 
labour he laid to the task, the transition to my home world seemed for him no 
more than the rushed flights of gnats returning to the surface of some oil slick, 
perturbed perhaps because of the shifts in its rainbow colours, but still 
recognising the basic scents they had left it with when they had abandoned it 
in the morning. (Delany 1986:346-347) 
The surface of the oil slick and its rainbow colours is reminiscent of the 
motion of light in water, and the shimmer or flicker of discourse. A further interesting 
feature of the dragon 'hunt' is the Old Hunter's description of it as reading a book. 
The sharp twist of cognitive dissonance that Korga experiences when he briefly 
'becomes' the dragon seems an unlikely analogy for the reading process, but perhaps 
in SF terms what is meant is that 'alien' experiences such as the flight of a dragon can 
be 'shared' by the reader as communicated by the author. One can broaden the scope 
of this as a function of the genre: to acclimatise the reader to the shock of the new; to 
make him or her value the concept of difference, and the crucial role it plays in 
language, society and identity. 
Becoming familiar with the alien or the strange means that eventually it will 
lose its differentiating quality. For example, each time Delany is labelled as a gay, 
black SF writer it reduces the very impact of that which distinguishes him from the 
mainstream or normative. Robert Reid-Pharr argues that "the paradox for the 
contemporary critic . . . is that, just as the diversity underlying the label Black, Gay 
Man becomes increasingly evident, the desire to demonstrate and recognise that 
difference lessens" (1994:356). This is where difference and play are so crucial, for 
their rejuvenating as well as their deconstructive properties. Another interesting 
aspect of the dragon 'hunt' in Stars is the fact that these are creatures of appetite and 
desire, reminding one of the 'game' that the Winged Ones play with Kire at the end of 
They Fly at <;iron: 
. . . the nerve endings concentrated in the flesh below the joint of wing and 
body is of the same order as those in the human genitals or the lining of the 
human ear: the stimulation of rushing air excites them - the sensation dying at 
precisely the rate (established by ages of evolution) to make the wings flap 
enough for lift-off. A permanent around-the-body high? Fly! I flew. (Delany 
1986:334) 
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The "gentle bodily urgmg towards certain kinds of motion" seems to result in 
behaviour that, to human eyes, is "like a creature satisfying a ravenous appetite" 
(1986:335). Appetite is an important part of both desire and discourse: 
The body's social function, like the social function of art, or education, 
is largely a discourse. And that side of the discourse that concerns sex, desire, 
and the anxieties connected with them both is ravenously appetitive. (Delany 
1992:4) 
In The Mad Man, Delany writes of 'pomotopia', which he defines as "simply the 
'sexual place' - the place where all can become (apocalyptically) sexual" (1999: 133). 
The apocalypse refers to 'ekpyrosis', that Heraclitean fire that quenches all 
differentiation, or the heterotopia that desiccates language and unbinds it from its 
ensnaring web of unlimited semiosis, turning the world into a tabula rasa. Such a 
totalising conflagration is necessary - though this brings one back to the danger of 
thematics as the representative of hierarchy and authoritarianism - if only to remind 
one that "desire lies like a bodily boundary between the everyday and the 
unspeakable", and that ''the unspeakable is always in the column you are not reading" 
(Delany 1999:65). Delany explains in a (non-) summary of his oeuvre: 
What I have done here is told you a story, a fiction, several fictions in 
fact. I've given them a more or less systematic presentation, held together by 
certain themes . . . which is to say that they will serve us only if we realise they 
are too simple. Too many things have been left out, too many questions 
remain, not enough history and socially stabilising institutions have been 
examined .... (Delany 1999:185) 
In the skies overhead, dragons yearn toward motion. Behind us in the margin 
of the margin, which has no centre, stands the Author, multiply refracted, breathing 
language as if it were air, writing us and the world into being. Gently Delany puts his 
hands on our shoulders, guiding the crosshairs as we aim at the sky. In a single fluid 
motion that ripples like light through water, we are in flight. 
And for one glorious instant, we are unbounded. 
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